IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S294 of 2014
B e t w e e n -
BORN BRANDS PTY LTD
First Applicant
HAYLEY BIRTLES‑EADES
Second Applicant
SALLY BIRTLES‑EADES
Third Applicant
and
NINE NETWORK AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent
GABRIELLA ROGERS
Second Respondent
GEORGIE GARDNER
Third Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 15 MAY 2015, AT 11.10 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicants with my learned friends, MR C.A. EVATT and MR R.K.M. RASMUSSEN. (instructed by Beazley Singleton Lawyers)
MR T.B. BLACKBURN, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.T.S. DAWSON, for the respondents. (instructed by Johnson Winter & Slattery)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Reynolds.
MR REYNOLDS: There should be some books of authorities which we made available to your Honours.
FRENCH CJ: Yes.
BELL J: We have those.
MR REYNOLDS: Your Honours, in my submission, there are five important issues of principle that are raised by this application. The first I will call for shorthand the Mizikovsky point. It arises in relation to imputation (a) which is set out at the application book at page 133 at line 26. Now, there was a contextual truth defence to this imputation which is set out at page 134 at line 20. The Court of Appeal upheld that defence in paragraph 88 of their reasons. If your Honours go to that paragraph which is in the application book, your Honours will see, at page 112, a quote there from the primary judge and it is there noted that:
imputation (a) cannot further injure the plaintiffs’ reputations.
In the third line there is reference to the evidence. The important point about the words “imputation (a)” in the first line and “evidence” in the third line is that it demonstrates a particular view of the law which is being adopted, that is, that the comparison is to be made only in relation to plaintiffs’ imputation (a), not (b), (c) and (d) and, secondly, in relation to the evidence of truth, not a contextual imputation.
So it is that finding that lies at the core of both the first and second points that I want to rely on. The first point I have called the Mizikovsky point raises this question of principle and the interpretation of section 26. Does the section involve one, weighing all of the plaintiffs’ imputations, including those proved to be true, on the plaintiffs’ side of the scales or, alternatively, does it involve simply looking at the imputations relied upon by the plaintiff which are not proved to be true.
Now, there is a very clear split in the authorities on this point. The Queensland Court of Appeal opted for the first view and that is referred to in the application book at…
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- Case
- [2015] HCATrans 111
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the plaintiffs had established a sufficient likelihood of success on their claims of misleading and deceptive conduct, defamation, and breach of confidence to warrant the grant of interlocutory injunctions. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the proposed broadcasts were likely to mislead consumers about the nature or quality of the plaintiffs' products, whether they were likely to be defamatory of the plaintiffs, and whether confidential information had been misused. The Court also had to assess the balance of convenience between the parties in granting or refusing the injunctions.
In determining these issues, the Court applied the well-established principles for the grant of interlocutory injunctions, requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate a serious question to be tried and that damages would not be an adequate remedy. The Court considered the likely impact of the broadcasts on consumers and the plaintiffs' reputations, as well as the potential harm to the defendants if the broadcasts were restrained and later found not to be unlawful. The Court also had regard to the specific elements of each cause of action, including the need to establish falsity and damage for defamation, and the existence of an obligation of confidence for breach of confidence.
The Court ultimately refused to grant the interlocutory injunctions sought by the plaintiffs. It found that the plaintiffs had not established a sufficient likelihood of success on their claims to warrant the extraordinary remedy of an interlocutory injunction, particularly when considering the balance of convenience. The Court concluded that damages would likely be an adequate remedy for any harm suffered by the plaintiffs should they ultimately succeed at trial.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case involves an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The applicants, Born Brands Pty Ltd and Hayley Birtles-Eades and Sally Birtles-Eades, sought special leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision in relation to a defamation action against the respondents, Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd, Gabriella Rogers, and Georgie Gardner. The application was heard in the High Court on 15 May 2015. The key procedural steps leading up to this application include the initial defamation suit filed by the applicants in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which was subsequently appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The applicants' counsel argued several points of law that they believed were misapplied by the Court of Appeal, including issues relating to the interpretation of section 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), the comparison of imputations in defamation cases, and the admissibility of expert evidence. The respondents' counsel contended that the application did not raise any significant special leave questions and that the Court of Appeal's decision should be upheld. The High Court ultimately refused the application for special leave to appeal, finding that the application did not present a sufficient prospect of success and did not raise the proposed special leave questions with sufficient clarity.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the interpretation of section 26 involve weighing all of the plaintiffs' imputations, including those proved to be true, or only those not proved to be true?
2. What is the correct test for determining whether a defendant has successfully justified a defamatory imputation: comparing imputations or comparing evidence?
3. Can a defendant justify a defamatory imputation that is different in substance from the plaintiff’s pleaded imputation and was not pleaded by the defendant?
4. Is there a common law and a statutory defence of truth under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), or does section 25 abrogate the common law defence?
5. Is the expert evidence of Professor Byard admissible and correctly applied by the Court of Appeal in determining the truth of various imputations?
Held
1. The court held that the issue of whether section 26 involves weighing all of the plaintiffs' imputations, including those proved to be true, or only those not proved to be true, did not sufficiently warrant the grant of special leave. Special leave was refused on this issue.
2. The court held that the issue of the correct test for determining whether a defendant has successfully justified a defamatory imputation - comparing imputations or comparing evidence - did not sufficiently warrant the grant of special leave. Special leave was refused on this issue.
3. The court held that the issue of whether a defendant can justify a defamatory imputation that is different in substance from the plaintiff’s pleaded imputation and was not pleaded by the defendant did not sufficiently warrant the grant of special leave. Special leave was refused on this issue.
4. The court held that the issue of whether there is both a common law and a statutory defence of truth under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), or whether section 25 abrogates the common law defence, did not sufficiently warrant the grant of special leave. Special leave was refused on this issue.
5. The court held that the issue of whether the expert evidence of Professor Byard was admissible and correctly applied by the Court of Appeal in determining the truth of various imputations did not sufficiently warrant the grant of special leave. Special leave was refused on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Born Brands Pty Ltd & Ors v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd & Ors, the High Court of Australia declined to grant special leave to appeal. The applicants argued several issues, including the interpretation of section 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), the correct test for determining whether a defendant has successfully justified a defamatory imputation, and the admissibility and application of expert evidence. The Court found that these issues were not sufficiently clear or likely to succeed to warrant special leave.
Firstly, regarding the interpretation of section 26, the applicants argued that the comparison should be made between all of the plaintiffs' imputations and the defendant's contextual imputations. The Court of Appeal, however, had compared only specific imputations and found that the evidence led to prove the truth of the contextual imputations was the same as the evidence led to prove the truth of the plaintiffs' imputations. Therefore, the Court found that the issue of whether to compare all imputations or only those not proved to be true did not arise in this case.
Secondly, the applicants argued that the correct test for determining whether a defendant has successfully justified a defamatory imputation is by comparing imputations, not evidence. The Court of Appeal, however, had considered the evidence in determining whether the plaintiffs' reputation was not further harmed by their imputations. The High Court found that the wording of section 26(b) compelled a consideration of the evidence called and accepted on that issue.
Thirdly, the applicants argued that a defendant cannot justify a defamatory imputation that is different in substance from the plaintiff’s pleaded imputation and was not pleaded by the defendant. The Court of Appeal had upheld the defence of truth for an alternative imputation that was different in substance from the plaintiffs' pleaded imputation. The High Court found that this issue did not arise in this case because the Court of Appeal had construed two imputations with a patent ambiguity and given judgment on that basis.
Fourthly, the applicants argued that there is both a common law and a statutory defence of truth under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). The High Court found that this issue did not arise because there was no Hore-Lacy issue in this case.
Lastly, the applicants argued that the expert evidence of Professor Byard was not admissible and incorrectly applied by the Court of Appeal. The High Court found that the Court of Appeal had dealt with the issues regarding Professor Byard's report and that there was no need for the High Court to revisit the question of the admissibility of opinion evidence.
In conclusion, the High Court found that the application did not raise the propounded special leave questions with sufficient clarity to warrant a grant of special leave and that the expert evidence going to the truth of various of the imputations did not suggest a sufficient prospect of success. Special leave was therefore refused with costs.