IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 164 of 1997
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
FRIENDS OF HINCHINBROOK SOCIETY INC
AppellantAND:
THE MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
First RespondentCARDWELL PROPERTIES PTY LTD
Second RespondentTHE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTHROP ACJ, BURCHETT AND HILL JJ
DATE:
30 APRIL 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
In this matter, the court delivered judgment last year, dismissing the substantive appeal, and deferring questions of costs for further consideration, in accordance with certain directions which the court gave, following the then awaited determination of the High Court appeal in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 152 ALR 83. The High Court matter having been decided, and the parties having had an opportunity to make submissions in accordance with the directions that have been mentioned, the court announced that judgment would be handed down today.
However, yesterday afternoon a document was filed in the Registry, purportedly under Order 52 r 19, entitled “Notice of Discontinuance”, in the following terms: “The Appellant discontinues the proceedings”.
The language of this document is perhaps revealing. Order 52 r 19(1) does not refer to “proceedings”. It provides:
“An appellant may at any time file and serve a notice of discontinuance of the appeal and upon its being filed the appeal shall be abandoned.” (Emphasis added.)
But here, “the appeal” could not be discontinued. The appeal has already been determined, and indeed special leave has been sought and refused in the High Court. Of the proceedings, only the deferred questions in relation to costs remain. They are in the hands of the court. All that is left for the appellant to abandon is its contention that it should not be subject to costs orders. The matter is somewhat analogous to Maddocks v D.J.E. Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 148 CLR 104 at 118, where, in the joint judgment of the High Court, it was said:
“[I]t is not possible for [the appellant] to withdraw the application once it had been made and judgment given on it. The time for discontinuance or ‘withdrawal’ expired on the giving of judgment by the Court of Appeal.”
It follows that the rule relied on cannot be applicable at this stage of the proceedings. If it were applicable, the consequences would be quite extraordinary. Often, courts deliver judgments which leave outstanding questions. In a particular case, delivery of judgment might make it plain that a party had to fear an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis. Could it be suggested the rule permits such an order to be evaded by a discontinuance filed after the court’s conclusions have been announced, or at least have been made deducible? Cf. Castanho v Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd [1981] AC 557 at 571 where it was held that even a notice of discontinuance which complied with the rules could be held to be an…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Trib... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1998] FCA 433
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant could discontinue the proceedings for costs after the substantive appeal had been determined, and whether the notice of discontinuance filed under Order 52 r 19 was valid in the circumstances. The court considered the language of the rule and the consequences of allowing the notice of discontinuance to be effective in such circumstances. It held that the rule could not be applied to discontinue proceedings once they had been determined and the context required the words "at any time" to be understood as relating to times prior to the matter being placed in the hands of the court at the hearing.
The court held that the notice of discontinuance was irregular and should be set aside with costs. It reasoned that the rule relied upon could not be applied to discontinue proceedings once they had been determined and that the context required the words "at any time" to be understood as relating to times prior to the matter being placed in the hands of the court at the hearing. The court also noted that allowing the notice of discontinuance to be effective in such circumstances could have extraordinary consequences, such as enabling a party to evade an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis.
The court set aside the notice of discontinuance and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondents. The court held that the rule relied upon could not be applied to discontinue proceedings once they had been determined and that the context required the words "at any time" to be understood as relating to times prior to the matter being placed in the hands of the court at the hearing. The court also noted that allowing the notice of discontinuance to be effective in such circumstances could have extraordinary consequences, such as enabling a party to evade an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi