Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION:
Bongers v Hawkesbury City Council [1999] NSWLEC 185
PARTIES
APPLICANT
BongersRESPONDENT
Hawkesbury City Council
NUMBER:
40023 of 1999
CORAM:
Pearlman J
KEY ISSUES:
Injunctions and Declarations :- Court's powers - whether apprehended breach - exercise of statutory discretion by council
LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Hawkesbury Local Environmetal Plan 1989
DATES OF HEARING:
05/28/1999
DATE OF JUDGMENT DELIVERY:
08/06/1999
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:
APPLICANT
Mr B J Preston (Barrister)
WITH
Mr D J Newhouse (Barrister)SOLICITORS
Dunhill Madden ButlerRESPONDENT
SOLICITORS
Mr C W McEwen (Barrister)
Abbott Tout
JUDGMENT:
IN THE LAND AND 40023 of 1999
ENVIRONMENT COURT Pearlman J
OF NEW SOUTH WALES 6 August 1999
- Applicant
- Respondent
Introduction
1. In these class 4 proceedings, the applicant, Ms S Bongers, seeks the following relief:
2. An order that the Respondent Council be restrained from determining the subject development application other than by refusing consent.1. A declaration that the Respondent Council has no power to grant consent either conditionally or unconditionally to development application no. DA90/98 in relation to property known as No. 714 Upper Colo Road, Upper Colo by reason of the proposed use being prohibited by the Hawkesbury Local Environmental Plan 1989.
The legislative background
2. On 15 April 1998, ADI Ltd (“ADI”) lodged development application DA90/98 with the respondent, Hawkesbury City Council (“the council”), seeking development approval for “installation of an open area site for EMI/EMC testing” . The land the subject of the development application is lot 2 in DP 751632 known as 714 Upper Colo Road, Upper Colo (“the site”).
3. Under the Hawkesbury Local Environmental Plan 1989 (“the LEP”), the site is within zone no 7(d) (Environmental Protection (Scenic)). Within that zone, “agriculture” (other than the felling of trees) is a purpose for which the site may be used without development consent, a number of purposes are prohibited, and all other purposes fall within an innominate class of development which may be carried out only with development consent.
4. Included amongst the purposes which are prohibited are “industries” and “light industries” . The term “industries” is not directly defined in the LEP, but cl 6 adopts the Environmental Planning and Assessment Model Provisions 1980 (“the model provisions”), which contains the following definition:
‘industry’ means:
(a) any manufacturing process within the meaning of the Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962; or
(b) the breaking up or dismantling of any goods or any article for trade or sale or gain or as ancillary to any business;
but does not include an extractive industry.
5. In s 4 of the Factories, Shops and Industries Act 1962, the term “manufacturing process” is relevantly defined as follows:
‘manufacturing process’ means any handicraft or process in or incidental to the making, assembling, altering, repairing, renovating, preparing, ornamenting, finishing, cleaning, washing, breaking up, or adapting of any goods or any articles or any part of an article for trade or sale or…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWLEC 185
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory framework, including the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and the Hawkesbury Local Environmental Plan 1989, which outlined the conditions under which development consent was required. The court found that the council had not yet exercised its discretion to grant or refuse consent for the proposed development, and therefore, there was no apprehended contravention of the Act. The court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to make the orders sought by Bongers, as the council had not yet made a decision on the development application. Furthermore, the court could not compel the council to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, nor could it usurp the council's function in determining the development application. The court dismissed the application and ordered Bongers to pay the council's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi