Boreham and Dawkins

[2009] FamCA 625

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BOREHAM & DAWKINS [2009] FamCA 625

FAMILY LAW – CONSENT ORDERS – Children

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Mr Boreham

RESPONDENT: Ms Dawkins

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

FILE NUMBER: MLF 2611 of 2006

DATE DELIVERED: 14 July 2009

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 14 July 2009

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Hutchins

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Lander & Rogers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Weil

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: M K Steele & Giammario

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT LAWYER: Mrs Hooper

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER Macgregor, Barristers & Solicitors

Orders

1. That BY CONSENT there be orders in accordance with the minutes of proposed orders marked Exhibit “A” sealed and attached hereto AND IT IS DIRECTED that such minutes remain upon the Court file.

2. That the solicitor for the mother engross the minutes and deliver them by electronic transmission to my Associate within 7 days.

3. That pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

4. That my reasons for judgment this day be transcribed and be placed on the file and be made available to the parties.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Boreham & Dawkins is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLF 2611 of 2006

MR BOREHAM

Applicant

And

MS DAWKINS

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is the second day of the final part of this hearing.  The parties spent all day yesterday in discussions.  The father was represented by counsel for the first time in the period of time that I have had control of the proceedings. 

2. The proceedings have been long and protracted, involving the parties’ daughter, who is not yet four years of age.  The case took a tragic pathway as a result of some problems that related to the father’s past drinking, and, on all of the material I have read, that now seems to be something about which he has taken very seriously and is endeavouring to sort out.

3. That is one of the reasons why the matter was delayed by me to ensure that the child’s best interests were served by taking the matter slowly. 

4. The case took an unusual turn some weeks ago when, as I understand it, there were serious allegations made against the father.  Mr Weil of counsel, on behalf of the mother, says today that his client has been given advice.  It is clear those allegations could never be proved to the requisite standard, and I told by Mrs Hooper, on behalf of the independent children’s lawyer, that not only has the independent children’s lawyer drawn on the assistance of various expert professionals, but she has no concerns about the child’s welfare in the care of the father.

5. Mr Hutchins of counsel, on behalf of the father, points to the fact that both mother and father have worked diligently for the first time towards working out what is in the child’s best interests in the future. 

6. In discussions, I have indicated the Court’s concerns about situations where serious allegations are made, and I think it is appropriate to point out, as Mr Weil says, that sometimes those allegations arise out of a matter of perception.  In the case of a very concerned mother, she is damned if she does and she is damned if she does not. 

7. Ultimately, the Court has to make the determination based upon the evidence, and Mr Weil has indicated his client’s view that those allegations could never be proved to have any substance such that a court could declare that the child was at any risk in the care of her father.  I think, in the end, all of these orders point to the fact that both parties are now focussing on the child’s best interests.  It is the first time, I can say, in this case that I have seen some real hope for this child having a meaningful relationship with both parents in a proper and protected parental environment, and that is very encouraging.  I am satisfied in the circumstances that these orders are not only in the child’s best interests, but that there is no risk that the court ought to be concerned about.

I certify that the preceding Seven (7) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin

Associate:

Date:  20 July 2009