Bowers v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bowers v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] QDC 106

PARTIES:

DANIEL MORGAN BOWERS

(Appellant)

v

COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

2294/20 

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

15 June 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 April 2021

JUDGE:

Byrne QC DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to adduce additional evidence refused.

2.   Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – s222 Justices Act 1886 – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – LEAVE TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE - where appellant seeks leave pursuant to s223(2) of the Justices Act to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence – whether the Court considers it appropriate there are special grounds for giving leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence.

APPEAL – s222 Justices Act 1886 – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – SPECIFIC ERROR – MANIFEST EXCESS - where the appellant was convicted of an offence of smoking on an aircraft contrary to Regulation 255(1)(a) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988(Cth) – where the appellant was sentenced in the Brisbane Magistrates Court to a $200 fine with a conviction recorded – whether the sentencing Magistrate’s consideration of the two-stage test under s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) in exercising her sentencing discretion constitutes a specific error – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive

LEGISLATION:

Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

CASES:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 192 ALR 92

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

House v the King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Kentwell v the Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601

Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

Pavlovic v Commissioner of Police [2007] 1 QdR 44

R v Hooper; ex-parte Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] QCA 308

R v Stephens [2021] QCA 127

Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679

Taylor v Lanyon [2006] QDC 321

Warapa v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2019] QDC 202

Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629

COUNSEL:

Mr M.L. Longhurst for the appellant.

Mr G.F. Perry for the respondent.

SOLICITORS:

TWC Lawyers for the appellant.

Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent.

Introduction

  1. On 24 July 2020 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Brisbane Magistrates Court to an offence of smoking on an aircraft contrary to Reg. 255(1)(a) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth). He was fined $200.00 and, as the offence was contrary to Commonwealth legislation, a conviction was necessarily recorded.

  2. This appeal is against the severity of the sentence. More specifically, the appellant complains that the recording of a conviction made the sentence manifestly excessive and that the sentencing Magistrate should have proceeded under s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) thereby facilitating the non-recording of a…

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Details
Case
[2021] QDC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Bowers v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant, Bowers, appealed against his sentence for smoking on an aircraft, which was contrary to Regulation 255(1)(a) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth). Bowers was sentenced in the Brisbane Magistrates Court to a $200 fine with a conviction recorded. The legal issues in the case revolved around whether the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was the result of a specific error and whether it was manifestly excessive. Additionally, Bowers sought leave to adduce further evidence, including affidavits from himself and his employer, to support his case.

The court examined the Magistrate's sentencing process and found that while there was an initial error in applying the statutory test under section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the overall sentence was not the result of an appealable error. The court noted that the Magistrate did not strictly follow the statutory wording but made a determination that aligned with the statutory test. The court also concluded that the sentence, while not the lowest possible, was not manifestly excessive or plainly unjust. Regarding the additional evidence, the court ruled that the affidavits were inadmissible as they did not meet the criteria for special grounds under section 223(2) of the Justices Act 1886.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal and denied Bowers' application for leave to adduce additional evidence. The sentence imposed was deemed not to be the result of an appealable error or manifestly excessive. The court's final orders were to refuse the application for leave to adduce additional evidence and to dismiss the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to adduce additional evidence refused.

2. Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

After imposing sentence it was brought to her Honour’s attention that she had incorrectly appreciated the effect of s 19B(1)(b) of the Crimes Act in that she had required all three limbs be satisfied before she considered the sentencing option was available. Her Honour recognised her error and noted that, having been satisfied of the character requirement in s 19B(1)(b)(i) of the Crimes Act, she needed to take into account the matters in s 16A. She said:“And in relation to that particular matter because of the need for general deterrence, I don’t think that it’s expedient in those circumstances…to proceed with the matter under s 19B.So that’s … I did express myself and applied that test incorrectly – thank you for raising that, (prosecution solicitor) – but I am satisfied, as you conceded – I think I can be satisfied about the good character and antecedents, but – so I think I did say earlier in my sentencing remarks about addressing s 16A and the need for general deterrence at the time…as well as all of those other circumstances such as the impact on – whether or not there is likely to be any impact on the defendant’s employment and visa, and the circumstances in which the offence occurred.” (underlining added)Application to adduce additional evidence The appellant seeks to adduce additional evidence in the form of two affidavits, namely one under the hand of the appellant and the other from Mr Harman, the Group Managing Director of the appellant’s employer. At sentence the submissions as to the impact of the recording of a conviction on the appellant’s visa status and his intended application for permanent residency were put in terms of an expectation that his visa “might” be cancelled and “he might be put in a show cause at the very, very worse (sic)”.[13][13]Sentencing submissions 1 – 9, ll 20 – 38. As to the impact of a recorded conviction on his employment, it was submitted that the appellant’s opinion was that “his employer would not take kindly to a person in his position having a criminal conviction” and, given his involvement with government agencies, “it could somehow have some impact”.[14][14]Sentencing submissions 1 – 8, ll 33 – 42. The requirement in s 223(2) of the Justices Act 1886 that there be special grounds before leave is given to adduce “new evidence” directs attention both to the reasons why the “new evidence” was not adduced at first instance, and the nature of it.[15] A useful summary of the relevant principles concerning the admission of fresh and new or additional evidence, in the context of an appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal, can be found in R v Stephens.[16] [15]Pavlovic v Commissioner of Police [2007] 1 Qd R 44, [30] – [36].[16][2021] QCA 127, [30]. The appellant submits that the affidavits should be received, in effect, because they confirm matters “largely” placed before the sentencing court which were “seemingly accepted by Her Honour” and because they “may assume relevance” in the event of re-sentencing in this appeal. Leaving aside for one moment the fact that not all the assertions in the material were in fact accepted by the sentencing Magistrate, the submission does not provide a basis for admission of this material according to accepted principle.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may well have been that a different Magistrate would have sentenced under s 19B but, as is almost invariably the case, there was not only one appropriate sentence open in the circumstances of the matter. What others might have done is not to the point. It appears to me that the sentence imposed was properly capable of being arrived at in all of the circumstances. Although another sentence could have been imposed, the one that was imposed was not unreasonable or plainly unjust, as that concept is understood as a matter of principle.Conclusion For the reasons contained herein, the affidavit of the appellant is inadmissible and a miscarriage of justice will not result if Mr Harman’s affidavit is not admitted. Therefore leave to adduce further evidence must be refused. The sentence imposed is not the result of appealable error and is not manifestly excessive.Orders The orders I make are as follows:1. Application for leave to adduce additional evidence refused.2. Appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The employer’s affidavit asserts that the recording of a conviction “will have an ongoing impact” on the appellant’s employment for reasons stated in limited terms therein. Although there is merit in the respondent’s submission that the affidavit is inadmissible as it is opinion evidence which does not sufficiently reveal the foundational material giving rise to the opinion, I consider that a person in the position of the deponent is inherently positioned to express this type of opinion, and it can be assumed that it is based on experience. However, I note that it is carefully worded and refers only to having “an ongoing impact” on the appellant’s employment, rather than suggesting that his employment would likely be terminated. Given that this latter affidavit, at least at face value, advances the parlous state of the evidence below as to the effect of a conviction on the appellant’s employment, it is admissible if it is necessary to admit it to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The issues raised by the appellant go to the weight to be afforded to it. Its admissibility on that basis will be considered below.ConsiderationSpecific Error It is unfortunate that the sentencing Magistrate initially misapplied the test dictated by s 19B of the Crimes Act, and that once the error was brought to her attention she did not precisely conform to the words of the statute. However, it must also be remembered that the sentencing remarks were being delivered ex tempore and some allowance should be made for infelicity in expression.[18][18]R v Hooper; ex-parte Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] QCA 308, [23]. In any case, the determination that it was not “expedient in those circumstances to proceed with the matter under s 19B” sufficiently accords with the stated statutory test for me to be satisfied that there is no appealable error in that respect. It is notable that the appellant does not contend that the use of that language suggests an error. Rather, it is submitted that the Magistrate failed to engage with the issues raised by s 19B of the Crimes Act as to whether it was inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or anything more than nominal punishment or that it was expedient to order probation. The appellant specifically submits that “with any offence being dealt with in any court, $200.00 is a nominal punishment”.[19] It is submitted that the Magistrate failed to appreciate that and, if considered that an appropriate punishment, should then have proceeded under s 19B. It is also more broadly argued that her Honour failed to engage with all considerations in s 16A of the Crimes Act, and had she done so she would have considered that it was inexpedient to impose more than nominal punishment.[19]Sentencing submissions 1-5, ll 20 – 21. The first argument cannot be accepted. While $200.00 is obviously not a large fine, particularly for a person with the appellant’s earning capacity, the quantum of the fine is not the only determinant. First, it is about 19 % of the available maximum penalty. Secondly, to say that a fine of that nature is only nominal punishment and therefore should not be imposed is to fetter the sentencing discretion by requiring that only larger fines, the quantum of which has not been identified, can ever be imposed for this offence. Thirdly, the legislative context must be considered. As the offence fell within the Commonwealth regime, the recording of the conviction necessarily occurs where a fine is imposed. The amount of the fine is not the sentence, it is the amount of the fine and the associated recording of the conviction. That is the very reason for this appeal. The pleaded ground of manifest excess has not been withdrawn and the submission cannot stand with that pursued ground of appeal. I need say nothing further about why the submission cannot be accepted.