SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2016 0217
| JASON BREWER (A PSEUDONYM)[1] | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, KYROU JA and CROUCHER AJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 27 April 2017 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 24 May 2017 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSCA 117 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Brewer] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Meredith, 26 October 2016) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Interlocutory appeal – Trial – Refusal of permanent stay – Indecent assault, rape sexual penetration of a child under 16 – Delay of 28–34 years since alleged offending – Complaint evidence – Death of complaint witnesses – Whether other potentially exculpatory evidence available – No enquiries made – Application for stay premature – Refusal of stay open – Application for leave to appeal refused.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms H Spowart | Victoria Legal Aid |
| For the Crown | Mr G J C Silbert QC with Mr W Stougiannos | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
MAXWELL P
KYROU JA:
Introduction and summary
This is an application for leave to appeal pursuant to s 295(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘CPA’) against an interlocutory decision made by a judge of the County Court refusing to grant a permanent stay of the proceeding or to sever two charges from the indictment.
The interlocutory decision was made by the judge in a pre-trial ruling dated 26 October 2016 (‘Ruling’). On the same day, the judge granted a certificate pursuant to s 295(3)(b) of the CPA to enable the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Ruling.
The applicant has been charged with six charges of indecent assault (charges 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8), one charge of rape (charge 5), one charge of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years of age (charge 6, which is as an alternative to charge 5) and one charge of gross indecency in the presence of a child under 16 years of age (charge 9, which is as an alternative to charge 8).
The offending is alleged to have occurred between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1988. The complainants are the daughter and son of the applicant’s then partner. Charges 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 relate to the female complainant and charges 2 and 3 relate to the male complainant. At the time of the alleged offences, the female complainant was between nine and 15 years of age and the male complainant was between 11 and 17 years of age. The applicant was then between 36 and 42 years of age.
At the time of his arrest for the alleged offences in June 2014, the applicant was 67 years of age, the female complainant was 41 years of age and the male complainant was 43 years of…
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- AGLC
- Brewer (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2017] VSCA 117
- Case
- [2017] VSCA 117
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the delay in bringing the charges was unjust and whether the appellant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced. It also considered whether there were other potentially exculpatory pieces of evidence that had not been explored. The court found that the application for a stay was premature because the appellant had not made inquiries to ascertain whether there were other potentially exculpatory pieces of evidence available. The court held that the trial judge's refusal of the stay was open and, therefore, the application for leave to appeal was refused.
The court determined that the delay in bringing the charges was not so lengthy or unjust as to render the trial unfair. It found that the appellant's right to a fair trial was not prejudiced by the delay. The court also held that the appellant had not made sufficient inquiries to establish whether there were other potentially exculpatory pieces of evidence available. Therefore, the trial judge's refusal of the stay was open. Finally, the court held that the application for leave to appeal was properly refused, as the appeal did not have a reasonable prospect of success.
The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the refusal of the stay was upheld. The court held that the trial judge's decision to refuse the stay was open and that the appeal did not have a reasonable prospect of success.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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