HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason C.J., Wilson, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ.
BP AUSTRALIA LIMITED v. BISSAKER
24 June 1987
Customs and Excise
Customs and Excise—Excise duty—Exemption—Ship's stores—Exemption not available where ship currently engaged in making international voyages but about to make non-international voyage—International voyage one between Australia and place outside Australia—Area of waters outside Australia not place outside Australia—Fishing vessels leaving Japan for fishing grounds—Call at Australian port for fuel before return to fishing grounds—Further call at Australian port before return to Japan—Excise Act 1901 (Cth), ss. 4(1) "overseas ship", 160A(1), (5) "ship's stores"—Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s. 130c "international voyage", "place outside Australia", "ship".
Decision
MASON C.J., WILSON, DEANE, DAWSON AND GAUDRON JJ.: The question for determination in this appeal is whether industrial diesel fuel supplied by the appellants to three Japanese long-line tuna fishing vessels in Fremantle was "ship's stores" within the meaning of that expression as defined by s.160A(5) of the Excise Act 1901 (Cth) and was exempted from excise duty by s.160A(1) of that Act.
2. Section 160A(1) provides:
"Except as provided by the regulations, ship's stores and
aircraft's stores are not liable to Excise duty."Section 160A(5) defines "ship's stores" for the purposes of Pt XIV of the Excise Act as meaning:
"... stores for the use of the passengers or crew of an overseas ship, or for the service of an overseas ship."It is common ground between the parties that the regulations under the Excise Act do not make ship's stores liable to excise duty.
3. By s.4(1) of the Excise Act it is provided that "'Overseas ship' has the same meaning as 'ship' has in Part VII of the Customs Act 1901". The word "ship" is not positively defined for the purposes of Pt VII of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) which deals with ship's stores and aircraft's stores. However, s.130C, an interpretation section for the purposes of the Part, provides that:
"'ship' does not include -(a) a ship that is not currently engaged in making international
voyages; or
(b) a ship that is currently engaged in making international voyages but is about to make a voyage other than an international voyage".
The expression "international voyage" is also defined by s.130C, so as to mean, in relation to a ship:
"... a voyage, whether direct or indirect, between a place in Australia and a place outside Australia".And the same section provides that the expression "place outside Australia" does not include:
"(a) a ship, or an area of waters, outside Australia;
(b) an installation outside Australia; or
(c) a reef, or an uninhabited island, outside Australia".
4. The respondent, the Collector of Customs for Western Australia (the "Collector"), considered that the three Japanese vessels were not overseas ships because they were not currently engaged in making international voyages or, if they were, they were about to make a voyage other than an international voyage. On the other hand the appellants maintained that each vessel…
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- Case
- [1987] HCA 24
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the obligation to maintain the premises in good repair and condition extended to remedying defects that existed at the commencement of the lease. Specifically, the court had to determine the scope of the tenant's repairing covenant and whether it encompassed latent defects present from the outset of the tenancy.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the covenant to maintain premises in good repair and condition does not extend to remedying defects that existed at the commencement of the lease, unless the lease expressly provides for such a remedy. The court reasoned that a covenant to repair generally applies to the state of the premises during the term of the lease, not to their condition at the time of commencement. The obligation is to keep in repair, not to put in repair, unless the wording of the lease clearly indicates otherwise.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales were set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi