Bradshaw v Gilbert's (Australasian) Agency (Vic) Pty Ltd

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86 CLR 209

purposes of the statute. To infer from the presence of S. 10 (2) in the statute that the wide words of S. 12 1 are to be read as excluding a power or function if according to the express terms of a provision of the statute it requires, or depends upon an exercise of discretion or judgment would be to defeat the administration of the Act. There may be matters depending upon the opinion, belief or state of mind of the commissioner and second commis- sioner which because of their character do not fairly fall within the description " power or function ,, in S. 12 (1). But it seems obvious that these words were intended to bear their wide natural meaning unrestricted by any inference from S. 10 (2) of the kind suggested by the rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Of this rule Wills J. in a judgment upheld in the House of Lords (Colquhoun v. Brooks (1) ) said I may observe that the method of construction summarised in the maxim Expressio unius exclusio alterius' is one that certainly requires to be watched. Perhaps few so-called rules of interpretation have been more frequently misapplied and stretched beyond their due limits. The failure to make the 'expressio' complete very often arises from accident, very often from the fact that it never struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded needed specific mention of any kind and the application of this and every other technical rule of con- struction varies SO much under differing circumstances, and is open to SO many qualifications and exceptions, that it is rarely that such rules help one to arrive at what is meant."

In the present case we are concerned with the function of assess- ing taxpayers. It has already been pointed out that S. 166 and S. 167 are not independent, but together give the directions which the assessing officer must pursue. The discretion or judgment involved in S. 167 forms a practically inseparable part of that function. It seems to be clearly within the contemplation of S. 12 (1) that such a discretion or judgment should be included in the delegation of the duty of assessing taxpayers. Any other view would make it impossible to carry on the work of the Depart- ment of Taxation. But in any case the question whether the right officer has applied his mind to the question whether the taxpayer's returns are satisfactory within S. 167 (b) is not a question left open by S. 177. As already has been said, SS. 166 and 167 are together concerned with the process of ascertaining the taxpayer's taxable income and the consequent tax. The clear policy of S. 177 is to distinguish between the procedure or mechanism by which the taxable income and tax is ascertained or assessed on

1(1887) 19 Q.B.D. 400, at p. 406; 14 App. Cas. 493.
86 CLR 210

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Details
Case
[1952] HCA 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Bradshaw v Gilbert's (Australasian) Agency (Vic) Pty Ltd* concerned a dispute over a contract for the sale of 127 tons of scrap battery lead at £98 per ton f.o.b. Melbourne. The purchaser, Bradshaw, refused to proceed with the contract, arguing it was illegal. The vendor, Gilbert's, then sued for damages representing the difference between the contract price and the price obtained on resale. The Supreme Court of Victoria found in favour of the vendor, and the purchaser appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine three primary questions. Firstly, whether the Victorian *Prices Regulation Act 1948* applied to the sale of goods intended for export. Secondly, if it did apply, whether any relevant provisions of the Act were inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation, specifically the *Banking (Foreign Exchange Control) Regulations* and the *Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations*. Thirdly, the Court had to consider whether a transaction in breach of the *Prices Regulation Act 1948* was void.

The Court, comprising Dixon C.J. and Taylor J., held that the *Prices Regulation Act 1948* did apply to sales of goods destined for export, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision for export prices as found in earlier Commonwealth regulations. They reasoned that the Act's language was clear and should not be limited by general considerations of policy or the perceived intent to protect only Victorian consumers. The Court found no repugnancy between the Victorian Act and the relevant Commonwealth regulations, concluding that the Commonwealth regulations controlled the mode of payment and export procedures, rather than the contractual price itself. Crucially, the Court determined that a sale in contravention of section 25(1) of the *Prices Regulation Act 1948* was void, overturning the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

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