JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: BRIGGS -v- WACHS - PILBARA (HEDLAND HEALTH CAMPUS) [2018] WADC 73
CORAM: JUDGE TROY
HEARD: 18 MAY 2018
DELIVERED : 1 JUNE 2018
FILE NO/S: APP 3 of 2018
BETWEEN: DAVID PRESTON BRIGGS
Appellant
AND
WACHS - PILBARA (HEDLAND HEALTH CAMPUS)
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATON SERVICE (WA)
Coram: ARBITRATOR EKANAYAKE
File Number : A 44855 of 2017
Catchwords:
Workers' compensation - Appeal - Error of law - Travel expenses - Proper construction of sch 1 cl 17(1aa), cl 19(3A)
Legislation:
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) s 3L, s 146, sch 1 cl 17, cl 17(1aa), c19, cl 19(3A)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr M J Lourey |
| Respondent | : | Mr J R Ludlow & Mr M J Thickett |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Chapmans Barristers & Solicitors |
| Respondent | : | HWL Ebsworth Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Amos v Brisbane City Council [2018] QCA 11
Bank Officials' Association (SA Branch) v Savings Bank of South Australia (1923) 32 CLR 276; [1923] HCA 25
Blackpool Corporation v Starr Estate Co (1922) 1 AC 27
Goodwin v Phillips [1908] HCA 55; (1908) 7 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566
Perpetual Executors & Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxtion (Cth) (1954) 88 CLR 434
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
JUDGE TROY:
Introduction
The respondent employer employed Mr David Briggs as a registered nurse. In March 2016, Mr Briggs was assaulted at work as a result of which he suffered an injury to his left shoulder. The respondent accepted liability. In February 2017 Mr Briggs drove from South Hedland to Perth and back to see an approved medical specialist, Dr Cordova. Is the respondent obliged to pay his vehicle running expenses, together with meals and accommodation in the sum of $1,996.08?
In order to answer that question it is necessary to determine which clause of sch 1 of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) applies. Mr Briggs contends that cl 19(3A) applies whereas the respondent submits that it is cl 17(1aa).
It is common ground that when Mr Briggs travelled to see Dr Cordova he did so for the purposes of s 93L of the Act, to pursue or preserve a common law entitlement.
Mr Briggs' attendance on Dr Cordova was for evaluation of his degree of permanent whole of person impairment for the purposes of pt IV div 2 subdivision 3. This part includes s 93L.
As is well known, pt IV div 2 of the Act operates as a statutory constraint on the awarding of common law damages against an employer applying to an injury caused by the negligence, or other tort, of the relevant employer. It does…
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- Case
- [2018] WADC 73
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether clause 19(3A) allowed the payment of travel expenses for medical assessments, despite the exclusionary words in clause 17(1aa). The court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including the principle that specific provisions should prevail over more general ones, and that all words in legislation should be given meaning and effect. The court found that clause 17(1aa) was a specific provision that excluded travel expenses, and this exclusion was not negated by the more general provision in clause 19(3A). Therefore, the court upheld the arbitrator's decision that Mr Briggs was not entitled to claim travel expenses under the Act.
The court's decision was based on the plain language of the legislation and the principle that statutory provisions should not be disregarded unless there is a clear intention to do so. The court rejected arguments that clause 19(3A) superseded clause 17(1aa) and that the exclusionary words in clause 17(1aa) should be ignored. The court also did not consider the respondent's alternative submission that the claimed entitlements should not be allowed for other reasons, as the primary issue had already been resolved.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566, Gummow & Hayne JJ noted that while it is a 'large step' to read one statute as abrogated by another, where only one statute is being construed, it is another thing to say that one provision of that statute is 'insusceptible of exercise in certain factual circumstances': [114]. Before I can apply the maxim to my consideration of cl 17(1aa) and cl 19(3A) I must be satisfied that the two statutory provisions under consideration must deal with the same subject matter, and one must be more specific than the other. I am so satisfied. Applying that principle I am satisfied that the arbitrator was correct in concluding that the two provisions can in fact be read together. Although cl 19(3A) expressly contemplates the payment of a worker's travelling expenses where a worker travels in order to have their degree of impairment assessed by an approved medical specialist, there are a number of reasons for such an assessment. Clause 19(3A) provides for travel, meal and lodging expenses for all attendances for the purposes of common law assessments (s 93L). In the latter scenario the position is governed by cl 17(1aa). Clause 17(1aa) provides for entitlements in circumstances where a worker seeks to protect or pursue their common law rights under pt IV of the Act and in doing so expressly excludes travel expenses. Clause 17(1aa) prevails because it is a specific provision relating to s 93L assessments as opposed to a general provision. The approach, urged upon me by Mr Briggs having regard to the overall purpose of the Act is that cl 17(1aa) is no more than a signpost, referring the reader of the Act to cl 19(3A) and that each clause deals discretely with one aspect of expenses. In my view, such a finding could only be reached if the exclusionary words under cl 17(1aa) are ignored. I am not prepared to disregard those plain words. It is a longstanding principle of statutory interpretation that all words in legislation should (where possible) be given meaning and effect: The Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405, 414. In my view the exclusionary words do not apply only to expenses payable under cl 17. I decline to construe the Act so as to conclude that a worker is compensated for medical and other expenses under cl 17(1) whilst, notwithstanding cl 17(1aa), paid the associated travel and other expenses under cl 19, I also reject Mr Briggs' alternative position that if cl 17(1aa) prevails over cl 19(3A), cl 19(3A), which was enacted at a later time must be taken to supersede the exclusionary part of cl 17(1aa) which must therefore be disregarded. If the intention of Parliament was that all travel, meals and lodging expenses would be covered by cl 19, there is no readily understandable reason for the retention of the impugned part cl 17(1aa). I am not satisfied that cl 19(3A) negates or supersedes the last part of cl 17(1aa). The arbitrator was correct in dismissing the appellant's application. Given my finding that cl 19(3A) does not apply to Mr Briggs' case, the respondent's alternative submission that the claimed entitlements should not be allowed in any event, as set out at pars 52 – 62 of its written submissions does not arise for consideration.