Breakwell v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Breakwell v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1471

Citation: Breakwell v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1471
Appeal from: Breakwell v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] AATA 628
Parties: ALLAN BREAKWELL and BREAKWELL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: SAD 350 of 2015
Judge: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2015
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – taxation liability – capital gains tax – whether applicants entitled to small business CGT concessions – whether loan by a family trust to the trustee should be included in applicants’ maximum net asset value test – whether loan was statute-barred by s 35(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) (LA Act) – effect of s 48 of the LA Act – whether no limitation period applied because an action to recover loan would be an action to recover trust property to which s 32 of the LA Act applied.

Held: loan not statute-barred – objection decision under review affirmed.

Legislation: Administrative Appeal Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 152, 152‑10, 152‑15, 152‑20,
Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) ss 32, 35, 36, 38, 42, 48
Cases cited:

Australian Iron and Steel Limited v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471
Barker v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) [2005] SASC 81; (2005) 91 SASR 167
Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 5
Edmunds v Pickering [2000] SASC 267; (2000) 77 SASR 381
In the matter of Auzhair Supplies Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 1; (2013) 272 FLR 304
Mackay v Peace [2007] QSC 195
Napolitano v Coyle (1977) 15 SASR 559
Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VR 1041
Re Brookers (Aust) Ltd (in liq); Brooker v Pridham (1986) 41 SASR 380
Robinson v Craven (1994) 63 SASR 267
The Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394

Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560

Date of hearing: 13 November 2015
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the Applicants: Cowell Clarke
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms G Walker
Solicitor for the Respondent: ATO Dispute Resolution
Table of Corrections
7 April 2016 In the final sentence of paragraph 41, the word “not” has been inserted between the words “does” and “prescribe”.
27 January 2017 In the second sentence in paragraph 11, the word “Oglivie” is replaced with “Ogilvie”.
27 January 2017 In the second sentence of paragraph 47, within the brackets, the word “or” is inserted between the words “whether of law” and “of fact”.
27 January 2017 In the Cases cited on the cover page, in the second sentence of paragraph 49 and in the second sentence of paragraph 50, the words “Re Brookers (Aust) Ltd (in liq);” are inserted before the words “Brooker v Pridham”.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1471
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Breakwell v Commissioner of Taxation involved the applicants, Breakwell, appealing against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal regarding their entitlement to small business capital gains tax concessions. The primary issue was whether a loan made by a family trust to the trustee of the trust should be included in the applicants' maximum net asset value test. Additionally, the court had to determine whether this loan was statute-barred under section 35(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA). The court also considered whether section 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act applied, potentially exempting the loan from any limitation period due to it being an action to recover trust property under section 32 of the same Act.

The Federal Court addressed the applicants' arguments by first clarifying the effect of section 35(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act, which bars the remedy but not the cause of action. The court held that the applicants' assumption that the six-year limitation period created an absolute bar to any claim was incorrect. The reasoning was based on established principles that limitation provisions create a defence which can be raised by the respondent, rather than extinguishing the cause of action. The court further found that there was no incongruity in concluding that the pre-1998 debt was not statute-barred. The decision to affirm the objection decision under review was based on the fact that it would be inequitable for the trustee to benefit from a loan without repayment and then rely on the limitation period as a defence.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the appeal. This decision underscored the principle that the applicants, having pursued their claim on a mistaken legal basis, should bear the costs of their unsuccessful appeal. The court rejected the applicants' argument that the Commissioner should not be awarded costs because the limitation issues were not initially raised by the Commissioner, noting that the applicants were aware of these issues during the proceedings but continued to pursue the appeal. The final orders were that the appeal be dismissed and the applicants pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Applicants pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I add that there is no incongruity in the conclusion that the pre‑1998 debt is not statute‑barred. On the contrary, it would be a surprising result if the trustee of a trust like the ABFT could take a loan from the trust, not repay the loan, and then rely successfully on the expiry of the limitation period in defence to a claim for repayment. Conclusion For the reasons given above, the appeal should be dismissed. The applicants submitted that, in the event that the appeal was determined against them by reason of the effect of ss 32, 35 and 48, there should be no order for costs because the Commissioner had not raised these matters in the Tribunal, by notice of contention on the appeal, or in the outline of submissions. The submission was to the effect, that if everyone had proceeded on a misconception of the law, then the applicants should not have to bear the costs of that. I do not accept that submission and consider that the principle of costs following the event should be applied. First, it is the applicants who pursued their claim in the Tribunal on a mistaken basis and, being unsuccessful, brought the present appeal. Secondly, it cannot be said that the applicants have been misled by the Commissioner’s position. I note in this respect that, even after ss 32, 35 and 48 were raised with the applicants at the hearing, they continued their pursuit of the appeal. The appropriate orders are that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicants pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel then submitted that Mr Breakwell’s signing of the 2007 balance sheet of the ABFT could not amount to an acknowledgement of a debt for the purposes of s 42 of the LAA. It was, he submitted, at best an acknowledgement of an asset, and not of a debt.Consideration It is convenient to address the matter first on the basis that s 35(a) of the LAA does apply to the loan from the ABFT to Mr Breakwell. That is the basis upon which the hearing proceeded in the Tribunal and on which the appeal was brought to this Court. The applicants’ submissions in the Tribunal and in this Court assumed that s 35(a) operated, by itself, to bar any claim by the ABFT against Mr Breakwell in respect of the pre‑1998 loan. That is to say, the applicants assumed that there was an absolute bar, by force of statute, to any claim by the ABFT against Mr Breakwell. This assumption is unsound, for two reasons. First, s 35(a) does not have the effect of extinguishing a claim in contract (or for repayment of a debt) after six years. It is well established that provisions such as s 35(a) bar the remedy, but not the cause of action. Section 35(a) does not prohibit an action being brought to recover a debt after six years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued and does not establish an element to be satisfied by an applicant pursuing the cause of action. Instead, provisions such as s 35(a) create a defence which can be raised by a respondent. The position was explained by Windeyer J in Australian Iron and Steel Limited v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471 at 488‑9:It may be that there is a distinction between Statutes of Limitation, properly so called, which operate to prevent the enforcement of rights of action independently existing, and limitation provisions annexed by a statute to a right newly created by it. In the latter case the limitation does not bar an existing cause of action. It imposes a condition which is of the essence of a new right. … It seems that, under the common law system of pleading, when a limitation is annexed by a particular statute to a right it creates, the plaintiff should allege in his declaration that the action was brought within time. On the other hand it is for the defendant to plead the Statute of Limitations as a defence to an action on a common law cause of action, as if he does not it is assumed that he intends to waive it …When time has run against a purely personal action the result, for a plaintiff, is that his remedy is barred but his cause of action is not extinguished; for a defendant, it is that he has, if he chooses to assert it, an immunity which Lord Esher called “his existing right to the benefit of the Statute of Limitations” …(Emphasis added and citations omitted) In The Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, Mason CJ at 405 noted that provisions such as s 35 “have been held to bar the remedy but not the right and thus create a defence to the action which must be pleaded …”. See also Brennan J at 426. The same principle was applied to s 36 of the LAA in Robinson v Craven (1994) 63 SASR 267 at 268‑9 (King CJ) and 274 (Perry J). Section 36 is a counterpart provision to s 35, and the principles stated in the authorities should be applied to s 35.