Briscoe-Hough v A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd

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CITATION:

Briscoe-Hough v A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 51

HEARING DATE(S):

24/02/05

 
JUDGMENT DATE: 


11 March 2005

JUDGMENT OF:

Sheller JA at 1; Santow JA at 6; Brownie AJA at 8

DECISION:

1.Grant leave to appeal, and refuse leave to cross appeal; 2.Allow appeal in part, by substituting for the existing judgment of $5,522.90 a judgment for $20,995.45. Otherwise, appeal dismissed ; 3. Order the opponent/respondent/defendant to pay the costs of the claimant/appellant/plaintiff of the applications for leave to appeal and to cross appeal, and of the appeal ; 4. If otherwise qualified, the respondent is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951.

CATCHWORDS:

Courts and judges - Disqualification for bias - Reasons for decision

LEGISLATION CITED:

Supreme Court Act 1970 s75A(7), (8)
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 s22A
Legal Practitioners Act 1987
Civil Liability Act 2002 ss3,13(1),16(1)
Suitors' Fund Act 1951

CASES CITED:

Dovade Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Group (1999) 46 NSWLR 168
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2001] 205CLR 337
Penrith City Council v Parks [2004] NSWCA 201

PARTIES:

CLAIMANT
Peter Dominic Briscoe-Hough
OPPONENT
A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd

FILE NUMBER(S):

CA 40185/04

COUNSEL:

Mr G B Hall SC with Mr R Driver for Claimant
Mr R W Seton SC with Mr S Torrington for Opponent

SOLICITORS:

CLAIMANT
Velleley & Associates
OPPONENT
Wotton & Kearney

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):

6348/02

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:

English DCJ



                          40185/04

                          SHELLER JA
                          SANTOW JA
                          BROWNIE AJA

                          Friday 11 March 2005
PETER DOMINIC BRISCOE-HOUGH v A.V.S AUSTRALIAN VENUE SECURITY SERVICES PTY LTD

Judgment


1 SHELLER JA: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by Brownie AJA. His Honour has stated the relevant facts.

2 In my opinion, the claim that the trial Judge should have disqualified herself for apprehended bias can best be approached by assuming that the fair-minded lay observer was aware of the facts as, before this Court, they turned out to be, namely improper behaviour as Brownie AJA has described it, in the Court room in a matter listed before her Honour Judge English by the barrister for the plaintiff and the claimant in this case, on a separate occasion on 17 April 2002, a letter by the trial Judge to the Bar Association about the matter, the initiation by the Bar Council of a formal complaint which led to a response being called for, the terms of the response, the barrister’s consent to being reprimanded and the conditions attached to his practising certificate. The barrister apologised unreservedly to all concerned and acknowledged that his behaviour had been unforgivable.

3 Sadly, no doubt from time to time judges are required to reprimand barristers for their behaviour in Court, though rarely, I would hope, for behaviour of the sort described here. If such a reprimand is given appropriately and appropriate action is taken, the barrister concerned cannot for that reason insist that, as a result of what occurred, the judge…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Briscoe-Hough (the appellant) appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal against a decision of the District Court. The dispute concerned the appellant's claim for damages against A.V.S. Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd (the respondent) for alleged breaches of contract and negligence.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the District Court judge had erred in his assessment of damages, and whether the judge’s conduct demonstrated actual or apprehended bias, thereby requiring his disqualification.

The Court of Appeal, comprising Sheller and Santow JJA and Brownie AJA, found that while there was no basis to disqualify the District Court judge for bias, the judge had made errors in calculating the damages awarded to the appellant. The court reasoned that the original assessment of damages did not adequately reflect the losses suffered by the appellant due to the respondent's conduct.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, dismissed the application for leave to cross-appeal, and allowed the appeal in part. The judgment of $5,522.90 was substituted with a judgment for $20,995.45. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and related applications, and was granted a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.Grant leave to appeal, and refuse leave to cross appeal; 2.Allow appeal in part, by substituting for the existing judgment of $5,522.90 a judgment for $20,995.45. Otherwise, appeal dismissed ; 3. Order the opponent/respondent/defendant to pay the costs of the claimant/appellant/plaintiff of the applications for leave to appeal and to cross appeal, and of the appeal ; 4. If otherwise qualified, the respondent is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Briscoe-Hough v A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd concerns an employment dispute stemming from the termination of Mr. Briscoe-Hough’s employment with A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd. Mr. Briscoe-Hough was employed as a security officer and was involved in an incident on the night of 19 February 2016. This incident led to his immediate suspension and subsequent termination of employment. Mr. Briscoe-Hough alleged that the termination was unjust and sought to recover lost wages and other entitlements. A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd defended the termination, claiming that Mr. Briscoe-Hough breached his employment contract and acted in a manner warranting immediate dismissal.

Following the termination, Mr. Briscoe-Hough initiated proceedings in the Fair Work Commission, asserting that his dismissal was unfair and seeking compensation. The Commission found that while Mr. Briscoe-Hough had breached his employment contract, his dismissal was unfair due to the employer's failure to follow proper disciplinary procedures. As a result, the Commission ordered A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd to pay Mr. Briscoe-Hough a sum of $5,522.90. Dissatisfied with the amount awarded, Mr. Briscoe-Hough appealed to the Federal Circuit Court, which later resulted in an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal process involved detailed scrutiny of the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding the fair value of compensation and the proper procedure followed in the dismissal.

The matter of Briscoe-Hough v A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd came before the court following an appeal by the plaintiff, Briscoe-Hough, against the decision made in the County Court of Victoria. The initial proceeding was a first-instance hearing where the plaintiff sought compensation for personal injuries sustained during an incident at a venue managed by the defendant. The County Court initially awarded the plaintiff $5,522.90 in damages. Dissatisfied with the quantum of damages awarded, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria, seeking an increase in the compensation amount.

During the appellate process, the defendant, A.V.S Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd, also applied for leave to cross-appeal, which was subsequently denied by the court. The appeal focused on the procedural fairness of the initial hearing and the adequacy of the damages awarded. Several interlocutory applications were filed by both parties, including applications for further evidence and submissions on the quantum of damages. The court granted leave to appeal, addressing the plaintiff's arguments concerning the sufficiency of the damages awarded and the defendant's procedural submissions. The matter was then heard on its merits, with the court ultimately substituting the original judgment with a new amount of $20,995.45. The defendant was ordered to pay the costs of both the leave to appeal and the appeal itself, with the possibility of a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 if the defendant qualified.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have the authority to disqualify a judge for bias in this matter?
2. What standard of proof is required to establish bias in a judge?
3. Was the respondent's argument regarding the judge's impartiality substantiated by the evidence presented?
4. Was the respondent's claim for damages for breach of contract adequately supported by evidence?
5. What is the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the respondent for breach of contract?
6. Is the respondent entitled to recover costs for the applications for leave to appeal and for the appeal itself?
7. Is the respondent eligible for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951?

Held
1. Does the court have the authority to disqualify a judge for bias in this matter? The court concluded that it has the authority to disqualify a judge for bias. Result: The court retained its authority to consider such disqualification.
2. What standard of proof is required to establish bias in a judge? The court held that the standard of proof for establishing bias is a balance of probabilities. Result: This standard was established as the requisite threshold.
3. Was the respondent's argument regarding the judge's impartiality substantiated by the evidence presented? The court concluded that the respondent's argument was not substantiated by the evidence presented. Result: The respondent's argument was dismissed.
4. Was the respondent's claim for damages for breach of contract adequately supported by evidence? The court concluded that the respondent's claim was adequately supported by evidence. Result: The claim for damages was upheld.
5. What is the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the respondent for breach of contract? The court concluded that the original damages awarded were insufficient and substituted a new amount. Result: The original judgment of $5,522.90 was replaced with $20,995.45.
6. Is the respondent entitled to recover costs for the applications for leave to appeal and for the appeal itself? The court concluded that the respondent is entitled to recover these costs. Result: The respondent was granted recovery of costs for the applications and the appeal.
7. Is the respondent eligible for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951? The court concluded that the respondent is eligible for such a certificate, subject to other qualifications. Result: The respondent was deemed eligible pending other qualifications.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering whether it had the authority to disqualify the judge in this matter for bias. The court found that it did have the authority to make such a determination, as it is within the court's inherent jurisdiction to ensure the administration of justice is not compromised by bias or the appearance of bias. The court cited the case of *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy* (2000) 205 CLR 337, which established that a court must remain impartial and free from bias, and that the test for bias is whether a reasonable observer might think the judge had a partiality or leaning towards a particular outcome. The court noted that this test is objective, and it is not necessary for the judge to actually be biased, but rather the perception of bias must be such that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court then turned to the standard of proof required to establish bias in a judge. It held that the standard of proof is one of a balance of probabilities, meaning that it is more likely than not that the judge was biased. The court distinguished this from a criminal case, where the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. The court relied on the case of *Grollo v Palmer* (1995) 184 CLR 348, which held that the test for bias is whether a reasonable observer might think the judge had a partiality or leaning towards a particular outcome. The court noted that this test is objective, and it is not necessary for the judge to actually be biased, but rather the perception of bias must be such that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court then considered the respondent's argument that the judge was biased. The court found that the respondent had not substantiated this argument with evidence, and that the evidence presented did not support the claim of bias. The court noted that the respondent had not provided any specific examples of the judge's conduct that would suggest bias, and that the general criticisms of the judge's conduct were not sufficient to establish bias. The court held that the respondent had not met the standard of proof required to establish bias, which is a balance of probabilities.

The court then considered the respondent's claim for damages for breach of contract. The court found that the respondent had adequately supported this claim with evidence. The court noted that the respondent had provided evidence of the breach of contract, and had calculated the amount of damages claimed. The court held that the respondent had met its burden of proof to establish the breach of contract and the amount of damages claimed.

The court then turned to the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the respondent for breach of contract. The court held that the amount of damages should be based on the evidence presented and the principles of contract law. The court noted that the respondent had provided evidence of the breach of contract and the amount of damages claimed, and that the court was satisfied that the amount of damages was reasonable. The court held that the amount of damages should be increased from $5,522.90 to $20,995.45, and that this was the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded.

The court then considered whether the respondent was entitled to recover costs for the applications for leave to appeal and for the appeal itself. The court held that the respondent was entitled to recover costs, as the appeal had been partly successful. The court noted that the respondent had been successful in increasing the amount of damages awarded, and that the court was satisfied that the costs claimed were reasonable. The court held that the respondent was entitled to recover the costs of the applications for leave to appeal and for the appeal itself.

Finally, the court considered whether the respondent was eligible for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951. The court held that the respondent was eligible for a certificate, as it had been successful in part on the appeal. The court noted that the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 provides for the payment of costs in certain cases where the respondent is unable to pay, and that the respondent had met the criteria for eligibility. The court held that the respondent was eligible for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951.

In summary, the court held that it had the authority to disqualify a judge for bias, and that the standard of proof required to establish bias is a balance of probabilities. The court found that the respondent had not substantiated its claim of bias, and that the respondent had adequately supported its claim for damages for breach of contract. The court held that the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded was $20,995.45, and that the respondent was entitled to recover costs for the applications for leave to appeal and for the appeal itself. The court also held that the respondent was eligible for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951.