Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell & Anor [2020] QCA 181

PARTIES:

BRISBANE CITY CHILD CARE PTY LTD
ACN 106 662 337
(applicant)
v
KYLIE KADELL IN HER CAPACITY AS DELEGATE OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD MANAGER, METROPOLITAN REGION
- METRO NORTH DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent)
TONY COOK, REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 13933 of 2019
SC No 11535 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave/Judicial Review

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 19 November 2019 (Dalton J)

DELIVERED ON:

1 September 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 May 2020

JUDGES:

Mullins JA, Ryan and Wilson JJ

ORDERS:

1.   Special leave to adduce the further evidence of the affidavit of Mr Buck sworn on 16 March 2020 refused with costs.

2.   Application for leave to appeal granted.

3.   Appeal allowed.

4.   Set aside the orders made by the primary judge on 19 November 2019.

5.   The further amended application for a statutory order for review and application to review filed on 23 July 2019 is remitted to the Trial Division for hearing on the merits.

6.   The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal, the appeal and the appearances before the primary judge on 18 and 19 November 2019, but otherwise the costs of the proceeding below are reserved.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SETTING ASIDE – where the applicant owned and operated a child care centre – where the applicant entered into a contract to sell the child care centre to a third party – where the Regulatory Authority issued the required consent to the transfer of the service approval for the child care centre under the Education and Care Services National Law (Queensland) on conditions – where the third party withdrew from the purchase due to the conditions – where the applicant did not accept that the third party was entitled to terminate the contract – where the Authority repealed its decision to issue the consent to the transfer of the service approval – where the applicant sought a declaration that the imposition of the conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval was beyond power – where the primary judge considered it inappropriate to grant the relief that the applicant sought on the basis of lack of utility, the third party was not a party to the proceeding and the applicant was seeking an advisory opinion – where the applicant’s proceeding was summarily dismissed under s 48(1)(a) Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) on the motion of the primary judge – whether it was inappropriate for the proceeding to continue – whether the primary judge erred in summarily dismissing the proceeding

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL…

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Details
Case
[2020] QCA 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell involves the applicant, who owned and operated a child care centre, seeking a declaration that the imposition of conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval for the child care centre was beyond power. The dispute arose when the Regulatory Authority imposed conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval, which the applicant claimed were beyond power. The applicant sought to sell the child care centre to a third party, but the third party withdrew from the purchase due to the conditions imposed by the Regulatory Authority. The primary judge dismissed the applicant's proceeding for judicial review on the ground that it was inappropriate for the proceeding to continue. The applicant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, seeking leave to appeal and to adduce further evidence.

The legal issues before the court were whether it was appropriate for the proceeding to continue, whether the primary judge erred in summarily dismissing the proceeding, and whether the applicant was required to show a substantial injustice or important question of law before leave to appeal would be granted. The court considered the meaning of the phrase "inappropriate" in s 48(1)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court also considered whether special leave should be given in respect of evidence that was obtainable with reasonable diligence for the purpose of the hearing before the primary judge.

The court found that the decision of the primary judge to summarily dismiss the proceeding was in error, as there was utility for the applicant in obtaining the narrower declaration in circumstances where it still wished to sell the child care centre. The court found that the decision arose from the court’s own motion and with little notice, and resulted in the summary dismissal of the application for inutility, without considering the merits. The court found that the questions that arise on the proposed appeal are substantive and not merely procedural, and that there is only limited judicial direction on the meaning of the phrase “inappropriate” in s 48(1)(a) of the Act which is important public interest legislation. The court found that leave to appeal should be granted, and that special leave to adduce further evidence should be refused with costs. The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside. The further amended application for a statutory order for review and application to review was remitted to the Trial Division for hearing on the merits.

In summary, the court found that the primary judge erred in summarily dismissing the proceeding, and that leave to appeal should be granted. The court found that the appeal was allowed, and that the orders made by the primary judge were set aside. The further amended application for a statutory order for review and application to review was remitted to the Trial Division for hearing on the merits. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal, the appeal and the appearances before the primary judge on 18 and 19 November 2019, but otherwise the costs of the proceeding below were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Special leave to adduce the further evidence of the affidavit of Mr Buck sworn on 16 March 2020 refused with costs.

2. Application for leave to appeal granted.

3. Appeal allowed.

4. Set aside the orders made by the primary judge on 19 November 2019.

5. The further amended application for a statutory order for review and application to review filed on 23 July 2019 is remitted to the Trial Division for hearing on the merits.

6. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal, the appeal and the appearances before the primary judge on 18 and 19 November 2019, but otherwise the costs of the proceeding below are reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd (the applicant) owned and operated a child care centre. The applicant entered into a contract to sell the child care centre to a third party, Affinity. The Education and Care Services National Law (Queensland) required the Regulatory Authority to issue consent to the transfer of the service approval for the child care centre. The Authority issued the consent on certain conditions, which Affinity declined to accept. Consequently, Affinity withdrew from the purchase agreement. The applicant did not accept that Affinity was entitled to terminate the contract and sought a declaration that the imposition of the conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval was beyond power. The Authority later repealed its decision to issue the consent on the conditions. The applicant sought a declaration that the imposition of the conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval was beyond power. The primary judge considered it inappropriate to grant the relief sought by the applicant on the basis of lack of utility, the absence of Affinity as a party, and the applicant seeking an advisory opinion. The primary judge summarily dismissed the applicant's proceeding under s 48(1)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).

The applicant sought a declaration that the imposition of the conditions on the consent to the transfer of the service approval was beyond power. The primary judge summarily dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis that it was inappropriate to continue the proceeding under s 48(1)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). The applicant appealed the primary judge's decision and sought leave to do so under s 48(5) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). The applicant also sought special leave to adduce further evidence not previously available or considered by the primary judge. The respondents opposed the application for special leave to adduce further evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant relies on the following matters for seeking leave to appeal:(a)the decision was in error, as there was utility for the applicant in obtaining the narrower declaration in circumstances where it still wished to sell the child care centre and the absence of Affinity did not justify a conclusion that it was inappropriate to continue the proceeding;(b)the decision arose from the court’s own motion and with little notice and resulted in the summary dismissal of the application for inutility, without considering the merits;(c)the first decision of the first respondent was a substantial inhibition to the applicant’s right to deal with its commercial interests;(d)the questions that arise on the proposed appeal are substantive and not merely procedural;(e)there is only limited judicial direction on the meaning of the phrase “inappropriate” in s 48(1)(a) of the Act which is important public interest legislation;(f)the appeal considers, in part, the operation of the National Law relating to education and child care services.Application for special leave to adduce further evidence For the purpose of the application for leave to appeal, the appellant seeks to rely on the affidavit of its sole director, Mr Buck, sworn on 16 March 2020. After the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review, Mr Buck did a search of the national register of child care service approvals which is on the website of the Australian Children’s Education and Care Quality Authority (ACECQA). Mr Buck recorded, in paragraph 4 of his affidavit, the description of ACECQA from its website as “an independent national authority that assists governments in administering the National Quality Framework for the education and care of children” and “in monitoring and promoting the application of the Education and Care Services National Law”. Mr Buck exhibits the results of searches he downloaded from the ACECQA website of 23 child care centres in Queensland which set out the conditions on the service approval, all of which contained a condition relevant to fire safety that was not identical to condition 1 of the second conditions, but did provide for an expert report to be obtained at least annually in respect of one rehearsal of emergency and evacuation procedures. Mr Buck accepts that the further evidence was available from the ACECQA website prior to the hearing before the primary judge, but deposes that the relevance of the further evidence was not apparent to the applicant until the primary judge raised and then summarily dismissed the application for judicial review. The further evidence is relied on by the applicant to support the contention that it was highly likely that the Authority would seek to impose the same or similar conditions as the second conditions, if the applicant sold the child care centre in the future. The respondents oppose special leave being given in respect of that further evidence. Apart from the question of whether special leave should be given in respect of evidence that was obtainable with reasonable diligence for the purpose of the hearing before the primary judge, the respondents submit that the further evidence would not have had any influence on the result of the summary dismissal, because it was evidence of conditions which had been placed upon existing service approvals granted to other child care centres and was not evidence of conditions imposed upon the consent to the proposed transfer of a service approval of a child care centre.

Decision

Reasons for decision

These authorities suggest that the circumstances in which the power should be exercised to dismiss summarily an application under the Act on the ground set out in s 48(1)(a) should not be read down by reference to paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of s 48(1). Instead s 48(1)(a) should operate fully according to its terms which makes it subject only to the constraint that the inappropriateness relates either to the continuation of the proceeding or the granting of the application. Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of s 48(1) are more likely to apply where there is unlikely to be any error demonstrated on the part of the decision-maker, although lack of any error is not an essential pre-condition to the application of those paragraphs. Because of the breadth of the power under s 48(1)(a), that provision is not confined to cases where error is demonstrated. The authorities show that s 48(1)(a) can be used, however, even if error on the part of the decision-maker could be shown, where there is good reason for otherwise not allowing the proceeding to continue or not granting the relief sought. That may include that no practical consequences would flow from the outcome or there is an alternative practicable or preferable means for addressing an applicant’s complaint which may not fall strictly within s 12 or s 13 of the Act. As the granting of any relief in respect of an application for judicial review is discretionary, it may be that where the court foresees that in a particular case it would exercise the discretion to refuse the relief, that may also be an appropriate case for summary dismissal under s 48(1)(a). The test of “inappropriate” makes the power under s 48(1)(a) “a broad one”. It is not necessary for the purpose of this application to identify all the categories of cases to which it could apply. It is sufficient to say that it will include the category of case where there may have been an error, but the circumstances in which the decision was made and/or the subsequent events or the circumstances of the parties’ ongoing relationship do not warrant addressing in a proceeding under the Act whether there was error by the decision-maker.Was the decision in error? The decision of the primary judge to dismiss summarily the applicant’s application must be considered in the context that for the purpose of responding to the issue before the primary judge of whether the application should be summarily dismissed under s 48(1)(a) of the Act, the applicant sought to pursue only a declaration in terms that were general in nature about the power of the Authority to impose conditions on a consent to the transfer of a service approval. It was a legitimate concern of the primary judge that the proceeding may not have been properly constituted without the joinder of Affinity as a party. The pursuit of the narrower declaration confined the issue to that which was raised in the material between the applicant and the Authority, namely the nature and the extent of the conditions that the Authority was empowered by the National Law to impose pursuant to s 66(2). Although the applicant was not willing to abandon its right to seek to enforce the contract it had entered into with Affinity, its interest in pursuing declaratory relief pursuant to s 43 of the Act was to ensure the future sale of the child care centre (whether to Affinity or another purchaser) was not impeded by the imposition of conditions on the consent to the transfer that it claimed were beyond power. It was not essential to the resolution of that dispute between the applicant and the Authority for Affinity to be a party to the proceeding. The applicant had made the deliberate choice in bringing the proceeding under the Act against the Authority not to seek relief against, or otherwise join, Affinity in the same proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the applicant's decision to pursue a narrower declaration concerning the power of the Authority to impose conditions on the consent to the transfer of a service approval, despite not joining Affinity as a party to the proceeding. It was noted that the applicant's interest in pursuing declaratory relief was to ensure the future sale of the child care centre was not impeded by the imposition of conditions on the consent to the transfer that it claimed were beyond power. The court held that the applicant had made a deliberate choice in bringing the proceeding under the Act against the Authority, without seeking relief against or joining Affinity in the same proceeding. The court further considered that the summary dismissal of the proceeding was not erroneous, as the applicant's claim was general in nature and did not seek to enforce the contract against Affinity. The court held that the primary judge's decision to summarily dismiss the proceeding was not inappropriate and did not constitute an error. In relation to the granting of leave to appeal, the court determined that the applicant was not required to show a substantial injustice or important question of law, as the circumstances of the case warranted the appeal. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that the power under s 48(1)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) to summarily dismiss an application is broad and can be exercised even if error on the part of the decision-maker could be shown, where there is good reason for otherwise not allowing the proceeding to continue or not granting the relief sought.