Boughton and Commissioner of Taxation
[2005] AATA 1259
•19 December 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 1259
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No NS2005/57
Sitting as the Small Claims Taxation Tribunal ) Re Laylee Boughton Applicant
And
Commissioner of Taxation
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President J. Block Date19 December 2005
PlaceSydney
Decision The objection decision under review is affirmed [Sgd] Mr J Block, Deputy President
Administrative
Appeals
TribunalADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ) NS2005/57
)
Sitting as the Small Claims Taxation
Tribunal )
Re:LAYLEE BOUGHTON
Applicant
And:COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
DECISION (CORRIGENDUM) [2005] AATA 1259
TribunalMr J Block, Deputy President
Date16 January 2006
PlaceSydney
WHEREAS:
1. The Tribunal issued a written decision dated 19 December 2005 in this matter.
2. It has come to the Tribunal’s attention that there is a typographical error in the written decision
3. The Tribunal wishes to amend the written decision so as to rectify this error and, wishing to do so with the least cost and inconvenience to the parties, applies the provision of section 43AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975.
NOW THEREFORE THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS that all references in the written decision to the Applicant’s representative, as “McNiece” be altered so as to reflect its correct spelling of “McNeice”.
[Sgd] Mr J Block
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
TAXATION - Employment alleged as between husband and wife – deductions claimed, some related to alleged employment by husband, and some related to employment by IPOH – nature of those expenses –sham –penalty provisions
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997; sections 284-75, 284-80 and 284-90
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (2001) 177 ALR 270
Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards (1994) ATC 4255
Case 49/97(1997) ATC 516
Case 16/93 (1993) ATC 208
Morris v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) ATC 4004
REASONS FOR DECISION
19 December 2005 Deputy President J. Block Part A; Introduction and General
1. The objection decision which is under review in this matter is the disallowance (in part) of an objection by Mrs Laylee Boughton (“the Applicant”) against her assessment for the year ending June 2003 (“the relevant year”). It may be noted at the outset that the Applicant did not originally, in submitting her return for the relevant year, claim that she derived an amount of $1040 by way of salary from her husband, Reverend Boughton, as an employee, and in respect of the relevant year. (The Reverend Boughton is referred to in these reasons as “the Minister” or “the husband” or “her husband”). In a letter dated 15 March 2005 addressed to the Respondent by Moneywise Accounting Taxation & Financial Services (Tp183) clause 1 reads (in part) as follows: “On checking the return it would appear that this sum was omitted in error from Lay Lee Boughton’s return. Would you kindly amend Lay Lee Boughton’s return to include the $1040 at item 2 of the return”
2. The Tribunal had before it the T-Documents tendered in accordance with section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 together with a number of exhibits, which need not be detailed; exhibits will be referred to in these reasons as required.
3. The Applicant was represented by Mr. David McNiece of Moneywise Accounting Taxation & Financial Services; Mr McNiece is a tax agent. The Respondent was represented by Mr. E. Chiaw is employed by the Respondent and as a litigation officer.
4. The Respondent had furnished written submissions dated 5 December 2005 and which referred to a number of decided cases. Mr. McNiece said at the commencement of the hearing that he would ask for an extension of time after the hearing, in order to file written submissions as to the cases referred to by the Respondent. Mr. Chiaw consented on the basis that he would have a right of reply. It is in these circumstances that I agreed that such a procedure would be permitted. At the close of the hearing on 5 December 2005 a timetable was agreed and the matter was rescheduled for hearing on 19 December 2005 and on which date the parties were given an opportunity to furnish oral submissions. Submissions, inter alia, as to the case law were duly received from Mr. McNiece and Mr. Chiaw filed supplementary submissions on behalf of the Respondent in reply.
5. The Applicant did not file written submissions at the time of the hearing. Nor were written statements furnished in respect of the Applicant and the Minister, both of whom gave oral evidence. The Respondent consented to their giving evidence and they did so. In the written submissions filed after the hearing and referred to in the preceding clause, Mr McNiece contended that the filing of written statements in respect of witnesses prior to the hearing is not compulsory in the Small Claims Taxation Tribunal; I accept that this may be so.
6. This is not a case in which it is necessary for me to deal with the evidence in detail and it is referred to in these reasons to the extent necessary only. There is one matter which can be disposed of at this early stage more particularly because nothing turns on it. In the written submissions filed after the hearing on 5 December 2005, Mr McNiece noted that the Minister is not in fact employed by the Church or for that matter by the Anglican Diocese; he went on to note that an Anglican Minister “is given a licence to officiate and is deemed to be self-employed similar to a professional fisherman who has a licence to fish”. As will be noted from later provisions of these reasons, the Minister received a stipend from the Church (as that term is defined later in these reasons) and he also received a rent-free house and a car allowance. The Church presumably had some ability to remove him if dissatisfied with him. However nothing turns on the precise relationship between the Minister and the Church (or the Anglican Diocese) and it is not necessary for me to deal with this aspect.
7. At a very early stage of his evidence the Minister was asked whether he did in fact and in respect of the relevant year employ his wife, the Applicant, in the sense that there was a contract, whether or not in writing, between them. He answered that “employment is a strong word. It is a shady area”. Other answers in the same context indicated that she was not his employee in any sense at all.
8. In consequence of those answers I thought it desirable to inform Mr. McNiece and the Minister (the Applicant being outside the Tribunal at that time as she was still to give evidence) as to some aspects of relevant law. I did so in the belief that it might curtail the hearing and perhaps even lead to a settlement. (That a settlement would have been eminently desirable will be apparent from later provisions of these reasons). I commenced by informing them that the cost of travel between two places of employment had become deductible following the decision of the High Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (2001) 177 ALR 270 and an amendment to the legislation which followed that judgment. In essence, and in respect of the relevant year, the costs of travel between two places of employment are deductible only if there were in fact two places of employment but not if there is one only, and because the costs of travelling to work from one’s home are not deductible. I referred also to case law as to when the cost of clothing (and laundering of that clothing) is deductible; I referred in particular to Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards 44 ATC 4255 and an unreported decision in this Tribunal by me and in which I allowed an opera singer deductions for some but not all of the dresses for which she claimed deductions, because some of them were acquired for a particular work-related purpose and could not be used outside that purpose. I referred also to the deductions claimed by the Applicant in respect of sunglasses and sunscreen in order to draw attention to the fact that such a deduction might be permitted to a person who worked out of doors in conditions of strong sunlight but not generally to an office worker employed indoors.
9. That discourse met with blank silence on the part of Mr. McNiece but with resentment on the part of the Minister who perceived it as being in some way oppressive. Later in the hearing he apologised for the fact that he expressed resentment.
10. In respect of the relevant year the Applicant claimed deductions as follows:
(a) Work related travel expenses amounting to $3887;
(b) Work-related clothing laundry and dry cleaning expenses amount to $1351
(c) Self-education expenses amounting to $1664;
(d) Other expenses amounting to $3778; the Respondent allowed the Applicant a deduction of $1752 in respect an income protection policy, and this then is the extent to which the objection was partially allowed.
Part B; Was the Applicant an employee of the Minister?
11. The Applicant and the Minister have been married for more than 30 years. During the relevant year he was the minister of the All Saints Anglican Church in Waitara (referred to in these reasons as “the Church’). In that capacity he received a stipend of $32000 per annum together with a car allowance and also the use of a rent-free house. He gave evidence at some length as to the extent to which the Applicant assisted him in his parish duties. He said in particular that when furnishing marital advice the assistance of a woman such as the Applicant was often helpful.
12. I might here note that I do not doubt that the Applicant is a particularly able and helpful clergyman’s wife. She is personable and educated and has herself obtained some theological training, in part through correspondence courses. I would go so far as to say that she provided more efficient assistance than might generally have been the case in respect of clergy wives. But that said the duties performed by her were all duties and functions which a clergyman’s wife would conventionally provide. According to the Minister’s evidence her duties were rendered at all times and as such took up considerable time. Her evidence was in important respects different; some of those differences were noted by the Respondent in his further submissions and as to which see clause 18 below... Importantly she was in the relevant year in the full-time employ of IPOH, then a listed company, as assistant secretary, and earning about $60000 per annum. (She has had some training in company law). She described her job with IPOH as demanding. She said that she was of particular help to her husband during her annual holiday which she took at a time which would be most suitable to him. She mentioned with some pride that on Sundays she attended all three services and unlike other clergy wives who attend some services only.
13. The evidence revealed in the starkest possible terms that she was never an employee. Her “salary” in the relevant year was $1040; there was no clear or, for that matter, any evidence as to why this rather odd figure was selected. When asked how it was paid, the Minister said that he paid his wife’s gymnasium costs. When it was pointed out to him that those costs did not amount to $1040 in a year he said that he also paid her insurance premiums. That in turn was demonstrably incorrect because the combined cost of the gymnasium and her insurance premium was far in excess of $1040. Exhibit R1 consists of a large bundle including unindexed and unnumbered documents and accounts sent to the Tribunal by Mr. McNiece. Towards the end of that bundle there is a Westpac statement for the period 20 November 2002 to 20 December 2002 and which indicated that the Minister’s stipend and the Applicant’s IPOH salary were paid into a Westpac account in their joint names and operated by both of them... Exhibit R1 also contains credit card statements which reflect, inter alia, gymnasium debits. One such statement referred to in the hearing reflected a number of such gymnasium debits all within the space of a few days. The Minister said that this was so because he attended the same gymnasium. But to say that he paid anything at all on her behalf would be inaccurate. They had a joint banking account on which either could draw; the credit card account was in her name but he had a supplementary card which allowed him to debit it in the same way that she could. Put in simple terms it is abundantly clear that this married couple used their combined financial resources jointly just as many other married couples do. The Applicant in her evidence when asked how her salary was paid said that this occurred through the payment of her insurance and gymnasium costs but then amended that evidence so as to refer to part only of her insurance costs. In respect of the relevant year are at least, the Applicant’s earnings were nearly double those of the Minister. It is likely that if anything the Applicant for this reason paid amounts for and on the half of the Minister. On the second hearing day (19 December 2005) and in the course of oral submissions, Mr McNiece said that if the claimed deductions were disallowed the Applicant would file an amended return for the relevant year and in order to claim the spouse rebate. When asked how this would be possible given the size of her earnings in the relevant year, Mr McNiece replied that the Minister’s taxable income for the relevant year was $390 only, and so that his, the Minister’s, earnings were such that she, the Applicant could claim the spouse rebate. Mr McNiece explained that the quite extraordinarily low amount reflected as the taxable earnings for the Minister arose in the main because the Applicant and the Minister were joint owners of negatively geared real property. Insofar as there was, in respect of the negatively geared property, a cash outlay it would have come (presumably) for the most part out of the Applicant’s earnings. Mr. McNiece agreed that there was another reason why this should be so; that other reason related to the “allowances” paid to the Applicant and the children. As to whether such a procedure as referred to by Mr McNiece is, in these circumstances, permissible is not something which need be resolved by me.
14. The Minister was asked in categoric terms whether the Applicant had a legal right to claim the “salary” as against him. His answer was that she would be able to do so but only in a breakdown situation. (I took the reference to a “breakdown situation” to be a reference to a divorce or separation).
15. The Minister’s own tax returns came under scrutiny and a number of exhibits were tendered in respect of his returns both in respect of the relevant year and other financial years. The evidence revealed that amounts of $3900 per annum were “paid” to his two daughters” for musical services; in prior years a similar amount was “paid” to his son for the same reason. His evidence was that they rendered services which entitled them to receive remuneration; he agreed though that the services rendered by the children were considerably less than those provided by the Applicant whose “salary” was nevertheless about one third of those of the children. When asked how the children were paid he said that he paid these amounts through his provision of school fees and the cost of music lessons. He said also in answer to a question as to whether the children had a legal right to exact payment that this would be so but only in a breakdown situation; as to what he meant by this term in relation to his children was not explained. On the second hearing day Mr McNiece informed the Tribunal that the Applicant and the Minister have three children, Philip born in 1977, Emily. born in 1982 and Selina born in 1985. He informed the Tribunal that in the tax year following the relevant year “allowances” of $3900 were “paid” to each of Philip and Emily. In all cases the “allowances” were included in Item 2 (other income) rather than Item 1, and where group certificates are required
16. That the alleged “salaries” were contrived was demonstrated by the fact that they were sometimes referred to as “allowances” and more particularly by the fact that in respect of the relevant year the Applicant’s “allowance” was omitted. Mr. McNiece said from the bar table that this occurred through an oversight. The manner in which the Minister “paid” “salaries” or “allowances” to his wife and children and claimed deductions for those “payments” revealed a very crude form of (illegal) income splitting of the Minister’s stipend which was derived as his personal exertion income.
17. The Applicant was asked whether she would have provided the same services even without payment; she said that her obligations to God would have obliged her to do so. She said also that the Minister could never afford to pay her but “it is a psychological thing that I am being paid”. When asked whether she had a legal entitlement to salary from the Minister in the same way as she had a legal right to her salary from IPOH, she said “no he can’t afford to give me these things”. As I have said the services provided by her were those of any clergyman’s wife consisting as they did of parish duties, although the Applicant may have been particularly efficient.
18. In supplementary submissions submitted in answer to those filed by the Applicant, the Respondent noted that the there was conflicting evidence by the Applicant and the Minister as to when the employment relationship started. Clauses 3 to 8 of those submissions, (and which are correct), read as follows:
“3. Both the Applicant and Rev. Boughton admitted that they never had any contract of employment in writing. As to any oral agreement, Rev. Boughton said that they had one oral agreement every year, whilst the Applicant admitted that in all those years of employment, she would have spoken to her husband about it no more than 4 or 5 times. What the Applicant said to her husband, Rev. Boughton about the employment was “I’ll work for you and you can pay me”.
4. Both the Applicant and Rev. Boughton gave conflicting evidence as to the time when they started to be in the relationship of the employment and the length of it. Rev. Boughton said that he started employing his wife since their marriage about 30 years ago, while the Applicant said that it was sometime after 1991.
5. There is no evidence to establish the fact the payment of $1040 was actually made between an employer and employee or in fact that it was made at all.
(a). Neither the Applicant nor the Rev Boughton could recall the amount or the method of any payment in respect of the years other than a few recent years;
(b) Rev Boughton gave evidence that in his income tax return for the year of 2003, he claimed deductions for payments he made to his two children as well as to his wife, the Applicant, on the basis that all three were his employees assisting him at the Church. The payments were made by paying their school fees and musical fees.
(c ) Both the Applicant and Rev Boughton gave evidence that the payment of $1040 per annum was made to the Applicant by paying $20 per week, through a credit card in her name, a monthly gymnasium fee of $18.40, plus $1.60 to her monthly insurance premium of $216.27. The credit card was then paid off with moneys held in a joint bank account;
(d) Under cross-examination, Rev Bought admitted that in his understanding, ‘joint account’ means “what is mine is hers and what is hers is mine”. When asked how it was possible to decide what money in the joint account is to go to what amount on the credit card, he answered: “we simply agreed that it is the best way of allocating money from the joint account”.
6. There is no evidence to suggest that there was intention on either the Applicant or the Rev Boughton’s part that they should have entered into a legally binding relationship of employment. In evidence, the Applicant said that even without any payment, she would be still doing the same to assist her husband at the Church and that she was not doing the duties for the sake of the money.
7. All the above evidence demonstrates one thing, one thing only, namely that whatever it is alleged to be, the relationship between the Applicant and Rev Boughton is simply a domestic and private arrangement.
8. Consequently, since there is no employment relationship existed between the Applicant and the Rev Boughton at the Church, the Respondent submit that all the deductions claimed by the Applicant in respect of the employment by her husband are not allowable (a list of these deductions disallowed by the objection decision is contained on T2-6).”
19. Towards the end of the Applicant’s evidence it emerged that in or about 1990 a seminar took place under the auspices of the Anglican Church. It was at that seminar that the Applicant became aware, so she said, that “salaries” of this nature were permissible. It was at that seminar that she met Mr. McNiece who has attended to their tax affairs since then.
20. The evidence revealed in clear terms that the Applicant was never employed by the Minister. It revealed rather that she was his loyal wife and partner. I formed the distinct impression that she is at least as intelligent as her husband and considerably more articulate. The concept of an employment and a salary was nothing more or less than a sham as referred to in Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449. I refer in this context to Richard Walter Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 67 FCR 243; 33 ATR 97 where Lockhart J said (at FCR 245; ATR 99):
There are many cases in the income tax field, particularly cases relating to s 260 where the word "sham" has been considered. I discussed some of them in Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449, where I said (at 454):
A "sham" is therefore, for the purposes of Australian Law, something that is intended to be mistaken for something else or that is not really what it purports to be. It is a spurious imitation, a counterfeit, a disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or true, but something made in imitation of something else or made to appear to be something which it is not. It is something which is false or deceptive.
In the same case Hill J defined a sham transaction as being one which involves "a common intention between the parties to the apparent transaction that it be a disguise for some other and real transaction or for no transaction at all" (at FCR 257; ATR 110).”
21. I should in fairness say that it may be that the Applicant and the Minister did receive advice of the nature stated (however bizarre that may seem) but the Applicant is in my view far too intelligent to have supposed that there was a proper or legal basis for it. She at least knew that in the relevant year she was a full-time and senior employee of IPOH.
22. It follows that the amount of $1040 was not employment income or income of any sort derived by the Applicant in the relevant year.
Part C; Deductions claimed in the relevant year
23. Having regard to Part B the Applicant was employed during the relevant year only by IPOH; her costs of travel between her home and the business premises of IPOH were thus of a private nature and not deductible.
24. The Applicant said in her evidence that as an upper echelon employee of IPOH she was obliged to dress appropriately in sober grey or charcoal suits which could not on any basis be characterised as a uniform. Those clothes could have been worn to church or to any other similar formal occasion. In the letter by Mr McNiece, referred to previously in these reasons, he referred (Tp185) to a uniform in the following terms; “the uniform has IPOH’s name and symbol engraved above the heart”. The Applicant did not in her evidence say anything at all as to a uniform except that she expressly disavowed any suggestion that she would have worn or was required to wear a uniform. It follows that the cost of clothing and laundering and dry-cleaning claimed by her were of a private nature and thus not deductible. See in this regard Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Edwards (1994) ATC 4255; see also Case 49/97 97 ATC 516 and Case 16/93 93 ATC 208. In the written submissions filed after 5 December 2005 but before the hearing on 19 December 2005, the Applicant abandoned her claims under this head.
25. In respect of the relevant year the Applicant incurred and claimed the cost of a correspondence course in counselling. That expense was in no way related to IPOH and her employment by IPOH. Those expenses too were of a private nature and non-deductible.
26. During the relevant year the Applicant travelled to Malaysia accompanied by one of her daughters and where she has close family connections. Each of the Applicant and the Minister gave evidence as to the Church’s need of someone who could speak fluent Mandarin. While in Malaysia the Applicant approached some theological seminaries as to the availability of a suitable candidate. The Church (or perhaps the Anglican Diocese) had indicated that it would be prepared to employ and pay a suitable person with this qualification. It is likely that the Applicant did incur some travel costs in Malaysia to this end. However and if this is so, the Applicant was in that event and of necessity acting as the agent of the Minister or the Church (or the Anglican Diocese), and in all probability one of the latter two organisations. It may be that a deduction under this head would have been available to the Minister or the Church or the Anglican Dioceses but the Applicant was not so entitled. The Applicant’s involvement in the Church was purely that of a helpmeet to the Minister. It may be noted that the evidence as to the purpose of that trip was decidedly vague and uncertain. Bearing in mind that her daughter accompanied her and that she stayed at least for a time with one of her siblings, the probabilities are that the primary purpose was personal. In any event however any such claim must fail because her claim to have been an employee of the Minister failed.
27. In his capacity as minister the Minister received a house rent free. However he was required to pay for certain utilities such as electricity, private telephone use and the like. It is not necessary for me to deal in any detail with this aspect since clearly enough any deductions under this head might have been available to the Minister but not to the Applicant, who did in fact claim a deduction for expenses of this nature...
28. As I have said, the Applicant abandoned her claim in respect of clothing, dry-cleaning and laundry; however she did not abandon any of her other deduction claims. The submissions by Mr McNiece were accompanied by the reports of numerous deduction cases in which there was no doubt as to the fact that there was employment. That material was of course of little relevance. Having found that there was never an employment relationship between the Applicant and the Minister all claims which depended upon there having been an employment relationship must fail. The only claims referable to IPOH and remaining to be determined relate to sunglasses and sunscreen. The Applicant said that during the relevant year IPOH owned three buildings, one in Martin Place and across the road from the MLC Centre, one in the Strand Arcade which runs between Pitt and George Streets, and the Queen Victoria building in George Street. She said that one of her duties as assistant secretary to IPOH required her to visit the latter two buildings periodically and at least three times per week. (As to why such a duty fell to be carried out by the assistant secretary of IPOH was never explained and Mr McNiece said that he was never given any reason). In his written submissions Mr. McNiece referred, in somewhat vague terms, to a deduction of this nature having been allowed to a taxation officer. At the hearing on 19 December 2005, he referred to a paragraph in CCH (at page 4421) reading as follows: “Expenses incurred on sunglasses, sunscreen and hats have been held to be deductible for certain taxpayers who were obliged to work outside in the open air to carry out their duties. In a test case involving the claims of a farm manager, a master of a game fishing vessel, a maritime studies teacher, a surveyor, a site construction supervisor, a builder, a physical education teacher, and electrical fitter and mechanic, a tennis umpire and a tax auditor, the Federal Caught found that the sun protection items were necessary to enable the taxpayers to perform the duties and increase their productivity.” The case referred to is Morris v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) ATC 4004. Clause 60 of the judgment in Morris reads as follows:
“Mr Fitton is 51 years of age and is a senior auditor in the large business and international section of the ATO. He is based in Sydney. Mr Fitton often travelled to the premises of various organisations to conduct audits and strategic reviews by train and walks from the nearest station to the organisation’s premises. It may take up to one hour for Mr Fitton to walk to and from these locations. While conducting an audit, in addition to looking at financial statements, Mr Fitton is often required to conduct inspections of outdoor sites which may take several hours.”
29. The Applicant said that she had an eye condition such that she needed to wear sunglasses when out of doors. (There was no medical evidence as to any such condition). When it was suggested to her that there were covered awnings in respect of some at least of the relevant walks, she said that there was still a glare. It may be noted that any such walk (assuming that this was one of her duties, and which is doubtful) would have taken at most 10 minutes and probably less, to the relevant building... The position of Mr Fitton (referred to in Morris) was very different, and so that Morris is on its facts distinguishable.
Part D; Penalties
30. Penalty tax at the rate of 50% was imposed under item 2 of section 284 – 90 (1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (“ITAA”). This item applies where “Your shortfall amount or part of it resulted from recklessness by you or your agent as to the operation of a taxation law”. However the rate was reduced to 25% under Item 3 of the same section and reading “Your shortfall amount or part of it resulted from a failure by you or your agent to take reasonable care to comply with a taxation law”.
31. The reduction allowed by the Respondent was in my view generous and arguably more generous that was apposite There was clearly a shortfall within section 284-80 and there were equally clearly false or misleading statements within section 284-75. This application has generated a very large volume of paper and has resulted in two hearing days and considerable expense. It did not have any prospect of success and should never have been brought. It was imprudent for another reason in that it exposed the Minister’s returns (and probably also those of the children) to scrutiny. The circumstances are such that there is no basis upon which the Tribunal can or should further reduce the penalty tax imposed
Part E; Conclusion
32. In summary:
(a) There was never a contract of employment between the Minister and the Applicant; the amount of $1040 reflected (belatedly) in her return for the relevant year was not income of any kind.
(b) Because she was not employed by the Minister the Applicant could not claim expenses referable to that alleged employment; she could not therefore claim the costs of travel between her home and the IPOH premises or any travel costs in respect of her trip to Malaysia; similarly she could not claim self-education expenses in respect of studies in counselling.
(c) As regards clothing, laundry and dry-cleaning the clothing was in no sense a uniform and the relevant expenses could not be claimed in relation to her employment by IPOH; as I have indicated these claims were abandoned.
(d) As a senior employee of IPOH who worked indoors her claims in respect of sunglasses and sunscreen cannot be allowed. (Morris is distinguishable)
(e) Certain expenses referable to the Church or the house supplied by the Church were not claimable by her because she was not employed in respect of any church activities.
33. Accordingly the objection decision under review must be affirmed.
I certify that the 33 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr Julian Block, Deputy President
Signed: A. Krilis
Associate
Date/s of Hearing 6 & 19 December 2005
Date of Decision 19 December 2005
Representative for the Applicant Mr David McNeice
Solicitor for the Applicant Mr Ed Chiaw
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