Bowman and Gould (Child support)

[2017] AATA 2898

Bowman and Gould (Child support) [2017] AATA 2898 (1 December 2017)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division

REVIEW NUMBER:  2017/BC011377

APPLICANT:  Mr Bowman

OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar

Ms Gould

TRIBUNAL:Member J Thomson

DECISION DATE:  1 December 2017

DECISION:

The decision under review is affirmed.

CATCHWORDS

Child Support – Departure determination – Income and financial resources of parent – Earning capacity – Decision under review affirmed

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

1. Mr Bowman seeks review of an objection decision made by the Department of Human Services – Child Support (the Department) on 27 February 2017. This decision disallowed his objection to a decision dated 9 December 2016 setting his adjusted taxable income as follows: for the period 6 September 2016 to October 2017 at $85,883, for the period 1 November 2017 to 31 January 2019 at $88,030, for the period 1 February 2019 to 30 April 2020 at $90,230, and for the period 1 May 2020 onward, in accordance with the normal administrative provisions of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”).

2. The Tribunal heard the matter on 3 October 2017. Mr Bowman and Ms Gould attended the hearing by conference telephone and gave affirmed evidence. The Tribunal had before it documents provided by the Department and the parties. Both parties had copies of these documents with them at hearing and the documents were admitted into evidence. The Department’s documents were marked Exhibit 1, the documents provided by Mr Bowman were marked exhibit A, and those provided by Ms Gould were marked exhibit B.

3. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal directed Mr Bowman to provide further expert evidence in relation to the depressive medical condition he asserted in his evidence at hearing which he said precluded him from returning to work. Ms Gould was also directed to provide further evidence in support of her claim for special needs with respect to the child. It was not considered necessary to provide copies of these further documents to the parties for comment.

CONSIDERATION

1. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal has considered the affirmed evidence of Mr Bowman and Ms Gould, and the documents contained in exhibits 1, A and B. The salient parts of the evidence will be outlined below.

The Legislative Framework

1. The rate of child support payable by a liable parent is usually based on an administrative assessment under Part 5 of the Act. A formula is used. It takes into account variables including each parent’s adjusted taxable income for the last relevant year of income, the number of children, and the level of care provided by each parent. Part 6 A of the Act allows for a departure from the administrative assessment (a process commonly known as a “change of assessment”). Under subsection 98C(1), the Registrar may make such a departure determination if three matters are established:

   ·One, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in subsection 98C (2) exists (subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(i));

   ·A departure is just and equitable as regards the children and each parent (subparagraph 98(1)(b)(ii)(A)); and

   ·It is otherwise proper to make a departure decision (sub- subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(ii)(B))

2. Subsection 98C(2) provides that the grounds for departure are the same as the grounds set out in subsection 117(2) of the Act.

3. If satisfied that a ground or grounds exist and that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the Registrar may make one of the determinations prescribed in section 98S of the Act. It permits a range of determinations, including varying the rate of child support payable, the adjusted taxable income or the cost percentage for a child.

Grounds for Departure

1. Subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) - commonly referred to as Reason 8 – provides as a ground for departure:

   (c) that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child…..

   (ia) because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent; or….

2. The words “in the special circumstances of the case” are not defined in the legislation. Whilst it is not possible to define with precision the meaning of that term, it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the legislation in subsection 117 (2) must be guided by the qualification that the Tribunal will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases. In Gyselman v Gyselman (1992) FLC 92 – 279, it was held that “special circumstances” were “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases”. The Tribunal will consider whether the application of the administrative assessment would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of child support payable, having regard to the evidence relevant to the parents’ financial position.

Mr Bowman’s Evidence

1. Mr Bowman’s case at hearing centred on his inability to return to any form of gainful employment because of his ongoing depressive condition. He provided a variety of medical evidence in support of his assertions in this regard, details of which are discussed below.

2. However, a brief analysis of the events which lead to his decision to give up his job as [an Occupation 1] on 3 June 2016, from which he was deriving an average taxable income of between $70,744 and $77,712 over the financial years ended 2009/10 to the 2014/15, and $85,883 in the financial year ended 2015/16, and following is useful.

3. Prior to 30 June 2016, Mr Bowman was assessed to pay child support of $10,312 per annum to Ms Gould, based on his 2015 taxable income of $75,009, and Ms Gould’s 2015 taxable income of $49,163.

4. The child support was privately collectable until Ms Gould’s application for collection by the Department was accepted on 28 July 2016. However, Mr Bowman ceased making his child support payments to Ms Gould as per the assessment then in effect on 25 June 2016.

5. Mr Bowman’s evidence was that prior to 3 June 2016, he was experiencing tiredness and fatigue in his work as [an Occupation 1]. He said he had incurred [formal warnings] from the [relevant state authority] for failing to comply with the provisions of the [relevant legislation]. The only evidence he provided in this respect was a [warning] issued on 4 December 2015 – (see pages 434 and 435 of exhibit 1). He said he considered it was no longer safe for him to continue [his occupation], and decided to cease working as [an Occupation 1] on 3 June 2016.

6. The Department’s file notes at page 187 and following records Mr Bowman applying to the Department on 3 June 2016 for acceptance of a $0 income estimate for the 2016/17 financial year, which the Department accepted on the same day (see page 191, exhibit 1).

7. On or about 31 August 2016, Mr Bowman and his current partner opened an account with [Bank 1] in their joint names as trustees for the [Mr Bowman] Superfund, his own self-managed superannuation fund.

8. On 19 October 2016, Mr Bowman applied to the Australian Business Registrar for, and was issued with, an Australian Business Number (ABN) in his capacity as trustee for the [Mr Bowman] Superfund (see exhibit 1, pages 164 and 165). At the same time, he arranged for his pre-existing superannuation account with [Company 1] to be rolled over into the [Mr Bowman] Superfund. An amount of $96,954.19 was transferred into the [Mr Bowman] Superfund on or about 25 October 2016 (see exhibit A, pages A64 to A70).

9. On 19 October 2016, Mr Bowman applied to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) for, and was issued with a tax file number for the [Mr Bowman] Superfund (see exhibit 1 page166).

10. Mr Bowman lodged his 2015/16 income tax return with the ATO on 19 July 2016 reflecting a taxable income of $77,414, comprised of a gross income of $100,228, less deductions of $22,814, including reportable superannuation contributions of $8,469. These contributions were added back by the Department decision maker in his decision of 9 December 2016 to arrive at the adjusted taxable income of $85,883 referred to in paragraph 1 above.

11. When Ms Gould applied to the Department for a change of assessment on 6 September 2016 on the grounds commonly called Reasons 8A, Mr Bowman was being administratively assessed to pay Ms Gould annual child support of $0 for the three children in the assessment, [Child 1], (born 2004), [Child 2], (born 2007), and [Child 3], (born 2008), based on his 3 June 2016 estimate of his 2016/17 income of $0 and Ms Gould’s reported 2016 taxable income of $55,798.

12. Ms Gould’s change of assessment application was determined by the Department on 9 December 2016, and a letter was sent to Mr Bowman that day notifying him of its decision. Although the Department’s decision maker was unable to be satisfied that a ground for departure from the administrative assessment under Reason 8A had been established, he commented in his reasons that Mr Bowman had not been forthcoming in explaining how he was managing to support himself on a $0 income estimate, and at the same time meet his daily living expenses and mortgage payments on his [Town 1] residential property. He was, however, not satisfied Mr Bowman had provided any satisfactory reason for leaving his employment as [an Occupation 1], other than to affect his child support liability, and accordingly found Reason 8B established.

13. The Department decision maker also commented on Mr Bowman’s failure to provide any information on his income generating activities, other than to advise that he conducted a trading account with [two trading companies] on behalf of his self-managed superannuation fund, both of which appeared to be associated with share trading.

14. Mr Bowman acknowledged in evidence at hearing that he was, and still is, actively engaged in share trading on behalf of his self-managed superannuation fund. This is confirmed by the bank statements he provided at the Tribunal’s direction (see exhibit A, pages 79 to 84). He said, in evidence, he was achieving a return of approximately 14% for his fund on his management of the fund’s share trading activities.

15. Significantly, Mr Bowman did not ventilate the circumstances of his depressive medical condition during the course of the initial change of assessment application before the Department’s decision maker.

16. Department  records of online and telephone communications between 15 December 2016 and 20 December 2016 record discussions between a Department officer and Mr Bowman, at or about the time Mr Bowman was notified of the Department’s decision to grant Ms Gould’s departure application on 9 December 2016, during which Mr Bradly complained about his increased child support assessment, the failure of the Department’s letter of 9 December 2016 notifying him of the change of assessment determination on 9 December 2016 to reach him, his lack of earning capacity due to his having “resigned” his employment as [an Occupation 1], and the consequent hardship situation that had placed him in with respect to his capacity to meet his child support payments. There is also some suggestion that he made threats to the Department officers during the telephone conversations that he would commit suicide if the Department sought to take his assets to satisfy his child support arrears.

17. It appears from the medical evidence provided by Mr Bowman that he presented at the [Town 1] Hospital’s emergency department on 20 December 2016 for treatment for suicidal ideation following his threats to Department staff to commit suicide.

Medical Evidence provided by Mr Bowman

1. Mr Bowman contends that he suffers from depression and anxiety and, in consequence of these conditions, is unable to undertake any form of gainful employment.

2. He gave evidence that he believes he has suffered from depression for some period of time before he was formally diagnosed by his local doctor, [Doctor A], following his consultation with [Doctor A] on 1 January 2017.

3. He said he treated himself for his depressive condition with natural remedies and meditation before seeking professional medical treatment from [Doctor A] at the recommendation of the emergency department at the [Town 1] Hospital following his presentation there on 20 December 2016 as noted above.

4. The [Town 1] Hospital’s clinical notes for 20 December 2016, (exhibit A, pages A13 to A17) record, relevantly, Mr Bowman being advised, amongst other things, to consult his local GP the following day to discuss anti-depressants, obtain a referral to a psychologist, and seek legal advice. He does not appear to have been admitted for further treatment that night.

5. It is noteworthy that, at page A15, the clinical notes record Mr Bowman remarking that he was ‘tempted to go back to work to get child support off his back’, and the reference to Mr Bowman consuming ‘2-3 bottles of spirits weekly’.

6. He presented for further treatment at the [Town 1] Hospital on several occasions – 11 and 25 August 2017, and on 1,7,13 and 14 September 2017. [Doctor B], the hospital psychiatric registrar, saw him on a number of occasions during this time, and assessed his condition and progress with his treatment.

7. He was discharged on 14 September 2017, the clinical  notes recording he appeared ‘settled with a new counsellor via Suicide Prevention network, reported medication working well, risk low currently, though changeable, but with nil need for acute mental health services at that time’.

8. A further report provided by [Doctor B] post hearing, dated 5 October 2017, records a diagnosis of Mr Bowman’s condition as “part of the cluster B personality traits – further known as the dramatic, emotional and erratic cluster which share problems with impulse control and emotional regulation and include borderline, narcissistic, histrionic and antisocial personality disorders”. [Doctor B] notes that during his review of Mr Bowman’s condition on 13 September 2017, he recommended continuation with psychologist intervention, exercise and the taking of [a medication].

9. [Doctor A] provided five reports; the first, dated 1 January 2017, is of no assistance, recording his opinion that Mr Bowman was suffering from “medical illness” and was “unfit for duty from 5/01/2017 to 2/02/2017”. His second report was more useful, identifying Mr Bowman’s symptoms as ‘chronic fatigue, insomnia, tiredness”, and that he would be unfit for duty.

10. [Doctor A] provided a certificate to Centrelink dated 8 June 2017 in which he diagnosed Mr Bowman’s condition as “depression”, estimated the likely duration of the condition as between 13 and 24 months, the symptoms as “lack of energy, tired”, the treatment as “psychologist, anti-depressant” and Mr Bowman as unfit for work or study from 8 August to 8 September 2017.

11. His fourth report, post hearing, dated 23 August 2017, confirms the depression diagnosis, but comments that Mr Bowman “is physically fine to work, but mentally not able to work”. His report continues, stating that he is not able to give a time frame as to when Mr Bowman will be able to work, and that, at the moment, he is receiving treatment for the depression with the aim to go back to work, when the depression has been controlled. He also comments that he considers treatment by a psychologist rather than an occupational therapist more appropriate.

12. [Doctor A] is a general medical practitioner and does not profess expertise in the field of psychology or psychiatry. He does not provide any credible medical, psychological or psychiatric basis for his conclusion that Mr Bowman is “mentally not able to work”. Absent such expert evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied there is evidence to support that conclusion.

13. [Doctor A’s] fifth report, post hearing, dated 18 October 2017, records, relevantly, Mr Bowman consulting him for depression, tiredness, lack of energy and concentration. He notes that Mr Bowman told him “he had quit his job because he felt burnt out”, but was unable to express an opinion as to when Mr Bowman will be able to return to work.

14. [Mr C], the psychologist to whom [Doctor A] referred Mr Bowman, provided a report dated 28 August 2017. Relevantly, the report reflects [Mr C’s] treatment of Mr Bowman over the course of the period 10 January 2017 – 20 March 2017, and 26 June 2017 – 28 August 2017. During the break in treatment between 20 March 2017 and 26 June 2017, (due to [Mr C] relocating is practice), he notes that Mr Bowman coped emotionally, but suicidal ideation flared up as a consequence of Mr Bowman coming under pressure from the Department regarding his compliance with his child support obligations. According to [Mr C’s] report, the focus of his treatment was on therapeutic sessions to develop coping skills to manage Mr Bowman’s severe depression and anxiety symptoms.

15. [Mr C] ceased treating Mr Bowman at the end of August 2017, and he was referred to [Ms D], who describes herself as a credentialed medical health nurse, for ongoing treatment of his suicidal ideations. [Ms D] provided a report dated 12 October 2017. She describes Mr Bowman presenting with a moderate to severe depression with minimal capacity to engage in employment, impacting on his general day-to-day functioning, largely attributable to his relationship with Ms Gould. She noted medication had been a minimal effective treatment option for Mr Bowman.

16. [Ms D] prescribes a form of treatment consisting of supportive psychotherapy incorporating relaxation strategies, which, she notes, Mr Bowman found helpful, and mindfulness skills. According to her report, Mr Bowman had not reported any current suicidal ideations. However, she notes that due to the moderate to severe depression he appears to exhibit, it could take some time for treatment to be effective and a determined timeframe is difficult to predict, taking into account the many variables precipitating Mr Bowman’s presentation.

17. None of the medical evidence, including the reports of [Mr C] and [Ms D], suggests that Mr Bowman is suffering from other than a form of depression and anxiety, precipitated by his relationship with Ms Gould, and conflict relating to his child support obligations.

18. The reports indicate that Mr Bowman is responding well to the prescribed treatment which largely relates to psychological intervention. The medication he has been prescribed is essentially for the purpose of alleviating his insomnia. There is no suggestion in the medical or psychological evidence that he is unable to engage in any form of gainful employment. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer from his course of conduct in deciding to resign from his [Occupation 1] employment in early June 2016 that his intention was to devote his time to managing the share trading activities of his own self- managed superannuation fund, at which he appears to have been successful.

19. He provided a copy of his superannuation fund’s 2016/17 income tax return, reflecting a taxable income for the period 19 October 2016 to 30 June 2017 of $16,014.

20. The Tribunal finds that the medical and psychological evidence adduced by Mr Bowman does not support his contention that he is unable to return to any form of remunerative employment, and that his decision to cease employment as [an Occupation 1] was a matter of personal preference. The tribunal is not satisfied that he has demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support in relation to children.

1. The medical and psychological evidence, at best, suggests that he has at least a minimal capacity to engage in some form of employment, and his own evidence as to his capacity to manage the share trading activities of his self-managed superannuation fund suggest he is able to return to gainful employment, regardless of his depressive/anxiety overlay.

2. The Tribunal is satisfied Mr Bowman has an unexercised capacity to earn income, which makes the administrative assessment of child support in this case unjust and inequitable, the case special, and a departure from the administrative assessment warranted.

Just and Equitable, and Otherwise Proper: General Observations

1. On 3 June 2016, Mr Bowman voluntarily terminated his employment as [an Occupation 1] from which he derived an adjusted taxable income for the financial year 2015/16 of $85,883 because he was fatigued, tired and burnt out. He contends he suffers from depression and is unable to undertake any form of remunerative employment for an indefinite period, until his depression is brought under control.

2. On 3 June 2016, Mr Bowman lodged a $0 estimate of his income for the 2016/17 financial year, and a corresponding $0 child support assessment issued for the period 1 August 2016 to 9 March 2017.

3. Ms Gould’s 2015/16 income used in the assessment was her 2015/16 adjusted taxable income of $50,798.

4. The Tribunal finds the medical evidence relied upon by Mr Bowman does not support his contention that he is unable to return to work, but rather that he has the capacity to earn income either as [an Occupation 1] or in some other remunerative form of employment, while continuing with his remedial treatment for his depression.

5. The requirement to consider whether a departure would be just and equitable and otherwise proper directs attention to what is fair to the parents, their children and the community. A decision-maker must have regard to a variety of factors such as the needs of the children, the parents’ commitments, any hardship that would be caused by departing or not departing from the formula, and the effect of any income tested benefits: subsections 117(4) to (9). Parents rather than the community have the primary duty to maintain a child: paragraph 117 (5) (a). It is necessary to consider the effect of any departure from the administrative assessment on entitlements to income-tested pensions, allowances and benefits: paragraph 117(5)(b). Relevantly, this requires consideration of the effect on either parent’s entitlement to family tax benefit Part A, which is subject to a maintenance income test.

6. A decision-maker must bear in mind the duties of parents and the objects of the Act, set out in sections 3, 4 and 114. These include:

   ·     The duty of a parent to maintain his or her child has priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary to enable the parent to support himself or herself and any other child or person that the parent has a duty to maintain.

   ·     The level of support should be determined in accordance with the costs of children, and according to the parent’s capacity to provide.

   ·     Parents should share equitably in the support of the child, and the child should have his or her proper needs met from reasonable and adequate shares in the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of both parents.

Would departure from the formula assessment be just and equitable?

1. The Tribunal has found that there is a ground to depart from the administrative assessment. The Tribunal must also consider, pursuant to section 117 (4) of the Act, whether it would be just and equitable to make a particular order. The Tribunal has considered the matters set out in subsections 117 (4) and (6) to (8). The Tribunal does not propose to explore every matter in detail, but will discuss those it regards as pertinent to this application.

Mr Bowman’s financial circumstances

1. Mr Bowman’s circumstances have been discussed in some detail above.

2. In his latest Statement of Financial Circumstances dated 1 September 2017, Mr Bowman discloses that he is unemployed and has no income whatsoever.

3. He discloses his current partner’s gross weekly income of $1,320 and lists weekly general and household expenditure of $667.50, including council rates, which would seem to be unjustified given he sold his [Town 1] property in March 2017. Otherwise, he discloses no other real property assets.

4. His weekly living expenses include groceries of $200, which seems high, $25 for sporting activities, and $125 in unspecified expenditure. His only assets appeared to be a joint interest in two encumbered motor-vehicles valued at a total of $65,000, and negligible bank savings. However, he lists his interest in his self-managed superannuation fund which he values at $80,000 as a joint interest with his current partner. Given that the fund was established entirely from the rollover of his [Company 1] superannuation fund balance, the full value of the fund would be wholly attributable to him.

5. Mr Bowman provided copies of bank statements for his [Bank 2] two joint bank accounts and his [Bank 2] credit card account. His joint account with his current partner, number [number], reflects a credit balance of $2,623 as at 3 June 2016, the date of his termination of his employment as [an Occupation 1]. Between 4 June 2016 and 1 August 2016, a total of $8,929 was credited to the account, including Mr Bowman’s final salary payment from [Employer name], and what appears to be a tax refund of $5,292. Over the 2016/17 Christmas and New Year period, the account reflected credit balances of between $1,188 and $1,008.

6. His joint account number [number] reflects credits to that account totalling $20,874 between 29 June 2016 and 20 December 2016, against debits of $19,872 including mortgage payments, presumably on his [Town 1] property, of $4,660 and “[trading site]” debits on 30 June and 1 July 2016 totalling $15,212. The account reflects credit balances ranging from $2,021 to $1,490 over the period 3 February to 17 March 2017.

7. Mr Bowman’s [Bank 2] credit card account number [number] statement reflects cash payments of $4,196 from the account over the period 25 November 2016 to 20 December 2016.

8. There is also the unexplained disbursement of the net sale proceeds from the sale of Mr Bowman’s [Town 1] property in March 2017 to be taken into account in assessing Mr Bowman’s financial resources available for child support.

Ms Gould’s financial circumstances

1. Ms Gould provided a Statement of Financial Circumstances dated 3 April 2017. It discloses her employment in an administrative capacity for a private company at a gross annual salary of $56,248. She reports her current partner’s gross weekly income of $1,700.

2. She receives a carer’s allowance for the child, [Child 1], who suffers from [a medical condition], and the child, [Child 2], of $94.70 per week. She has not received any child support from Mr Bowman since 24 June 2016.

3. Ms Gould is the registered proprietor of the family home valued at $360,000, but subject to a mortgage debt of $248,927. She also has a half interest in an investment property with her current partner, with her share valued at $62,500, also subject to a total mortgage debt of $62,695. She reports modest bank savings, a motor vehicle valued at $7,000, household contents valued at $57,000, and a half interest in a boat and campervan which she values at $1,250.

4. Her liabilities, including total mortgage debt of $311,622, credit card debt of $14,146 and a [bank] loan of $5000, total $331,268.50.

5. Ms Gould’s average weekly expenses, based on the information provided in her Statement are approximately $1,321 and are otherwise unremarkable.

6. Ms Gould provided evidence with respect to the child, [Child 1’s] special needs regarding her [medical] condition, but was unable to provide any current medical or occupational therapy reports, or costs estimates for treatment of [Child 1]’s condition. However, she advised that [Child 1]’s special educational, medical and therapy needs are covered by a special [State] Government allowance paid through the [relevant government department] and the family’s health insurance cover with [insurance company], and she did not require the Tribunal to address those issues in its deliberations.

Conclusion

1. The Tribunal is satisfied Ms Gould relies on child support payments to support the children. She does not receive Family Tax Benefits and she requires whatever financial support Mr Bowman can reasonably provide to support the children.

2. The Tribunal concurs with the objections officer’s decision not to disturb the original decision maker’s determination of Ms Gould’s change of assessment application, setting Mr Bowman’s adjusted taxable income at $85,883 for the period 6 September 2016 until 31 October 2017, for the period 1 November 2017 to 31 January 2019, at $88,030, and for the period 1 February 2019 until 30 April 2020 at $90,230.

3. As noted earlier herein, on 25 June 2016, Mr Bowman ceased making his child support payments required under the administrative assessment of $10,312 per annum to which he was assessed to 30 June 2016.

4. Since that time, Mr Bowman has established his own self-managed superannuation fund which he has operated successfully, returning a significant profit. He has also sold his [Town 1] property receiving a return of $37,718. An analysis of his bank accounts suggests he applied approximately $15,212 of his own funds between 30 June and 1 July 2016 to share trading activities outside the scope of his own self-managed super fund, and has had funds totalling approximately $20,874 passing through his joint bank account number [number] over the period 29 June 2016 to 20 December 2016, none of which was applied to discharge his child support liability to Ms Gould and the children.

5. His current partner has a gross income of $68,640 per annum. Mr Bowman has the capacity to generate an income in the vicinity of $85,000 per annum and the financial resources sufficient to pay child support on an adjusted taxable income at that level.

6. Taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal considers Mr Bowman has the capacity to generate the income and the financial resources sufficient to warrant leaving the assessments determined by the Department’s decision maker on 9 December 2016 in place. Such an outcome is just and equitable, and otherwise proper.

7. As the Tribunal has reached the same conclusion as the objections officer in the decision under review, the Tribunal affirms that decision.

DECISION

The Tribunal decides that the decision under review is affirmed.