FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BOYCE & BOYCE | [2007] FamCA 1165 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Finalisation of consent orders |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Boyce |
| RESPONDENT: | Mrs Boyce |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 9941 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 27 September 2007 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Young J |
| HEARING DATE: | 27 September 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr. Turnbull |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Peter Berry |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr. Wilkinson |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | David Wilkinson & Co |
ORDERS
THAT the further hearing of the application to pronounce consent orders as to all property and financial issues be adjourned to the Judicial Duty List at 10.00 a.m. on 1 November 2007.
THAT the extempore reasons for judgment be transcribed, be placed upon the Court file and be made available to the parties
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Boyce & Boyce is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 9941 of 2007
| MR BOYCE |
Applicant
And
| MRS BOYCE |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In the matter of Boyce, I have before me in the judicial duty list, consent orders on final property and financial issues that the parties seek now to have finalised.
Mr Turnbull, solicitor, appears for the husband. Mr Wilkinson, solicitor, appears for the wife. Both parties are in court.
The original application for consent orders was filed 5 September 2007, and annexed thereto were orders which the parties executed and dated 22 August 2007.
The matter came before the Registrar, who declined to make orders. At that stage there was a letter from Berry Family Lawyers, who then and now act for the husband, highlighting their concern with paragraph 24 of the orders. Paragraph 24 provides that:
“A husband shall not have any person reside with him at [the C property], other than the parties' son. The husband or the child, […], shall not reside at [the M property]”.
The child is ten years of age. These orders would restrict the husband on an ongoing and permanent basis, and additionally I record the existence of a notation, paragraph 31, to the same effect. I am advised that both parties did consent and remain in agreement with this paragraph. My suggestion has been that a time clause should be added to paragraph 24, so that the orders operate until the child attains an age agreed by the parties, be it 16, 18 or whatever. In any event, paragraph 31 should be deleted.
There are other difficulties with the orders that have become apparent in discussion with practitioners. The actual person or the parties jointly responsible for the conduct of sale of the properties in paragraph 1, needs to be more clearly defined, particularly as to reserve price and other matters.
Paragraph 9 needs to be withdrawn so that the solicitors act only on the conveyance. No appropriate notice has been given to the Trustees of…
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- AGLC
- Boyce & Boyce [2007] FamCA 1165
- Case
- [2007] FamCA 1165
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether to pronounce the consent orders as presented by the parties.
Young J adjourned the application for further hearing. The reasons for this adjournment were not detailed in the provided text, but the Court directed that the extempore reasons for judgment be transcribed and made available to the parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
THAT the further hearing of the application to pronounce consent orders as to all property and financial issues be adjourned to the Judicial Duty List at 10.00 a.m. on 1 November 2007.
2.
THAT the extempore reasons for judgment be transcribed, be placed upon the Court file and be made available to the parties
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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