[2002] QCA 255
COURT OF APPEAL
de JERSEY CJ
JERRARD JA
WILSON J
Appeal No 3631 of 2002
| LEESA MAREE BOND | Applicant (Plaintiff) |
| And | |
| JOHN MICHAEL CERRUTO And ARTHUR JOSEPH PALK And COLES MYER LTD And THE COUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF And STATE OF QUEENSLAND And NOMINAL DEFENDANT And FAI GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD | Not party to appeal (First Defendant) First Respondent (Second Defendant) Second Respondent (Third Defendant) Not party to appeal (Fourth Defendant) Not party to appeal (Fourth Defendant) Third Respondent (Defendant by election) Not party to appeal (Defendant by election) |
BRISBANE
..DATE 23/07/2002
JUDGMENT
JERRARD JA: In this application the second and third defendants and the defendant by election applied to this Court for orders that the appellant, who was the unsuccessful plaintiff in the trial of this matter, provide security for costs of the appeal.
It is not disputed that the plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt, having last been bankrupted under a debtors petition filed 1st August 2000. She has no current income and no assets. She was injured on 22nd November 1993 when a motor vehicle she was driving collided with the rear of a motor vehicle driven by the second defendant and owned by the third defendant.
The reasons for judgment of the learned trial Judge delivered on 25th March 2002 record that the plaintiff's case was conducted on the basis that immediately prior to her colliding with the second defendant's vehicle, it had moved out of a southbound left-hand lane of the Bruce Highway into a right-hand southbound lane. This manoeuvre occurred when vehicles travelling south in both lanes had begun to slow down, and on the plaintiff's case it resulting in cutting down the plaintiff's breaking distance and causing her to collide with the second defendant's vehicle.
The second defendant's evidence, as recorded in the reasons for judgment, was that he had moved into that right-hand lane some distance before the point of collision.
It is obvious that the facts upon which liability turned were in short compass. The learned Judge referred to the contents of three documents completed by the plaintiff in the two weeks after the collision, which appeared inconsistent with the version she gave in evidence as described by the Judge.
The learned Judge also referred to the plaintiff's own account, the second defendant's account and to evidence supporting the plaintiff's account given by her husband and her stepson. The Judge did not think any inferences could safely be drawn from the skid marks and debris seen by the plaintiff and her husband a day or so after the accident, and held that in the circumstances the Judge was not prepared to conclude that the second defendant's vehicle moved out of the left lane immediately prior to the collisions. The "collisions" last referred to occurred when the plaintiff's vehicle drove the second defendant's vehicle forward into the vehicle ahead of the second defendant's, that vehicle being driven by the third defendant.
The Judge held that the plaintiff's…
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 255
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles for granting security for costs in an appeal, particularly the plaintiff's financial situation, her lack of assets, and the limited prospects of success on appeal. Despite Bond's argument that the order would cause considerable hardship to her family due to her inability to work resulting from the accident, the court found that the application for security for costs should succeed. The court was mindful of not shutting its doors to potential merit in the appeal but also recognised the financial burden on the defendants. The plaintiff offered to provide $3,000 as security, which the court deemed appropriate given the circumstances. The court ordered that Bond provide security for the respondents' costs of the appeal in the amount of $3,000 or pay those costs directly, with the proceedings stayed pending compliance.
Background
Background to the litigation
Bond appealed the decision of the trial judge, asserting several grounds for appeal. The second and third defendants, Cerruto and Palk, along with Coles Myer Ltd and others, applied for an order that Bond provide security for the costs of the appeal. Bond, who is an undischarged bankrupt with no income or assets, opposed the application. The application was heard by the Court of Appeal, which considered the limited prospects of success on appeal, Bond's financial situation, and the need to balance fairness and the court's discretion in such matters.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the appellant/plaintiff should be required to provide security for the costs of the appeal to the second and third defendants/respondents.
2. If so, what amount of security should be ordered, considering the appellant's financial situation and the applicants' estimated costs.
Held
1. The Court held that the appellant should be required to provide security for the costs of the appeal to the second and third defendants/respondents.
2. The Court held that the appropriate amount of security should be $3,000, considering the appellant's financial situation and the applicants' estimated costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered the principles relevant to an application for security for costs on the hearing of an appeal, which were recently remarked upon in Natcraft Pty Ltd v. Det Norske Veritas and Another [2002] QCA 241. The Court noted that the appellant, an undischarged bankrupt with no current income or assets, had already had a "day in court" and lost on the merits. Additionally, the reasons for judgment and the grounds of appeal to date demonstrated limited prospects of success on appeal. These factors weighed in favour of making an order for security for costs. The Court also acknowledged the hardship that such an order would cause to the appellant's family, but ultimately found that the applicants' need for protection outweighed this consideration. The Court further noted that the appellant had made an open offer to pay $3,000 for security for costs, which she would borrow from her husband's business. The Court deemed this offer reasonable and ordered that the appellant provide security for the applicants' costs of the appeal in the sum of $3,000, or alternatively, pay those costs directly. The Court also ordered that pending such payment or provision of such security, the proceedings on the appeal be stayed. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where an appellant with no assets seeks to appeal a decision, and the prospects of success on appeal are limited, the Court may order the appellant to provide security for the respondents' costs of appeal, taking into account the appellant's financial situation and the respondents' estimated costs. The Court must balance the need for protection of the respondents against the potential hardship to the appellant and their family.