Brayden and Brayden
[2016] FamCAFC 250
•18 November 2016
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BRAYDEN & BRAYDEN | [2016] FamCAFC 250 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where final property orders were made by consent – Where subsequent orders for enforcement of those consent orders were made – Where further orders were made for the husband to pay the wife’s costs – Where the husband filed appeals from each of those orders – Where the hearing was transferred from Hervey Bay to Brisbane – Where the hearing occurred in the husband’s absence – Whether the husband argued that circumstances of the transfer did not accord the him procedural fairness – Where the husband was on notice of the change of venue – Where the husband sought to substantially re-litigate issues raised in earlier appeals – Appeal dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 177 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 25B.07, 25B.08 and 25B.10 – 25B.14 |
| Sheen & Paulo [2007] FamCA 1175 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Brayden |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Brayden |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 13044 | of | 2007 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NA | 59 | of | 2015 |
| NA | 88 | of | 2015 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 18 November 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | May J |
| HEARING DATE: | 19 September 2016 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 6 August 2015 29 October 2015 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2015] FCCA 2110 [2015] FCCA 3294 |
REPRESENTATION
| FOR THE APPELLANT: | In person (via telephone) |
| FOR THE RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
Orders
Appeal NA59 of 2015 is dismissed.
Appeal NA88 of 2015 is dismissed.
The Application in an Appeal NA88 of 2015 is dismissed.
The Application in an Appeal NA88 of 2015 and NA59 of 2015 is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Brayden & Brayden has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NA59 of 2015 and NA88 of 2015
File Number: BRC13044 of 2007
| Mr Brayden |
Appellant
And
| Ms Brayden |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Mr Brayden (“the husband”) filed two appeals from decisions of Judge Spelleken. The orders were made on 6 August 2015 and 29 October 2015.
This matter has a long history. By consent, final property orders were made on 20 June 2008 in the Federal Magistrates Court. Those orders provided for the sale of the former matrimonial home at A Street and how the proceeds of the sale of the property were to be distributed. Provision was also made in relation to a business previously operated by the husband and Ms Brayden (“the wife”), with an adjustment to be made at the settlement of the sale of the house. The decision about the amount of such adjustment was to be made by the wife’s solicitors.
As will be later explained, the source of some dispute is that the house ultimately was not sold to a third party. Further property orders were made by consent on 7 May 2009 providing that the wife transfer the house to the husband and that he pay her $254,000 to be first applied to the payment of the mortgage and the balance then be divided as to 57.5 per cent to the wife and 42.5 per cent to the husband. It was specifically provided that the remainder of the 20 June 2008 orders remain in full force and effect. In other words, the provision in relation to adjustment for the business remained.
There was a dispute between the parties in relation to the operation of these orders and the wife commenced an enforcement application. On 1 November 2011, Spelleken FM (as her Honour then was) ordered that:
1.The husband pay to the wife the amount of $9,352.94 within 28 days of the date of this order.
2.The $11,000 held in the trust account of Carswell & Company be forthwith paid to the wife and this Order shall be authority to Carswell & Company to release the monies to the wife.
3.The husband pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the application filed 20 January 2010 fixed in the amount of $3360.00.
The Federal Magistrate dealt with the dispute between the parties in relation to the business and the agreement about the payment by the husband of the mortgage on the house.
The husband appealed from that decision and on 27 July 2012 I dismissed that appeal. Apart from an issue in relation to the location of the hearing of the husband’s subsequent application before Spelleken FM, the substance of these appeals contain most of the same matters already argued and dismissed in the last appeal.
NA59 of 2015 (“the enforcement appeal”)
Turning now to the present appeals, on 2 September 2015 the husband filed Appeal NA59 of 2015 from orders of Judge Spelleken made 6 August 2015 (“the enforcement appeal”).
The husband appeals all of the orders, which includes the appointment of a Trustee for the sale of the matrimonial home, that upon completion of the sale, the funds be dispersed to discharge the mortgage over that property, pay the Trustee’s costs and pay an amount of $19,622.22 to the wife. Any net proceeds remaining would have then been received by the husband. These orders were made to enforce the husband’s compliance in paying a debt owing to the wife, arising from the substantive orders made on 20 June 2008 and the enforcement of those orders made 1 November 2011, which the husband had failed to pay. The husband failed to appear at the hearing before Judge Spelleken.
NA88 of 2015 (“the costs appeal”)
On 26 November 2015 the husband filed the second Appeal NA88 of 2015 from cost orders made by Judge Spelleken on 29 October 2015 (“the costs appeal”). The husband filed an application for a stay of the orders made on 6 August 2015 for the sale of the matrimonial home, as he had raised the necessary funds to discharge the debt owing to the wife. However, the husband opposed paying a number of other costs.
The husband appeals orders which required him to pay the Trustees professional costs of $1,395.39, which were to be paid from the amount held in the trust account of the Trustee’s solicitors. The husband was ordered to pay the wife’s legal costs of $1,881.00 incurred in responding to the stay application, and also $21,503.66 being the final amount remaining owed to the wife. Finally, the husband was required to pay the stamp duty when the matrimonial home was transferred back into his sole name.
The Applications
There are also two applications filed by the husband. The first, an Application in an Appeal NA88 of 2015 (“the costs appeal”) filed 5 July 2016 seeking the court provide the transcript of the hearing due to financial hardship, and leave to appear by telephone.
The second is an Application in Appeals NA88 of 2015 and NA59 of 2015 filed on 11 March 2016 seeking the court provide transcripts in both appeals due to financial hardship and that he be allowed to adduce further evidence associated with the enforcement appeal.
The husband was allowed to appear by telephone. The wife did not appear, as she did not seek to participate or be heard in the appeal.
Background
The husband and the wife commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court in Brisbane in 2007. Interim orders were made by Federal Magistrate Howard (as his Honour was then) that required the husband to make all mortgage payments due on the matrimonial home so long as he occupied the house.
As already mentioned, on 20 June 2008 Federal Magistrate Howard made a number of orders in relation to the parties’ property. These orders were varied by consent on 7 May 2009.
Further background to this litigation is set out in extensive detail in my reasons published 27 July 2012. It is unnecessary to repeat most of those reasons, save to refer to those factors relevant to these appeals:
Part E – The basis of the Consent order agreed upon between [Ms and Mr Brayden]
This agreement describes the terms of settlement of the separation and dissolution of partnership of [the wife] and [the husband], both formally [sic] of [A Street], Queensland.
It is herewith agreed and witnessed that:
1.All assets once owned by the [Brayden] family will be shared equally, unless otherwise agreed to in writing. All said assets over $500 in value will be inventoried, market valued, and total value will be shared equally or as agreed in writing.
2.[The husband] has been bought out of [Business S] for the sum of $20,000 and this money will be settled at the time of the sale of [the A Street property] or as agreed to in writing. [The husband] will continue to sell for [Business S] gaining a commission of 30% on whatever clients he refers to [Business S]. [The husband] will also be paid $60/wk for miscellaneous printing and administration services.
3.[The wife] will move into another home, paying the costs of her own rent and allowing me to rent at [the A Street property] at the rent equal to the amount necessary to keep the mortgage in good standing until I can finish the renovations and sell the house. Upon selling [the A Street property], this asset will also be split equally. All expenses relating to preparing [the A Street property] for the sale will be shared equally. The time frame allocated to the sale of [the A Street property] is maximum 6 months, unless otherwise agreed to in writing at which time, either party may force the sale of the home and settlement of assets, or receive payment from the other party.
15.In my view, if this can be seen as an order it was more a statement of intention by the parties at that time and clearly was superseded by subsequent orders.
16.Three property orders were made by Federal Magistrate Jarrett on 30 January 2008, 20 June 2008 and 7 May 2009.
17.On 30 January 2008 interim orders were made as to parenting and the payment of the mortgage, including that “so long as the [husband] occupies the former matrimonial home at [A Street] he shall promptly make all repayments as and when they fall due in respect to the mortgage over the property” (order 6).
18.On 20 June 2008 orders were made by consent that the parties would do all things necessary to effect a sale of the former matrimonial home. The orders also provided that in the event of the property not being sold from listings, the parties procure a sale by public auction four weeks after the deadline date for sale by private treaty, and if necessary a further public auction within eight weeks of the first auction (order 1).
…
20.By May 2009 the property had not been sold and the parties agreed that the husband would purchase the home at a purchase price of $254,000. The orders made 7 May 2009 varied part of the orders of 20 June 2008 by consent of the parties. The 7 May 2009 orders were expressed to be “By consent by way of final order with respect to property proceedings”. …
21.It was correspondingly ordered that order 3 of the 20 June 2008 orders be deleted (being the provisions upon sale of the house) but that the remainder of those orders remain in full force and effect. There appears to have been an oversight however in deleting the entirety of order 3 of 20 June 2008, as the adjustments to be dealt with at settlement in relation to the separation and post separation liabilities, pursuant to order 2 of the 20 June 2008 orders, were not repeated in the new orders. As will be seen however, Federal Magistrate Spelleken considered, correctly in my view, that these liabilities were still to be taken into account.
22.The husband ceased paying the mortgage and as a result the bank took steps including instructing solicitors. The settlement of the sale of the house took place on 17 July 2009 when the sum owing to the bank (including solicitor’s fees) was $166,645.18. The husband had lived in the house from October 2007 until settlement of the sale.
The husband appealed these orders, which were stayed on 13 March 2012, pending the appeal. As previously noted, I dismissed the husband’s appeal on 27 April 2012.
The wife attempted to enforce the orders on 11 April 2013 by filing a creditor’s petition. This was dismissed on 10 April 2014 because Judge Coates determined he did not have the appropriate jurisdiction.
Enforcement Appeal
On 12 November 2014 the wife commenced enforcement proceedings for the amounts referred to the orders of 1 November 2011. In her reasons dated 6 August 2015, Judge Spelleken noted that the application did not reference the appropriate rule as contained in the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”), and the wife’s affidavit wrongly referred to the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth). Her Honour noted that the correct rule to rely upon was set out in Part 25B of the Rules, and in particular rr 25B.07, 25B.08 and 25B.10 – 25B.14.
It seems from [16] of those Reasons that mention of the matter occurred on 16 December 2014 where the husband appeared in person, and it was decided that the venue for the hearing of this application would be in Brisbane and not in Hervey Bay or the Maryborough region. It was listed for 2.15pm on 17 March 2015. The judge notes that for “administrative reasons” the matter was moved to 10.00am 7 April 2015. An email was sent to the parties advising them of the new date.
The husband failed to attend on 7 April 2015. The husband emailed the associate of Judge Spelleken that morning explaining that he was hitchhiking to Brisbane and provided his telephone number to try and appear by phone. Despite two attempts being made to contact the husband, he did not answer.
As a result of the husband’s failure to attend, Judge Spelleken determined it was appropriate to hear the application in the absence of the husband, for the following reasons:
19.Two attempts were made between 9.30am and the hearing of the matter at 12:30 to telephone the [husband] and upon each occasion the [husband] could not be contacted. Even though, as mentioned earlier, the particular section of the Federal Circuit Court Rules that provided the Court with jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the [wife] were not referred to in the Application in a Case and were incorrectly stated in the affidavit of the [wife] to support her application, and that the [husband] was not personally in attendance on 7 April 2015, it was determined by the Court that it was appropriate to hear the application in the [husband]’s absence after taking into account the following:
a)The application was commenced on 12 November 2014, and a response filed by the [husband] on 3 December 2014, some four months before the hearing of the matter;
b)The matter was listed for mention on 16 December 2014 when the venue and hearing time and date were directed by the Court, with that date being amended by email to the parties dated 15 January 2015, just under three months before the hearing date on 7 April 2015.
c)The substantive orders were made by the Court on 7 May 2009, an order for the enforcement of that order was made by this Court in 1 November 2011, those orders were stayed on 15 December 2011, and the appeal dismissed on 27 April 2012.
d)A further attempt to enforce the orders was made when the [wife] filed a creditors petition on 11 April 2013 which was transferred to the Federal Circuit Court on and ultimately dismissed by Judge Coates on 10 April 2014 not because the [husband] had paid the monies owed to the [wife] but because it was his Honour’s decision that he did not have the jurisdiction to make the orders.
e)The amount ordered by the Court to be paid on 7 May 2009 is still unpaid, some six years later, and despite the [husband]’s appeal having been dismissed in 2012 the amount including costs that were ordered by the Court on 1 November 2011 remain unpaid.
f)The Court had the benefit and read the [husband]’s response and affidavit filed 3 December 2014 and was referred to and took into account orders and Reasons made in November 2011, orders and Reasons of Justice May of April 2012, orders and Reasons of Judge Coates made April 2014.
g)Attempts were made following the email of the [husband] received at 5.58am on 7 April 2015 to call the [husband] for him to appear by telephone at the hearing, but those attempts were unsuccessful, the hearing not commencing until 12.30pm on that day.
…
20.Taking into account all of those factors it was determined that it was appropriate to hear the application in the absence of the [husband], while at the same time taking into account, as mentioned earlier, the material that he had filed in response to the application, as well as the detailed history also referred to. Out of an abundance of caution however the Court will only take into account in deciding the application, the undisputed history of the matter contained in the affidavits of the [wife] and her witnesses.
21.The undisputed evidence relied on by the Court to make the orders proposed by the [wife] are as follows:
a)An order was made on 1 November 2011 for the payment of two amounts totalling $12,712.94 and that amount remains unpaid.
b)Interest has accrued on the sum of $9,352.94 since the making of that order in the sum of $3.870.87 which remains unpaid.
c)There is no evidence before the Court from the [husband] that he was not aware of the orders made by the Court.
d)The [wife] has filed an affidavit in support of her application which in all relevant respects complies with Rule 25B.12
22.A reading of the [husband]’s affidavit suggests that, as mentioned earlier, he wishes to re-agitate issues raised in previous proceedings. His ability to do so however was exhausted by Justice May dismissing the [husband’s] appeal against those orders.
(Emphasis added)
Having determined the application should be allowed, Judge Spelleken made a number of orders on 6 August 2015 which required a trustee be appointed for the sale of the matrimonial home and upon completion of the sale, the following:
(11)That upon completion of the sale the sale proceeds be paid in the following manner and priority:
(a)Firstly in payment of all necessary selling costs including agent’s commissions, legal costs, marketing and advertising costs and all other necessary costs incurred in the sale;
(b)Secondly in discharge of any liabilities secured against the property by registered mortgage and all normal adjustments at settlement;
(c)Thirdly in payment of the Trustee’s costs and expenses incurred in effecting the sale;
(d)Fourthly in payment of the amount owing to the [wife] $19,622.22.
(e)Fifthly the balance remaining of the sale proceeds be paid to the [husband].
Additionally, Order 12 requires the Trustee be reimbursed for all of his costs.
The Costs Appeal
On 1 September 2015 the husband filed an application for a stay of the Orders made on 6 August 2015 which appointed the Trustee to sell the matrimonial home, to satisfy the debt of $19,622 then owing to the wife. On 29 October 2015 the parties, including the Trustee, appeared before Judge Spelleken.
The Judge was made aware that the husband had the necessary funds to pay the wife, and the costs of the Trustee. The wife’s solicitor proposed orders whereby the Trustee would be discharged from his obligations to sell the matrimonial home, $21,503.66 would be paid to the wife and $1,395.39 to be paid to the Trustee for his professional costs. The husband agreed to those orders, but opposed any order to pay the wife’s solicitors costs – an amount of $1,881.00.
The judge ordered that in addition to the wife and Trustee costs being paid, the wife’s solicitors costs must also be paid pursuant to s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Additionally, the husband was ordered to pay any stamp duty owing to the Office of State Revenue after the matrimonial home had been transferred back into his name.
Discussion
The husband had three grounds of appeal in the enforcement appeal, and a further eight grounds in the costs appeal. During the hearing of these appeals, the husband clarified the basis of both appeals which can be described as follows:
a)That the orders made by Judge Spelleken on 1 November 2011, and all subsequent orders (including those appealed), are in error because they failed to take into account an amount apparently owed to the husband pursuant to orders made in the State Magistrates Court at Hervey Bay on 3 May 2007;
b)That the judge erred by transferring the hearing on 7 April 2015 to Brisbane from Hervey Bay, and was in error by failing to provide the husband an opportunity to make submissions relevant to that hearing;
c)Consequently, the husband was not accorded procedural fairness by the judge and therefore incurred additional and unnecessary costs, such as Trustee and solicitor fees;
In clarifying the grounds, the husband confirmed that he was seeking that the whole property matter be re-heard. The husband attempted to raise complaints about the parties’ children, who are nearly adults, but was reminded during the appeal hearing that he had not appealed any orders relating to the children.
(a) The failure to consider the 3 May 2007 Orders
The husband asserts that orders made in the State Magistrates Court in Hervey Bay on 3 May 2007 were still in force, and there remained a debt of approximately $20,000 owing to him as a result of the wife buying him out of the joint business. The husband argues that it was the failure of the wife to pay this debt that led him to discontinue the mortgage repayments on the matrimonial home, and therefore caused both parties unnecessary expense when the wife commenced enforcement proceedings for the amounts to be paid to her in the 1 November 2011 Orders.
The husband previously raised this issue in the appeal before me on 27 April 2012. In that appeal, the Reasons at [51] – [57] comprehensively deal with this issue. It is not possible for the husband to raise this complaint again and this ground fails.
(b) The venue and hearing the matter in the husband’s absence
As previously noted, on 16 December 2014 the following order was made:
1.This matter be listed for an interim hearing at 2:15pm on 17 March 2015 for no longer than two (2) hours in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Brisbane.
Correspondence on the court file records that on 5 December 2014 the husband emailed the Judge’s Associate objecting to the matter being listed in Brisbane.
On 15 January 2015 the parties were advised via an email that due to changes in Judge Spelleken’s diary, the hearing of the matter would be listed to 7 April 2015. The husband responded on 31 March 2015 objecting again to the location of the hearing. The Judge’s Associate contacted the wife’s solicitors, who did not consent to the matter being transferred to Hervey Bay or for the husband to appear by phone. The husband was advised of this via an email on 2 April 2015.
It is not clear whether the husband was aware, or made an application pursuant to, r 8.01 of the Rules. That rule provides:
Change of venue
(1)A party who files an application or response in a proceeding may apply to have the proceeding heard in another registry of the Court.
(2) In considering an application, the Court must have regard to:
(a) the convenience of the parties; and
(b) the limiting of expense and the cost of the proceeding; and
(c) whether the matter has been listed for final hearing; and
(d) any other relevant matter.
It is clear the husband objected to the venue change, but did not make a proper application.
In any event a court is not bound by the Rules or otherwise obliged to give written reasons to change the venue of the hearing just because one party asks for it. In Sheen & Paulo [2007] FamCA 1175, Boland J (exercising jurisdiction as a single judge) found no single factor in the Rules carries more weight than the other:
38.The mother was unable to take me to any authority to support her proposition that equal weight should be given to each factor in the relevant rule. It is clear having regard to the drafting of the rule, that the rule does not require any particular weight to be given to any one factor. In some cases issues relating to the balance of convenience may be decisive. In other cases the proximity of a final hearing date and the availability of a judicial officer to hear an application may be the most influential factor in determining a venue application. I am satisfied there is no basis, either in the rule itself, or authority, which requires equal consideration to be given to each sub-paragraph of the rule, and sub-paragraph (d) which is necessarily general in its terms, militates against such a construction.
The power to change the venue for a hearing is discretionary and the ambit of that power is very wide. Such discretion is an exercise of practice and procedure rather than of any substance.
While the court appreciates that travel expense and inconvenience is often incurred with litigation, the husband seems not to understand that court hearings cannot be organised for his convenience. The Federal Circuit Court is a heavily burdened court where judges regularly go on circuit. A reality of circuit work is that the continuation of some cases must be heard in registries separate to the original, or preferred, location. A review of the court record would indicate that the matter has been previously heard in Bundaberg, Hervey Bay and in Brisbane – all appearances the husband has been able to facilitate. The husband has been unable to demonstrate that there was a substantial injustice to him when orders were made in his absence nor any error in a decision of a procedural nature.
The second aspect to this ground is the decision of Judge Spelleken to hear this matter in the husband’s absence. As previously noted, the husband contacted the court on the day of the hearing to advise he was having difficulty in securing transport to the court and was attempting to hitchhike. On appeal, the husband explained that the attempts to contact him via his telephone did not succeed because he was in an area of the highway with no reception. The husband submitted that as he is on a disability pension, he could not afford the travel cost associated with travelling to Brisbane and hitchhiking was his only option.
As set out in [19] – [20] of those Reasons, it can be seen that the judge set out in considerable detail the reasons for hearing the application in the husband’s absence. The history of the matter, as recited by her Honour, demonstrates this is an ongoing and protracted dispute. The wife has been seeking her share of the property settlement since at least 2008 and it is the husband’s conduct that has incurred years of unnecessary legal expense and delay.
Importantly, the husband did not appeal the order made on 16 December 2014 setting the matter down to be heard in Brisbane. This ground is without merit.
(c) Procedural fairness and bias
Relevant to the discussion above, the husband asserts that hearing the application in his absence meant he was not accorded procedural fairness. This resulted in his having to pay additional Trustee and solicitor fees. It is clear this challenge relates to the “costs appeal”, being the decision of Judge Spelleken on made 6 August 2015.
The husband confirmed in the appeal hearing that he had in fact paid all the amounts owing to the wife. What is not clear, therefore, is what the husband expects an appeal court can do at this stage, the matter being at an end.
The husband also argued that Judge Spelleken demonstrated bias towards him, making it clear in his opinion that his applications would never succeed. A crucial part of this submission necessitated a transcript of the hearing – something the husband asserted he could not afford. This is dealt with in further detail below, and for the Reasons given this aspect of the challenge cannot succeed.
The husband clearly seeks to re-agitate issues challenging the property settlement orders from which there is no appeal. He has failed to demonstrate any errors of law pertaining to the orders from which he appeals. For example, the husband challenges the decision to move the hearing of the enforcement application – but this is not the subject of any orders he appeals.
The Applications
The husband filed two applications, variously seeking that the court provides him with the transcripts of the hearings before the judge and also seeking to adduce further evidence.
The husband was advised that it is not the practice of the court to provide litigants with transcripts. There is no fund available to the court to facilitate the provision of transcripts. It is only in unusual circumstances that the court would be prepared to do this and there are no such features in this case which would require the provision of transcripts.
Dealing with the further evidence, the husband refers to emails he had sent to the Court explaining why he couldn’t make the hearing on 7 April 2015, and evidence relating to the solicitors for the wife apparently delaying the sale of the home. The husband’s affidavit fails to annex this material. As the appeals cannot succeed, the two applications should also be dismissed.
Conclusion
During the hearing of the appeal, the husband asked to provide the Court with a copy of the 2007 consent orders which he believed supported his claim for a payment of $20,000 from the wife. The husband was permitted that opportunity. On 19 September 2016, the husband sent not only this document, but several others which were apparently relevant to this issue. It is not appropriate to have regard to these other documents. It can only be repeated that the issue of the 2007 consent orders has been determined by me in a previous appeal. It is not possible to understand how the husband could have thought there would be further hearings in this matter.
As the husband is self-represented and the wife did not appear, there should be no order as to costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice May delivered on 18 November 2016.
Associate:
Date: 18 November 2016