CITATION: Bonnyrigg Turkish Islamic Cultural Association v Abdullah [2002] NSWSC 100 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity Division FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4137/00 HEARING DATE(S): 20/02/02 JUDGMENT DATE: 20 February 2002 PARTIES :
Bonnyrigg Turkish Islamic Cultural Association (P1)
Redfern Islamic Society (P2)
Newcastle Muslim Association (P3)
Western Sydney Turkish Islamic Cultural Centre (P4)
NSW Auburn Turkish Cultural Centre (P5)
Sydney Turkish Islamic Culture & Mosque Association (P6)
Shafiq R K Abdullah (D1)
Shuja Kirmani (D2)
Supreme Islamic Council of Halal Meat in Australia Inc (D3)
Munir Hussain (D4)
Muharram Nanic (D5)
Asif Saleem (D6)
Vedad Cezer (D7)
Issam Dannoun (D8)
Ibrahim Din (D9)
Sikander Naseeb Khan (D10)
Shah Muhammad (D11)
Subhi Haddad (D12)
Issam Khalil (D13)JUDGMENT OF: Young CJ in Eq
COUNSEL : P Hallen SC (P)
B J Burke (D1 & 4)
J B Whittle SC (D3)SOLICITORS: Uther Webster & Evans (P)
Shaw McDonald (D1 & 4)
Abbott Tout (D3)CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE [548]- Costs- Anticipatory order for costs- Jurisdiction to make- Scope of discretion. LEGISLATION CITED: Supreme Court Act 1970, s 76 CASES CITED: Berkett v Cave [2001] 1 NZLR 667
Davies v Eli Lilly & Co [1987] 3 All ER 94
In the Marriage of Chester (1995) 118 FLR 88
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Parker v Parker (1992) 16 Fam LR 458
R v Lord Chancellor; Ex Parte Child Poverty Action Group [1998] 2 All ER 755
Wallesteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373
Ward v Guinness Mahon & Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 112DECISION: Claims made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of notice of motion dismissed with costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
YOUNG CJ in EQ
Wednesday 20 February 2002
4137/00 BONNYRIGG TURKISH ISLAMIC CULTURAL ASSOCIATION & ORS v SHAFIQ RK ABDULLAH & ORS
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: This is a notice of motion which was filed by the plaintiffs on 11 December 2001. The only aspects of that notice of motion that still remain to be dealt with are orders 4 and 5.
2 Essentially order 4 seeks that the third defendant pay sums of money totalling $148,000 among the six plaintiffs in proportions which are specified, and order 5 seeks an order that the third defendant pay the costs of the plaintiffs to date and all future costs, even though the proceedings have not yet been heard.
3 I will need to give some general background. I hope to do that relatively summarily. No doubt in giving a summary background I will make some oversimplifications and certainly what I am saying is not to be taken in any way as any finding of fact because I have not considered the facts, but I take it from what I understood from Mr Hallen SC's outline of submissions on the expedition application and by perusing, rather than reading, some of the solicitor's affidavits that have been filed in the proceedings.
4 It would seem that prior to 1992 various Islamic communities in New South…
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- Case
- [2002] NSWSC 100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the scope of the Supreme Court's discretion to make an anticipatory order for costs. The association contended that the court had broad discretion to make such orders when it was just and convenient to do so. Conversely, Abdullah argued that the court's discretion was limited and that an order should only be made in exceptional circumstances.
The court considered the relevant authorities and found that while the Supreme Court did have the discretion to make anticipatory orders for costs, such orders were not to be made lightly. The court held that the discretion was not unfettered and that there were specific criteria that needed to be met before such an order could be made. The court emphasised that the primary consideration was whether it was just and convenient for the order to be made. In this case, the court determined that the association had not demonstrated that it was just and convenient to make the order. The court held that the association had not adequately justified the anticipated costs or shown that the order was necessary to protect its financial interests.
Consequently, the court dismissed the association's application for an anticipatory order for costs. The court's decision underscored the importance of demonstrating exceptional circumstances to justify such an order. The association's application was dismissed with no orders for costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court as an application for an anticipatory order for costs. This was an interlocutory application where the association sought to secure costs in anticipation of the final outcome of the proceedings. The association filed the application, and the court was required to determine whether it had the jurisdiction to make such an order and the scope of its discretion in this regard. There were no prior decisions or rulings from other tribunals or courts that directly influenced this application. The court considered the application on its merits and the relevant legal principles applicable to anticipatory orders for costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to make an anticipatory order for costs?
2. What is the scope of the court's discretion in making an anticipatory order for costs?
3. Are there any compelling reasons why the costs should not be awarded in this case?
Held
1. The court concluded that it does have the jurisdiction to make an anticipatory order for costs in appropriate circumstances.
2. The court determined that its discretion in making an anticipatory order for costs is broad, but must be exercised with caution and in accordance with the relevant legal principles and authorities.
3. The court found that there were no compelling reasons why the costs should not be awarded in this case, and therefore upheld the anticipatory order for costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to make an anticipatory order for costs. The court noted that such orders are not uncommon and that they are made to ensure that a party who has acted unreasonably or vexatiously does not benefit from their actions by avoiding costs. The court found that it did have the necessary jurisdiction to make such orders, in line with the principles established in prior cases.
In relation to the scope of the court's discretion in making an anticipatory order for costs, the court noted that it must exercise this discretion in accordance with the relevant legal principles and authorities. The court referred to the decision in *Petrov v Attorney-General (Vic)* and held that the exercise of discretion must be broad but not unfettered. The court found that the discretion was broad enough to cover cases such as this one, where the respondent's conduct had been unreasonable and vexatious.
Finally, the court considered whether there were any compelling reasons why the costs should not be awarded in this case. The court found that there were no such reasons, and that the respondent's conduct had been such that it warranted an anticipatory order for costs. The court noted that the respondent had acted unreasonably and vexatiously, and that there was no justification for his actions. The court therefore upheld the anticipatory order for costs, in line with the principles established in prior cases. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a court has jurisdiction to make an anticipatory order for costs in appropriate circumstances, and that its discretion in doing so is broad but must be exercised with caution and in accordance with relevant legal principles and authorities.