Bowring, P.A. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs

Case

[1987] FCA 358

13 Jul 1987

No judgment structure available for this case.

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION NOT REQUIRED

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

No. VG 3 of 1987

)

GENERAL DIVISION

)

B E T W E E N :

PHILIP ARTHUR BOWRING

Applicant

A N D :

THE

MINISTER

FOR

IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC

AFFAIRS

Respondent

13 JULY, 1987

KEELY J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application by Philip Arthur Bowring (the applicant) under the Administrative Decisions

(Judicial

Review) Act 1977 (the Judicial Review Act) for an order of review of a decision that he be refused the grant of a return endorsement under S . 11A(l)(b) of the Migration Act - 1958 (the Act). The decision was made by Mr. Derrick Hammon, an authorised officer for the purposes of S. 11A of the Act, and

was notified to the applicant's solicitor, Mr. J. Little, by

letter dated 4 December 1986.

Mr. Hammon supplied to the applicant, upon request

under S . 13 of the Judicial Review Act, a statement of

L .

reasons, dated 20 March 1987, which included the followlng

passages:-

"A Findings on material questions of

fact

1. The applicant is a

British subject

and the holder of a

British passport.

2. The applicant first entered Australia on or about 10 January 1972 as a migrant; on 20 January 1972 he was issued with a permanent entry permit. Within a few months of his arrival in Australia he

purchased a house in Sydney, which he

still owns.

3. He

came

to

Australia initially

to

join the staff

of "Finance Week", a

magazine being newly launched in Australia. In June 1982 "Finance Week" was closed down and the applicant became a self-employed journalist writing for

several

publications

in

Australia and

abroad.

The applicant's

maternal

grandmother was born

a d

lived

in

Australia.

4. On or

about

15 April 1973, the

applicant departed

from

Australia

for

Hong Kong, to

take

up a

temporary

appointment there. He has resided in Hong Kong ever since, but he has made a number of visits to Australia since then.

5 . At the time the applicant left Australia in April 1973, he was not

required to

obtain a return endorsement

to

facilitate

re- ntry

his

into

Australia, because as a British subject of European descent he was exempt from

the

requirement

o

obtain a

return

endorsement.

6 . In 1974 a new immigration policy was announced by the then Minister. Its effect was that all Commonwealth citizens

of European descent (except persons

covered by special arrangement with New

Zealand) entering

o

re-entering

Australia on or

after 1 January 1975

would require visas. Those

UK

citizens

with an Australian born

parent

or

grandparent

were

totain

special

conditions of entry into Australia; those Australians who had a UK born parent had

a reclprocal

right

of

entry into

the

United Kingdom.

(The Patriality Policy)

7. In

1977

Mr. Bowring

travelled

to

Australia; on his arrival he was informed by the authorities that his "permitted to remain" stamp was no longer valid, however he was allowed to enter Australia on a temporary entry visa.

8 . On 1 April 1982 the then Minister

announced

the

abolitiion of

the

"Patrials" category.

B The evidence

or

other

material

on

which these findings are based

9 . In making the above findings of fact, I had regard to

Departmental file No.

82/38236 consisting of 119 folios."

Mr. Little, who appeared for the applicant, took the court through much of the material contained in the departmental file referred to in paragraph 89. That file included various internal memoranda and minutes, in addition to correspondence between the applicant or Mr. Little on his behalf, and the Department of Immigration (the Department), commencing with a letter from the applicant dated 17 February 1983.

Only grounds (a) (i) and (ii), (b) (ii) and (c) (iv) of the application were pursued. Ground

(a) was that:-

"(a) [the decision] involved errors of law, in

that -

(i) it

proceeded

on the basis that a return

endorsement may

only

be

granted

to

persons with permanent resident status,

(ii) it confuses the concepts of domicile and residence".

These

grounds

were

supported

reference

by

to

paragraphs 12, 13 and 14

of the statement of reasons which

were as follows:-

"12.

Applications for return endorsements are

assessed

agalnst

following

the

basic

requirements:

[a] The applicant must be

a permanent resident

of

Australia of at least twelve months

standing.

[bl The applicant's true country

of residence

must be Australia.

[cl Applicants overseas must have been absent

from Australia for less than three years.

[In

these

reasons

for

ludgment

hose

paragraphs will be referred to as 12(a),

12(b) and 12(c) respectively]

13. The Resident Re-Entry Handbook states at paragraph 7.4.2 [should read 7.4.3.21

that:

'Where

applicant's

the

record

of

movements to and from Australia suggests that he or she has been taking advantage

of

the

return

endorsement

system

to

maintain

resident

status

in

Australia

while having true residence in another

country, the following factors should be

considered:

. Immigration

status

over

the

whole

period in Australia.

.

family,

th

of

Whereabouts

particularly the immediate family.

.

ownership.

Disposition of assets including home

..

. Employment

hlstory/occupation.

If the applicant has positive links with

Australia,

the

fact

that

residence

has

been

divided

between

Australia

and

elsewhere need not mean that he or she is

not a genuine settler.'

-

14. The

Handbook

states

at

paragraph

11.1.3 that

when a replacement

return

endorsement is sought in

a new passport,

the application should be refused and the

existing return endorsement cancelled

if

it is clear

that

the

applicant's

true

place of residence is outside Australia."

The

submission in support of ground

(a)(i)

was

that

the

statement

of

reasons

placed

an

emphasis

on

a continuing

residence requirement which is contrary to the wording and

intention of S.

11A(l)(b) of the Act and is also contrary to

the

Department's

policy

(the

policy),

as

set

out

in

the

Resident Re-Entry Handbook which was issued in June 1983 (the

Handbook).

Section 11A(l)(b) of the Act

provides:-

"11A( 1) An authorized officer

may,

in

accordance with this section -

....

(b) upon request

by a person who is residing

in Australia, or has

resided in Australia and

wishes to return to

Australia, grant to that

person

a

return endorsement with respect to

travel to Australia by that person and any

other person whose name is included in the

return endorsement on any number

of occasions

while it remains in force."

It is noted

that

the

sectlon

does

not

require

current

residence

and

provides

that

a return

endorsement

may

be

granted to a person who "has resided in Australia".

Mr. Little referred to Potter

v Minehan (1908) 7 CLR

277 and to

-

R

v

Director-General of Social Welfare for

Victoria; ex parte Henry and another (1975) 133

CLR

369; he

submitted

that

the

policy

in

the

Handbook

"talks

of

settlement

rather

than

esidence".

Mr.

Little

cited

paragraphs 4 and 7 of the policy and in particular paragraphs

7(l)(i), 7(2)(i), 7(4)(2)(i) and

7.4.3 of the Handbook, the

material parts of which read as follows:-

"4.1 A procedure

existing

for

many

years

whereby

permanent

residents

intending

a

temporary absence from Australia were granted re-entry visas valid until a specified date was, in the main, discontinued in March 1976.

The

re-entry

visa

was

replaced

by

the

Authority to Return (issued in Australia) and

the

Authority

for

Return

(issued

overseas)

which

permitted

an

number

of

journeys

and

absences

of

up

to

three

years

on

each

occasion.

4.2

Impressions

of

the

return

authority

stamps are shown in Annex E.

4.3

There

was

no

residential

qualifying

period under return authorlty policy and for

administrative convenience return authorities

were issued in conjunction with the grant of

resident status in Australia and visa issue to

unassisted migrants overseas.

4.4

This resulted in some people exploiting

the return authority system by using it to

maintain their resident status in Australla

simply by making brief visits here to activate

or reactivate their return autorities while

having

their

true

residence

overseas.

This

I .

practice is contrary to the spirit of migrant

entry policy; a requirement applying to

all

applicants

for

migration

is

that

they

must

intend settlement In Australia.

4.5

The issue of return authorities ceased

on

1 September

1979.

However,

once

issued

a

-

return

authority,

like

its

successor

the

return endorsement, continues

in force until

the

expiry

of

the

period

specified

in it

unless it is cancelled. It is not affected

by

the expiry of the passport in which it is

contained.

4.6 Policy provides that return authorities

held by people who are not genuine settlers

are to be allowed to run the course of the

passports In which they were issued, but are

to be cancelled as they come to notice when

new

passports

are

obtained.

See

paragraph

11.1.4.

4.7 References in this handbook to existing or lapsed return endorsements are to be taken

as

including

existing

or

lapsed

return

authorities.

....

7.2

Residential

requirement

for

grant

of

return endorsement

7.2.1

Section 11A(l)(b) of the Migration Act

provides for the grant of a return endorsement to a person who is residing in Australia or has resided in Australia and wishes to return

to Australia.

7.2.2 As a means

of

ensuring

that

return

endorsements are issued only to people whose

true country of residence is Australia, policy

requires a qualifying period of 12 months with

resident status in Australia before a resident

becomes eligible to apply for a return

endorsement.

7.2.3

If

residence

has

been

broken

by

an

absence or absences overseas but the

person's

settlement

intentions

are

not

suspect,

the

aggregate period of actual residence may be

taken into account. where

a resident who left

Australia hefore becoming eligible to apply

for a return

endorsement

was

granted

a

temporary

visa

under

the

provisions

of

paragraph 13, the aggregate may include the

period

spent

under

temporary

entry

permit

before

resident

status

was

acquired

again.

(But

see

paragraph

1 3 . 1

about

issue

of a

return

e dorsement

tohe

older

of

a

temporary entry permit.)

....

1 . 4 . 3

Person

seeking

replacement

return

-

endorsement

1.4.3.1

An

assessment

is

to

be

made

of

whether the person has genuinely settled in

Australia."

Paragraph 7.4.3.2

appears in paragraph 1 3 of the statement of

reasons which has been set out earlier.

Mr.

Tracey, of counsel, on behalf of the respondent,

submitted that, even

if paragraph 12(b) of the statement

of

reasons was not consistent with

S .

11A(l)(b), paragraph 15

made it quite clear that the decision was not based upon

paragraph 12(b); what was fatal to the applicant was the fact

that he had "been absent from Australia" for more than three

years (see paragraph 12(c)).

I accept Mr. Tracey's

submission as to paragraph

15 of

the statement of reasons, which reads:

"15. In

the

applicant's

case,

he

is

not

resident

in

Australia

and

has

no

plans

to

become resident in the near future; he has not until about 1996."

even divided his time between Australia and

Hong Kong. He was resident from 10 January

1972 to 15 April 1973, he has not lived in

That paragraph states, correctly, that the applicant

" 1 s not

resident" but "has resided in Australia"

(S. llA(1)

(b)

).

It

then records the fact, again correctly, that the

applicant

"has not lived in Australla since [1973]". It foll

owed that

-

he fell outside the policy statement that he "must

have been

absent

from

Australia

for

less

than

three

years"

- see

paragraph 12(c) of the statement of reasons, quoted earlier.

Mr.

Little submitted (under ground (a)(ii)) that the

decision-maker

had

confused

the

concepts

of

domicile

and

residence but in my opinion the statement of reasons does not

disclose

any

such

onfusion.

I accept Mr. Tracey's

submission that paragraph

15 only refers to "residence" (cf.

S. 11A(l)(b)).

The next ground relied on by the applicant was ground (b)(ii) which states:-

"(b) [the decision] was an improper exercise

of

the power under which it purported to be

made

that

took

in

it

an

rrelevant

consideration into account, namely that

-

....

(ii) the

applicant's purpose in seeking the

grant of

a return endorsement was to

secure a future

unlimited

right

o

residence in Australia."

This ground was directed to matters which included the

letter, dated

4

December 1986, from Mr. Hammon who did not

consider

"a decision to allow Mr. Bowring an unlimited right

of return to this country is justified

by

the circumstances

of his case."

I am unable to accept the submission that Hr. Hammon took into account an irrelevant consideration, namely, the applicant's "purpose in seeking the grant ... was to secure a

future

unlimited

right

to

residence

in

Australia".

The

applicant himself

in a letter had asked

how his right of

abode in Australia might be re-established.

I also accept

~ r .

TKaCey'S submission that HK. Hammon's consideration of

this aspect was no more than a comment in response to

a

matter raised by the applicant;

it was not a matter raised

positively against the applicant as a

reason why his

application should be

refused.

Ground

(b)(ii)

of the

application has not been made out.

The remaining

ground was (c)(iv) which Hr. Little

accepted had not been clearly expressed

in the application.

AS set out in the application it stated:-

"(c)

[the decision] was an improper exercise

of the power under

which it purported to

be

made in that it failed to take into

account

relevant considerations, namely that -

....

(iv) in being interpreted to apply to him the

1974 visa policy deprived the applicant

without prior notice or compensation of

the legitimate expectation that he could

return to Australia."

It was suggested that the words "in being interpreted to apply to him" should be ignored; the ground was directed to paragraphs 17(ii) and 18(ii) of the reasons which read as follows:-

"17. I further considered whether there were

grounds to grant the applicant a return endorsement outside the policy. The applicant's solicitor submitted two major grounds for a decision outside of policy, as follows:

....

(ii)That the applicant was not informed of, and did not become aware of, the relevant policy changes which affected his right to return to Australia for permanent residence; and that as matter of natural justice he should, upon being informed of the effect of the policy change, have the same opportunity he would have had if he had known its implications when it was first published.

18. I rejected . .

. the above

. . . on the

following grounds:

....

(ii) I do not accept that there was any action open to the applicant at the time of the relevant policy changes which could have preserved a right of residence in Australia. An unconditional right of

return

for residence in Australia

is

extended only to Australian citizens. Any previous grant of a return endorsement would not have been effective to preserve such a right to the applicant."

My understanding of Mr. Little's submissions in support of this ground is that they follow three steps.

The

first step was a contention that the policy

statement of 1

August 1974 (which

came into effect on 1 January 1975) was

misleading. It was submitted that, on its face, it appeared

to relate only to people coming to settle or visit and did

not

apply

to

the

appllcant

when

re-entering

the

country,

there being nothing in the policy statement about re-entry.

-

The

second

step

was

that,

at

the

time

when

the

applicant left Australia, he could return without the need

for a return endorsement (paragraph

5 of the statement of

reasons).

As

he

was

misled

into

believing

that

his

situation continued, he had

a legitimate expectation that he

could

return

at

any

time

without

hindrance

from

the

Australian authorities. It was argued that he was therefore unable to avail himself of an opportunity to make effective

representations -

in relation to his "settlement intentions"

- on the factual basis that had existed when the policy first

came

into

effect

in

1975.

The

opportunity

to

do

so only

arose after 1977, by which time it was too late as he had

already been absent for more than three years (see paragraph

12(c) of the statement of reasons).

The third step was the contention that

Mr.

Hammon

should therefore (in 1986) have treated the application on

the basis of notional facts

i.e.

as if the applicant had

satisfied the policy referred to in paragraph 12(c) of the

statement of reasons.

Mr.

Little

contended

that

these

submisslons under

ground (c)(iv) were within the spirit

and intent of the

authorities on natural justice; he referred to - Kioa v

Minister (1985) 62 ALR 321 at 371 where Brennan J. said

-

"[tlhere are interests beyond legal rights

. . . described as

legitimate expectations."

In my opinion there was no breach

of the principles of natural justice.

Further, even if there

were a natural justice requirement, its

content would

not

have required the disclosure of

a change of policy to the

applicant as one of those potentially affected by it.

It may be added that Mr.

Hammon did consider the

individual circumstances of the applicant in relation to the policy question (as submitted to him by Mr. Little and

briefly summarized in paragraph

17(ii) of the statement of

reasons) . Although the conclusions of Mr. Hammon

in

paragraph 18(ii) of

the

statement

of reasons have

been

criticised by the applicant, it is clear law that it is not for this court to make decisions on the merits of an

applicant's case.

I am also unable to accept Mr. Little's

submission that paragraph 18(ii) showed a defective legal analysis of the applicant's position. For the same reason as that stated earlier, when dealing with ground (b)(ii), I accept Mr. Tracey's submission that those comments in paragraph 18(ii) were merely a response by Mr. Hammon to a matter which had been raised by the applicant and was not a

1 4

.

matter raised positively against the

applicant

as a

reason

why his application should be refused.

Accordingly ground (c)(iv) also fails.

It

follows

that the application must

be dismissed.

I certify that this

and the preceding

thirteen pages are a true copy

of the

Reasons for Judgment herein

of

his

Honour Mr. Justice Reely

Associate:

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Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81