Bragg v Returned and Services League Henley and Grange Sub-branch Inc No. Scciv-03-418

BRAGG v RETURNED & SERVICES LEAGUE HENLEY & GRANGE SUB-BRANCH INCORPORATED
[2003] SASC 226
Magistrates Appeal

GRAY J This is an appeal against a magistrate’s decision to dismiss a claim for damages in negligence following an assault.
Background
George Bragg claimed damages alleging that the Returned & Services League Henley & Grange Sub-Branch Incorporated (the club) had breached their duty of care towards him. The claim arose out of an assault on Mr Bragg by a club member Antonio Ravesi. Mr Bragg sustained personal injury.
The premises occupied by the club were licensed pursuant to the provisions of the Licensing Act 1997 (SA). Patrick Christopher Woods was the president of the club. Mr Ravesi was the vice president. Both men had been club members for many years. Mr Bragg was also a member of the club. The club premises were situated at Henley Beach. They comprised a clubroom with a seated area outside the entrance. The licensed premises included the clubroom and the outdoor seating area.
On the day of the assault Mr Woods was working behind the bar. Early in the afternoon Mr Ravesi arrived and Mr Woods was concerned by his state. Apparently Mr Ravesi had not been taking his medication for a long standing mental condition. Mr Woods decided that he would limit Mr Ravesi to one brandy for the day. During the course of the afternoon the concern about Mr Ravesi’s behaviour was such that calls requesting police attendance were made. In the event the police did not attend. Late in the afternoon Mr Woods considered that he would contact Mr Ravesi’s medical advisor. His attempt was unsuccessful. Mr Ravesi’s behaviour worsened and he became annoying and aggressive. He tried to provoke a fight with Mr Woods and was generally annoying to other patrons. Mr Woods was so concerned about the situation that he requested Mr Ravesi to leave. Following this request Mr Ravesi left the club rooms. He confronted Mr Bragg who was seated in the outside area with friends. Words were exchanged. Mr Ravesi then struck Mr Bragg without warning. Counsel for the club accepted that Mr Woods’ conduct and knowledge was that of the club.
The Findings of the Magistrate
The magistrate concluded that the club owed a duty of care to Mr Bragg but had in the circumstances discharged its duty. He dismissed Mr Bragg’s claim.
The magistrate made the following findings:
-     Mr Ravesi was well known to Mr Woods to be suffering with mental health problems as is evidence by his initial refusal to serve Mr Ravesi a double brandy and his evidence that he believed, because of his behaviour, that Mr Ravesi needed his medical officer.
-     Whilst there had been previous unpleasant experiences of Mr Ravesi’s behaviour suffered by many members of the club, he had never, prior to 7 December 2000, displayed a propensity for violence.
-     Once Mr Ravesi’s behaviour in the bar became annoying and disruptive (not threatening) to other patrons, Mr Woods ordered Mr Ravesi to leave the club.
-     Mr Ravesi left the club building without any incident.
-     Mr Ravesi was not affected by either alcohol or any drug or medication.
-     Mr Bragg was not affected by any alcohol or drug and drinking a soft drink.
-     At no time did Mr Bragg threaten, insult or intimidate Mr Ravesi prior to the incident occurring.
-     Outside of the club building but still on the club premises Mr Ravesi, without any provocation, set upon Mr Bragg causing him to fall to his knees and suffer an injury.
The magistrate concluded:
Mr Ravesi is an elderly gentleman. He is aged 65 and has been a member of the RSL for 20 years or so. Unfortunately he was diagnosed with manic depression some 25 to 30 years ago. He takes medication and regularly consults a psychiatrist.
…
At the time of the incident Mr Ravesi was vice president of the club. Mr Woods was the president.
…
He is well known at the club. He has also been known to be ‘Aggressive’ (as described by Mr Woods and Mr Mooyman), ‘Off the planet’ (as described by Mr Bragg), ‘Suffers a bad spell’ (as described by Mr Smidore), ‘Talk irrationally and loudly’ (as described by Mr Smidmore), ‘Uptight’ (as described by Mr Woods).
…
I saw and heard the witnesses give their evidence. Without hesitation I find as a fact that Ravesi set upon Bragg without any warning and with no provocation whatsoever.
At trial an issue for determination was the scope of the duty of care owed by the club to Mr Bragg. Did the duty extend to controlling members and patrons of the club? The magistrate concluded that all that the club was required to do was to tell Mr Ravesi to leave:
…Mr Woods said that because he formed the view that Mr Ravesi’s behaviour was annoying to others, he became concerned that the situation might get out of control so he ordered Mr Ravesi outside.
It was not suggested by any witness that Mr Ravesi was intoxicated or that he was known to take illegal drugs. Mr Woods knew Mr Ravesi suffered with mental health problems. He could see Mr Ravesi was being ‘aggressive’ with other patrons and decided, as he should have, to remove him.
What does ‘remove him from the premises’ mean? This was not a hotel or night club with loud music, consumption of vast quantities of alcohol or behaviour by patrons such that crowd controllers were required on a daily basis or at all. This was the local sub-branch of the RSL where the members gathered to socialise and have a few drinks. All that Woods was required to do was tell Ravesi to leave. Ravesi left. Woods was not required to go outside and stand by to see Ravesi off the premises altogether. That is – out of the car park and onto the street.
I find as a fact that Woods did remove Ravesi by telling him to leave and that Ravesi complied. It was not necessary for Woods to ensure that Ravesi left the premises (including the car park).
In light of those findings of fact and having regard to the whole of the evidence from all of the witnesses I find that the club did not at any time breach the duty of care it owed to Mr Bragg.
Issues on Appeal
The Plaintiff’s Case
Counsel for Mr Bragg submitted that the magistrate had failed to correctly assess the scope of the duty of care owed by the club to Mr Bragg. It was said that the scope of the duty was to be determined with reference to the relevant statutory provisions governing the grant of the liquor licence held by the club. It was submitted that when regard was had to the statutory provisions it was apparent that the club was under a duty of care to protect members and patrons from disorderly conduct by others. It was contended that the duty extended to the entire club premises including the area outside the building frequented by club members.
It was submitted that Mr Ravesi’s mental illness was well known to the club president and other club members. Further on the day of the assault a number of events had occurred which heightened the need for care.
It was said that the club was on notice that Mr Ravesi, was acting strangely and had not taken his medication. The situation called for police and medical attendance and if Mr Ravesi remained might get out of control.
Counsel for Mr Bragg submitted that to simply ask Mr Ravesi to leave the clubrooms unescorted did not discharge the club’s duty of care.
The Defence Case
Counsel for the club submitted that despite Mr Woods’ and other club member’s awareness of Mr Ravesi’s condition he had never before been known to resort to violence. In this circumstance Mr Woods’ request for Mr Ravesi to leave the premises was sufficient to discharge the duty of care owed by the club.
Duty of Care
Liquor licences are granted to a number of entities including clubs pursuant to the provisions of the Liquor Licensing Act. Section 42(1) provides:
It is a condition of every licence that the licensee must comply with codes of practice prescribed or approved under the regulations -
(a) to minimise the harmful and hazardous use of liquor; and
(b) to promote responsible attitudes in relation to the promotion, sale, supply and consumption of liquor.
Regulation 9 of the Liquor Licensing (General) Regulations 1997 approves a code of practice published by the Commissioner for the purposes of section 42 of the Act.[1] The code of practice imposes an obligation to comply with the code in addition to any licence conditions imposed by the licensing authority. The code establishes guidelines for practices relating to intoxication and disorderly or offensive behaviour and disturbances:
[1] (1) For the purposes of section 42 of the Act, the code of practice entitled Code of Practice under section 42 Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (September 1997) published by the Commissioner with the approval of the Minister is approved.
(1)    A licensee must establish and maintain appropriate practices –
(a)    to guard against the unlawful supply of liquor to intoxicated customers;
and
(b)    to deal with incidents of intoxication or disorderly or offensive behaviour to customers.
(2)    In particular –
(a) a licensee must ensure that the manager of the licensed premises and persons engaged in supplying liquor to customers have a detailed knowledge of the provisions of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 relating to intoxicated persons or persons behaving in an offensive or disorderly manner:
(i)        section 108 – making it an offence to sell or supply liquor on licensed premises to a person who is intoxicated;
(ii)       section 124 – empowering an authorised person, if necessary, to use reasonable force to –
remove from licensed premises any person who is intoxicated or behaving in an offensive manner; or
prevent the entry of such a person onto licensed premises;
(iii)      section 125 – empowering the licensee or manager of licensed premises to bar a person from entering or remaining on the licensed premises for up to 3 months –
if the person commits an offence, or behaves in an offensive or disorderly manner, on, or in an area adjacent to, the licensed premises; or
on any other reasonable ground; and
(b)    a licensee must establish and maintain appropriate practices designed to –
(i)ensure persons engaged in supplying liquor to customers are alert to the signs of intoxication and the potential for offensive or disorderly behaviour; and
(ii)ensure early intervention in incidents of intoxication or offensive or disorderly behaviour of customers with due regard to the safety of staff and customers; and
(iii)promote the effective use of the powers provided by the Act to deal with incidents of intoxication or disorderly or offensive behaviour of customers.
7. Practices relating to disturbances etc.
(1)    A licensee must, if the licence authorises the sale of liquor for consumption on the licensed premises, establish and maintain appropriate practices to –
(a)    minimise undue offence, annoyance, disturbance, noise or inconvenience to people who reside, work or worship in the vicinity of the licensed premises resulting from activities on the licensed premises or the conduct of people making their way to or from the licensed premises; and
(b)    protect the safety, health or welfare of customers and staff; and
(c)    ensure public order and safety at events on the licensed premises expected to attract large crowds; and
(d)    guard against the licensed premises being used for the purposes of illicit drug dealing.
(2)    The following are examples of practices that might be established and maintained by a licensee for the purposes of this clause:
(a)    providing public telephones;
(b)    displaying information about taxi and public transport services and emergency telephone numbers;
(c)    ensuring that entrance and exit areas, and parking areas, have adequate lighting and are free of hazards and obstructions;
(d)    encouraging customers to limit noise and behave appropriately in making their way to or from the licensed premises;
(e)    providing effective measures for crowd control;
(f)     cooperating with police in the investigation of illicit drug dealing;
(g)    discouraging the consumption of liquor by staff while carrying out duties at licensed premises.
In Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie[2] the Victorian Court of Appeal considered the duty of care owed by a club to its patrons, under similar liquor licensing legislation:
Persons in the position of the club realise that in the course of their business they are attracting potential trouble-makers to their premises, and they take steps to deal with the resulting danger of violent and other disorderly behaviour. If a person becomes drunk or criminally disorderly on their premises, then it is they who have invited the potential criminal to their premises and created the environment in which the criminal activity has occurred. They are under a statutory duty – we are not here concerned with rights of action for breach of a statutory duty – to expel drunk and disorderly persons and they recognise that they are under a responsibility to maintain order on their premises.
In Gordon v Tamworth Jockey Club[3] where Sheller JA remarked:
In principle, the situation is no different from a case where a member of the public lawfully on the premises and having consumed a considerable amount of alcohol suddenly and unexpectedly assaults another person on the premises. In such a situation, in order to recover in negligence the person assaulted must rely upon a general duty owed by the respondent to persons lawfully on the premises to take reasonable care to protect them from criminal activities such as assault; see per Hayne J 205 CLR at 290. What is required must be measured against what is practicable; Chordas v Bryant. Assuming such a duty to be owed the only evidence that there was a breach in this case was the evidence of what occurred immediately before the assault and the assault itself. There was no evidence that at any time earlier during the day Mr Cook had given any indication that he was likely to assault anybody. The case is distinguishable from those in which members of the public are invited by the occupier on to the premises in such numbers and in such circumstances that crowd control including the removal of people behaving aggressively is essential to the safety of others lawfully on the premises. This case falls within the Modbury principle that an occupier is not responsible for the criminal activities of people on the premises certainly in the absence of any indication that those persons proposed to commit a criminal act. In my opinion it is nothing to the point that the respondent's official noticed shortly before the assault that Mr Cook was drunk and saw him throw a stubby at a possum when he was near the appellant.
These observations are directly relevant to the present case.
[2] (2001) 3 VR 447 at 457-8 per the Court
[3] [2003] NSWCA 82
The terms of the code of practice provide the statutory background against which the existence and scope of the common law duty of care are to be assessed. The common law duty of care included a duty to protect the club’s patrons and staff from offensive and disorderly conduct and to maintain adequate practices to deal with any incidents arising whether by reason of intoxication or offensive or disorderly behaviour. The club, being a place where liquor is served and people congregate creates an environment that has the potential to become “out of control”.
Foreseeability
The Relevant Principles
It is necessary to consider whether the risk of Mr Ravesi striking Mr Bragg was foreseeable. In Wyong Shire Council v Shirt[4] the High Court considered the test of foreseeability. Mason CJ observed:
A risk of injury which is quite unlikely to occur, … may nevertheless be plainly foreseeable. Consequently, when we speak of a risk of injury as being "foreseeable" we are not making any statement as to the probability or improbability of its occurrence, save that we are implicitly asserting that the risk is not one that is far-fetched or fanciful. Although it is true to say that in many cases the greater the degree of probability of the occurrence of the risk the more readily it will be perceived to be a risk, it certainly does not follow that a risk which is unlikely to occur is not foreseeable.
In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man's response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant's position.
The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable. But, as we have seen, the existence of a foreseeable risk of injury does not in itself dispose of the question of breach of duty. The magnitude of the risk and its degree of probability remain to be considered with other relevant factors.
The Relevant Evidence
[4] (1979) 146 CLR 40 at 48
A letter tendered at trial from a psychiatrist Dr De Pasquale, provided details of Mr Ravesi’s illness:
Mr Ravesi suffers from schizoaffective disorder. He also suffers from a poorly controlled diabetes. He has bouts of heavy drinking. He has bouts of heavy drinking. He has had numerous admissions to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital and Glenside. His admissions are usually precipitated by his poor compliance with medication. When unwell he is thought disordered, unkept, irritable, hostile, uncooperative, grandiose, confused and disorganised. Once Mr Ravesi recovers he remembers very little of his behaviour and when told he is generally remorseful and ashamed.
As earlier observed Mr Woods and other club members were aware that Mr Ravesi had a medical condition that could lead to inappropriate behaviour and a propensity to act in an aggressive manner.
The evidence demonstrated that other members of the club were aware that Mr Ravesi suffered a medical condition that caused his aggressive and anti-social behaviour. A club member Tony John Mooyman said:
Tony tends to get – he gets aggressive. I don’t know if he doesn’t take his medication or whether it is because of the alcohol or what his problem is. He does get aggressive towards people. He swears at them. He is sharp when he talks to them. He postures aggressively and he gets what I call, I don’t know what a doctor would call it, but I’d call it a stare. Not looking at you. He is looking through you.
Another club member William Smidmore gave the following evidence:
Q.Mr Ravesi suffers from a mental illness, doesn’t he.
A.Yes.
Q.That is common knowledge in the club, isn’t it.
A.Yes.
Q.Have you ever assisted Mr Ravesi when he has had one of his bad spells.
A.Yes.
Q.He doesn’t necessarily remember what has happened, does he.
A.No.
Q.His bad spells can happen if he hasn’t been taking his medication correctly.
A.Yes.
Q.And if he has been drinking.
A.No.
Q.So he doesn’t necessarily need to have been drinking, but he can still have a bad spell, from what you have observed.
A.Yes.
Mr Woods was aware that Mr Ravesi had been banned from other clubs:
Q.In fact, you knew that he had been barred by two other RSL clubs at some stage because of his behaviour, didn’t you.
A.Yes.
Q.Indeed, at least initially he was barred from the RSL after this particular night, wasn’t he. Your RSL club.
A.Yes.
…
A. He is not a member of the Henley & Grange RSL.

Mr Woods described the events of the day in question in evidence:
A.I did have a word with Tony [Mr Ravesi] about 12 o’clock.
Q.    Can you just recall what happened and tell his Honour what happened.
A.Vaguely, he came in and wanted a double brandy and I said to Tony ‘I am not going to give you a double brandy Tony. You can have a single brandy and that’s all for the day’.
Q.    You served him a single brandy.
A.    Yes.
….
Q.You obviously made some judgment that day, didn’t you. I am talking about not serving him a drink.
A.    Put it this way, it was approached to me, I made a decision not to serve him.
Q.    But why.
A.I can’t say why. I am not a medical person but I know he was uptight. He takes medication. I said to him ‘Have you taken you medication Tony.’ He said ‘What’s it got to do with you’.
Q.    Would he normally respond to you that way.
A.    No.
Q.    So he was behaving unusually, wasn’t he.
A.    That’s right.
Q.Your concern as to whether he took his medication or not was because you have known him to behave unusually before when he hasn’t taken his medication, is that right.
A.    Yes.
Q.In fact, you knew that he had been barred by two other RSL clubs at some stage because of his behaviour, didn’t you.
A.    Yes.
…
Q.    Do you agree that Mr Ravesi was being annoying to some of the patrons.
A.    I do.
Q.    Behaving aggressively in the way he talked.
A.    That is one of the reasons I rang his medical officer, isn’t it?
Q.    That is the reason why you rang the medical officer.
A.    Yes it is because of the aggressive nature.
Q.    You didn’t think that things would get out of control.
A.    No.
Q.    You thought you could handle the situation.
A.      Yes, that’s right.
Q.You thought you could handle the situation, but you needed some attention from his medical officer, that’s right isn’t it.
The evidence also demonstrated that by late afternoon Mr Woods became concerned that the situation with Mr Ravesi might get “out of control”.
A.I did ring a secretary to get Tony’s medical officer’s phone number and I rang that number to come and help.
Q.When was that.
A.That would have been about ten to five in the afternoon.
Q.So you rang who.
A.Tony’s medical officer.
Q.He needed medical help, didn’t he.
A.He might have been, yes.
Q.You can’t now recall why, but whatever his state was, that is Tony’s state was, you were so concerned about him that you were trying to ring a medical officer to help him.
A.I did ring the medical officer, yes.
Q.Obviously there is something about Tony’s behaviour that led you to take that step, is that right.
A.I wouldn’t say behaviour. The man was –
Q.Was what.
A.In my opinion he wasn’t well.
Q.He was behaving out of the ordinary.
A.He just wasn’t well, that’s all.
Q.What was it about him being unwell, or can’t you remember.
…
Q.What was it about Tony that led you to make that enquiry.
A.I have known Tony for a long time, I know his history and I know he is on medication.
Q.What is his medical history.
A.I know he has to take medication.
Q.What for.
A.I don’t know.
…
Q.Is it a mental condition or a physical condition.
A.It’s a mental condition.
Q.His behaviour becomes inappropriate, isn’t that right, when he hasn’t taken his medication.
A.I wouldn’t say that. I have never had any trouble with him. I have never seen him be violent to anybody.
Q.So it is a mystery to you why it was that the other members of the club didn’t want him back as it was voted in the AGM, is that right.
A.It’s not a mystery. He can be aggressive. He has got an aggressive nature and people just don’t want to be in the environment when somebody is like that.
Q.He was like that that day wasn’t he.
A.Yes.
Sometime later Mr Woods formed the view that Mr Ravesi should leave the premises:
Q.       Do you remember Mr Ravesi going outside.
A.       Yes, because I sent him outside.
Q.       You sent him outside.
A.       I asked him to go outside, yes.
Q.You asked him to go outside because his behaviour was upsetting other patrons, didn’t you.
A.       Yes.
Q.       But you didn’t escort him right off the premises, did you.
A.       It was busy. I didn’t need to escort him off the premises.
Q.       You were busy tending the various patrons that were there.
A.       That’s right.
Q.The reason you sent him outside was to stop him annoying the patrons who were in the bar because that is what he was doing, wasn’t it. Annoying the other patrons.
A.       Yes.
Q.       You didn’t want the situation developing that got out of control, did you.
A.       No.
Q.That is what you were a bit concerned about in the bar, weren’t you, that the situation might get out of control and that is why you asked Mr Ravesi to leave.
A.       That would be right.
Lesley Booth, another club member gave this evidence about the events that transpired after the assault:
A.       I asked could they get the police to assist Mr Ravesi.
Q.       Who did you ask.
A.       Mr Woods.
…
Q.What did he say.
A.I wouldn’t like to say but he sort of told me he had been trying to get the police all day.
Breach of Duty
In the present case the club was under a common law duty of care to its patrons including Mr Bragg. The duty extended to Mr Bragg whilst he was on the club premises. The premises included the outdoor seating area. The scope of the duty included taking care to ensure that order was maintained in the club and that patrons were not subjected to offensive or disorderly behaviour. The code of practice underscores this duty. The maintaining of proper order in licensed premises including clubs is important. It is the club who has invited “the potential criminal to their premises and created the environment in which the criminal activity has occurred”[5]. The club was an environment in which patrons were entitled to feel safe and secure, relax in convivial company and not to be on guard against possible offensive or disorderly conduct.
[5] Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447 at 457-8
In the present case a heightened duty arose. The club members including the president Mr Woods were aware that Mr Ravesi suffered from a degree of mental instability that required medication. They knew that he was under ongoing medical care. They were aware that he had been banned from other clubs. From the time Mr Ravesi arrived at the club it was clear that “things with Mr Ravesi were not right”. As earlier observed Mr Woods’s concern about Mr Ravesi led him to restrict his consumption of alcohol, to call for the assistance of the police, to call Mr Ravesi’s medical adviser in an effort to obtain assistance and eventually to make the decision that Mr Ravesi be told to leave. Mr Ravesi had wanted to fight with the president and although the evidence from club members was circumspect it is apparent that Mr Ravesi was conducting himself in an offensive and disorderly manner on this occasion. As Mr Woods said he feared “the situation might get out of control”.
These circumstances gave rise to a foreseeable risk that Mr Ravesi may continue to behave in a disorderly and offensive manner. There was a risk that was not far fetched and fanciful that Mr Ravesi’s conduct may expose patrons to a risk of injury. In these circumstances the club failed in its duty of care to Mr Bragg by not having Mr Ravesi escorted from the club premises. It would have been simple and straightforward to have one or more appropriate club personnel escort Mr Ravesi from the premises and make arrangements for his safe journey home or as otherwise directed. This was not done. The duty to remove Mr Ravesi included the need to escort him from all areas frequented by patrons. This included the outdoor area where Mr Bragg was with friends. Further steps could have been taken to protect patrons. All patrons could have been warned so that they might be on notice that Mr Ravesi was leaving and may behave in a disorderly or offensive manner. This did not happen.
These steps represent the minimum action necessary to maintain control of the premises. It was not enough to simply request that Mr Ravesi leave. Patrons remained exposed to a risk of offensive and disorderly behaviour. The request to leave was inadequate and did not discharge of the club’s duty of care towards its patrons including Mr Bragg.
Conclusion
For these reasons the decision of the magistrate dismissing Mr Bragg’s claim should be set aside. The club breached its duty of care to Mr Bragg. The matter should be remitted for an assessment of damages.

JUDGMENT CITATIONS LISTED IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE IN JUDGMENT

1(1) For the purposes of section 42 of the Act, the code of practice entitled Code of Practice under section 42 Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (September 1997) published by the Commissioner with the approval of the Minister is approved.

(2) The Commissioner must ensure that—
(a)a copy of the code of practice is available free of charge to each licensee; and
(b)a copy of the code of practice is available for inspection by members of the public free of charge during normal business hours at the office of the Commissioner; and

(c) copies of the code of practice are made available for purchase or by other means.

2 (2001) 3 VR 447 at 457-8 per the Court
3 [2003] NSWCA 82
4 (1979) 146 CLR 40 at 48
5 Ritchie

(2) The Commissioner must ensure that—

(a) a copy of the code of practice is available free of charge to each licensee; and

(b)a copy of the code of practice is available for inspection by members of the public free of charge during normal business hours at the office of the Commissioner; and

(c) copies of the code of practice are made available for purchase or by other means.

[2003] SASC 226

25 July 2003