BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited [2002] FCA 679

EVIDENCE – opinion – evidence relating to markets for fuel and retail prices – whether deponent has specialised knowledge – whether such knowledge based on experience – whether expressed opinion wholly or substantially based on that knowledge

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55(1), 56, 59, 60, 76(1), 79, 135, 136
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51A, 87(2)(b)

Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542 referred to
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615 referred to

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (formerly BP Australia Limited) v NYRAN PTY LIMITED
W144 of 2002

RD NICHOLSON J
28 MAY 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W144 of 2002

BETWEEN:

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
ACN 004 085 66
(formerly BP Australia Limited)
APPLICANT

AND:

NYRAN PTY LIMITED
ACN 056 571 530
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RD NICHOLSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The objection on behalf of the respondent to the admission of paragraphs 12 – 17 of the affidavit of Kelliann Barnes sworn on 16 May 2002 be allowed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W144 of 2002

BETWEEN:

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
ACN 004 085 66
(formerly BP Australia Limited)
APPLICANT

AND:

NYRAN PTY LIMITED
ACN 056 571 530
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RD NICHOLSON J

DATE:

28 MAY 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant brings a motion seeking orders that the hearing of this proceeding be expedited and be set down on a date before 1 July 2002. 

    Background circumstances

  2. As appears from the statement of claim, the applicant entered into a fuel supply agreement (“the FSA”) with the respondent on or about 1 April 1998 whereby the applicant agreed to supply fuel to the respondent for a period of three years commencing on 2 April 1998.  It is pleaded that pursuant to the FSA, clause 11 thereof, provided that the applicant would supply fuel to the respondent at specified prices.  Clause 21 provided:

    “21.The Second Price Negotiation will be deemed to have concluded on the Second Year Anniversary and;

    21.1…

    21.2if new prices have not been agreed, then the prices specified in clause 11 will continue to apply;

    for the remainder of the Term.”

  3. It is then pleaded that in October 1999 the applicant and the respondent undertook negotiations in relation to the FSA.  On or about 17 November 1999 it is pleaded that there was agreement reached between them to the effect that the respondent would take supply of fuel from the applicant and would not seek supply from an alternative source; the term of FSA would be extended from three years to seven years; and the respondent would pay a clean fuel quality premium (“CFQP”) charged by the applicant upon the applicant’s assurance…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 679
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited, the applicant, BP Australia, sought an expedited hearing for a proceeding related to a fuel supply agreement (FSA) with the respondent, Nyran Pty Limited. The dispute centred around the interpretation and application of the FSA, particularly concerning the renegotiation of fuel prices and the extension of the agreement's term. BP Australia argued for a prompt resolution of the matter due to significant financial implications for both parties and the broader market, including potential impacts on consumers and other market participants.

The central legal issue before the court was the admissibility of certain paragraphs in the applicant's affidavit, specifically paragraphs 12 to 17, which contained opinions about the necessity for an expedited hearing and the potential market and financial consequences of a delayed resolution. The court had to determine whether these opinions, based on the deponent's experience and the views of others involved in negotiations, met the statutory requirements for the admissibility of opinion evidence under the relevant legal framework.

The court concluded that the opinions expressed in paragraphs 12 to 17 were not "wholly or substantially" based on the deponent's own experience and knowledge but rather derived from a "combined team effort." This made them dependent on the views of others involved in negotiations with other oil companies, which did not meet the statutory tests for the admissibility of opinion evidence. Consequently, the objection to the admission of these paragraphs was allowed.

As a result, the court ruled that the objection on behalf of the respondent to the admission of paragraphs 12 to 17 of the affidavit of Kelliann Barnes sworn on 16 May 2002 be allowed. This ruling was specific to the assessment of whether the deponent's experience and knowledge qualified for the admission of opinion evidence concerning the issues raised in those paragraphs and did not reflect on the deponent's experience or actual specialised knowledge.

Orders

Orders of the court

The objection on behalf of the respondent to the admission of paragraphs 12 – 17 of the affidavit of Kelliann Barnes sworn on 16 May 2002 be allowed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant brings a motion seeking orders that the hearing of this proceeding be expedited and be set down on a date before 1 July 2002. Background circumstances As appears from the statement of claim, the applicant entered into a fuel supply agreement (“the FSA”) with the respondent on or about 1 April 1998 whereby the applicant agreed to supply fuel to the respondent for a period of three years commencing on 2 April 1998. It is pleaded that pursuant to the FSA, clause 11 thereof, provided that the applicant would supply fuel to the respondent at specified prices. Clause 21 provided:“21.The Second Price Negotiation will be deemed to have concluded on the Second Year Anniversary and;21.1…21.2if new prices have not been agreed, then the prices specified in clause 11 will continue to apply; for the remainder of the Term.” It is then pleaded that in October 1999 the applicant and the respondent undertook negotiations in relation to the FSA. On or about 17 November 1999 it is pleaded that there was agreement reached between them to the effect that the respondent would take supply of fuel from the applicant and would not seek supply from an alternative source; the term of FSA would be extended from three years to seven years; and the respondent would pay a clean fuel quality premium (“CFQP”) charged by the applicant upon the applicant’s assurance that such CFQP would not exceed that paid by other customers of the applicant. The position in relation to the CFQP is not a matter of further concern for the purpose of these reasons. Around 14 December 1999 it is alleged that the applicant proposed the first draft of amendments to the FSA. However, in May 2000 the same parties undertook further negotiations. It is alleged that in early May 2000 the respondent agreed with the applicant that:“(a)a price renegotiation take place each year during the month preceding the anniversary of the commencement of the FSA (“the price negotiation period”), with the aim of agreeing new prices for the fuel to be supplied pursuant to the FSA; (b)if new prices were agreed during the price negotiation period, those new prices would take effect for a period of twelve months commencing on the next anniversary of the commencement of the FSA (“the next twelve months”);(c)if new prices were not agreed the prices specified by BP during the price negotiations period would be the prices at which fuel would be supplied for the next twelve months subject to Gull’s rights in subpar (d)(d)if new prices were not agreed during the price negotiation period, Gull was entitled (except in the case of a failure to agree new prices for the CFQP), within 7 days of the date on which the next twelve months commenced to give 90 days’ notice in writing of the termination of the FSA and, the new prices specified by BP during the price negotiation period would apply to the fuel supplied pursuant to the FSA(e)the CFQP for motor spirit would be $0.0035 until the agreed Changeover Date (as defined) unless a “Suitable Regional Marker” was agreed by both parties prior to 30 June 2000provided that any increases in prices be no greater than any increase to any other customer of BP in Western Australia.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The affidavit then addresses matters upon which the deponent relies to contend that there is a need for expedition of the hearing of the claim. Those matters appear in pars 12 – 17 of the affidavit, which read:“(12)BP wishes to comply with its contractual obligations as determined by the Court and it seeks to have those obligations determined by the Court as a matter of urgency. So long as the question of the prices which BP is entitled to charge Gull from 1 July 2002 remains unresolved, there are potentially significant financial and economic consequences not only for the parties themselves but also for the market generally. Early determination of this dispute is important to a determination of the prices that will be charged, not only by BP to Gull but also to other market participants such as the OOCs and, of course, ultimately to consumers of fuel in Western Australia.(13)A number of potentially significant difficulties arise depending upon whether BP charges Gull the higher prices specified in its letter of 28 March 2002 from 1 July 2002 (confidential exhibit “KB4”) and, if so, whether Gull pays those prices.(14)Questions will inevitably arise as to the retail prices which will be charged for so long as the current dispute remains unresolved, and as to the consequences for the market and for consumers. For instance, if Gull was to pay BP the currently prevailing prices (thereby potentially placing Gull immediately in breach of the RFSA) and not pass on to consumers any increase reflecting the new prices for which BP contends then, the longer the dispute remains unresolved the greater the likelihood that Gull will not have recouped sufficient revenue from the retail market to satisfy any liability to BP for damages if BP’s interpretation of the RFSA is ultimately upheld. This may have the potential to threaten Gull’s viability, which would not only have consequences for BP’s ability to recover any damages to which it was entitled but would also impact upon consumers of fuel in Western Australia.(15)Alternatively, Gull might seek an injunction restraining BP from charging the higher prices. If it were to succeed in obtaining an injunction, I understand it would be obliged to give an undertaking as to damages. If Gull’s interpretation of the RFSA was ultimately found to be incorrect, the damages for which Gull would be liable under the undertaking could amount to approximately A$34m. Now produced and shown to me and marked confidential exhibit “KB5” are details of the damage BP would suffer in those circumstances.(16)In addition to the matters outlined above, until the dispute with Gull is resolved BP is confronted with substantial commercial difficulties in its negotiations with all of the OOCs, which account for 4.6 billion litres of fuel sold in Western Australia per annum and 33 billion litres of fuel sold per annum elsewhere in Australia. These difficulties may also have significant ramifications for consumers and for the structure of the market and the operation of the market generally.(17)If BP charges Gull the currently prevailing price after 1 July 2002 and charges the OOCs the market price after 1 July 2002 then those circumstances could give rise to artificial anomalies in the structure of the market. [Confidential sentence omitted]. Changes in market share of the various participants in the market would likely occur. It is inevitable, in my view, that the pricing disadvantage of the OOCs would cause them to place commercial pressure on BP to reduce its prices to the OOCs thereby causing a substantial loss to BP if it has to sell below market price in order to maintain some equality among the market participants to which BP supplies.”Admissibility of applicant’s evidence

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is apparent that the opinion which the deponent seeks to express in pars 12-17 is not “wholly or substantially” based on her experience alone. It is derivative from the “combined team effort” and dependent substantially on the views of those involved in negotiations with other oil companies. In the context of the Act, as has been said, I regard that as not properly falling within her own “specialised knowledge”. Conclusion For these reasons I consider that the objection to the admission of pars 12-17 should be allowed. It should be appreciated that this ruling in no way constitutes a reflection on the experience or actual specialised knowledge of the deponent. The ruling is confined only to an assessment of whether her experience and specialised knowledge therefrom qualifies in meeting the statutory tests for admission of opinion evidence in respect of the issues raised in pars 12- 17 of her affidavit.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established