Bota and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2018] AATA 2508
•27 July 2018
Bota and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 2508 (27 July 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/1320
Re:Aurel Bota
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:27 July 2018
Place:Sydney
The decision under review is affirmed.
........................[sgd]...........................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – disability support pension – whether pension should be paid at the single or married rate – meaning of “a member of a couple” – whether applicant living separately and apart from his wife – section 24 discretion – whether special reason not to be treated as a member of a couple – ability to pool resources – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 4, 24, 1064
CASES
Bishop and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 531
Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106
Dimov and Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services [2005] AATA 912
Hogan and Secretary, Department of Employment, Education and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 162
Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084
Main v Main (1949) 78 CLR 636
Pascoe and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2013] AATA 745
Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Wilson [2011] AATA 554Sperring and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1050
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Guide to Social Security Law
REASONS FOR DECISION
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
27 July 2018
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
The matter before the Tribunal is whether Mr Aurel Bota should have been paid his Disability Support Pension (DSP) at the married or single rate.
RELEVANT FACTS AT TIME OF APPLICATION
Mr Aurel Bota (currently aged 63 years) was granted a Disability Support Pension (DSP) on 3 October 2008. The precise nature of Mr Bota’s disabilities are not relevant to this determination. His payments were then at the prescribed single rate of pension.[1]
[1] The different rates for single and married persons during the period(s) under review are attached at the end of this determination at Annexure A.
On 11 June 2015 Mr Bota married Elena Oli Bota. Mrs Bota is a citizen of the Philippines. On 7 March 2014 she applied for a “permanent residency” visa but her application was rejected on 13 April 2016 and she appealed this decision to another division of this Tribunal.[2] That appeal was unsuccessful.[3]
[2] Tribunal Documents at pages 51-52.
[3] Decision of the AAT dated 27 October 2017 and subject to a confidentiality order in relation to publication of details under section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Mr and Mrs Bota lived together in Maroubra (NSW) from the time of their marriage until November 2015 when Mrs Bota left Sydney to live in Tweed Heads where, in 2016 she commenced employment on a permanent part-time basis at an aged care facility.
It is relevant to record that Mr Bota states that the reason for Mrs Bota relocating to Tweed Heads was as a result of threats and fear of aggression from their neighbours. He does not, in any sense, ascribe her departure to a breakdown in their personal or marital relationship. They thus lived separately but still considered themselves a married couple.[4]
[4] Tribunal Documents at page 51.
On 2 July 2015 Mr Bota formally notified the Department of his marriage and, consequently, on that day, the Department exercised the discretion available to it under section 24(1) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (the Act) and continued to pay Mr Bota at the single rate of pension despite his being married. The apparent reason for this was that Mrs Bota did not then appear to have any means of support, including social security benefits (as a non-citizen without permanent residency) and so the reduction in the rate of DSP payment would have caused Mr Bota some financial hardship.[5]
[5] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph [5].
Subsequently, the Department initiated a review of Mr Bota’s pension payments and obtained further information from Mr Bota regarding both his domestic and his financial situation. Based on this advice, the Department decided to no longer exercise the discretion to pay Mr Bota at the single rate and changed his payments to the married rate as of 18 July 2016.[6] The Department’s rationale for this change in policy was that it took the view that since Mrs Bota was then in receipt of an income from her regular employment this meant that Mr Bota no longer met the criteria of “being in financial hardship” which is a requirement which must be met in order to allow the Secretary to exercise the section 24(1) discretion.[7]
[6] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph [7].
[7] Ibid page 2.
On 4 August 2016 Mr Bota requested a departmental review of this decision which was affirmed by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) on 16 September 2016. Mr Bota then appealed this decision to the Social Services and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) which, on 3 February 2017, upheld the decision of the ARO and rejected Mr Bota’s appeal.
It is from that decision of AAT1 that Mr Bota sought review by this Tribunal on 9 March 2017 and the matter came before it on 23 July 2018.
MATERIAL CHANGES
Since the lodging of that application, the circumstances of the Botas’ relationship changed and the Tribunal was advised by the Respondent at the hearing, that as of 27 May 2018 Centrelink had accepted that the couple were “separated”. As a result Mr Bota’s payments were restored, as of that date, to the single rate of DSP payment.
The Respondent was unable to present any documentary evidence on this point, but in evidence Mr Bota affirmed that his wife had advised Centrelink of their separation and had done so on the appropriate form. Mr Bota also confirmed that although separated the couple were not divorced and referred throughout his evidence to Mrs Bota as “my wife”.
The question before the Tribunal thus concerns the appropriate rate of DSP payment to Mr Bota for the period from 18 July 2016 (the date of transition from single to married rate) to 27 May 2018 (date of reversion to single rate) (“the relevant period”). It is no longer concerned with matters subsequent to the couple’s separation.
RELEVANT LAW
The legal framework within which this matter must be determined is set out in the Act and in the Guide to Social Security Law (the Guide). The Guide provides detailed explanation of both the policy and the guidelines for interpretation of various aspects of the Act and decision-makers are bound to give effect to its definitions and requirements.
In Mr Bota’s case the relevant sections of the Act are:
·Section 4(2) of the Act sets out the definition of what it means to be “a member of a couple”. It defines “a person” as “a member of a couple” if:
“the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary’s opinion (……), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis”
·In Mr Bota’s case, when his pension was altered from the single to married rate, he was regarded, by the Department, as a member of a couple because he was legally married and although he and his wife were not then living together this was not regarded as being a permanent or indefinite characteristic of their relationship. The High Court in Main v Main held that for a couple to be regarded as living genuinely “separately and apart” they must not only be physically separate but there must be evidence that the matrimonial relationship (“consortium vitae”) has broken down and that there is no prospect of the couple resuming a life living together.[8]
·While it was accepted that Mr and Mrs Bota were living separately, Mr Bota made no claim, at the time, that this was a permanent and indefinite status or that their matrimonial relationship had ended.
·Section 24 of the Act provides the Secretary with discretion to disregard the strictures and definitions of section 4(2). It provides:
“(1) Where:
(a) a person is legally married to another person; and
(b) the person is not living separately and apart for the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; and
(c) the Secretary is satisfied that the person should, for a special reason in the particular case, not be treated as a member of a couple;
the Secretary may determine, in writing, that the person is not to be treated as a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act.”
·Section 4(6) of the Act provides, quite simply, that: “A person is not a member of a couple if a determination under section 24 is in force in relation to the person.”
·Section 1064 sets out an elaborate and complex mechanism whereby the actual rate of pension payment is calculated.
[8] (1949) 78 CLR 636. The Court’s determination was in relation to the provision of section 69(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 of Western Australia, but clearly deals with the same definition.
The relevant sections of the Guide, in relation to Mr Bota’s positon are as follows:
·Section 2.2.5.20 provides guidance on how the Secretary should determine whether or not a couple are living separately and apart as required by the Act if section 24 discretion is to be exercised. The relevant parts of that section state:
- A legally married couple or a couple in a registered relationship or a de facto couple are determined to be separated if they are living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis.
- If a couple claim to be separated they must establish that: they are living apart either permanently or indefinitely, and there has been an estrangement or breakdown in their relationship. Generally, a physical separation as well as an emotional separation between the couple is required. Note: Living separately and apart should not generally be accepted if the couple are living apart solely because of ill health, employment and/or economic reasons. All other options should be explored before a determination is made that a couple are living separately and apart….
·Section 2.2.5.50 provides guidance on how the Secretary’s discretion is to be exercised under section 24 of the Act. The parts of that section which are noteworthy are as follows:
- In situations where the department considers that there is a special reason in the particular instance, and it would be unfair to administer the rate of payment, or income and assets test provisions that apply to couples, the Secretary can determine, under the provisions of section 24, that the person should not be treated as a member of a couple.
- Section 24 discretion exists to deal with unfair, inequitable and/or unjust anomalies. Section 24 is intended to be the option of last resort, and should only be applied when all other reasonable means of support have been explored and exhausted.
- It is not possible to predict all the situations where section 24 should be applied as the circumstances of each particular situation need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- The discretion to treat a person as NOT being a member of a couple should be exercised ONLY where a full consideration of all the circumstances relevant to the individual's case would make it unjust or unreasonable not to do so.
- Members of a couple in ordinary circumstances will pool their resources and share their expenses, making it cheaper for them to live than if they were 2 single people. A significant body of case law has established that the inability to pool resources for their mutual benefit is a special reason to exercise the discretion in section 24. Generally, section 24 would NOT be appropriate where a couple is able to, but chooses not, to pool resources or where one or both members of a couple choose not to access a source of support which they could contribute to the pool. Consideration should be given to whether either member of the couple has access to any social security or other support that has not been explored or realised. Generally a person would be expected to claim any benefits to which they are entitled.
- In deciding whether or not to apply the discretion in section 24, the overall financial situation should be considered. Income and readily available funds from assets should be compared to necessary expenditure. Income, and readily available funds, from all sources should be taken into account. This includes, but is not limited to, income from employment, income support payments….., investments, insurance and compensation pay-outs, trusts, accessible superannuation, liquid assets, etc. For information on liquid assets refer to SSAct section 14A. Any in-kind support should be considered…...Necessary expenditure could include, for example, electricity, gas, telephone, rates, rent, groceries, transport and loan repayments.
CONSIDERATIONS
Against these requirements in the Act and the Guide, there are two matters which must be determined in order to resolve Mr Bota’s application. They are:
(1)Were Mr and Mrs Bota were “living separately and apart” for the purposes of the Act during the relevant period and, in the event that they were not,
(2)Should the Secretary have exercised her section 24 discretion and determined that Mr Bota should be paid at the single rate of DSP because there was, relevantly, “special reason in the particular case.”
Living separately and apart
For the reasons stated below, the Tribunal is in no doubt that Mr and Mrs Bota constituted a couple for the purposes of the legislation during the relevant period.
Indeed, there was no attempt to deny this on behalf of Mr Bota. In his application for review, dated 9 March 2017 he referred on several occasions to “my partner” or to “myself and my spouse.”[9]
[9] Applicant’s Evidence at A1. Tribunal Documents at pages 1-4.
Similarly in earlier material Mr Bota referred to “I (and my wife)”[10] or to “my wife Elena Oli Bota.”[11]
[10] Tribunal Documents at page 70.
[11] Tribunal Documents at page 6.
The criteria for the establishment of such a relationship are set out in section 4(3) and 4(3A) of the Act in the following terms:
“Member of a couple--criteria for forming opinion about relationship
(3) In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), subparagraph (2)(aa)(ii) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any joint liabilities; and
(ii) any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iii) any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other person; and
(iv) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;
(b) the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children; and
(ii) the living arrangements of the people; and
(iii) the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;
(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the people hold themselves out as married to, or in a de facto relationship with , each other; and
(ii) the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people about the nature of their relationship; and
(iii) the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint social activities;
(d) any sexual relationship between the people;
(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other, including:
(i) the length of the relationship; and
(ii) the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the people provide to each other; and
(iii) whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to continue indefinitely; and
(iv) whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like relationship or a de facto relationship.
(3A) The Secretary must not form the opinion that the relationship between a person and his or her partner is a de facto relationship if the person is living separately and apart from the partner on a permanent or indefinite basis.”
The Secretary has provided extensive judicial authority in relation to the way in which the various aspects of this section are to be considered.[12] The Tribunal does not believe it would be of great value to work exhaustively through all the material put before it by the Secretary in this determination, however, since there are five key aspects to be considered in making such a determination as to whether two people constitute a couple for the purposes of the Act, those should be examined.
[12] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraphs [17]-[21] and [25]-[26].
Section 4(3) requires regard to be had to a number of factors, indeed the Secretary must take into account: “all the circumstances of the relationship, including in particular, the following matters”:
(a)The financial aspects of the relationship: here the Tribunal is satisfied that Mr and Mrs Bota held joint bank accounts into which Mrs Bota’s wages were paid and to which both had access. Mr Bota asserts that the reasons for this was not in order to pool resources but because his wife, not being a permanent resident, was unable to open a bank account in her own name.[13] However, there is evidence that they actually pooled their resources and that, on at least one occasion Mr Bota made a substantial deposit ($31,000) from another account[14] which money was used primarily by his wife.
(b)The nature of the household: Prior to her move to Tweed Heads, Mrs Bota lived with Mr Bota in Sydney and provided “outstanding domestic support and personal care” for him.[15] Admittedly there was a physical separation when Mrs Bota moved to Tweed Heads but the couple kept in touch, shared resources and in due course Mr Bota spent some time in Tweed Heads, apparently moving there in late 2016 or early 2017. In response to questioning by the Respondent, Mr Bota agreed that Mrs Bota made regular trips to Sydney and he to Tweed Heads, and on each occasion they lived under the same roof. The Tribunal understands “household” to mean more than merely a physical co-location, but rather a relationship-based arrangement, and to that extent is satisfied that Mr and Mrs Bota’s lives, at the time, constituted a “household” for the purposes of the Act.[16]
(c)The social aspects of the relationship: There is very little direct evidence before the Tribunal on this matter, although it has already noted that Mr Bota continues to refer to Mrs Bota as either his “partner”, “wife” or “spouse”; that he has appointed her as executor of his estate and to act on his behalf in dealings with the Department.[17] Mr Bota told the Tribunal that this arrangement was simply an informal agreement between the two parties, and not a legally executed instrument and the Tribunal accepts that this was the case. It also notes Mr Bota’s evidence that he has no other family in Australia and a limited network of friends. He also told the Tribunal that when the couple lived together in Maroubra they joined and participated in the activities of local clubs in the area. The Tribunal is satisfied that all this is sufficient to establish the basis for a genuine social aspect to the relationship.
(d)Any sexual relationship between the people: There is no evidence before the Tribunal on this matter other than a comment referred to below in relation to Mr Bota’s claims about the non-consummation of their marriage and the exercise of conjugal rights. The Tribunal accepts that this relationship was not one embracing a sexual aspect. The Tribunal notes the Secretary’s reliance upon authorities to the effect that absence of a sexual relationship is not itself determinative of the lack of a couple relationship.[18]
(e)The nature of the people’s commitment to each other: This requires the establishment of a significant degree of mutuality and evidence of a degree of shared life and commitment. Although the relationship has been impacted by the physical separation of the couple for periods of time it is clear that they continued to exhibit a commitment to each other in terms of financial support, caring activities (especially of Mrs Bota in relation to Mr Bota’s disabilities) and the differential nature of their relationship compared with that exhibited with respect to other people. This commitment has persisted despite the couple’s separation. Mr Bota told the Tribunal that as of the hearing date, now that he had moved to Tweed Heads (in separate accommodation – his provided by the Department of Housing), Mrs Bota still came around to help him with matters such as the shopping and aspects of his ongoing healthcare. Although the relationship was not a particularly lengthy one[19] there was both “companionship and emotional”[20] support attendant upon it. The Tribunal is conscious of the relationship which Mrs Bota retains with children of a previous marriage in the Philippines[21] and with her aged parents, but does not regard this as derogating from her commitment to Mr Bota.
[13] This is not necessarily correct. Mrs Bota held a valid visa, was married to an Australian citizen, had a permanent address in Australia and had valid means (passport) of personal identification.
[14] Tribunal Documents at pages 54-59; 79, 95.
[15] Tribunal Documents at page 6.
[16] Bishop and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 531 at [46] and Dimov and Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services [2005] AATA 912 at [31].
[17] Tribunal Documents at pages 52 and 64 respectively.
[18] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraph [34].
[19] See s 4(3)(e)(i) of the Act.
[20] See s 4(3)(e)(ii) of the Act.
[21] Tribunal Documents at page 52. The Tribunal is seized of the fact that divorce is not possible under Philippines law but Mr Bota advised in evidence that Mrs Bota obtained her divorce in Australia, although when and upon what basis was not apparent.
As the Tribunal has noted, the High Court has determined that “separately and apart” has two distinct elements: the couple must be physically separated and the matrimonial relationship must, using the Court’s terminology no longer “continue to subsist.” At the relevant period the Tribunal finds that this latter requirement was not fulfilled.
The terminology of the High Court was followed by the AAT in its determination in Hogan where it stated that:
“[w]hat must be considered is not only whether the parties live separately, in physical terms, but also whether the marital relationship (the consortium vitae) has not been forged or has broken down.”[22]
[22] Hogan and Secretary, Department of Employment, Education and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 162 at [60].
The Tribunal accepts that Mr Bota has indicated that his physical separation from his wife which apparently took place in November 2015, that is only some 5 months after they were married, led to a “break in the continuity of the relationship, we are unable to consummate our marriage and there are no foreseeable prospects of restitution of our conjugal rights.”[23]
[23] Tribunal Documents at page 6.
However there is also evidence before the Tribunal of Mr Bota, during the relevant period, making visits to Tweed Heads[24] and of Mr Bota being listed in medical records as having a physical address in Tweed Heads.[25] Mr Bota was clearly in Tweed Heads at the time of the Tribunal hearing and had notified the Tribunal by email (dated 18 May 2018) that his reason for appearing at the Tribunal by telephone was “because I live 900 km from Sydney.”
[24] Tribunal Documents at pages 10 and 73.
[25] Applicant’s Material A3 at Attachment C.
Finally Mr Bota has drawn the Tribunal’s attention to Mrs Bota’s application for grant of a spouse visa[26] as part of his description of her as “My Wife”. Without being able to provide further details, Mr Bota confirmed that Mrs Bota’s application for this spouse visa had been granted. For that to be the case, the relevant immigration authorities must have been satisfied that, at least at the time of application (which would have been during the relevant period), the couple were married.
[26] Tribunal Documents at page 7.
The Tribunal thus finds no impediment to coming to a conclusion that Mr and Mrs Bota constituted a couple, and that each of them was a part of that couple in the period up until the time of their separation in May 2018.
It then requires the Tribunal to determine if they were living “separately and apart”. For the reasons which have been outlined, although the couple had periods of physical separation (and periods of cohabitation[27]) there is no evidence to suggest that the matrimonial relationship had so fractured as to satisfy the second test of the High Court cited above. The Tribunal finds that the matrimonial relationship still “continue[d] to subsist” and that, as a result, for the purposes of the Act, they were not living separately and apart.
[27] The Tribunal accepts that mere cohabitation is insufficient in this regard. As the Tribunal said in Sperring and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1050 at [70]: “being a member of a couple involves a lot more than sharing a common address.”
Special Reasons
Having disposed of the first of the questions posed above, the Tribunal turns to the question of whether there are special reasons for the Secretary to exercise the section 24 discretion to treat Mr Bota as a single person for DSP purposes.
The Tribunal has set out above the criteria provided by the Guide in section 2.2.5.50 which turn upon the determination as to whether the couple are able to pool resources and whether there are issues of financial hardship to consider.
This Tribunal is conscious of the various expressions of caution discussed by both the Tribunal and the Courts in terms of the interpretation of these guidelines. They are well summarised in the Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions.[28]
[28] Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions at paragraphs [40]-[52].
In essence a decision in such cases turns upon two elements, namely an awareness that the matter must be analysed from the perspective of the person making the claim (in this case Mr Bota) and not from the point of view of the couple per se,[29] and secondly that the key issue is the ability of the couple to pool their resources.[30] This pooling is to be taken as possible unless there are specific circumstances which make it practically impossible – this is, more than a failure to do so when it could have been done. An element of irresistible external prevention needs to be present.[31]
[29] Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106 at [20]-[21].
[30] Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084 at [41]-[42].
[31] Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Wilson [2011] AATA 554 at [29].
Impecuniosity may be taken as an example of the external and irresistible factors which makes the pooling impossible.[32] Mere physical separation, where that is based upon the choice of the parties, does not so qualify.[33]
[32] Pascoe and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2013] AATA 745 at [38].
[33] idem at [50].
Finally the Tribunal notes that the Court has made it clear that the section 24 discretion “is not lightly to be enlivened”[34] and there must be some element in the situation which is genuinely unusual or different.
[34] Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 106 at [18].
In Mr Bota’s case there was clearly a capacity to pool resources with his wife, and this was done. Mr Bota had modest income from his DSP and Mrs Bota was in employment.[35] Mr Bota had other sources of income or capital which led him, in the past, to be able to make a significant lump-sum payment into an account which both parties were able to access.[36]
[35] Tribunal Documents at pages 58-59.
[36] Tribunal Documents at page 57.
The question of the lump-sum payment was raised extensively by Mr Bota in his evidence seeking to explain its nature and eventual expenditure. Neither of these matters is of relevance or concern to the Tribunal in these proceedings. Although Mr Bota was at pains to give the Tribunal details of his complaints about Centrelink’s failure to deal with other matters concerning his entitlements, as was explained to him in the AAT1 hearing, these are not matters currently under review by this Tribunal.[37]
[37] AAT1 decision at Tribunal Documents pages 21- 29, specifically paragraphs [8]-[11].
There is no evidence to suggest that either party was so impecunious as to be unable to make some contribution to a shared pool of resources during the relevant period, although the Tribunal accepts that this has ceased with the couple’s separation.
There was nothing exceptional about Mr and Mrs Bota living separately although still being married and constituting a couple for the purposes of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS
Although Mr and Mrs Bota, now separated, lived physically apart for most of their married life, they did not do so exclusively. There were times when they physically cohabited, and although their relationship was a non-sexual one, throughout their time together they shared a mutual bond of companionship and emotional attachment. The marital bond endured until at least May 2018. Financially they pooled their resources. In this respect there was nothing exceptional or unusual compared with other couples in similar circumstances.
When Mr Bota married he became part of a couple. As such he forfeited his right to have his DSP paid at the single rate. There is no compelling evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that, in the period from 18 July 2016 to 27 May 2018, Mr Bota was other than a member of a couple or that there were any reasons for him not to be treated as such by the Secretary. The discretion vested in the Secretary was not enlivened by any circumstances which presented at the relevant time.
The decision under review is affirmed.
ANNEXURE A
Relevant Disability Support Pension Rates[38]
[38] Table supplied upon request by Respondent.
Commencement date
Single
Member of a couple
20 March 2016
$794.80 per fortnight / $20,664.80 annually
$599.10 per fortnight / $15,576.60 annually
20 September 2016
$797.90 per fortnight / $20,745.40 annually
$601.50 per fortnight / $15,639.00 annually
20 March 2017
$808.30 per fortnight / $21,015.80 annually
$609.30 per fortnight / $15,841.80 annually
20 September 2017
$814.00 per fortnight / $21,164.00 annually
$613.60 per fortnight / $15,953.60 annually
20 March 2018
$826.20 per fortnight / $21,481.20 annually
$622.80 per fortnight / $16,192.80 annually
I certify that the preceding 42 (forty-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
......................[sgd]..............................................
Associate
Dated: 27 July 2018
Date(s) of hearing: 23 July 2018 Applicant: In person Solicitors for the Respondent: Department of Human Services
1
9
0