BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 317

Appeal from: Application for an extension of time: BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2649
File number(s): NSD 1998 of 2016
Judge(s): FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 13 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision to refuse to grant a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa – whether there is sufficient merit to grant an extension of time – whether the Tribunal’s decision was not logical or rational – whether the Tribunal afforded procedural fairness to the applicant – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M(1), (2), (3)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3 Pt 7AA, ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 417, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, (2), 473DC-473DF, 473GA, 473GB
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15(2) (repealed)

Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka)

Cases cited:

BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400

BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2649

Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187

Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 184; 231 FCR 243

Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133

SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91

Date of hearing: 6 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Galvin of MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1998 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BOH16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FARRELL J:

Introduction

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgement of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA): see BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2649. The primary judge made orders and delivered judgement ex tempore on 13 October 2016 and published his written reasons on 24 November 2016. 

  2. The applicant requires an extension of time because, generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within 21 days after the date on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order made: see r 36.03 of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 317
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BOH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought an extension of time to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had affirmed the decision to refuse the grant of a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa. The applicant had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2012 and applied for the visa in 2015, citing fears of harm if returned to Sri Lanka due to his Tamil ethnicity, political opinions, failed asylum application, and illegal departure. The delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection had refused the visa, and this decision was affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority. The primary judge had dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review with costs.

The court had to determine whether there was sufficient merit in the application to warrant an extension of time and whether the Tribunal's decision was not logical or rational, and if the Tribunal had afforded procedural fairness to the applicant. The court considered the principles outlined in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) and applied them to the present case. The court noted that while the legislated time limits are to be observed, the discretion to extend time could be exercised if it was proper to do so. The applicant needed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and it must be fair and equitable to extend the time. Other actions taken by the applicant to challenge the decision, any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay, and the merits of the appeal were also factors considered by the court.

After considering the application and the principles, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The court found that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it was not fair and equitable to extend the time. The court also noted that the mere absence of prejudice to the respondent did not justify the grant of an extension. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These are my reasons for dismissing the application with costs.Background The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 10 September 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. He applied for a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa on 8 September 2015. He claimed to fear harm if he was returned to Sri Lanka on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity, his imputed anti-government political opinion, as a failed asylum seeker and due to his illegal departure from Sri Lanka. On 12 May 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection decided to refuse to grant the visa. The delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” and was referred by the Minister to the Immigration Assessment Authority (also referred to as the IAA) for review. On 10 June 2016, the Authority made a decision under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to affirm the delegate’s decision and issued its decision record. The primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Authority’s decision with costs.Principles for determination of the application In written submissions filed by the Minister on 27 February 2018, the Minister relied on a summary of the principles which apply in determining an application such as this discussed by Derrington J in BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400 at [2] relying on the judgement of Katzmann J in Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315 at [9] and [10] as follows:9.The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”) retain the 21 day time limit for filing a notice of appeal and the discretion given to the Court in the former Rules to extend that period: r 36.03. The discretion is wide. It is constrained only by the interests of justice and the subject-matter and purpose of the legislation. Section 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FCA Act”) provides that the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions of the Act and the Rules is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. That purpose includes the objective of disposing of all proceedings in a timely manner: FCA Act, s 37M(2). Section 37M(3) requires the Court to interpret and apply the Rules and exercise any power conferred by them in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose. Consequently, the discretion conferred by r 36.03 is to be exercised in that way.10.The requirement in the former Rules (O 52 r 15(2)) that an applicant show “special reasons” has been removed. Despite the absence of a requirement for special reasons (which, in any event, only meant something out of the ordinary (Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187)), it seems to me that the considerations guiding the exercise of the Court’s discretion set out by the Full Court in Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] continue to apply:(a)Applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored;(b)The applicant must show an “acceptable explanation for the delay”; it must be “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;(c)Other action taken by the applicant to challenge the decision is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;(d)Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension but the mere absence of prejudice will not justify the grant of an extension;(e) The merits of the appeal are to be taken into account.See also the discussions in Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 243 at 246–247, [15]; SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 at [15]–[19]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–349.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established