Boski v Biffin

Case

[2015] NSWSC 363

31 March 2015

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Boski v Biffin [2015] NSWSC 363
Hearing dates:31 March 2015
Date of orders: 31 March 2015
Decision date: 31 March 2015
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Campbell J
Decision:

Appeal allowed.
The final order of his Honour Magistrate Bugden made on 31 July 2014 that the plaintiff undergo a non-intimate forensic procedure pursuant to s 24 of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW) be set aside and the matter is remitted to Sutherland Local Court for redetermination according to law.
The defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the appeal in a sum not exceeding $8,500.

Catchwords: APPEAL – forensic procedure order of Local Court – question of law – whether the Magistrate erred in failing to have regard to the test set out in s 24(1)(b) Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW);
Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW);
Cases Cited: LK v Commissioner of Police [2011] NSWSC 458
Category:Consequential orders (other than Costs)
Parties: Alasdair Boski (Plaintiff);
Detective Senior Constable Peter Biffin, NSW Police (Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel: A Bannister (plaintiff)
E. Sullivan (Defendant)

Solicitors: Crown Solicitors Office (NSW)
Bannisters Lawyers
File Number(s):2014/00230418

EX TeMPORE Judgment (REVISED)

  1. This is an appeal brought under s 115A Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW) from a final order made by his Honour Magistrate Bugden at the Sutherland Local Court on 31 July 2014. The order was made under s 24 of the Act ordering the appellant to submit to a forensic procedure, namely, fingerprinting. Section 115A incorporates certain provisions of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) including s 52(1). Section 52(1) provides an appeal to this Court against sentence as of right but only on a ground that involves a question of law alone.

  2. The respondent concedes that one of the grounds pleaded in the appellant's Amended Summons filed on 19 March 2015 involves a question of law alone. That ground is the new ground 6 which is in the following terms:

The learned Magistrate erred in failing to have regard to and failing to apply the test set out in s 24(1)(b) of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000.

  1. The respondent concedes, with respect I think properly, not only that an appeal on that ground lies as of right, but also that the appeal must succeed.

  2. The appellant (and I will use neutral language) is said to be a suspect in relation to an offence of possession of a firearm contrary to s 7 of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). The case has a long history. It is sufficient if I record that the appellant's father was charged with that offence in respect of that firearm, was committed for trial, arraigned and acquitted by a jury in the District Court. The defence at trial was that a third person, a sometime resident of the premises, had planted the gun in the tallboy (an item of furniture) in which the gun was found by police executing a search warrant.

  3. Section 24(1) of the legislation is in the following terms:

(1) A Magistrate may order the carrying out of a forensic procedure if satisfied on the balance of probabilities:

(a) that the circumstances referred to in subsection (2) or (3) exist, and

(b) that the carrying out of such a procedure is justified in all the circumstances.

  1. On a plain reading of the section there are obviously two conditions that must be satisfied in any case before an order can be made requiring a citizen to undergo a forensic procedure. This is a case to which the provisions of subsection (3) apply, that is to say a case of non-intimate forensic procedure, in this case as I have said, fingerprinting.

  2. Subsection (4) (which I will not set out in full) sets out relevant considerations that the Magistrate must have regard to in deciding whether the procedure is “justified in all the circumstances”. It is quite clear on the face of it that the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (h) are mandatory considerations for the consideration of the learned Magistrate; all will not be engaged on the facts of every case. It is clear from the express language of subsection (4), and in particular from what is sometimes referred to as the chapeau, that what is involved in the determination of the paragraph (b) question is a balancing exercise. That is to say, the Magistrate must balance the public interest in obtaining evidence as to whether or not the suspect committed the alleged offence against the public interest in upholding the suspect's physical integrity, having regard to the matters set out in the succeeding paragraphs (a) to (h).

  3. In a reserved decision given on 31 July 2014 (with commendable promptitude after the hearing) the Magistrate set out the evidence that had been led before him, the arguments of the parties and then proceeded to make a decision (commencing at p 5 line 25 of the transcript of his reasons) by referring to the onus of proof on the prosecution under s 103 of the Act being on the balance of probabilities. He also directed himself that the requirements of the Act must be strictly complied with. With respect, this was a correct direction. His Honour then continued:

The test is a reasonable belief not a suspicion...

What the evidence in this hearing revealed is that a fully loaded, semi-automatic, cut down .22 rifle was located in a tallboy in a bedroom regularly occupied by the [appellant]. The prospective criminal charges are very serious with a possibility if [the appellant] was to be convicted of gaol sentences, perhaps a lengthy gaol sentence. The police have excluded by one means or another three men whose fingerprints may have been located on the rifle and the [appellant] intermittently sleeps, effectively, next to the rifle. One asks rhetorically, how could he not be reasonably regarded as a suspect in those circumstances?

On the basis of all of the evidence I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the police belief and that belief is more than a mere suspicion and that the defendant's fingerprints will either provide evidence that he controlled the firearm or support his position that he had no knowledge of the firearm.

In coming to that decision it is clear to me that upon the balance of probabilities I have to engage in that the weapon, a cut down, fully loaded semi-automatic rifle is an extremely dangerous weapon ... and, most significantly, that the defendant sleeps not more than feet from where this rifle was located.

  1. I think it is apparent, as the respondent concedes, that his Honour has addressed himself fulsomely to the requirements of s 24(1)(a), but he has not, with great respect, turned his mind at all to the second, and I would think, critical question whether the carrying out of the procedure is justified in all the circumstances by reference to the requirements of subsection (4).

  2. Some of what his Honour said, for instance, about the seriousness of the offence might be taken as implicitly considering the s 24(4)(b) question. But when one considers again the chapeau to the subsection, it is quite clear that his Honour has failed to carry out the balancing exercise of the public interest in obtaining the evidence against the competing public interest of upholding a suspect's physical integrity and, of course, a suspect's important civil liberties.

  3. I am not suggesting that a Magistrate must expressly refer to the actual language of the section in every case, but at the same time close attention to the terms of applicable legislation, is of first importance in the exercise of judicial power. It may be obvious from a Magistrate's reasons that his or her Honour has had regard to the terms of s 24 without the need for the Magistrate to set them out. But in this case I am satisfied, from the reasons actually given by his Honour, that his Honour has overlooked the need to address s 24(1)(b) by reference to s 24(4).

  4. This is, with respect to his Honour, a clear misdirection constituting an error of law justifying this appeal. It is quite clear from the authorities carefully set out in the written submissions of the parties, as his Honour appreciated, that strict compliance with the requirements of s 24 is called for in the exercise of the power to make a final order; in this regard, this case is like LK v Commissioner of Police [2011] NSWSC 458 at [37] (Fullerton J).

  5. For these reasons I make the following orders:

  1. Appeal allowed.

  2. The final order of his Honour Magistrate Bugden made on 31 July 2014 that the plaintiff undergo a non-intimate forensic procedure pursuant to s 24 of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 be set aside and the matter is remitted to Sutherland Local Court for redetermination according to law.

  3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the appeal in a sum not exceeding $8,500.

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Decision last updated: 07 April 2015

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Statutory Material Cited

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LK v Commissioner of Police [2011] NSWSC 458