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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B22 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
AUGUSTO BRAIDOTTI and MARY
VILMA BRAIDOTTI
Applicants
and
QUEENSLAND CITY PROPERTIES
LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
BRENNAN ACJ
DAWSON JGAUDRON J
Braidotti TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT BRISBANE ON FRIDAY, 29 JUNE 1990, AT 12.02 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
BlT 11/1/RB 1 29/6/90 MR G.L. DAVIES, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Queensland:
May it please the Court, I appear with my learned
by Bain Gasteen Smith) friend, MR B.J. CLARKE, for the applicant. (instructed
MR D.F. JACKSON, ~C: May it please the Court, I appear with my learne friend, MR T.W. QUIN, for the respondent.
(in.structed by Henderson Trout)
BRENNAN ACJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor. MR DAVIES: Your Honours, we seek leave to read an affidavit which is really further to an affidavit which, on our
learned friend's side was, I think filed yesterday,
at least served on us yesterday. Could I hand up
copies of that affidavit. It is an affidavit by
John Sydney Power O'Keefe and it is sworn today.
MRJACKSCN: Perhaps I should inquire if Your Honours have the affidavit from our side to which my learned friend
has referred, one by Mr Morrow.
BRENNAN ACJ: It was filed yesterday, was it?
MR JACKSON: Yes, it was, Your Honour, in multiple copies. BRENNAN ACJ: It appears that none of the Justices has that.
MR JACKSON: I am sorry, Your Honour. I will endeavour to - may I hand to Your Honours one copy of it innnediately and - I can give Your Honours three copies altogether.
BRENNAN ACJ: Perhaps you should give us some time to read these
affidavits. There is no objection on either side to
the reception of either affidavit?
MR JACKSON: No, Your Honour. BRENNAN ACJ: Being thus informed, Mr Solicitor, you may proceed. MR DAVIES: Thank Your Honour.
Your Honours would be aware that the Full Court
declared that the contract between the parties was
rescinded by the respondent on 10 August 1989. There
were, in our respectful submission, two steps in
Their Honours' reasoning to that conclusion: the
first was that the contract was an instalment
contract within the meaning of section 71 of the
PROPERTY LAW ACT and they reached that conclusion
because they said that clause 42 of the contract,
which provided that the purchaser agreed to pay to the
vendor the sum of $80 per week in order to maintainthe property for farming purposes until the contract
came to an end, provided for payments within the meaning
of that section.
BlTll/2/RB 2 29/6/90 Braidotti The second step in their reasoning was that
the vendor/applicant had repudiated the contract by
purporting to rescind without first giving notice
of intention to do so within the meaning of
section 72 of the Act and that that entitled thepurchaser then to rescind.
- -The consequence was that the respondent is,
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- Case
- [1990] HCATrans 153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court involved the interpretation of the Property Law Act. Specifically, the court was required to determine whether the contract was an instalment contract within the meaning of section 71 of the Act, and whether the vendor's purported rescission, without prior notice of intention to do so as required by section 72 of the Act, constituted a repudiation of the contract that entitled the purchaser to rescind.
The applicants' submission was that the Full Court's reasoning was flawed. They contended that the contract was not an instalment contract as defined by the Act, and that the vendor's actions did not amount to a repudiation. The applicants highlighted clause 42 of the contract, which stipulated weekly payments for farming purposes until the contract's end, and clause 1, which provided the vendor with a right to recover unpaid deposit amounts as a liquidated debt regardless of termination. The applicants argued that these provisions, along with the standard form nature of the contract, supported their position that the Full Court had erred in its interpretation of the law and the contract.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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