Boswell v Fletcher Construction Australia Limited

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[2005] TASSC 116

CITATION:              Boswell v Fletcher Construction Australia Limited & Anor  [2005]              TASSC 116

PARTIES:  BOSWELL, Kenneth Henry
  v
  FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION AUSTRALIA LIMITED
  HAZELL BROTHERS CIVIL CONTRACTING PTY     LTD

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  2043/1994
DELIVERED ON:  28 November 2005
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  10, 19 October 2005
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure - Supreme Court procedure - Tasmania - Practice under Rules of Court - Time - Leave to take fresh proceedings in the action - Delay exceeding six years since last step taken - Factors relevant in the exercise of discretion to grant leave.

William Crosby & Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 490; Appleby v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd 120/1997; Argo Pty Ltd v Page Seager (A Firm) [2000] TASSC 89; Koziol v Gargel [1999] TASSC 12; Aylett v Her Majesty's Attorney-General for the State of Tasmania & Ors [2003] TASSC 68, referred to.

Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r56.
Aust Dig Procedure [283]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  B R McTaggart
             First Defendant:  No appearance
             Second Defendant:  M E O'Farrell
Solicitors:
             Plaintiff:  Ogilvie Jennings
             First Defendant:  No appearance
             Second Defendant:  Page Seager

Judgment  Number:  [2005] TASSC 116
Number of paragraphs:  76

Serial No 116/2005
File No 2043/1994

KENNETH HENRY BOSWELL v FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION AUSTRALIA LIMITED
and HAZELL BROTHERS CIVIL CONTRACTING PTY LTD

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  TENNENT J

28 November 2005

Introduction

  1. The Supreme Court Rules 2000 ("the Rules"), r56(1), provides:

"(1) If a step, other than an application on which no order has been made, has not been taken in a proceeding for 6 years since the last step was taken, a party may not take any further step in the proceeding without the order of the Court or a judge."

No step has been taken in these proceedings since February 1996.  The plaintiff is therefore precluded from taking any further step unless he has the leave of the Court.  He now applies for that leave.

The application for leave

  1. The first defendant took no part in the application. 

  1. Counsel for the plaintiff relied on affidavits sworn by Richard Grueber, a solicitor, on 5 July and 1 August 2005, the plaintiff on 4 July and 23 August 2005, Judy Prokopiec, a records manager for Workplace Standards Tasmania, on 4 July 2005 and Leigh Mackey on 7 October 2005.  Notice to cross-examine was given in respect of Mr Grueber and the plaintiff and both gave oral evidence.

  1. The second defendant relied on an affidavit of Nicholas Sweeney sworn 20 July 2005.  He was not cross-examined. 

The law

  1. The principles to be applied in an application under the Rules, r56, are not in dispute. In William Crosby & Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 490, the High Court dealt with a similar provision. At 496 it was said (per McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ):

"What it does is to forbid the further prosecution of proceedings in which no step…

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Details
Case
[2005] TASSC 116
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Kenneth Henry Boswell, applied for leave to take a further step in proceedings against two defendants, Fletcher Construction Australia Limited and Hazell Brothers Civil Contracting Pty Ltd, under r56 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000. The plaintiff suffered an injury in 1991 at a construction site, and had commenced proceedings against the two defendants in 1994. However, no steps had been taken in the proceedings for six years, necessitating an application for leave under r56. The first defendant did not take part in the proceedings, while the second defendant opposed the plaintiff's application. The primary issue for the court to determine was whether there was good reason for excepting the particular proceedings from the general prohibition imposed by r56. The court found that the plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for delay and an arguable case against the second defendant, but that the second defendant would suffer significant prejudice if the plaintiff was allowed to proceed against it. The application for leave against the second defendant was dismissed. However, the application for leave against the first defendant was granted, as the first defendant had not raised any prejudice and none of any significance existed apart from the impact of delay on memory. The court granted the plaintiff leave to take a step in these proceedings against the first defendant.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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