BR v State of Queensland (No. 2)

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 154

PARTIES:

BR
(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland
(Respondent)

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – suspension without pay decision

DELIVERED ON:

6 May 2022

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Hartigan IC

On the papers

ORDER:

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – public service appeal – appeal against a suspension without pay decision – where appellant is also employed as a ride share driver – where appellant has been charged with seven indictable offences during the course of his employment as a ride share driver – where appellant suspended from duty without remuneration – where appellant submits that decision is not fair and reasonable – where appellant submits he was denied natural justice – where respondent formed a reasonable belief that the appellant is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law – where it was open on the material for the decision maker to form a reasonable belief that the appellant was liable to discipline under a disciplinary law – where appellant was not denied natural justice – where decision fair and reasonable – decision appealed against confirmed

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 562B and 562C
Public Service Act 2008 (Qld), ss 137, 187 and 194
Suspension (Directive 16/20), cls 5 and 6

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)
Mazza v Stewart (Commissioner of Police) & Anor [2017] QSC 43

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. The Appellant [(name withheld)][1]is employed by the State of Queensland [(Department name withheld)] ('the Department'), in the position of [(position title withheld)] in the [(team name withheld)] on a permanent full-time basis.

    [1] The identifying information of the Appellant has been withheld by an order of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission issued on 22 April 2022. See BR v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 146.

  1. In addition to the Appellant's public sector role with the Department, the Appellant also works as a ride share driver. In October 2021, the Appellant was charged with seven indictable offences, which are alleged to have occurred during the course of his work as a ride share driver, including, but not limited to, five counts of sexual assault.

  2. On 8 November 2021, the Appellant's then legal representatives advised the Department that he had been charged with seven indictable offences and that he had been remanded in custody. The Appellant was subsequently released from custody after being granted bail.

  3. Following receipt of this information, the Department issued the Appellant a notice of suspension on normal remuneration pursuant to s 137(1)(a) of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ('the PS Act') and a show cause notice for suspension without remuneration, on the basis that the Department held a reasonable belief that the…

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Details
Case
[2022] QIRC 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BR v State of Queensland (No. 2) was heard by the Industrial Court of Queensland, involving an appeal against a decision to suspend a public servant, BR, without pay. The appellant, who was employed by the state of Queensland, faced multiple serious charges, including five counts of sexual assault, entering a dwelling with intent, and deprivation of liberty, while concurrently working as a ride-share driver. The decision to suspend BR without pay was based on these charges and the potential impact on public service integrity and safety.

The court was tasked with determining whether the suspension decision was fair and reasonable, and if the appellant had been denied natural justice. The decision maker had considered the severity of the charges and the necessity of the suspension to maintain public service standards. BR argued that the decision was unjust and that it violated his right to the presumption of innocence. However, the court held that the suspension was an administrative action rather than a disciplinary one, and thus, the decision maker was not required to determine the truth of the allegations.

In its ruling, the court found that the decision to suspend BR without pay was both fair and reasonable. The court accepted that the decision maker was justified in forming a reasonable belief that BR was liable to discipline under a disciplinary law, given the nature and number of the charges. The court also found that BR had not been denied natural justice. The court confirmed the decision to suspend BR without pay, noting that any impact on BR's human rights was justified by the public interest in maintaining public service integrity. The court emphasised that suspension was an administrative measure and not a form of punishment or disciplinary action.

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons contained herein, I have found that the decision was fair and reasonable.The decision In the decision, the decision maker advised the Appellant that he was to be suspended from duty without normal remuneration and provided the following reasons in support of the decision:Consideration of suspension without normal remuneration…The nature of the discipline matter against you· In your response, you appropriately concede that the charges against you are serious, As I have noted, in my view, noting the number and nature of the charges (including five counts of sexual assault, one count of entering a dwelling with intent and one count of deprivation of liberty), and the number of complainant's involved (three, noting it does not appear to be suggested that the complainants are known to each other, or were previously known to you), the charges against you are of the utmost seriousness.· Throughout your Response, you have made various submissions regarding the test in Briginshaw, the presumption of innocence, and that there have been no adverse findings against you. It is important to note however that I am not required, nor is it appropriate for me, to determine whether you engaged in the conduct the subject of the criminal charges in determining whether to suspend you from duty without remuneration. The decision to suspend you from duty (whether with or without pay) should not be conflated with the commencement of a disciplinary process pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Act. Rather, suspension is an administrative action, taken for administrative necessity, and is not disciplinary action (see clause 1.2 of Directive 16/20). Further, in the event your employment is not ultimately terminated following a formal discipline process, you are entitled to be reimbursed your normal remuneration from the date of your suspension without pay (see clause 6.6 of Directive 16/20). The decision maker also considered the effects of the decision on the Appellant's human rights as follows:I acknowledge that my decision to continue your suspension and to suspend you from duty without normal remuneration may potentially impact on your human rights including the right to privacy and reputation, which extends to protect professional relationships and reputation and the right to participate in public life (through employment in the public service).However, I consider any limitation is demonstrably justified. This is because in my view the public interest in ensuring consideration is given to suspending employees without normal remuneration where there are factors outside of the Department's control impacting on its ability to progress allegations against an employee, (such as serious outstanding criminal charges), outweighs the limited potential impact on your human rights at this time. Further, in the event that the criminal charges do not ultimately lead to your termination, you will be reimbursed for any lost remuneration arising from your suspension without remuneration. I also note that you have secondary employment which is providing you with income during the course of your suspension without pay. As I have noted above, suspension is an administrative action taken and is not discipline or taken as a form of punishment. Finally, for the reasons set out above, I do not accept your submissions that a decision to suspend you means that your entitlement to the presumption of innocence in respect of the criminal charges against you has been compromised, or that I have made any determination as to the veracity of the allegations against you. Relevant legislation and Directive

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the decision, the decision maker advised the Appellant that he was to be suspended from duty without normal remuneration and provided the following reasons in support of the decision:Consideration of suspension without normal remuneration…The nature of the discipline matter against you· In your response, you appropriately concede that the charges against you are serious, As I have noted, in my view, noting the number and nature of the charges (including five counts of sexual assault, one count of entering a dwelling with intent and one count of deprivation of liberty), and the number of complainant's involved (three, noting it does not appear to be suggested that the complainants are known to each other, or were previously known to you), the charges against you are of the utmost seriousness.· Throughout your Response, you have made various submissions regarding the test in Briginshaw, the presumption of innocence, and that there have been no adverse findings against you. It is important to note however that I am not required, nor is it appropriate for me, to determine whether you engaged in the conduct the subject of the criminal charges in determining whether to suspend you from duty without remuneration. The decision to suspend you from duty (whether with or without pay) should not be conflated with the commencement of a disciplinary process pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Act. Rather, suspension is an administrative action, taken for administrative necessity, and is not disciplinary action (see clause 1.2 of Directive 16/20). Further, in the event your employment is not ultimately terminated following a formal discipline process, you are entitled to be reimbursed your normal remuneration from the date of your suspension without pay (see clause 6.6 of Directive 16/20). The decision maker also considered the effects of the decision on the Appellant's human rights as follows:I acknowledge that my decision to continue your suspension and to suspend you from duty without normal remuneration may potentially impact on your human rights including the right to privacy and reputation, which extends to protect professional relationships and reputation and the right to participate in public life (through employment in the public service).However, I consider any limitation is demonstrably justified. This is because in my view the public interest in ensuring consideration is given to suspending employees without normal remuneration where there are factors outside of the Department's control impacting on its ability to progress allegations against an employee, (such as serious outstanding criminal charges), outweighs the limited potential impact on your human rights at this time. Further, in the event that the criminal charges do not ultimately lead to your termination, you will be reimbursed for any lost remuneration arising from your suspension without remuneration. I also note that you have secondary employment which is providing you with income during the course of your suspension without pay. As I have noted above, suspension is an administrative action taken and is not discipline or taken as a form of punishment. Finally, for the reasons set out above, I do not accept your submissions that a decision to suspend you means that your entitlement to the presumption of innocence in respect of the criminal charges against you has been compromised, or that I have made any determination as to the veracity of the allegations against you. Relevant legislation and Directive