FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BOG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1087
Appeal from: BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354 File number: VID 1167 of 2018 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 12 July 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the appellant had been refused a protection (class XA) visa – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka)
Cases cited: BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354
DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287; [2013] FCAFC 161
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137; [2003] FCAFC 120
SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125
Date of hearing: 21 February 2019 Date of last submissions: 1 March 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Petrie Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice. ORDERS
VID 1167 of 2018 BETWEEN: BOG16
Appellant
AND: DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
REEVES J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JULY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The notice of appeal filed on 17 September 2018, as amended, is dismissed.
2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal to be taxed failing agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REEVES J:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court delivered on 30 August 2018 (see BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354). The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister, the first respondent, to refuse to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
The factual context to this matter was conveniently summarised by the primary judge (at [3]–[5]) in the following terms:
3.The [appellant] is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion. The [appellant] arrived in…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1087
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal had properly considered the cumulative effect of the appellant's claims that were accepted by the Tribunal, and whether the Tribunal's failure to consider such cumulative effect amounted to a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that once the Tribunal accepted certain aspects of his claims, it should have been apparent to the Tribunal that a cumulative effect claim existed, which the Tribunal failed to consider. The appellant further argued that the Tribunal should have considered whether he would suffer serious harm upon his return to Sri Lanka, even though the Tribunal did not accept that he had any imputed association with the LTTE.
The Court found that the appellant's argument went beyond the Tribunal's review obligations, which required the Tribunal to consider claims that were expressly articulated or those which clearly arose from the materials before it. The Court held that the appellant's contention that the Tribunal should have identified a cumulative effect claim from the materials before it was not supported by the authorities. The Court also found that the aspects of the appellant's claims that the Tribunal did not accept were fatal to his claims, and therefore, the failure to consider the cumulative effect did not affect the outcome of the case.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to this appeal, to be taxed failing agreement. The Court held that the appellant's argument was not supported by the authorities, and the Tribunal's failure to consider the cumulative effect of the appellant's claims did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The Court further held that the appellant's claims were ultimately determined by the aspects of the claims that the Tribunal did not accept, and therefore, the outcome of the case would not have been different even if the Tribunal had considered the cumulative effect.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The notice of appeal filed on 17 September 2018, as amended, is dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal to be taxed failing agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the appellant’s supplementary submissions on the same issue, he contended that “it should not readily be inferred that the Tribunal ‘implicitly … applied s 36(2)(aa) by … adopting the language of s 36(2)(aa) in its earier [sic earlier] findings’” (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). CONSIDERATION In its review of a delegate’s decision with respect to a protection visa application, the Tribunal is obligated, among other things, to “deal with claims that are expressly articulated and those which clearly arise from the materials before [it]”. The latter obligation “includes a claim raised by the evidence and contentions before the Tribunal which if resolved in one way would or could be dispositive of the review” (see DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177 at [19] per Reeves, Rangiah and Colvin JJ, citing NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 (NABE) at [60]–[63] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ). In NABE, the Court approved the view expressed by Cooper J in SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137; [2003] FCAFC 120 at [19] that such a claim “must be raised ‘squarely’ on the material available to the Tribunal before it has a statutory duty to consider it”. The Court added that “the use of the adverb ‘squarely’ does not convey any precise standard but it indicates that a claim not expressly advanced will attract the review obligation of the Tribunal when it is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal. Such a claim will not depend for its exposure on constructive or creative activity by the Tribunal” (see NABE at [58]). To similar effect, in NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 at [15], Allsop J (as his Honour then was) expressed the view that an unarticulated claim must arise “tolerably clearly” from the materials before the Tribunal and it was not required to “undertake an independent analytical exercise” of those materials to discover whether such an unarticulated claim existed. This passage was approved by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287; [2013] FCAFC 161 at [70] per Mansfield, Gilmour and Foster JJ. The appellant did not contend that he articulated a cumulative effect claim before the Tribunal as outlined in particular (f) to this ground of appeal. Instead, he contended that, once the Tribunal decided to accept him on those aspects of his claims as identified in particulars (a) to (e) inclusive, such a claim should have been apparent from the materials before it. This contention cannot be accepted. It goes well beyond the Tribunal’s review obligations as outlined above. It involves a strained construction of the “creative activity” the Court rejected in NABE. Moreover, such an exercise would not salvage any of the appellant’s claims because those aspects of them that the Tribunal did not accept were fatal to those claims. This is illustrated by the fact, which the appellant’s counsel accepted, that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had an imputed profile with the LTTE at any time and in any form.