Boyle v The Salesian Society (Vic) Inc
[2021] VSC 47
•11 February 2021 (given ex tempore, revised)
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY LIST
S ECI 2019 00758
| BRENDAN BOYLE | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| THE SALESIAN SOCIETY (VIC) INC & ORS (according to the attached Schedule) | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | Ierodiaconou AsJ |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 10 February 2021 |
DATE OF RULING: | 11 February 2021 (given ex tempore, revised) |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Boyle v The Salesian Society (Vic) Inc |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSC 47 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for stay of proceeding – Personal Injury – Psychiatric injury – Medico-legal examination of plaintiff at defendants’ request – Where plaintiff refused to submit to examination – Where examination involved alleged risk to plaintiff – Reasonableness of defendants’ request – Reasonableness of plaintiff’s refusal – Balancing of competing interests – Where prejudice to the defendants not established and risk of harm to the plaintiff accepted – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, r 33.04 – Pyman v Whitefriars College Inc [2019] VSC 361 applied – Stace v Commonwealth (1989) 51 SASR 391.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr M Magazanik | Rightside Legal |
| For the Defendants | Mr C Morshead | Colin Biggers & Paisley |
| No appearances by or on behalf of the Second and Third Defendants |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary.............................................................................................................................................. 1
Background......................................................................................................................................... 1
Defendants’ submissions................................................................................................................. 4
Plaintiff’s submissions..................................................................................................................... 7
Applicable principles........................................................................................................................ 9
Analysis.............................................................................................................................................. 10
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 13
HER HONOUR:
The parties are in dispute about whether or not the plaintiff must submit to examination by a psychiatrist nominated by the first and fourth defendants. The first and fourth defendants seek that the proceeding be stayed if the plaintiff does not submit to psychiatric assessment by 18 February 2021. A stay is also sought if the plaintiff does not do all things reasonably requested, and answer all questions reasonably asked by the psychiatrist for the purpose of the examination.
Summary
The first and fourth defendants’ application is made pursuant to r 33.04 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (‘the Rules’).[1] The defendants’ application will be dismissed.
[1]The defendants’ application is made by summons filed on 29 January 2021.
Background
In this proceeding, the plaintiff alleges that he was abused by priests Father Fox and Father De Hood (the second and third defendants), while a student and boarder at Salesian College Rupertswood between 1978 and 1981. Father Fox and Father De Hood have not taken an active part in the proceeding. The proceeding is defended by the Salesian Society (Vic) Inc (the first defendant) and Mr Gregory Chambers, as executor of the estate of a former Provincial of the Salesians, namely the late Wallace Cornell.
The plaintiff makes allegations of sexual abuse and battery against the second and third defendants. Additionally, he makes allegations of negligence, direct and vicarious liability, against the first and fourth defendants. The allegations, including those of abuse and battery, are denied by the first and fourth defendants.
The plaintiff claims damages for psychiatric injury, as well as medical and like expenses, and loss of earning capacity.
For convenience, references below to ‘the defendants’ are references to the first and fourth defendants.
The plaintiff served a medical report of Dr Danny Shub, psychiatrist, dated 28 December 2018.[2]
[2]Defendants, Affidavit of Christopher Mark Jones sworn 27 January 2021, Exhibit ‘CMJ-1’.
The defendants served a medical report of Dr Helen Piirto, dated 7 October 2019, and a later supplementary report dated 6 July 2020.[3]
[3]Ibid, Exhibits ‘CMJ-2’ and ‘CMJ-3’.
The request for the examination by Dr Jager, psychiatrist, was made on 26 November 2020 by the defendants’ solicitors.[4] The plaintiff’s solicitors responded very shortly afterwards seeking an explanation. The defendants’ solicitors responded the same day referring to r 33.04 and noting that the plaintiff had not identified a reasonable cause for not agreeing to attend the proposed assessment for the following reasons.
The plaintiff’s own expert report from Dr Danny Shub, dated 28 December 2018, is now almost two years old.
The report obtained by the defendant from Dr Piirto and dated 7 October 2019, is now over a year old. (It is correct that the defendant obtained a supplementary report from Dr Piirto dated 6 July 2020. However, as you will be aware, that report was prepared ‘on the papers’ and without the plaintiff submitting to a further assessment).
Accordingly, the parties are relying on opinions that are based on observations of the plaintiff that are now (at a minimum) 13 months old, and the defendant considers a current opinion would be of benefit.
As noted below, it is intended that the assessment would be conducted by way of video conference, thus negating the need for either the plaintiff, or Dr Jager, to travel interstate, noting that the plaintiff resides in Perth and Dr Jager is based in Melbourne.[5]
[4]Ibid, Exhibit ‘CMJ-4’, email correspondence from the defendants’ solicitors to plaintiff’s solicitors dated 26 November 2020.
[5]Ibid, Exhibits ‘CMJ-4’, email correspondence exchanged between the parties’ solicitors on 26 November 2020.
On 30 November 2020, the plaintiff’s solicitors responded:
You identified the age of the existing reports as the relevant factor in requesting Mr Boyle attend a separate and new medico-legal practitioner. The age of the reports, from the Plaintiff’s perspective, is of little significance when you consider the opinions expressed in them.
Dr Shub diagnosed Mr Boyle as having suffered complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a major depressive disorder and a substance abuse disorder related to the abuse and that these conditions had been present over Mr Boyle’s adult life.
Dr Piirto, the defendant medico-legal expert in this case, opined that Mr Boyle presented that [sic] a chronic unspecified Anxiety Disorder with encapsulated Post Traumatic Stress Disorder phenomena. Dr Piirto stated that Mr Boyle’s symptomology that had been present in ‘the last few years’ was not representative of most of his adult life. Later Dr Piirto accepted that ‘Mr Boyle has almost certainly mobilised a range of psychological defence mechanisms … throughout most of his adult years.’
The nature of the Plaintiff’s injury is not, on the medical evidence, a short-term condition. He has been injured for many, many years.
But critically, the last defendant medico-legal examination caused the plaintiff enormous trauma. He required inpatient care for a number of days due to an increase in symptoms.
In accordance with the Plaintiff’s ongoing discovery obligations please see attached to this letter the records of the Sir Charles Gardiner Hospital. You will see that in the days prior to the appointment with Dr Piirto, Mr Boyle attended for psychiatric care and reported that he was concerned to be alone and concerned for his own well being due to his feelings of anxiousness and depression. Clearly the appointment caused a serious risk of self-harm and suicide.
We consider there is no justification in exposing the Plaintiff to this kind of trauma and disruption when he has already attended a medico-legal in relation to his claim simply because the defendant wishes to have a second opinion.[6]
[6]Ibid, Exhibit ‘CMJ-5’.
On 22 December 2020, the defendants’ solicitors responded that an assessment with Dr Jager had been scheduled for 21 January 2020 over video and would take approximately 45 minutes to one hour. The letter stated:
We acknowledge that, in the days leading up to the plaintiff’s assessment with Dr Helena Piirto, the plaintiff presented to Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital Department of Emergency (Hospital) with feelings of depression and anxiety. That much is evident from the Hospital’s records that you provided to us with your 30 November letter, which indicate that the plaintiff’s presentation related to the subject matter of the current Proceeding, as well as other stressors in his life including separation from his wife and an inability to work due to back pain.
From the records available to us, we are not aware of whether the plaintiff’s symptomatology continued after the assessment with Dr Piirto. If there are records about this, we would be pleased to receive them, so that we can consider them.
The plaintiff is pursuing a claim in excess of $1 million and the first and fourth defendants are entitled to properly prepare their defence of the case, including with reference to r.33.04 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, which entitles defendants to request that the plaintiff submit to a further psychiatric examination. Accordingly, the first and fourth defendants maintain their request for the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric medical examination with Dr Jager, and in light of this, have booked in the following date for that assessment.[7]
[7]Ibid, Exhibit ‘CMJ-6’.
On 11 January 2021, the plaintiff’s solicitors responded stating that the plaintiff would not attend the appointment and that instead, he would be prepared to attend a short re-examination with Dr Piirto.[8]
[8]Ibid, Exhibit ‘CMJ-7’.
By affidavit sworn by their solicitor on 8 February 2021, the defendants propose that any medico-legal examination of the plaintiff by Dr Jager would not involve the taking of any history from the plaintiff relating to or about the sexual assaults and abuse the subject of the proceedings, the circumstances surrounding the sexual assaults and abuse or the veracity or accuracy of the plaintiff’s account of the assaults or abuse, unless the plaintiff willingly consents to disclosing such information.
The relevant timetabling orders were made on 11 January 2020. The date for the exchange of medical reports was 29 January 2021. The proceeding is listed for trial in approximately one month, namely, on 9 March 2021.
Defendants’ submissions
The defendants submit that the request for examination by Dr Jager is reasonable for the following reasons.
First, a significant passage of time has elapsed since the plaintiff was examined. There has been a gap of almost 18 months. Such a gap is significant where there is medical evidence from both parties that his symptomatology is fluctuating. A further medical report is required to address current symptomatology, condition and treatment. The position of the defendants would be prejudiced if there is not an up-to-date assessment of symptoms and diagnosis. The medical records discovered do not go beyond the date of Dr Piirto’s examination. Although there have been some further reports by the plaintiff, they have not assessed his condition. The post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosed by Dr Shug requires ongoing symptoms to be sustained. There ought to be an up-to-date assessment to include the symptoms lessened or exacerbated. Both Dr Shug and Dr Piirto opined that a clearer picture of the plaintiff’s diagnosis could occur if he undertook further treatment. Moreover, the plaintiff reported that he found talking to the psychologist at the hospital beneficial. The defendants do not have information as to whether he continues to receive further treatment and if so, whether his condition has improved.
Pausing there, I agree that an up-to-date diagnosis would be beneficial for the parties and the Court.
Secondly, the defendants say the medical report of Dr Jager is required to address issues of causation and quantum. Dr Jager’s opinion on potential factors contributing to the plaintiff’s condition will be informative to the parties and the Court. The reports of Dr Shug and Dr Piirto address the role of some causative factors, but they do not fully explore the role and impact of other causative issues on the plaintiff over time. Dr Shug does not opine on whether or not any other causative factors played a role in the plaintiff’s conditions. Although Dr Piirto identifies a number of causative factors, these are not fully explored. For instance, one issue that she found difficult to ascertain was whether or not there was a degree of genetic predisposition. That is an issue for another medical expert to further explore. Hospital records recently served by the plaintiff upon the defendants referred to factors such as the plaintiff’s separation from his wife and inability to work due to back pain. While there is reference to these in Dr Piirto’s report, recent hospital evidence suggests that they may have been exacerbated. There is, however, limited material available to the defendant on that issue.
Thirdly, the defendants’ request is reasonable because the proposed assessment is only 45 minutes to one hour and would be conducted over video link. Moreover, it is proposed that the scope of the examination be narrowed as a compromise, and so as to minimise risk to the plaintiff. Accordingly, Dr Jager would not ask the plaintiff about the alleged abuse. This addresses a key factor identified by the plaintiff in his affidavit concerning his refusal to attend, namely, the desire not to have to explore experiences of abuse. Orders can be constrained to ensure the allegations are not revisited to reduce or remove the risk to the plaintiff.[9]
[9]JKZ v Scots College [2018] NSWSC 1526.
Fourthly, all issues between the parties are currently in dispute. This is a factor in determining whether the request is reasonable.[10]
[10]Downing v Wein [2005] VSC 134.
Fifthly, the size of the plaintiff’s claim is a relevant factor to be taken into account in determining whether the request is reasonable. This is particularly the case where, as here, the claim is substantial.[11] The plaintiff’s list of special damages dated 27 March 2020 claims more than $1.45 million and reserves the right to amend the list.
[11]JKZ v Scots College (n 9).
The defendants assert that it is unreasonable for the plaintiff to refuse to attend the proposed examination with Dr Jager for the following reasons.
First, the plaintiff refers to his admission at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital for four days in September 2019 prior to attending the appointment with Dr Piirto. While reference is made to the impact of attending the appointment with Dr Piirto, the medical records from the hospital identify ‘multiple other stressors’, including the plaintiff’s separation from his wife, his inability to work due to chronic back pain and his attendance with symptoms of depression and anxiety.
Secondly, the hospital records predate the plaintiff’s assessment with Dr Piirto. No medical evidence has been served in relation to his condition after his attendance at the assessment, or in relation to any impact that the assessment had.
Thirdly, a reason for the plaintiff’s refusal was that his injury is not a short-term condition. As described above, there have been fluctuations in his symptomatology, including in recent years, and the experts left open the possibility for a change in his prognosis. In such circumstances, and noting his substantial claim for future loss of earning capacity, his refusal to attend a further assessment is unreasonable and ought not outweigh the defendants’ right to obtain evidence as to whether there has been any changes to his condition, symptomatology or prognosis.
Fourthly, all experts are required to comply with the expert witness code of conduct. If necessary, Dr Jager could walk through the code of conduct with the plaintiff when he conducts his assessment, for the purpose of clarifying Dr Jager’s duty to the Court pursuant to Order 44 of the Rules. The plaintiff’s refusal to attend an assessment with Dr Jager on the basis that it would be for ‘a doctor who was working for the Salesians’ is not reasonable.
Fifthly, the plaintiff is reluctant to discuss the impact of abuse. However, the assessment will occur less than one month before trial, during which he will need to give such evidence.
Plaintiff’s submissions
The plaintiff contends that the defendants seek a fresh medical examination late and after expiry of orders for the exchange of medical reports. There is no explanation as to why they do not want to send the plaintiff back to Dr Piirto, who lives in the same city as the plaintiff. Dr Piirto has provided multiple reports and it is assumed that she will give evidence at trial.
Additionally, while the defendants make repeated reference to the plaintiff’s symptoms ‘fluctuating’, and it is correct that Dr Shub’s report describes some of the plaintiff’s symptomatology as such, the report also makes clear that the plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric injuries are permanent and entrenched.
The defendants are either planning to call both Dr Piirto and Dr Jager to give evidence, or alternatively, just call Dr Jager. If they are planning to call Dr Piirto to give evidence then there is no justification for obtaining another report from Dr Jager. If the defendants do not wish to call Dr Piirto, that is not an acceptable or reasonable reason for obtaining another report from Dr Jager. Rather, it is looking for ‘a fresh pair of eyes’, which is an insufficient reason to make the request for a new examination reasonable.[12]
[12]Thomson v Transport Accident Commission (2020) 92 MVR 181, 190 [48] (Clayton JR, as Her Honour then was).
The defendants have modified the request by saying that the plaintiff does not need to talk about the abuse or circumstances of it. That concession makes no difference to the reasonableness of the request because they have said nothing about why the new expert is required. The defendants bear the burden of proving that the request for the further report is reasonable.[13] The corollary of establishing that is that the defendant would be unreasonably prejudiced if the opinion is not obtained.[14]
[13]Ibid 189 [41].
[14]Ibid.
The question is whether or not the further medical opinion can be addressed by way of follow-up report, or whether it requires a new examination by a new expert.[15]
[15]Ibid 189 [47].
Pausing there, I consider the fact that the plaintiff agrees to submit to a follow-up report by Dr Piirto is a concession that the defendants are entitled to a further report, and is a sensible compromise.
The plaintiff submits further that his refusal to attend the proposed medical appointment by Dr Jager is reasonable. He relies upon his affidavit in addition to: the evidence contained in the Sir Charles Gairdner hospital records; the report of the Self Harm and Crisis Counselling Service coordinator of the hospital dated 24 September 2019; and, the report of Dr Peter Cummins, the plaintiff’s general practitioner, dated 5 February 2021. The plaintiff has an acute stress reaction to what he sees as examination by the psychiatrist retained by the alleged perpetrators. The evidence is of suicidality. It is an exceptionally reasonable position for the plaintiff not to submit to a new examination by a new doctor, given the effect the discussion of sexual abuse has on him. His evidence is that this relates to discussion of the impacts of sexual abuse as well as the discussion of sexual abuse itself.[16]
[16]Plaintiff’s affidavit affirmed 9 February 2021, [9].
If there is a question as to which party prevails, that is, if both the defendants’ requests and the plaintiff’s refusal are reasonable, then there is a balancing of the right of the plaintiff to personal liberty and the right of the defendants to prepare litigation as they think fit. Concern surrounding the plaintiff’s self-harm and suicide should outweigh the defendants’ right to prepare litigation.
In reply to the defendants’ submission that there is no evidence about the plaintiff descending into suicidality after the appointment, it is submitted that there is no difference as to whether suicide and death occurs prior to the proposed appointment or after it.
In reply to the defendants’ submissions about the upcoming trial, the plaintiff knows that it is immovable and is aware of the risks.
Pausing there, I note that a trial with an independent judicial officer presiding and the plaintiff’s legal practitioners present is a different experience to attending a medical examination.
Applicable principles
Order 33 of the Rules is applicable. Rule 33.04(1) permits a defendant to request a plaintiff submit to appropriate examinations by a medical expert or experts at specified times and places. Rule 33.04(2) states:
Where a plaintiff refuses or neglects, without reasonable cause, to comply with the request under [r.33.04(1)], the Court may, if the request was on reasonable terms, stay the proceeding.
The relevant principles are not in dispute. In Pyman v Whitefriars College (Inc), Forbes J outlined the following principles, which I gratefully adopt:
The application of a stay of proceedings sought by the defendant requires the exercise of discretion by the Court. I must be satisfied of two things:
(a)that the plaintiff’s refusal to attend was without reasonable grounds, and
(b)that the defendant’s request to attend the examination was reasonable.
Where both the request is reasonable and the refusal is on reasonable grounds, I am required to balance the competing interests of the parties in the litigation and their ability to present and defend their case. Both parties referred in submissions to Stace v Commonwealth. That case sets out the following three general principles in considering applications of this kind:
1.The decision whether or not to grant a stay involves the exercise of a discretion;
2.In exercising the discretion it is necessary for the Court to balance the right of the plaintiff to personal liberty against the right of the defendant to prepare a defence of the litigation as it sees fit; and
3.In determining whether either the request of the defendant and the refusal of the plaintiff is reasonable the question is not whether the request or objection is objectively reasonable but whether it is reasonable in light of the information or advice which the parties receive from their respective advisers.[17]
[17]Pyman v Whitefriars College Inc [2019] VSC 361 [11] and [12], citing Stace v Commonwealth (1989) 51 SASR 391.
I also note the summary of relevant cases by Clayton JR (as her Honour then was) in Thomson v Transport Accident Commission:[18]
[18]Thomson v Transport Accident Commission (n 12) 181 – 188 [20] – [35].
Analysis
Despite some concerns about the proximity to the trial date, I am prepared to accept that the defendants’ request for the plaintiff to have a psychiatric examination by Dr Jager is made on reasonable terms. It is reasonable to request an up to date report and it is open to the defendants to seek a second specialist opinion.
However, the defendants’ application must be refused.
I am entirely satisfied that the plaintiff’s refusal to attend the further medical examination is reasonable in light of the following factors.
First, the plaintiff has already attended a psychiatric examination organised by the defendants.
Secondly, the medical evidence, and the evidence of the plaintiff, indicates that the plaintiff will be at risk of self-harm, potentially suicide, if he is forced to attend another psychiatric examination.[19] I accept that evidence. Prior to the previous examination organised by the defendants, namely the examination with Dr Piirto, the plaintiff became very ill and was hospitalised. The report of Mr Richard Majda, Self Harm and Crisis Counselling Service Coordinator of the Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital, dated 24 September 2019, states that the plaintiff presented to that hospital on 19 September 2019:
... in the context of suffering anxiety, agitation, depression and acute suicidal ideation. There are a number of factors contributing to this but the most significant factor identified by [the plaintiff] was an up-coming legal appointment related to compensation he is seeking for experiences of childhood abuse. [He] displayed symptoms of… intermittent suicidal ideation, heart palpitations and hot sweats prior to presenting to hospital.
[The plaintiff] was admitted to the Mental Health Observation Ward for four days and then provided with out-patient support. [He] expressed significant distress when describing his childhood experiences of abuse and is also very anxious about the subsequent legal process he is pursuing. I hope these factors will be considered while he is recovering. [20]
[19]Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Affidavit affirmed 8 February 2021; the report of his general practitioner, Dr Peter Cummins, dated 5 February 2021 and contained in Exhibit ‘LM-2’ to the first affidavit of Laird Macdonald affirmed on 5 February 2021.
[20]Plaintiff, Second Affidavit of Laird Macdonald, affirmed 5 February 2021, Exhibit ‘LM-1’.
The defendants rely on hospital records referring to multiple other stressors for the plaintiff’s illness in addition to the upcoming appointment with Dr Piirto. They also submit that the plaintiff did, however, manage to build a rapport with Dr Piirto and there is no evidence of ongoing harm. However, I am satisfied that there is a risk of serious self-harm if the plaintiff is required to attend a further medical examination organised by the defendants with a new psychiatrist. The evidence of Dr Peter Cummins, the plaintiff’s general practitioner since 2002, includes the following:
I would be extremely concerned given [the plaintiff’s] circumstances that another full medico-legal examination would put him at further risk of another Agitated Depressive Episode with all its concomitant risks to his mental health and safety.[21]
[21]Report dated 5 February 2021 contained in Exhibit ‘LM-2’ to the first affidavit of Laird Macdonald affirmed on 5 February 2021.
The risk of self-harm is present, and, for current purposes, it is irrelevant whether that risk arises prior to the proposed appointment and then continues after it, or not. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that conducting the proposed assessment over video link or limiting it to one hour will mitigate this risk. So too the issue about limiting the questions concerning the alleged abuse. The plaintiff deposes of his anxiety and distress in anticipation of being examined by doctors engaged by the defendants and asked about the alleged abuse and impact upon him. The plaintiff’s own evidence includes the following:
Since my lawyers have told me about the Defendant’s application to force me to see a different doctor I have again begun to feel extremely anxious and distressed. I do not wish to have to again explain my experience of abuse and everything the abuse did to me to a doctor who is working for the Salesians. I am worried that going through the entire process again will send me down a very dark and dangerous path in terms of my mental health.[22]
[22]Plaintiff’s Affidavit affirmed 9 February 2021, [9].
Thirdly, the plaintiff has offered to attend a further examination by the psychiatrist engaged by the defendants who has already examined him, namely Dr Piirto. There was no adequate explanation as to why a report by Dr Jager is required given that Dr Piirto has already provided reports. I am not satisfied with the defendants’ explanation as to why this offer has not been accepted. The defendants referred to Dr Piirto’s inability to reach conclusions about some matters, however, they have not taken steps to follow those matters up with Dr Piirto. The defendants referred to the plaintiff providing further medical information since Dr Piirto’s examination. Again, there is no reason why this information requires psychiatric examination by a different practitioner. The defendants referred to the length of time, namely 17 months, since the plaintiff has been examined. However, there was no explanation as to why a new psychiatrist, rather than Dr Piirtro ought be engaged to conduct a further examination and provide an updated report. The defendants submitted further reports were required to address causation and quantum. However, there is no real explanation as to why Dr Piirto has not been asked to supplement her report on these issues. It is conceded that Dr Jager’s qualifications are similar to those of Dr Piirto. This is not a case where examination is sought by a medical expert with different expertise.
For completeness, in respect of the defendants’ submissions as to the lack of current medical records: there are no extant applications for particular discovery.
In balancing the interests of the parties, I am not satisfied that any prejudice suffered by the defendants in proceeding to trial without further medical examination and opinion from another psychiatrist, namely Dr Jager, justifies stay of the proceedings. I am not satisfied it is such that it prevents their defence of the proceeding. Moreover, the risk of harm to the plaintiff associated with such an examination is evident. Justice lies in disallowing the application.
Conclusion
Costs will follow the event. Orders will be made requiring the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s costs of, incidental to and occasioned by the application.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
| S ECI 2019 00758 | |
| BETWEEN: | |
| BRENDAN BOYLE | Plaintiff |
| - v - | |
| THE SALESIAN SOCIETY (VIC) INC | First Defendant |
| JULIAN BENEDICT FOX | Second Defendant |
| FRANCIS PETRUS DE DOOD | Third Defendant |
| GREGORY CHAMBERS (AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE WALLACE CORNELL) | Fourth Defendant |
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