Brand and Yoke

[2007] FamCA 759

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRAND & YOKE [2007] FamCA 759

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Undefended hearing – Failure by the husband to attend, comply with the obligation of providing disclosure and participate – Property division in favour of the husband 80 per cent to 20 per cent – Substantial initial contribution by the husband and use of business acumen to substantially increase the parties’ wealth by $2,000,000 – Adjustment in favour of the wife of 11 per cent or 22 per cent differential to take into account the husband’s ability to access land entitlements in a Pacific country worth about $1,000,000

Family Law Act 1975

Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC ¶93-204
Townsend v Townsend (1995) FLC ¶92-569
Ferraro v Ferraro (1993) FLC ¶92-335
Charman v Charman [2006] Fam Law 1018
Weir v Weir (1993) FLC ¶92-338
Black v Kellner (1992) FLC ¶92-287

APPLICANT: Ms Brand

RESPONDENT: Mr Yoke

FILE NUMBER: CAF 437 of 2004

DATE DELIVERED: 1 August 2007

PLACE DELIVERED: Canberra

JUDGMENT OF: Faulks DCJ

HEARING DATE: 30 July 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Millar

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Farrar Gesini and Dunn

No appearance for or on behalf of the husband

Orders

1. That Peter Willy and Associates, Solicitors, do all acts and things necessary forthwith to cause to be paid to the wife all money held in trust by them on behalf of the husband and the wife being the proceeds of the sale of the property known as L in Queensland and that service of this order upon the solicitors shall be sufficient authority for them to pay that money to the wife or as she may direct.

2. That Orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Orders made by Deputy Chief Justice Faulks on 14 November 2006 which direct the Trustee not to make splittable payments of the husband’s superannuation fund is hereby revoked.

3. That in accordance with s 90MT1(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) whenever a splittable payment within the meaning of s 90ME of the Act becomes payable to or on behalf of Mr Yoke (“the husband”), born in September 1946, (reference number …) from his interest in the Y Superannuation Fund managed with E Limited (“the fund”) Ms Brand (“the wife”) be entitled to be paid by the Trustee of the Fund (“the Trustee”) 100 per cent of the splittable payment and that there be a corresponding reduction in the amount the husband would receive but for these orders.

4. That the operative time for Orders 3 and 5 be the date of the transfer of the transferable benefit as defined in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994.

5. That the Trustee in accordance with the obligations set out in the Act and Family Law Superannuation Regulations 2001 do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to calculate the entitlements of and make payment to the wife in accordance with these orders.

6. That these orders are binding upon the executors, administrators, beneficiaries, heirs and assigns of the parties.

7. That unless otherwise specified in these Orders:

   (a)Each party is entitled both at law and in equity to the property currently in his or her possession or control.

   (b)The wife is declared to be the owner of any benefit from any of the superannuation schemes in her name being the M Superannuation Fund, the F Superannuation Fund and the R Superannuation Fund. 

   (c)Each party indemnifies and will indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.

8. All material produced subpoena which did not become the subject of exhibits will be returned by the Court to the persons producing it as soon as practicable.

9. Any material produced subpoena which became an exhibit will be returned by the Court at the expiration of the appeal period to the person producing it.  Any material produced by a party which became the subject of an exhibit will be returned by the Court to the party at the expiration of the appeal period.

10. The matter be removed from the Pending Cases Inventory.

IT IS NOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ORDERS that the judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice Faulks delivered this day will for all publication and reporting purposes be referred to as Brand v Yoke.

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA

FILE NUMBER: CAF 437 of 2004

Ms Brand

Applicant

And

Mr Yoke

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

1. The proceedings in this matter proceeded as an undefended trial in the absence of the husband in the circumstances hereafter set out. 

2. The proceedings began when the wife filed an Application for Final Orders on 7 July 2004.  The husband filed a Response and a Financial Statement on 26 August 2004.  Otherwise there has been little, if any, substantive material filed by the husband in the proceedings and in particular nothing in relation to this, the final hearing of this matter. 

3. The husband was represented by experienced lawyers up until 2 July 2007 although it would be fair to say that the involvement of the firm’s solicitors has been sporadic because of earlier notices of Ceasing to Act and subsequent resumption of representation of the husband. 

4. The matter was set down for final hearing on 12 July 2007.  A preliminary indication from Registrar Routh that he would be listing the matter for a final hearing on that date was given to the parties by telephone on 15 June 2007.  On that occasion I accept that the husband was advised that if he wanted to vacate that date he would need to file an application. He did not do so.

5. The material relied upon by the applicant wife in the proceedings is set out in a document entitled “Documents Relied Upon by the Respondent Wife” [sic] filed in the Court on 27 July 2007.  Also filed were affidavits by Anne Lesley Northcote and Kasey Lee Fox, the wife’s solicitors, which outlined the steps that were taken to ensure that the husband had notice both of the proceedings before the Court on this day and of the evidence likely to be adduced in that hearing.  This included the affidavit of the Single Expert, Mr W, which dealt with the valuation of matters relating to the Q Limited. 

6. The wife’s solicitors have sent copies of all relevant documents to the husband’s address as provided by his previous solicitors and as found on the Internet to be a place from which he conducts his business.  The Court also sent a letter to that address advising the husband that the final hearing would occur today.  I am satisfied that the husband was aware of these proceedings or should have been.  It is likely that he has chosen not to participate.

7. During the course of matters prior to the hearing there had been an application before me on 14 November 2006 about the possible joinder of a company which controlled a trust to which the legal title of a substantial number of shares held in a Pacific country (apparently of the husband’s) were to have been transferred. The correspondence in evidence permits me to make a finding that such shares were beneficially the husband’s.  The company was represented on that day but not joined as a party.  On 14 November 2006 I made orders flagging the superannuation of the husband.  Subsequently on 24 November 2006 I delivered a judgment in which I dealt with proceedings to restrain the husband from disposing of the equitable or beneficial interest or otherwise diminishing his entitlement in shares in Q Limited.  In that judgment I pointed out to the husband and to his lawyers that the husband’s choice of failing to make a full disclosure about his circumstances at that point was inappropriate[1] and I concluded in paragraph 11 as follows

   No doubt in due course he will need to, and will avail himself, of an opportunity to explain his decision [about a failure to disclose at that point], but in the meantime, if an adverse inference is drawn against him he cannot be heard to complain.  The remedy was always in his hands and he has chosen not to accept it.

8. I went on to find that he had a beneficial interest in some 3,332,156 shares which had been the subject of the application and restrained him from further dealing with them.

9. Accordingly, while some of the evidence before me was not the most current evidence that might possibly be obtained about a number of the assets (particularly of the husband), the husband cannot be heard to complain about the way in which the matter proceeded.  He had from the beginning of the proceedings, a continuing obligation to make a full and frank disclosure.  So far as I am able to ascertain he has never done so.  If, accordingly, findings are made about property when the husband was in possession of knowledge which may have changed those findings but has chosen not to present it to the Court, he cannot be heard validly to complain. 

The Property Pool

[1] ¶10

1. The Balance Sheet of Assets and Superannuation of the parties was presented by counsel for the wife in the course of the hearing before me. 

2. That Balance Sheet is set out at Endnote 1Endnote 1 together with the source of the value ascribed to the items in the Balance Sheet.  I make the following findings in relation to the Balance Sheet proposed by the wife. 

   1.Shares in  Q  Limited

   (a)I find that the shares were beneficially owned by the husband and possibly still are beneficially owned by him.  Whether they have been disposed of or not, they ought relevantly to be brought into account because they existed at times relevant to these proceedings.  If the husband were to have been successful (as appears from some of the documentation tended and annexed to the wife’s affidavit) in transferring the shares to a third party, then in my opinion, he remained the beneficial owner by resulting trust.  If contrary to that finding the husband had intended, and validly made, a gift of the shares to a third party (whichever that may have been) then in accordance with the principles outlined in Chorn v Hopkins[2] and Townsend v Townsend[3], this was a disposal of assets which does not or should not be used to diminish the pool of property available for distribution.  The husband has never provided any evidence about what happened, if anything, to the shares.

   [2] (2004) FLC ¶93-204

   [3] (1995) FLC ¶92-569

   (b)I further find in relation to the shares that their value is, as expressed by the Single Expert, Mr W, $2,053,800. In addition, the expert identified some land entitlements (pages 6-8 and 9 of his report) but was apparently unable to find any value with precision. I propose to take this assert of the husband’s into account under s 75(2), and in my opinion, in doing so I might reasonably (in the flexible intent of s 75(2)) bring this asset into account at around the “average” figure suggested by Mr W, namely $1,003,428.

   2.Proceeds of sale L Property

   (a)I accept that the net proceeds of the sale of this property were $400,758.43.  For these purposes I rely upon Exhibit W1 which was a letter from the solicitors conducting the sale of the property.

   (b)It appears that from submissions made to me by counsel that the money was never invested in an interest-bearing account. This was apparently brought about by the failure on the part of the husband to consent to such a course. This is a matter which is raised in relation to my considerations under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) as appears hereafter. 

   3.Ford Falcon

   (a)This is the wife’s car valued at $2,000 in her financial statement filed on 25 September 2006 and subsequently in her statement on 27 April 2007.  I accept her valuation in the circumstances, uncontested, at $2,000.

   4.Mitsubishi Magna

   (a)This is the husband’s car valued in his financial statements sworn on 5 October 2006 at $2,900.  I accept this valuation as an admission against interest at least, and accept that value for the purposes of these proceedings[4]. 

   [4] Exhibit W2

   5.I Shares (wife)

   (a)I accept that for the purposes of these proceedings an appropriate value is $5,632.23[5]. 

   [5] Exhibit W3

   6.I Shares (husband)

   (a)I accept that for the purposes of these proceedings an appropriate value is $5,159.73[6].  In this regard I note that the husband’s share-holding is in accordance with his statement in 2004.  He may or may not have more or less shares than that now.  In the circumstances the applicant proposes that I accept the number of shares declared by the husband to be his at that point as his current shareholding.  Because of his failure to participate in the proceedings it is reasonable that I should do so.  If in fact he has disposed of the shares for either a great sum than that presently indicated or a lesser sum then in essence this becomes his problem of his general attitude of failure to disclose.  Any disadvantage suffered by the wife by his sale of the shares at a higher price is something that she accepts in her submission made above. 

   [6] Exhibit W4

   7.Telstra Shares (husband)

   (a)I accept that the proper value for these shares for the purposes of these proceedings is $1,872[7].  This again relates to an older Financial Statement (2004) by the husband as to his share-holding coupled with an appropriate calculation as of the end of July this year.  The comments I have made above about the I shares apply equally to these shares. 

   [7] Exhibit W5

   8.Westpac Bank Account (husband)

   (a)The balance was $1,302 in the husband’s financial statement sworn on 5 October 2006.  Again this figure may no longer be relevant but if the bank account has been disposed of, it ought properly to be added back in these proceedings.  If it has been increased, the wife has accepted the lesser figure for the purposes of the finalisation of these proceedings. 

   9.ANZ account in the Pacific country

   (a)The husband had $100 in an account. Again this flows from the husband’s financial statement dated 5 October 2006 and the comments referred to above apply.

   10.Macquarie Bank Account

   (a)The husband had two dollars in an account. The same comments apply to this.

   11.ING account (wife)

   (a)The amount of $5,997.84 relates to a statement dated 30 June 2007[8] and I accept that it is an appropriate value for the purposes of these proceedings.  It is not a valuation opposed.

   12.ANZ bank account (wife)

   (a)I accept the amount of $1,403.74 as being an appropriate figure for these proceedings.  This arises from Exhibit W7 which was a bank statement obtained through the internet on 23 July 2007. 

   13.Mr Yoke & Associates

   (a)The husband’s interest in the business referred to above was valued by him in his financial statement sworn on 5 October 2006 at $2,000.  This constitutes an admission against interest. 

   [8] Exhibit W6

3. A late addition to the list of assets of the parties is money owed by Q Limited to the husband.  This appears as a consequence of certain Q Limited company documents which form part of the annexure to the wife’s affidavit which relevantly began at page 76.  It appears that there is money, or was at that point, owed to the husband for “royalties”.  I would suspect from seeing the other material relating to the company that there may also be money owed to the husband by the company by way of a director’s loan.  However there is no evidence about that and the wife makes no relevant claim in relation thereto.  I am satisfied however that it is reasonable in the circumstances to include as an asset of the parties (the husband in this case) the sum of $53,017.

4. This provides a total property pool, excluding superannuation, of $2,535,944.97.

5. In Australia also the husband has superannuation interests through the Yoke Superannuation Fund.  These were valued in accordance with the Regulations following from the Form 6 request from the wife’s solicitors in the sum of $449,102.  In this regard I am satisfied from the affidavit material filed and from the copy of the faxed response to the wife’s solicitor from the Trustee, that the relevant requirements of natural justice have been complied with in relation to the superannuation fund and I am at liberty, from that point of view at least, to make the orders sought by the wife about those funds. 

6. In relation to the wife’s M Superannuation Fund I find as a consequence of Exhibit W9 (the internet statement from the M dated 17 July 2007) the value of this interest is $15,863.93.

7. In relation to the wife’s F Superannuation Fund, I find from the statement[9] that as at 30 June 2007 the interest of the wife in this fund was $44,866.90.

   [9] Exhibit W10

8. In relation to the wife’s R Superannuation Fund, I find that the interest in this fund is relevantly $14,193.97.[10]

   [10] Exhibit W11

9. This leaves total superannuation funds of $524,026.80 and total property and superannuation of $3,059,971.77.

General Approach

1. It is my obligation under the Act in determining what division of property should occur between the parties to determine first what the property is, then to consider what contributions each of the parties has made in accordance with s 79 of the Act, and then to take account of the matters relevant to the parties under s 75(2) of the Act and finally to consider whether a division of property in accordance with those findings and determinations would be just and equitable.

2. There is no doubt that the husband’s considerable business acumen has substantially contributed to the accumulation of the assets referred to above. 

3. The following matters and facts appear to be relevant. 

4. The husband was born in September 1946 and the wife in February 1962.  The wife has a son, K, from a previous relationship.  He is currently 16. 

5. The parties began their relationship in October 1998 and began to live together in January 1999.  The wife received a redundancy package later in that year and a company in a Pacific country which was then known as P Limited and was incorporated.  It subsequently changed its name to Q Limited.  The parties engaged in a number of trips to the island for business and the husband finalised his financial arrangements for his first marriage in January 2000.  The wife and the husband were married on 22 April 2000 in the Pacific country and later that year the wife ceased her ordinary paid employment but continued to assist the husband in his business.  It is not suggested in relation thereto that she was the driving or moving force in relation to business decisions but she assisted him and I accept that she did so by attending meetings with him, meeting with potential investors, drafting share certificates and other business documents, and producing conference materials as well as acting as a hostess.  I accept that she provided support and assistance to him by maintaining a home leaving him free to conduct the business for which he was apparently eminently suited and capable. 

6. The parties moved to the Pacific country in December 2000 and bought in 2001 the house in L referred to in the list of assets.  Each of the parties contributed to that purchase although the principal contribution came from the husband who applied some $245,000 (so he asserted) from money that was his prior to the commencement of cohabitation and which represented, he asserted, part of the money he had managed to salvage from his first marriage property settlement.  If in fact he had money beyond that sum, no evidence of it has been presented to the Court and it does not now lie to the husband to assert a higher contribution than the $245,000 referred to. 

7. The husband’s business continued to be principally centred in the Pacific and both husband and wife travelled there regularly for the purposes of that business.  In April 2002 the wife left full-time employment to assist the husband more directly with his business and that continued through until January 2004 when they separated. 

1. In summary, the husband’s initial contributions exceeded those of the wife.  His contributions were found to be and admitted to be $245,000 which he contributed to the L property.  The wife’s were some $40,000 of her redundancy payment which was used to purchase furniture, a motor vehicle, the L property and to pay for trips to the Pacific country.  She also had a motor vehicle and some other savings and furniture. 

2. The husband was engaged in business throughout their entire period of cohabitation and this apparently produced a reasonable income.  Details of it are not available to the Court and no evidence has been satisfactorily supplied by the husband which would establish the level of that income. 

3. At the same time the wife was substantially engaged in paid employment for most of the relationship and applied her income to the joint expenses of the parties.  I have already indicated the wife made other non-financial contributions to the business of Mr Yoke & Associates and to Q Pty Limited as I have also indicated above. 

4. In addition, the wife was the primary home maker and as such enabled the husband to pursue his business activities. 

5. The wife submits that I should find that the contributions of the parties should be found to be, so far as the husband is concerned 80 per cent, and the wife 20 per cent.  This recognises that the husband’s business acumen was substantially responsible for the accumulation of the wealth owned by the parties and each of them at the time of separation and more relevantly at the time of hearing. 

6. The ‘special’ contribution made by parties in relation to property pools involving large sums of money has been the subject of some comment by this Court, see for example Ferraro v Ferraro[11] and has more recently been commented upon in the United Kingdom in Charman v Charman[12].

   [11] (1993) FLC ¶92-335

   [12] [2006] Fam Law 1018

7. The arguments for acceptance of the validity of a claim for a ‘special’ contribution are centred on the production of a substantial pool of property which would not otherwise have been accumulated by the parties. A contrary view which in many cases in my opinion would be valid is that in circumstances where parties agree to work together that a court should be slow to interfere in arrangements which the parties themselves have apparently agreed upon and found acceptable. The fact that one party earns more than the other from his or her activities would seem to be irrelevant. If each contributes as much as he or she is able to do in the circumstances and neither finds it necessary either to have a separate financial agreement (as the Act provides) and if the evidence otherwise suggests that neither party sought otherwise than to assert that the assets of the parties were accumulated for their mutual benefit, in my opinion the appropriate finding would ordinarily be that the parties contributions were equal. That does not preclude the parties reaching a different conclusion themselves during the course of their cohabitation and does not preclude the taking into account of assets that are contributed by parties otherwise then from their personal labour or efforts.

8. Nevertheless in this matter even if I were to accept that the husband’s efforts constituted within the terms of the authorities in this country at least, a special contribution then in my opinion the submission made on behalf of the wife for contributions should be regarded as 80 per cent to 20 per cent would be appropriate.  This effectively would reflect a differential between the contributions of the parties of 60 per cent which in my opinion more than adequately accommodates the ‘special’ component of any contribution made by the husband. 

Section 75(2) factors

1. The husband is older than the wife.  All the evidence available to me suggests that he is capable of earning more money then the wife and will continue to be so capable. 

2. The wife continues to have the care of her son with, I accept, some child support provided by the child’s father, who is not the husband. 

3. If the property is to be divided broadly in proportion to the contributions of the parties, the husband will certainly finish up with significantly more assets than the wife.  This is a factor appropriately also to be taken into account.

4. It was submitted that the husband’s failure to co-operate in the investment of the proceeds of the L property meant that there was a loss of interest which ultimately would have fallen if the application of the wife is to be accepted to the wife.  There is some force in this submission, particularly as there was an order made by consent before Registrar Routh on 28 August 2006 that the proceeds be invested in an interest-bearing account.  This is a factor although in default of there being any evidence as to what interest rate might have been attracted by the investment of the sum it is difficult to make any precise finding about quantum. 

5. A significant additional factor is the husband’s Pacific land entitlements which were found by the Single Expert to have an “average” value of $1,003,428 which is about 33 per cent of the asset pool otherwise.

6. Finally, as a factor relevant under s 75(2)(o) it was urged on me that I should take account of the husband’s failure to make a full and frank disclosure. This is a matter which is of some concern. Although I have made the findings particularly about the value of the share holding in Q Company set out above, the husband’s failure to cooperate and provide information which would have either facilitated or at least simplified that task and his declared policy in early proceedings not to make disclosures even when it was entirely appropriate for him to do so has delayed these proceedings in the Court, removed the possibility of an earlier mediated agreement between the parties and left me in the end with a significant doubt that I have the full financial picture of the husband. It would be tempting to assume that his failure to disclose meant that the position as set out in the statement of assets and superannuation represents so far as the husband is concerned a minimum position. I do not have information which would enable me to reach that conclusion but the husband cannot hide behind his own wilful failure to disclose to argue that the Court should have come to a different conclusion. See generally Weir v Weir[13] and Black v Kellner[14].

   [13] (1993) FLC ¶92-338

   [14] (1992) FLC ¶92-287

7. It was urged on me by counsel for the wife that I should make an adjustment in favour of the wife of five per cent in relation to these matters on the basis that as was submitted, the husband’s shares and land holdings were worth $3,057,228 which I did not subsequently find them to be.

8. The age difference between the parties favours the husband. The care of the wife’s son is a matter which would cause an adjustment in her favour as something that has an effect on her financial consequences.  The husband’s superior earning capacity is significantly in favour of the wife. I accept that the division of property however it may be calculated will leave the husband vastly better off than the wife on the findings I have made about the value of the property.  Of less effect although relevant is the loss of interest which would require an adjustment in favour of the wife.  Of particular effect is the husband’s land holdings which is a significant financial factor in his favour.

9. The husband’s failure to make a full disclosure in my opinion I cannot weigh adequately except on the question of costs.  He may or may not have done himself a serious disadvantage in failing to make a full disclosure.  I therefore do not attribute any particular weight to this factor although I acknowledge that conduct of this sort in some cases could be relevant, in particular to the question of costs.

10. The suggested adjustment in favour of the wife of five per cent in my opinion is not only reasonable but modest in the context of the pool as submitted.  In my opinion, an adjustment in the revised pool of 11 per cent or a differential of 22 per cent is appropriate. 

11. Accordingly, applying those principles I should divide the property of the parties as found by me previously in the ratio of 69 per cent to the husband and 31 per cent to the wife.  This reflects in a distribution of property as set out in Endnote 1 under “Proposed Asset Split”. 

12. I otherwise direct that the matter be removed from the pending cases list. 

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice Faulks

Associate: 

Date: 

Endnote 1

BALANCE SHEET OF ASSETS AND SUPERANNUATION

Asset	Ownership	Value	Source
Shares in Q Group Limited (3,334,656 shares)	Husband	$2,053,800.00	Valuation report by single expert Mr W dated 18 July 2007
Proceeds of sale for L Property	Joint - Held in the Trust Account of Peter Willey & Associates	$400,758.43	Letter from Peter Willey & Associates dated 28 November 2006.
Ford Falcon	Wife	$2,000.00	Financial Statement by Wife filed 25 September 2006 and 27 April 2007
Mitsubishi Magna	Husband	$2,900.00	Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 5 October 2006
I Shares	Wife	$5,632.23	I Dividend Statement dated 24 May 2006 and I Share calculator dated 26 July 2007
I Shares	Husband	$5,159.73	I Dividend Statement dated 19 April 2004 and I Share calculator dated 26 July 2007
Telstra Shares	Husband	$1,872.00	Telstra Dividend Statement dated 30 April 2004 and Telstra Share calculator dated 26 July 2007
Westpac Bank Account	Husband	$1,302.00	Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 5 October 06
ANZ Account in Pacific country	Husband	$100.00	Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 5 October 2006
Macquarie Bank Account	Husband	$2.00	Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 5 October 2006
ING Account	Wife	$5,997.84	ING statement at 30 June 2007
ANZ Bank Account	Wife	$1,403.74	ANZ Netbank at 23 July 2007
Mr Yoke & Associates	Husband	$2,000.00	Husband’s Financial Statement sworn 5 October 2006
Director’s loan (liability owed by  Q Company)	Husband	$53,017	Wife’s Affidavit sworn 27 April 2007 (page 76)

TOTAL NET ASSETS
(EXCLUDING SUPERANNUATION):         $2,535,944.97

Superannuation

Yoke Superannuation Fund	Husband	$449,102.00	Superannuation Information Request received from Australian Executor Trustees dated 1 July 2007
M Superannuation Fund	Wife	$15,863.93	Internet Statement from M Company dated 17 July 2007
F Superannuation Fund	Wife	$44,866.90	Superannuation statement as at 30 June 2007
R Superannuation Fund	Wife	$14,193.97	Statement as at 18 July 2007

TOTAL SUPERANNUATION:  $524,026.80
TOTAL ASSETS & SUPERANNUATION:   $3,059,971.77

PROPOSED ASSET SPLIT

NON-SUPER ASSETS	HUSBAND	WIFE
Shares in Q Group Ltd	$2,053,800.00
Proceeds of sale for L property	$400,758.43
1996 Ford Falcon	$2,000.00
1993 Mitsubishi Magna	$2,900.00
I Shares	$5,632.23
I Shares	$5,159.73
Telstra Shares	$1,872.00
Westpac Bank Account	$1,302.00
ANZ Bank Account in Pacific country	$100.00
Macquarie Bank Account	$2.00
ING Bank Account	$5,997.84
ANZ Bank Account	$1,403.74
Mr Yoke & Associates	$2,000.00
Director’s Loan	$53,017
SUPERANNUATION
Yoke Superannuation Fund	$449,102.00
M Superannuation Fund	$15,863.93
F Superannuation Fund	$44,866.90
R Superannuation Fund	$14,193.97
TOTAL	$2,120,152.73	$939,819.04
PERCENTAGE	69%	31%