Brisbane City Council v Newton

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[2014] QCA 337

COURT OF APPEAL

HOLMES JA

Appeal No 8870 of 2014
QCAT No 152 of 2014

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL  Applicant

v

CHRISTOPHER GRAEME NEWTON  Respondent

BRISBANE

WEDNESDAY, 17 DECEMBER 2014

HER HONOUR:  Mr Christopher Newton has sought leave to appeal a decision of the Appeal Division of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal.  (I’ll refer to Mr Newton from here on as the applicant, simply to distinguish him from Mr Newton of Queen’s Counsel who appeared for the Brisbane City Council on its application.)  The Appeal Division of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal had refused the applicant’s application for leave to appeal from a first instance tribunal decision concerning his tenancy of a Council property.

The respondent to his application in the Tribunal, the Brisbane City Council, seeks an order striking out his application for leave. It says that, although sitting as a single Judge, I have jurisdiction to make such an order under rule 767(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which enables a single Judge of Appeal to exercise the Court’s power in “an application in a civil proceeding for leave to appeal”, and also pursuant to section 44(2)(a) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act, which empowers a Judge of Appeal to exercise the Court’s power to make an order concerning the institution of an appeal.

The Council has referred to ASIC v Neolido Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 266, in which reference was made to McPherson JA’s having refused an application for leave to appeal, sitting alone, under rule 767, and to my decision in McElligott v McElligott [2014] QCA 54, striking out a notice of appeal under section 44(2).

The grounds on which the Council seeks to have the application for leave struck out are that it’s improperly instituted, in that it’s plain the applicant means the appeal itself to involve the re-agitation of factual questions, including unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, although under section 150(3)(a) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, leave to appeal can only be given on questions of law; that the applicant has no prospects of success in the proposed appeal; and that there is no utility in the appeal, because the Council has already retaken possession of the property and substantially demolished the dwelling house on it.

I have some concerns, which I’ve explored with counsel, as to whether the reference in rule 767(b) to “an application in a civil proceeding for leave to appeal” extends to an application which arises out of proceedings in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Section 3(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules makes the rules applicable to civil proceedings in the Magistrates, District and Supreme Court, and the rules dealing with the commencement and carriage of proceedings refer to proceedings commenced in those courts.

On one view, the expression in rule 767(b) would seem to envisage an application which arises from an existing proceeding in the District or Supreme Court. There is also the…

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Case
[2014] QCA 337
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brisbane City Council v Newton, the applicant, Mr Christopher Graeme Newton, sought leave to appeal a decision of the Appeal Division of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal concerning his tenancy of a property owned by the Brisbane City Council. The Brisbane City Council opposed the application for leave to appeal, contending that it was improperly instituted and devoid of merit. The central legal issue before the court was whether the single judge of the Court of Appeal had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for leave to appeal and, if so, whether the application should be struck out on the grounds of being improperly instituted and lacking prospects of success.

The court considered whether the single judge had jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to appeal, given that the appeal arose from proceedings in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. While the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules and the Supreme Court of Queensland Act provided for a single judge to exercise jurisdiction in certain circumstances, the court was cautious about extending this jurisdiction to matters arising from the Tribunal. However, the court acknowledged that the rules and acts could be interpreted to encompass such matters. The court also examined whether the application was properly instituted, noting that although some of the grounds for appeal seemed to involve factual disputes, others appeared to raise questions of law. The court ultimately concluded that it was not appropriate to determine the merits of the application as a single judge and decided to adjourn both the application for leave to appeal and the application to strike it out to be heard by a bench of three judges.

In conclusion, the court decided to reserve its ruling on the costs of the application and adjourned the matter for further hearing by a bench of three judges of the Court of Appeal. The court did not strike out the application for leave to appeal at that stage but instead opted to follow the usual practice of hearing such applications with a bench of three judges.

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