BOG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BOG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1087

Appeal from: BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354
File number: VID 1167 of 2018
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the appellant had been refused a protection (class XA) visa – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka)

Cases cited:

BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354

DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287; [2013] FCAFC 161

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137; [2003] FCAFC 120

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125

Date of hearing: 21 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 1 March 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Petrie
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice.

ORDERS

VID 1167 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BOG16

Appellant

AND:

DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The notice of appeal filed on 17 September 2018, as amended, is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal to be taxed failing agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REEVES J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court delivered on 30 August 2018 (see BOG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2354). The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister, the first respondent, to refuse to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

    THE FACTUAL CONTEXT

  2. The factual context to this matter was conveniently summarised by the primary judge (at [3]–[5]) in the following terms:

    3.The [appellant] is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion. The [appellant] arrived in…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1087
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BOG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Tribunal had refused the appellant a protection (class XA) visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider certain aspects of his claims and their cumulative effect, which would have demonstrated that he had a real chance of suffering serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now sought leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal had properly considered the cumulative effect of the appellant's claims that were accepted by the Tribunal, and whether the Tribunal's failure to consider such cumulative effect amounted to a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that once the Tribunal accepted certain aspects of his claims, it should have been apparent to the Tribunal that a cumulative effect claim existed, which the Tribunal failed to consider. The appellant further argued that the Tribunal should have considered whether he would suffer serious harm upon his return to Sri Lanka, even though the Tribunal did not accept that he had any imputed association with the LTTE.

The Court found that the appellant's argument went beyond the Tribunal's review obligations, which required the Tribunal to consider claims that were expressly articulated or those which clearly arose from the materials before it. The Court held that the appellant's contention that the Tribunal should have identified a cumulative effect claim from the materials before it was not supported by the authorities. The Court also found that the aspects of the appellant's claims that the Tribunal did not accept were fatal to his claims, and therefore, the failure to consider the cumulative effect did not affect the outcome of the case.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to this appeal, to be taxed failing agreement. The Court held that the appellant's argument was not supported by the authorities, and the Tribunal's failure to consider the cumulative effect of the appellant's claims did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The Court further held that the appellant's claims were ultimately determined by the aspects of the claims that the Tribunal did not accept, and therefore, the outcome of the case would not have been different even if the Tribunal had considered the cumulative effect.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of appeal filed on 17 September 2018, as amended, is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal to be taxed failing agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the criteria under s 36(2)(a) of the Act and that he was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT The appellant’s two grounds of review before the Federal Circuit Court raised the same issue, namely the Tribunal’s treatment of the appellant’s brother’s alleged connection with the LTTE. The primary judge rejected both of those grounds. In its original form, ground of appeal 1 was almost identical to ground of review 1 before the Federal Circuit Court. However, at the hearing of this appeal, the appellant sought leave to amend his notice of appeal to delete particular (g) to that ground of appeal and to abandon ground of appeal 2. That leave was granted. It can be seen from the remaining parts of ground of appeal 1 above (at [8]) that the main effect of these amendments was to excise from this appeal the claim relating to the brother’s alleged LTTE connection. That being so, it would serve no purpose to detail how the primary judge dealt with that issue. For the following reasons, the same outcome applies to the balance of ground of appeal 1. The essence of the contention advanced by the amended form of ground of appeal 1 is contained in particular (f) (see at [8] above). It is that, when it was conducting its review, the Tribunal failed to consider the cumulative effect of those aspects of the appellant’s claims which it did accept. The primary judge noted this contention with respect to ground of review 1 (which, as noted above, is almost identical to ground of appeal 1) at [18]–[19] of her Honour’s reasons, but then disposed of the whole of that ground (at [25]–[27]) based on her Honour’s finding that “no claim squarely [arose] from the material before the [T]ribunal that the [appellant’s] brother’s connection with the LTTE … may separately or in conjunction with other factors cause the [appellant] to face a real chance of serious or significant harm”. As a consequence, the primary judge did not deal with the cumulative effect contention referred to above. Accordingly, no purpose will be served by reviewing any of the primary judge’s reasons.THE CONTENTIONS In his written submissions concerning ground of appeal 1, the appellant claimed that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to “consider each necessary and relevant consideration and … integer” (footnote omitted) of his claims and the material questions of fact which, he claimed, were squarely raised by them. As is already noted above, the appellant contended that those integers comprised the aspects of his claims which the Tribunal had accepted, as set out in the remaining particulars to this ground of appeal (see at [8] above) and the cumulative effect of those accepted claims as they relate to the treatment he may be subjected to upon his return to Sri Lanka and whether there was “a real chance that [he] may have a real chance of longer detention, or may suffer other serious harm”. The appellant also contended that, while the Tribunal did not accept that he was imputed with any LTTE association before he left Sri Lanka, it should have considered whether he would suffer the serious harm it had accepted had occurred in the past upon his return to Sri Lanka after a four year absence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the appellant’s supplementary submissions on the same issue, he contended that “it should not readily be inferred that the Tribunal ‘implicitly … applied s 36(2)(aa) by … adopting the language of s 36(2)(aa) in its earier [sic earlier] findings’” (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). CONSIDERATION In its review of a delegate’s decision with respect to a protection visa application, the Tribunal is obligated, among other things, to “deal with claims that are expressly articulated and those which clearly arise from the materials before [it]”. The latter obligation “includes a claim raised by the evidence and contentions before the Tribunal which if resolved in one way would or could be dispositive of the review” (see DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177 at [19] per Reeves, Rangiah and Colvin JJ, citing NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 (NABE) at [60]–[63] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ). In NABE, the Court approved the view expressed by Cooper J in SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137; [2003] FCAFC 120 at [19] that such a claim “must be raised ‘squarely’ on the material available to the Tribunal before it has a statutory duty to consider it”. The Court added that “the use of the adverb ‘squarely’ does not convey any precise standard but it indicates that a claim not expressly advanced will attract the review obligation of the Tribunal when it is apparent on the face of the material before the Tribunal. Such a claim will not depend for its exposure on constructive or creative activity by the Tribunal” (see NABE at [58]). To similar effect, in NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 at [15], Allsop J (as his Honour then was) expressed the view that an unarticulated claim must arise “tolerably clearly” from the materials before the Tribunal and it was not required to “undertake an independent analytical exercise” of those materials to discover whether such an unarticulated claim existed. This passage was approved by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA (2013) 219 FCR 287; [2013] FCAFC 161 at [70] per Mansfield, Gilmour and Foster JJ. The appellant did not contend that he articulated a cumulative effect claim before the Tribunal as outlined in particular (f) to this ground of appeal. Instead, he contended that, once the Tribunal decided to accept him on those aspects of his claims as identified in particulars (a) to (e) inclusive, such a claim should have been apparent from the materials before it. This contention cannot be accepted. It goes well beyond the Tribunal’s review obligations as outlined above. It involves a strained construction of the “creative activity” the Court rejected in NABE. Moreover, such an exercise would not salvage any of the appellant’s claims because those aspects of them that the Tribunal did not accept were fatal to those claims. This is illustrated by the fact, which the appellant’s counsel accepted, that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had an imputed profile with the LTTE at any time and in any form.