JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BRADLEY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2016] WASCA 33
CORAM: BUSS JA
MAZZA JA
MITCHELL J
HEARD: 19 JANUARY 2016
DELIVERED : 19 FEBRUARY 2016
FILE NO/S: CACR 14 of 2015
CACR 15 of 2015
BETWEEN: LACHLAN GEORGE BRADLEY
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :EATON DCJ
File No :IND 904 of 2013
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Drugs offences - Appeals against conviction and sentence - Appellant failed to file appellant's cases - Springing orders - Extension of time for compliance - Whether further extension of time should be granted
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 24
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1), s 33(1), s 38, s 38A, s 38B
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 43(2)(g)(ii)
Result:
Applications for an extension of time to comply with springing orders dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr L M Fox
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bui v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 168
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268
Jenkin v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 226
Le v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 120
MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49
The State of Western Australia v Hunter [2014] WASCA 87
Wharton v The Queen [No 2] [2015] WASCA 176
REASONS OF THE COURT: Before the court are the appellant's applications filed on 16 October 2015 to extend time to comply with springing orders made by a single judge of this court.
Background
On 6 November 2014, the appellant was convicted after trial in the District Court of four drug offences, being three counts of possession of a prohibited drug with intent to sell or supply it to another contrary to s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) (MDA) (counts 1, 2 and 4); and one count of attempting to manufacture a prohibited drug contrary to s 6(1)(b) read with s 33(1) of the MDA (count 3).
On 19 December 2014, the appellant was sentenced as follows:
Count 1
4 years' imprisonment
Count 2
2 years' imprisonment
Count 3
2 years' imprisonment
Count 4
1 year's imprisonment
The learned sentencing judge ordered that the sentence on count 2 be served concurrently with the sentence on count 1, and that the sentences on counts 3 and 4 be served cumulatively on count 1. Thus, the total effective sentence was 7 years' imprisonment. His Honour ordered that the sentences take effect from 3 October 2014, and that the appellant be eligible for parole (sentencing remarks ts 9).
On 5 February 2015, appeal notices against conviction and sentence were filed on the appellant's behalf. The appellant was required…
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- Case
- [2016] WASCA 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that it had the authority to extend time for compliance with a springing order, even after the deadline had passed, based on previous cases such as FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL and Wharton [No 2]. The court also noted that the general principles for extending time for compliance with a springing order, as set out in MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch, applied to criminal appeals. These principles include considering the circumstances in which the springing order was made, the reason for non-compliance, the prejudice to the defaulting party if time is not extended, and the prejudice to the other party if time were extended. The court emphasised that, while there was a strong public interest in the timely disposition of criminal appeals, it must also pay due regard to the difficulties that self-represented appellants in custody face and the serious consequences that potentially flow to an appellant's liberty if the court refuses to grant such applications.
In this case, the court held that the appellant had not provided a sufficiently compelling reason for the extension of time, as the appeals had been on foot for approximately five and a half months, and the appellant had not made any significant progress towards their resolution. The appellant was already in default of the rules and of two orders extending time. Despite the appellant's claim that his appellant's cases were '99% complete' when the springing orders were made, he failed to complete them within the given time frame. The court concluded that the appellant's default could not be insulated from its consequences merely because he had a reasonably arguable case on the merits. Therefore, the court decided not to grant the appellant a further extension of time for compliance with the springing orders.
The final orders of the court were that the appellant's appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed, and the appellant was required to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This court has the power to extend time for compliance with a springing order even though the time for compliance has passed: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268 and Wharton [No 2] [48] ‑ [49]. The general principles applicable to an application to extend time for compliance with a springing order were set out by Master Newnes (as his Honour then was) in MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49 [38] ‑ [41], [46] ‑ [51], [54] ‑ [57]. In Wharton [No 2], those general principles were held to also apply in criminal appeals [52]. In this context, the court said:[T]his court will pay due regard to the difficulties that often face self‑represented appellants in custody and the serious consequences that potentially flow to an appellant's liberty if the court refuses to grant such applications. It must also be recognised that there is a strong public interest in the timely disposition of criminal appeals and that, in many cases, there is a human cost to victims and/or their families as a result of undue delay. (citations omitted) The court went on to state [57] ‑ [58]:The starting point is that this is an application to extend time for compliance with a springing order. Maintenance of the authority of the court requires that weight is given to the need to comply with orders of the court. By its nature, a springing order is intended to be the end of the line for a party who has failed to comply with orders of the court and maintenance of the authority of the court. The proper administration of justice requires that the springing order generally be, as is its evident object, the last opportunity for the party in default. Often, if not generally, when the deadline for compliance with a springing order has passed, and the party in default seeks an extension, that party provides the document the subject of the default in support of the application for an extension of time. The exercise of the discretion to extend time to comply with a springing order must be exercised having regard to all of the circumstances of a particular case. There are no hard and fast rules as to the matters to which the court should have regard, but the court will usually have regard to at least the following matters:(a)The circumstances in which the springing order came to be made.(b)The reason for non-compliance with the springing order.(c)The prejudice to the defaulting party if time is not extended.(d)The prejudice to the other party if time were extended. Another relevant consideration is whether the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case on the merits. However, even if the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case, that does not automatically insulate that party from the consequences of its default. By the time the springing orders were made, the appeals had been on foot for approximately five and a half months, and the appellant had not made any significant progress towards their resolution. The appellant was in default of the rules and of two orders extending time. When the springing orders were made, the appellant claimed that his appellant's cases were '99% complete'. He was then given ample time to complete them. He acknowledged the importance of complying with the orders, but failed to do so.