Braidotti & Anor v Queensland City Properties Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Brisbane No B22 of 1990

B e t w e e n -

AUGUSTO BRAIDOTTI and MARY

VILMA BRAIDOTTI

Applicants

and

QUEENSLAND CITY PROPERTIES

LIMITED

Respondent

Application for special leave

to appeal

BRENNAN ACJ
DAWSON J

GAUDRON J

Braidotti

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON FRIDAY, 29 JUNE 1990, AT 12.02 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

BlT 11/1/RB 1 29/6/90

MR G.L. DAVIES, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Queensland:

May it please the Court, I appear with my learned

by Bain Gasteen Smith) friend, MR B.J. CLARKE, for the applicant. (instructed
MR D.F. JACKSON, ~C:  May it please the Court, I appear with my

learne friend, MR T.W. QUIN, for the respondent.

(in.structed by Henderson Trout)

BRENNAN ACJ:  Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR DAVIES:  Your Honours, we seek leave to read an affidavit which

is really further to an affidavit which, on our

learned friend's side was, I think filed yesterday,

at least served on us yesterday. Could I hand up

copies of that affidavit. It is an affidavit by

John Sydney Power O'Keefe and it is sworn today.

MRJACKSCN:  Perhaps I should inquire if Your Honours have the

affidavit from our side to which my learned friend

has referred, one by Mr Morrow.

BRENNAN ACJ: It was filed yesterday, was it?

MR JACKSON:  Yes, it was, Your Honour, in multiple copies.
BRENNAN ACJ:  It appears that none of the Justices has that.
MR JACKSON:  I am sorry, Your Honour. I will endeavour to -

may I hand to Your Honours one copy of it innnediately and - I can give Your Honours three copies altogether.

BRENNAN ACJ: Perhaps you should give us some time to read these

affidavits. There is no objection on either side to

the reception of either affidavit?

MR JACKSON:  No, Your Honour.
BRENNAN ACJ:  Being thus informed, Mr Solicitor, you may proceed.
MR DAVIES:  Thank Your Honour.
Your Honours would be aware that the Full Court

declared that the contract between the parties was

rescinded by the respondent on 10 August 1989. There

were, in our respectful submission, two steps in

Their Honours' reasoning to that conclusion: the

first was that the contract was an instalment

contract within the meaning of section 71 of the

PROPERTY LAW ACT and they reached that conclusion

because they said that clause 42 of the contract,
which provided that the purchaser agreed to pay to the
vendor the sum of $80 per week in order to maintain

the property for farming purposes until the contract

came to an end, provided for payments within the meaning

of that section.

BlTll/2/RB 2 29/6/90
Braidotti

The second step in their reasoning was that

the vendor/applicant had repudiated the contract by

purporting to rescind without first giving notice
of intention to do so within the meaning of
section 72 of the Act and that that entitled the

purchaser then to rescind.

- -The consequence was that the respondent is,

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Details
Case
[1990] HCATrans 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Augusto Braidotti and Mary Braidotti (the applicants) sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of Queensland. The dispute concerned the rescission of a contract for the sale of property. The Full Court had declared that the respondent, Queensland City Properties Limited, had validly rescinded the contract on 10 August 1989, entitling the respondent to claim damages against the applicants.

The legal issues before the High Court involved the interpretation of the Property Law Act. Specifically, the court was required to determine whether the contract was an instalment contract within the meaning of section 71 of the Act, and whether the vendor's purported rescission, without prior notice of intention to do so as required by section 72 of the Act, constituted a repudiation of the contract that entitled the purchaser to rescind.

The applicants' submission was that the Full Court's reasoning was flawed. They contended that the contract was not an instalment contract as defined by the Act, and that the vendor's actions did not amount to a repudiation. The applicants highlighted clause 42 of the contract, which stipulated weekly payments for farming purposes until the contract's end, and clause 1, which provided the vendor with a right to recover unpaid deposit amounts as a liquidated debt regardless of termination. The applicants argued that these provisions, along with the standard form nature of the contract, supported their position that the Full Court had erred in its interpretation of the law and the contract.

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Evidence Before The Court

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