BQW16 v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 3249
•14 November 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BQW16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 3249 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of the Delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant a Protection visa to the applicant – claim that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to exercise proper procedure, did not bring an impartial mind to the matter, denied natural justice to the applicant, was preoccupied and cut and pasted from the decision of the Delegate – none of the grounds asserted by the applicant established – no jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for judicial review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 45AA, 423A, 424, 424A, 424AA, 430 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Cases cited: AWA15 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 604 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls & Ors (2011) 244 CLR 427 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li & Anor (2013) 249 CLR 332 Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 MZWOG v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1738 MZZZW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 154 Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 SZIFS v Minster or Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1574 SZMDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 499 |
| Applicant: | BQW16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1713 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing date: | 22 November 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 14 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person. |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr L. Dennis |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Minter Ellison Lawyers |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
The Amended Application filed in this Court on 30 September 2016 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1713 of 2016
| BQW16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The Applicant in this proceeding is a male citizen of Bangladesh aged 35 years, having been born on 19 May 1983.
By Amended Application filed in this Court on 30 September 2016 he seeks to quash and have re-determined the decision of the Second Respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), dated 8 June 2016 which set aside the decision of the Delegate (Delegate) of the First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), dated 19 December 2014 refusing to grant to him a Temporary Protection (Class XD) (Subclass 785) visa (temporary Protection (Class XD) visa).
The Applicant arrived in Australia, via Thailand and Indonesia, at Darwin on 6 May 2013 as an irregular maritime arrival. He was granted a Bridging visa on 23 July 2013, and on 4 September 2013 the Applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Protection (Class XA) visa).
Claims for Protection
In his Statement dated 4 August 2013 forming part of his Protection (Class XA) visa application the Applicant made the following claims:
a)He was born in Italla Village in Comilla District, Bangladesh, is a Muslim and was raised on a farm on which vegetables were grown and cows were raised for milk.
b)He fears returning to Bangladesh. His elder brother was a member of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and he himself was a supporter of the BNP. As a supporter he attended meetings, encouraged people to vote for the BNP, placed posters around the village and helped at BNP meetings and events, as he believed the BNP helped the welfare of the poor people in his village. He also had a business at a shop keeper.
c)At the beginning of 2013 approximately five or six men from the Awami League (AL), which was the political party in power in Bangladesh at that time, went to the Applicant’s shop to extort 250,000 taka from him and if he did not pay the money they were going to beat and / or kill him.
d)He was given three days to provide the money, but two days later the AL members returned to ask for money again. The Applicant called his brother to the shop and when the Applicant and his brother refused to pay the AL members they beat his brother and they all started fighting.
e)His father advised he and his brother to report this incident to the village leader. The village leader advised the AL members that the Applicant’s family could not pay so much money, but they did not accept the village leader’s advice and targeted the Applicant and his brother. His brother is now missing because he and his brother would not join the AL or pay the AL money.
f)He fears that he will be harmed or killed by AL members and the authorities in Bangladesh will not protect him because the AL is in power.
Relevant Criteria and Law Applicable to Protection Visa Applications
A convenient summary of the relevant grounds and criteria for the grant of protection visas in this proceeding can be found in the judgment of Charlesworth J in AWA15 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 604 at [5] – [7] as follows:
[5]The Minister is to grant a visa if satisfied that the visa applicant satisfies the relevant criteria. If the Minister is not so satisfied, he must refuse to grant the visa: s 65(1) of the Act. For the appellant to qualify for the grant of a protection visa it was necessary for the Minister to be satisfied that (among other things) the appellant fulfilled either the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (Refugee Criterion) or the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (Complementary Protection Criterion).
[6]The Refugee Criterion requires that the Minister be satisfied that the visa applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, as amended by the Refugees Protocol, namely a person who:
... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
[7]Relevantly, the Complementary Protection Criterion requires that the visa applicant be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because:
... the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; ....
Decision of Delegate
The Applicant attended an interview with the Delegate on 30 September 2014 with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages, and was represented by his registered migration agent.
The Delegate in his Decision Record summarised the Applicant’s claims as made in his Protection (Class XA) visa application and by the Applicant’s registered migration agent at the interview with the Delegate.
In the result, the Delegate found that the Applicant was not a witness of truth with regard to his claims for protection and that he had fabricated his claims to enhance his prospects of invoking Australia’s protection obligations. Accordingly, the Delegate rejected his claims in their entirety and found that he was not satisfied that Australia had protection obligations to the Applicant under s.36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and cl.866.221 of Sch.2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) and refused to grant to him a Protection (Class XA) visa.
Decision of Tribunal
The Applicant applied to the Tribunal on 12 January 2015 for merits review of the Delegate’s decision and at that time gave a copy of the Decision Record of the Delegate to the Tribunal. Under cover of email dated 22 April 2016 the Applicant’s solicitor and registered migration agent (solicitor) made lengthy written submissions in support of the application for review (Submissions).
On 28 April 2016 the Applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments together with his solicitor and with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages.
At [3] of its Decision Record the Tribunal recorded that whilst the Applicant had originally applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, as of 16 December 2014 (i.e. 3 days before the decision of the Delegate on 19 December 2014) by force of s.45AA of the Act and reg.2.08F of the Regulations the Applicant’s Protection (Class XA) visa application was taken to be, and to have always been, a valid application for a temporary Protection (Class XD) visa and taken not to be, and never to have been, a valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa.
Nevertheless, I note that the criteria to be satisfied for the temporary Protection (Class XD) visa remained the same criteria as that which applied to a Protection (Class XA) visa, for which the Applicant had originally applied, namely satisfaction both at time of application and at time of decision of a criterion mentioned in s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act and that the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claims to protection under both the Refugees Convention criterion and the complementary protection criterion.
At [11] of its Decision Record the Tribunal itemised the sources of evidence and information before it, including the claims as made by the Applicant in his entry interview, his interview with the Delegate, information submitted by the Applicant, information referred to in the Delegate’s Decision Record and a range of country information.
From [12] – [14] the Tribunal summarised the Applicant’s claims to protection and reproduced at [14] the claimed essential and significant reasons for the Applicant’s claim to fear persecution as made in section 2 of the Submissions.
At [17] of its Decision Record the Tribunal recorded that it considered that “the Applicant’s evidence on central aspects of his claims was variously vague, unsubstantiated as well as often inconsistent with his earlier evidence. For reasons outlined below the Tribunal is not satisfied that critical aspects of the applicant’s claims are credible and finds that the decision should be affirmed.”.
Then from [18] – [28] the Tribunal considered eight separate matters in relation to the Applicant’s claims, on which it made adverse findings.
At [29] of its Decision Record the Tribunal recorded its questioning of the Applicant as to his BNP beliefs and activities and found that his lack of knowledge of BNP principles and policies reflected poorly on his credibility and the reliability of his evidence and led it to refuse to accept that he had the profile of a BNP supporter as he had claimed.
At [30] the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied as to the reliability of the Applicant’s claims and recorded that it did not accept that he was of adverse interest to anyone in Bangladesh. At [34] the Tribunal found that the Applicant was not a witness of truth, it was not satisfied that critical aspects of his claims were credible and it did not accept that AL members and supporters were looking for the Applicant.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant satisfied the Refugees Convention criterion or the complementary protection criterion and at [42] set aside the Delegate’s decision to refuse a Protection (Class XA) visa because it had found that the Delegate should have considered an application for a temporary Protection (Class XD) visa (see [11] above) and substituted the Delegate’s decision with a decision to refuse to grant to the Applicant a temporary Protection (Class XD) visa.
Grounds of Attack on Tribunal Decision in this Court
The Grounds of the Amended Application are as follows:
1. The Administrative Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) made error of law and failed to exercise the proper procedure in relation to make decision on the review of the applicant's protection visa rejection by the First Respondent.
2.The manner in which the tribunal dealt with the application and the applicant was such that it is possible to fairly apprehend that the tribunal did not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the matter before it.
3.The second respondent has denied the applicant's natural justice and procedural fairness pursuant to s423A and 430(1) of the Migration Act 1958.
4.The applicant claims that the Tribunal was preoccupied and that was why he was denied natural justice and procedural fairness when the Tribunal formed the view about the applicant before the hearing. Preoccupation is clearly authenticated in its decision that the Tribunal has cut & pasted from the delegate's decision.
5.The applicant was deprived of the natural justice and procedural fairness. The Tribunal did not give neutral view in assessing / reviewing the applicant's claim whose interest has [been] adversely affected by the primary decision. The review authority did not give the applicant opportunity in a correct manner to present his case. The Tribunal did not follow the hearing rule as based on Maxim which is clearly recognized as a denial of procedural fairness.
The Applicant also relied on an Outline of Submissions dated 3 November 2017 (Outline of Submissions) and Particulars to the Grounds in the Amended Application (Particulars). At the hearing in this Court he did not address the Grounds, but rather complained that the Tribunal had considered a different type of protection visa application than that for which he had originally applied. I pointed out to him that the criteria for both the Protection (Class XA) visa and the temporary Protection (Class XD) visa were the same and invited him to state how he had been disadvantaged, but he could not.
Consideration
I will first deal with the five Grounds which appear in the Amended Application, then deal with other complaints appearing in the Particulars and then deal with the complaint raised in the Outline of Submissions.
Ground 1
Ground 1 simply asserts in general terms that the Tribunal made an “error of law” and “failed to exercise a proper procedure”. It may be that this Ground is to be read as a preamble to the Grounds that follow.
In the absence of an identification of the alleged “error of law” or of how it is asserted that the Tribunal exercised improper procedure it is not possible to deal with this Ground and as it stands it is not made out.
Ground 1 fails to establish jurisdictional error.
Ground 2
This Ground appears to assert that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by apprehension of bias. The test for apprehension of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the decision making process: see Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 344 – 345. It is an objective test not requiring an assessment of the state of mind of the judge or decision-maker, as is necessary on an enquiry about actual bias: see Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls & Ors (2011) 244 CLR 427 per Gummow A-CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ at 437 [32].
Actual or apprehended bias are matters which go to procedural fairness and the denial of procedural fairness on the part of an administrative decision-maker, such as the Tribunal, may result in jurisdictional error justifying an order that the decision be set aside: Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at 91 [17] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li & Anor (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 357 [48] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
The Applicant has tendered a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. I told him at the hearing that I did not propose to read this transcript generally, but only those portions which I was specifically taken to. I was not taken to any portions of the transcript, but nevertheless I have skim-read its pages. In my view, neither the transcript of the Tribunal hearing nor the Decision Record of the Tribunal itself has any tendency to suggest that there could be a reasonable apprehension of bias in connection with the decision of the Tribunal.
Further, it is to be remembered that the Applicant’s solicitor was present at the Tribunal hearing and the transcript reveals that at the end of the hearing the solicitor made submissions to the Tribunal. The transcript indicates that no complaint was made by either the Applicant or his solicitor of the conduct of the Tribunal at the hearing.
Ground 2 fails to establish that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.
Ground 3
This Ground contends that the Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness under s.423A and s.430 of the Act. Section 423A prescribes how the Tribunal is to deal with new claims or evidence that were not previously raised and s.430 prescribes the content of the written decision of the Tribunal on a review.
Here, in my view the Decision Record of the Tribunal has complied with s.430 of the Act and there was no reliance upon nor breach by the Tribunal of s.423A. This Ground fails to establish jurisdictional error.
Ground 4
This Ground fails at a factual level.
There is no evidence that the Tribunal member was “preoccupied” and thereby denied natural justice and procedural fairness to the Applicant. The transcript of the Tribunal hearing appears to indicate a completely conventional hearing where the Tribunal member engaged in her inquisitorial function of questioning the Applicant about his claims in the presence of his solicitor, who made no complaint of the Tribunal member’s conduct at the hearing.
Further, I cannot find any evidence that the Tribunal in its Decision Record has cut and pasted anything from the Decision Record of the Delegate. Even if it had, this in itself would not constitute jurisdictional error as long as the Tribunal gave meaningful consideration to its review of the decision of the Delegate and “… brought its own independent mind to bear on what would be the correct or preferable decision on the review”: MZZZW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 154 at 163 [31] per Tracey, Murphy and Mortimer JJ.
This Ground fails to establish jurisdictional error.
Ground 5
This Ground also fails to establish jurisdictional error.
There is not a skerrick of evidence that the Tribunal in this case was actually biased, or had in bad faith pre-judged or pre-decided the review application. There is no evidence that the Tribunal truncated or restricted the Applicant from presenting his case in the presence of and with the assistance of his solicitor, who again made no complaint to the Tribunal member in this regard.
Particulars
Turning to the Particulars to the Grounds, the first three paragraphs appear to assert that the Tribunal acted unfairly by not putting the inconsistencies it found “in writing to the [Applicant] for comment”, and thereby breached s.424(1) of the Act, which I assume is meant to be a reference to s.424A or s.424AA.
In relation to this complaint the role of the Tribunal was as stated by Hayne J in Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 at 661 – 662 [265] – [266] and [268]:
[265]…………The tribunal was not obliged to tell Mr Muin that it was minded to reach a view about that question, which was contrary to the view he sought to have it form, and then ask him whether he wished to contradict that view. That he had to make out his claim about this matter was apparent from the outset of the tribunal's review. Indeed, it was apparent from the moment he made his claim to a protection visa. This was not some issue that emerged only in the course of the tribunal's proceedings.
[266] Nor was the tribunal bound to draw attention to the material which it considered to be persuasive of the view that he was not a refugee and then ask him whether he wanted to contradict it. Of course he wanted to put the opposite view. Again, so much was clear from the moment he made his claim for a protection visa. But it is fundamentally wrong to speak, in this context, in terms of “contradiction” if that is to suggest some competition between cases put by adversaries. Here there was no adversary to Mr Muin's claim. It was for him to make good his claim that he was entitled to Australia's protection.
[268] Yet in essence the plaintiff's case in relation to adverse material was, first, that he could legitimately expect the tribunal to tell him that it was minded to find against him and, secondly, that he could legitimately expect the tribunal to tell him what material, adverse to his claim, the tribunal either was minded to accept or was considering accepting and, before concluding the matter, seek his comment about that predisposition and that material. Procedural fairness does not go so far. To accept these contentions would amount to casting the tribunal in the role of an adversary to a claimant's claim to refugee status. Not only were the procedures prescribed by the Act not adversarial proceedings, the tribunal is not to be cast in the role of contradictor.
(emphasis added)
Further, as Graham J said of proceedings before the Tribunal in SZMDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 499 at 505 – 506 [36] – [37]:
[36] Proceedings before the tribunal are not adversarial, but inquisitorial. The tribunal is not in the position of a contradictor of the case being advanced by an applicant. A tribunal member conducting an inquiry is not an adversarial cross-examiner, but an inquisitor obliged to be fair. In an application for a review before the tribunal, it is for the applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument he wishes to advance, and for the tribunal to decide whether his claim has been made out; it is not part of the function of the tribunal to seek to damage the credibility of an applicant’s story in a manner a cross-examiner might seek to damage the credibility of a witness being cross-examined in adversarial litigation. The tribunal conducting an inquisitorial hearing is not obliged to prompt and stimulate an elaboration which an applicant chooses not to embark on. See per Gummow and Heydon JJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs); Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 437 ; 75 ALD 1 ; [2003] HCA 60 at [57]–[58] ; see also SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 ; 231 ALR 592 ; 93 ALD 300 ; [2006] HCA 63 at [47] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 ; 231 ALR 340 ; 92 ALD 513 ; [2006] HCA 53 at [40] .
[37] The Act does not require that the tribunal actively assist an applicant in putting his case nor does it require the tribunal to carry out an inquiry in order to identify what that case might be: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553; 198 ALR 293; 75 ALD 151; [2003] FCAFC 126 at [36].
Finally, in relation to s.424A and s.424AA of the Act it is clear law that the word “information” in those sections relates to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation and not to the Tribunal’s existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at 615 – 616 [17] – [18] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ.
In fact the transcript of the Tribunal hearing does indicate at the bottom of unnumbered page 26 that the Tribunal did inform the Applicant that it was going to put information to him that would, subject to the Applicant’s comments, be part of the reasons for affirming the Delegate’s decision and then proceeded to do so. In the ensuing pages apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies were put by the Tribunal member to the Applicant. In my view, the Tribunal was not strictly under any obligation to put perceived inconsistencies to the Applicant, but the apparent belief or assumption by the Tribunal that s.424A or s.424AA of the Act required information to be provided to an applicant is immaterial if, in fact, such information is exempted from the operation of those sections: SZTGV v Minister for Immigration (2015) 229 FCR 90 at 109 [53] per Perram, Jagot and Griffiths JJ; SZMDS v Minister for Immigration (2009) 107 ALD 361 at [14] per Moore J; SZTNL v Minister for Immigration (2015) 231 FCR 204 at 219 [49] per Griffiths J.
Next it is asserted in the Particulars that the Tribunal “failed to give the benefit of the doubt” to the Applicant and required the Applicant “to strictly prove all of his claims” and had found that the Applicant “had concocted all of his claims in as much as the Tribunal did not have evidence to make that finding”.
In my view none of these allegations establish jurisdictional error. The Tribunal did not use the word “concocted” in its Decision Record and it did not require the Applicant “to strictly prove all of his claims”. The Decision Record of the Tribunal discloses that the Tribunal gave meaningful consideration to the Applicant’s claims but in the end was not satisfied that they were true.
Finally, it is asserted in the Particulars that “the tribunal was quite influenced and biased by the primary decision given by the delegate”. However, there is no evidence that this was the case. The Tribunal was carrying out its statutory duty of reviewing the Decision Record of the Delegate and there is nothing that has a tendency to indicate that the Tribunal was improperly or illegitimately influenced by the Delegate’s decision, and this assertion does not establish jurisdictional error.
Outline of Submissions
In the Outline of Submissions the Applicant appears to complain that the Tribunal did not deal with the issue of relocation and did not check with the Applicant that he understood the change in the law on 16 December 2014, summarised at [11] above.
As to the issue of relocation, the Tribunal in its Decision Record in the last bullet point of [12] recognised that the Applicant had claimed that “he could not relocate” in Bangladesh “as Awami League members are everywhere”.
However, the fact of the matter is that the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was or is of any adverse interest to anyone in Bangladesh or that there was a real chance he would be killed or suffer serious harm, or harm of any kind, if he returned to Bangladesh now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that there was real risk that in returning to Bangladesh he would suffer significant harm: see [30] – [32] and [37] – [38] of the Decision Record of the Tribunal. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to deal with the issue of relocation: see MZWOG v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCA 1738 at [12] per Sundberg J.
As to the change of law concerning the Protection (Class XA) visa for which the Applicant had originally applied, in my view there was no obligation on the Tribunal to give the Applicant advice in this regard: SZIFS v Minster or Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1574 at [24] per Graham J. After all, the Applicant had his own solicitor and the criteria considered by the Tribunal for the grant of the temporary Protection (Class XD) visa were the same criteria applicable to the Protection (Class XA) visa for which he had originally applied.
The Applicant has not pointed to any practical difference or practical injustice which resulted from the Tribunal not advising him of the legal changes effected as and from 16 December 2014. The only practical difference I have been able to discover between the two different subclasses of visa is that cl.866.511 would permit the holder of a Protection (Class XA) visa “to travel to and enter Australia for a period of 5 years from the date of grant”, whereas cl.785.511 would permit the holder of a temporary Protection (Class XD) visa to travel to and enter Australia for a maximum period of 3 years. The fact that there was a change in Australian law in this respect as and from 16 December 2014 is not something of which the Applicant can complain.
Conclusion
Accordingly, in my view the Applicant has not established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error and the Amended Application filed in this Court is to be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Dowdy
Associate:
Date: 14 November 2018
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