Boulos v MRVL Investments Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Boulos v MRVL Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 309

File number: NSD 2168 of 2019
Judgment of: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 30 March 2021
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – answers to separate question in class action

INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether cl 3 of schedule 7B of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) prevented a post 28 March 2008 variation by way of undertaking under s 346R(2)(b) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) proposed in order to seek to pass the fairness test – it did not

INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether notice under s 346P of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) could be revoked relying upon s 33(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) – it could not – whether decision under s 346M(2) that a collective agreement did not pass fairness test in s 346M could be rescinded or revoked – it could not

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 33(1), 33(3)

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 150B, 340, 342, 344, 346E, 346F, 346J, 346M, 346P, 346R, 346S, 346T, 346U, 346W, 346X, 346Y, 346YA, 346ZA, 346ZB, 346ZD, 346ZE, 347, 367

Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) schs 7A and 7B

Cases cited:

Flaherty v Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing (2010) 184 FCR 564

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care (2003) 145 FCR 1

Minister for Indigenous Affairs v MJD Foundation Ltd (2017) 250 FCR 31

NSW v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118

Precision Products (NSW) Pty Limited v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) 74 NSWLR 102

Rodriguez & Sons Pty Ltd v Queensland Bulk Water Supply Authority trading as Seqwater (No 22) [2019] NSWSC 1657

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area:  Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs:  68
Date of hearing: 29 March 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Lynch SC and Mr SR Meehan
Solicitor for the Applicant: Adero Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JK Kirk SC with Mr Y Shariff SC and Ms KN Pham
Solicitor for the Respondent: Johnson Winter & Slattery

ORDERS

NSD 2168 of 2019
BETWEEN:

RAYMOND BOULOS

Applicant

AND:

MRVL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 000 620 888)

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties confer with a view to providing within 14 days a joint position articulating the appropriate answers to the separate question.

2.No order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

  1. On 27 August 2020, the Court ordered that the following question be heard separately from any other question in the proceedings:

    The questions arising on paragraphs 3 to 12 of the Defence (other than paragraphs 10D and 10E) and paragraphs 1 to 6…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Boulos v MRVL Investments Pty Ltd (No 2), the Federal Court examined the validity of certain decisions made by the Director of the Workplace Authority under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WR Act). The case involved the Merivale Agreement, a collective agreement between an employer and employees, which had undergone amendments in an attempt to meet the 'fairness test' required by the WR Act. The central dispute centred on the legal consequences of these amendments and decisions, specifically whether the Merivale Agreement could be varied post-amendments and if certain decisions by the Director could be rescinded.

The primary legal issues included whether clause 3 of Schedule 7B of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) precluded a variation of the Merivale Agreement by an undertaking under section 346R(2)(b) of the WR Act, and whether the Director had the authority to revoke a notice under section 346P or a decision under section 346M(2) that a collective agreement did not pass the fairness test. The court also considered whether these decisions, if flawed, could remain valid unless set aside by the Court.

The court ruled that clause 3 of Schedule 7B did not prevent a variation of the Merivale Agreement by way of an undertaking. Additionally, the court determined that the Director lacked the power to revoke a notice under section 346P or a decision under section 346M(2) of the WR Act. This meant that such decisions could not be rescinded unilaterally by the Director. Furthermore, the court held that if these decisions were flawed, they could not remain valid unless explicitly set aside by the Court.

The court ordered the parties to confer and provide a joint position within 14 days, articulating the appropriate answers to the separate question posed. No order was made as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties confer with a view to providing within 14 days a joint position articulating the appropriate answers to the separate question.

2. No order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 12 June 2009, the Director wrote to Harmers, stating that the Merivale Agreement as amended by the undertaking of 11 June 2009 passed the fairness test (Second Undertaking Decision). Merivale contends that the Rescission Decision validly revoked or rescinded the First Fairness Test Decision and that the subsequent steps culminating in the Second Undertaking Decision meant that the Merivale Agreement as amended by the undertaking on 11 June 2009 passed the fairness test. The second issue in dispute between the parties is whether the Director had power to make the Rescission Decision to revoke the notice of 15 December 2008 or the First Fairness Test Decision which was thereby notified. Merivale’s position is that the notice and/or decision could be revoked with the consequence that, pursuant to the Second Undertaking Decision, the Merivale Agreement as varied by the undertaking lodged on 11 June 2009 applied to the employment of the applicant and group members. The third issue is Merivale’s alternative contention that if the impugned decisions are affected by legal error or beyond power, they remain valid or should be treated as valid unless and until set aside by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The issue of whether the Court should exercise its discretion is not raised by the separate question. That question would have involved substantial factual argument and discovery. FIRST ISSUE The first question that arises is whether the Merivale Agreement was capable of variation under the provisions of Div 5A of the Pre-transition WR Act, having regard to amendments to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRAct) after the Merivale Agreement was lodged with the Director. At the time that the Merivale Agreement was lodged in December 2007, Div 5A of Pt 8 of the Pre-transition WR Act required the Director to decide whether the Merivale Agreement passed the “fairness test” prescribed by the WR Act. The scheme established under Div 5A was to the following effect:·If an employer and employees approved a collective agreement in the appropriate manner (s 340), the collective agreement had to be lodged by the employer within 14 days after approval in accordance with s 344: s 342. (Section 347 in Div 6 had the effect that the collective agreement comes into operation on the day it was lodged.)·The Director had to determine under s 346M whether certain collective agreements (of which the Merivale Agreement was one) passed the fairness test: s 346E(2).·The Director had to give written notice of that fact to the employer: s 346J(1)(a).·If the Director was not satisfied that an agreement passed the fairness test in s 346M, the Director was required to notify the employer, and provide advice as to how the agreement could be varied to pass the fairness test: s 346P.·The employer could lodge a variation of the workplace agreement by giving to the Director a written undertaking in relation to the collective agreement: s 346R(2)(b). ·If that occurred, the Director was required to decide whether the agreement as varied passed the fairness test: s 346U.·If the agreement (as varied) passed the fairness test, then it continued in operation: s 346X. If the agreement (as varied) did not pass the fairness test, then it ceased to operate and the employees were entitled to compensation: s 346W. An employee was entitled to compensation in respect of periods that a workplace agreement that did not pass the fairness test was in operation: ss 346X, 346W and 346ZD(1).·An employer who received a notice under ss 346J, 346P or 346U had to take reasonable steps to ensure that all persons whose employment was subject to the collective agreement receive a copy of the notice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant submitted that s 346ZB of the Pre-transition WR Act prevented the Merivale Agreement from operating, once it ceased to operate and that s 346ZB prevented what might otherwise be the operation of s 33 of the AI Act because it evidenced a contrary intention for the purposes of s 2(1) of the AI Act. Section 346ZB provided:346ZB Operation of workplace agreementsA workplace agreement that has ceased to operate because it does not pass the fairness test can never operate again. It is convenient to address the applicant’s position first given that, if it is correct, it would not matter what otherwise might be the operation of s 33(1) or (3): s 2(1) of the AI Act. Section 346ZB has not been the subject of any judicial consideration. Merivale submitted that s 346ZB has nothing to say about the operation of an agreement in circumstances where the decision that the agreement does not pass the fairness test is revoked. Merivale submits that, if s 346ZB were read literally, a workplace agreement could never operate again even if the decision that the agreement did not pass the fairness test were set aside by a court. According to Merivale, that plainly cannot be the case and, once it is accepted that s 346ZB does not prevent an agreement from operating, where a decision that the agreement did not pass the fairness test is set aside by a court, it follows that it also does not prevent an agreement from operating again where a decision that the agreement did not pass the fairness test is otherwise revoked. Section 346ZB no longer applies in those circumstances because the agreement is no longer an agreement that does not pass the fairness test. Merivale submitted that, having regard to its context, s 346ZB has a narrower operation than at first appears from the ordinary meaning of the words. Merivale submitted that the provisions which precede s 346ZB (namely ss 346Y to 346ZA) deal with the employment arrangements that apply if a workplace agreement ceases to operate because it does not pass the fairness test and that, in general terms, the effect of those provisions is that the employer and employee become bound by the instrument or instruments that would have applied, but for the agreement that has now been found not to pass the fairness test (see ss 346Y(2) and 346YA(2)). In some circumstances, that has the effect that an agreement that has ceased to operate will revive. Section 346ZB is directed towards whether an agreement that does not pass the fairness test can operate again in that specific context. Merivale contended that this construction is further supported by the fact that there are express exceptions to the operation of s 346ZB contained in those provisions – see: ss 346Y(3) and 346YA(4). Merivale also submitted that there is no good reason to treat the statutory scheme as having been intended to be entirely inflexible, admitting no possibility of mistakes. I do not accept this argument. The concept of a workplace agreement ‘ceasing to operate’ is central to the operation of Div 5A and, more specifically, to the operation of Subdivision D entitled “Consequences if a workplace agreement does not pass the fairness test”. The concept is one used throughout the Subdivision. Section 346ZB is in Div 5A, Subdivision D. It provides the consequence if “a workplace agreement ceases to operate”. Section 346R(3), for example, provides:(3) If the employer does not take the action referred to in subsection (2) within the relevant period in relation to the workplace agreement, then at the end of that period:(a) the workplace agreement ceases to operate; and(b) the employee or employees whose employment was at any time subject to the workplace agreement are, after the end of the relevant period in relation to the workplace agreement, entitled to any compensation payable to the employee or employees under section 346ZD.