Brady v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Brady v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2002] FCA 363

BANKRUPTCY – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court of Australia – appellant claimed to be secured creditor with security over a gold mining lease and certain plant and equipment (“the Property”) – respondent trustee, on legal advice, denied appellant held such security – trustee sold some of the Property – appellant sued trustee for conversion and, in the alternative, for breach of certain duties under the Bankruptcy Act, should appellant be found to be an unsecured creditor – Federal Magistrate held appellant’s security to be valid and awarded damages to appellant for conversion – whether Federal Magistrate erred in not awarding damages against respondent for failing to take possession of the Property and protect the interests of creditors – whether damages award was inadequate.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs – offer made by respondent to compromise – appellant did not accept offer, but made counter-offer to settle for over ten times amount of eventual judgment – whether Federal Magistrate erred in finding that respondent’s offer of compromise exceeded the amount of the judgment and interest recovered – whether Federal Magistrate erred in finding that appellant’s refusal to accept respondent’s offer was sufficiently unreasonable to justify ordering appellant to pay respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis for part of the relevant period – no discretionary error demonstrated – whether appellant should be permitted to adduce further evidence not tendered to Federal Magistrate – tender refused.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 58, 90, 116, 129(1), 176

Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 applied
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 WLR 586 referred to
Bates v Omareef Pty Ltd (unreported, Emmett J, Federal Court of Australia, 28 October 1997) referred to

Alpine Hardwood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 224 referred to

PETER JOHN BRADY v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

W433 of 2001
W485 of 2001

CARR J
28 MARCH 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

W433 OF 2001

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PETER JOHN BRADY
Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

W485 of 2001

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

PETER JOHN BRADY
Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

W433 OF 2001

WESTERN AUSTRALIA…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 363
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Brady v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy involves two appeals by the appellant against decisions made by a Magistrate. In the first appeal, the appellant argues that the Magistrate awarded inadequate damages and failed to consider certain causes of action. In the second appeal, the appellant challenges the Magistrate’s costs orders, arguing that they were inappropriate given the circumstances of the case. The respondent contends that the Magistrate’s decisions were correct and that the appellant’s appeals should be dismissed.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate erred in awarding damages and whether the costs orders made by the Magistrate were appropriate. The court needed to determine if the Magistrate correctly assessed the damages for the conversion of the secured assets and if the costs orders were justified given the appellant’s failure to accept a compromise offer.

The court found that the Magistrate did not err in his assessment of damages. The evidence presented regarding the value of the assets was deemed vague and unsatisfactory, and the court agreed with the Magistrate’s approach in assessing damages based on the value of the assets at the time of conversion. The court also found that the Magistrate appropriately considered the respondent's concession regarding the validity of the Mortgage Debenture and the subsequent sale of the assets. Regarding the costs orders, the court held that the Magistrate’s decision was correct, given that the appellant did not accept a compromise offer that was substantially higher than the eventual award of damages.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court upheld the Magistrate’s decisions on both the damages and the costs orders, finding no basis for the appellant’s contentions that the Magistrate had erred.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The court records strongly suggest that only one judgment was delivered, namely the judgment of 21 September 2001. However, two notices of appeal were filed (possibly because the learned Magistrate delivered two sets of reasons for judgment) and the parties have treated the matter as involving two judgments and two appeals. Accordingly, it is convenient to deal with the matter in these reasons on the same basis. In relation to the “first judgment”, the appellant complains that the learned Magistrate awarded him inadequate damages and failed to consider causes of action (other than the one upon which the judgment was based) upon which the appellant relied at first instance. In “the second judgment” the Magistrate made costs orders (awarding to the appellant only part of his costs and ordering him to pay a substantial part of the respondent’s costs) by reason of the appellant’s failure to accept an offer to compromise his claim. The offer to compromise was made by the respondent some 13½ months before the trial, in an amount which was about 25% greater than the damages and interest awarded to the appellant under the first judgment. The appellant contends that the Magistrate erred in making those costs orders. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On 2 February 1990 the appellant entered into a joint venture agreement with Messrs Stanley Frederick Leeder and Kim Roderick Mitchell, gold miners, for the development and operation of a gold mine conducted on Gold Mining Lease 63/2319 near Norseman in Western Australia. One of the terms of the joint venture required the appellant to advance to Messrs Leeder and Mitchell a sum of approximately $35,000 which they were to apply for the purposes of the joint venture. Any profits were to be shared equally between the three joint venturers. It was part of the appellant’s case at first instance that, as matters transpired, he advanced to Messrs Mitchell and Leeder amounts totalling $83,406.00. The Magistrate did not make a finding of fact about the amount of those loans. Nor, for reasons which will appear below, was it necessary for the Magistrate to make such a finding. To secure repayment of the loans, Messrs Mitchell and Leeder executed, on 25 June 1990, a mortgage debenture in favour of the appellant and his wife June Mary Brady (now deceased). I shall refer to that document and the documents annexed to it as “the Mortgage Debenture”. Under the terms of the Mortgage Debenture, Messrs Mitchell and Leeder transferred and assigned certain property (“the Property”) to the appellant and his wife. As the parties chose to use a pro forma document in the form of a bill of sale over a vehicle, the Property was described in the body of the Mortgage Debenture as the “Vehicle” which in turn was defined as “the vehicle described in the Schedule”. In the Schedule “The Vehicle” was described as “Being all the items and matters in Schedule 11/3”. The Magistrate found as a fact (and it appears not to be in issue) that Schedule 11/3 was in the following terms:“schedule 11.3the vehicle (the term in this agreement to include all items and matters in the schedule below) (a)all plant – equipment – buildings – stock at present at mine site gold mining lease 63/2319 both above and below the surface (b) gold mining lease 63/2319 (c) without lessening any part of a above does include specifically as well as any further items herein scheduled 1.mitsubishi utility my 16782.toyota utility 6nc 4043.foden truck al 108184.3 air blasters ex australis5.compressor 6.generator & switchboard7.drilling unit8.bogger9.statesman deville-holden10.mining equipment at 35 brockman st.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my opinion, the Magistrate did not err in refusing to award exemplary damages to the appellant, and this ground is not made out. FURTHER EVIDENCE As I have mentioned above, at the hearing of the appeal the appellant sought to adduce further evidence. The first was his affidavit sworn on 1 February 2002 and the annexures thereto. The appellant told me that this evidence went to the value of the gold mine, the presence on the mine of the Caterpillar TD33, the reliability of Mr Mitchell as a witness and the value of the Foden truck. The second body of evidence was contained in a folder of 18 numbered documents. The appellant told me that these documents were relevant to the costs which he had incurred prior to the offer to compromise (a matter relevant to the “second appeal” – i.e. the costs order), the value of the Mitsubishi vehicle, the price of gold, examples of other equipment on the site which were not the subject of the claim before the Magistrate, ownership of the gold mine, the reliability of Mr Mitchell’s evidence, the presence of the Caterpillar TD33 on site and Mr Websdale’s reliability as a witness. I rejected all of that evidence because I was not satisfied that it was reasonably clear that if it had been available at first instance and had been adduced, the outcome of the trial would have been different or that it was so highly likely to be different as to make it unreasonable to suppose otherwise. I was also satisfied that, with reasonable diligence, the appellant could have procured that evidence for production at the hearing before the Magistrate: Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435. I note that, although the appellant was not represented at the appeal, he was represented at the hearing before the Magistrate by senior and junior counsel who were instructed by a firm of solicitors. MRS BRADY As I have earlier mentioned, Mrs Brady was a joint mortgagee with Mr Brady and so named in the Mortgage Debenture and has since died. I raised the significance or otherwise of these facts with the parties at the hearing of the appeal. Neither party (and in particular the respondent) sought to raise this as an issue on the appeal and apparently had not done so at first instance. There is therefore no need for me to consider the matter. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the appeal will be dismissed with costs. “APPEAL NO. W485 OF 2001” I now turn to the appellant’s appeal against the orders made by the Magistrate in relation to costs and interest. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND On 13 March 2000 the respondent’s solicitors served on the applicant a document which was headed “Notice of Offer of Compromise”. Omitting formal parts, the notice read as follows:“The Respondent offers to pay the Applicant the sum of Forty two thousand dollars ($42,000.00) in satisfaction of the Applicant’s claims herein. The said sum of $42,000 is inclusive of costs and interest. Interest is calculated at the rate of 7% per annum on the principal sum of $27,500 for six years. This offer of compromise is made under Order 23 Federal Court Rules.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
On 31 January 2001 a Judge of this Court ordered that the application be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia. The hearing before the Magistrate took place over a period of 4 days. Each side called witnesses and some affidavits were admitted into evidence. THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE The learned Magistrate described the appellant’s claim under s 176 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) as being “essentially based” upon two causes of action. He identified the first as being a conversion claim based upon the validity of the Mortgage Debenture and the second as being “breach of duty, negligence against the trustee causing loss to the Applicant as an unsecured creditor of the bankrupt estates …”. The Magistrate first turned to what he described as “the conversion claim”. He considered the evidence of the appellant and that of Mr Mitchell in relation to the execution of the Mortgage Debenture. The Magistrate preferred the evidence of the appellant to that of Mr Mitchell and found that the Mortgage Debenture was a valid security for the loans advanced to Messrs Leeder and Mitchell. [The respondent does not challenge that finding.] The Magistrate noted that the respondent had conceded that in the event that there was a finding that the document was a valid Mortgage Debenture then there had been conversion of the plant and equipment which the respondent had caused to be sold on 23 March 1995. I pause at this stage to make two observations. First, it does not appear that the concession extended to the gold mining lease (which as noted above formed part of the Property). Secondly, the concession related only to that sale. The Magistrate then said this:“31. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the issue of whether the Applicant could be regarded as an unsecured creditor and indeed whether in those circumstances there has been a breach of duty of care.32. I am satisfied that by virtue of the conversion which has occurred whereby the goods which were the subject of the mortgage debenture were sold that the trustee has breached a duty of care to the Applicant in failing to recognise the Applicant as a secured creditor and dealing with the assets accordingly.” The Magistrate then turned to the question of assessing damages, noting that the evidence in support of that claim was “vague and unsatisfactory”. He accepted a submission from the respondent that damages should be assessed in an amount equal to the value of the plant and equipment at the time of conversion i.e. 23 March 1995. He also accepted a submission that one particular item which the appellant claimed to be part of the secured Property, a Caterpillar truck (or possibly track) loader, was not the subject of the Mortgage Debenture. It would appear that the Magistrate reached that conclusion partly on the basis that that item was not listed in the Mortgage Debenture. This is one of the issues raised by the appellant in the appeal. The Magistrate held that the respondent should not be liable for any damages for deterioration in the value of the Property between the date when the bankruptcies first occurred and when it was sold. In doing so, he accepted the respondent’s submission that the appellant was not prevented from exercising rights which he had asserted under the Mortgage Debenture and had taken no steps to exercise those rights despite the fact that he had taken Supreme Court proceedings which could have been continued. He summed up in these terms:“Whilst there has been conversion I do not accept that there has been “unlawful retention”.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

Full text does not contain this section.