FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bob Brown Foundation Inc v Minister for the Environment [2022] FCA 498
File number: TAD 5 of 2022 Judgment of: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 2 May 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunction – where the second respondent (MMG) made a referral under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) in relation to certain preliminary design and assessment works – where a delegate of the Minister for the Environment decided that the proposed action was not a “controlled action” provided it was undertaken in a particular manner, as specified in the decision notice – where the “manner” requirements did not include specific measures to protect the Tasmanian Masked Owl – where the applicant sought judicial review of the decision of the delegate – where the applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain MMG from undertaking the proposed action – whether prima facie case – whether balance of convenience favoured the making of an injunction order – held: application for interlocutory injunction dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 5
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), ss 68, 74A, 75, 77, 77A, 156B, 391, 475, 479
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Ltd (2013) 305 ALR 363
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238
Tegra (NSW) Pty Ltd v Gundagai Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 806; 160 LGERA 1
Division: General Division Registry: Tasmania National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 63 Date of hearing: 29 April 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr S Pritchard SC with Ms T Meyrick Solicitor for the Applicant: Fitzgerald and Browne Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K Pham Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms PA Neskovcin QC with Ms RV Howe Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ashurst ORDERS
TAD 5 of 2022 BETWEEN: BOB BROWN FOUNDATION INC
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
First Respondent
MMG AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 MAY 2022
THE COURT NOTES THAT: the second respondent has by its counsel given the following undertaking:
Subject to the final determination of the proceeding, or further order, in undertaking the Preliminary Design and Assessment Works, MMG Australia Limited (MMG) undertakes to implement the following measures in relation to the Masked Owl:
1.Suitable Masked Owl nesting habitat trees will not be disturbed and a 15 metre exclusion zone applied;
2.A suitable Masked Owl habitat tree is the following:
(a)a tree with a diameter greater than 1 metre at breast height; or
(b)a tree with a hollow entrance of 15 cm or greater.
3.Surveys for
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 498
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In addressing the first issue, the Court found that the Foundation had established a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried. The Court accepted that the grounds of review relied on by the Foundation were arguable, even if some were not particularly strong. However, the Court found that the balance of convenience did not favour the making of an injunction order. The Court found that the potential injury to the Tasmanian Masked Owl, even if the proposed action proceeded, was not sufficient to outweigh the injury that MMG would suffer if an injunction were granted.
The Court further found that the strength of the Foundation's case and their chances of success were relevant factors to consider in assessing the balance of convenience. However, the Court found that, overall, the lower risk of injustice lay with MMG if an injunction were granted. The Court also found that it was not feasible to undertake a detailed examination of the material before the delegate in the context of the application for an interlocutory injunction.
The Court dismissed the Foundation's application for an interlocutory injunction and granted leave to amend the originating application for judicial review. The Court reserved costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant have leave to amend the originating application for judicial review to the form provided to the Court on 29 April 2022.
2. The applicant file and serve the amended originating application for judicial review by 4.00 pm on 4 May 2022.
3. The applicant’s application for an interlocutory injunction (contained in its originating application) be dismissed.
4. Costs be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was brought before the court on an application for an interlocutory injunction by the applicant. The matter was part of a judicial review of the decision made by the delegate under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). The applicant had previously sought leave to amend its originating application for judicial review, which was granted, and the amended originating application was filed and served within the specified timeframe. The court heard arguments from both the applicant and MMG regarding the applicant's application for an interlocutory injunction.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicant has established a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried on the grounds of the judicial review application.
2. Whether the balance of convenience favours the making of an interlocutory injunction order.
3. Whether the applicant has demonstrated that the injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo pending the trial of the judicial review application.
Held
1. The court held that the applicant has established a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried on the grounds of the judicial review application.
2. The court held that the balance of convenience did not favour the making of an interlocutory injunction order.
3. The court held that the applicant has not demonstrated that the injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo pending the trial of the judicial review application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I note, in particular, the following additional relevant principles:(a)The requirement to establish a prima facie case does not mean that the applicant must show that it is more probable than not that it will succeed at the trial. It is sufficient to show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: O’Neill at [65] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ and Crennan J relevantly agreed at [19].(b)The “balance of convenience” consideration requires an assessment of whether the inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the respondent would suffer if an injunction were granted: Beecham at 623.(c)The strength of the applicant’s case is not considered in isolation from the balance of convenience: Samsung at [67]. In considering where the lower risk of injustice lies, all relevant factors are to be weighed in the balance. The strength of the applicant’s case and their chances of success may be a relevant matter when assessing the balance of convenience.Consideration I start by addressing whether or not there is a prima facie case. In my view, the applicant has established a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried. Each of the grounds relied on by the applicant is, at least, arguable. In oral submissions, senior counsel for MMG accepted that the applicant has established a prima facie case. In the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to assess the strength of the prima facie case. While the precautionary principle has been considered in the context of other legislation, it has received only limited consideration in the context of the EPBC Act. This makes it difficult to form a preliminary view as to the strength of ground 1 and the second limb of ground 2. Insofar as the first limb of ground 2 is concerned, without a detailed examination of the material that was before the delegate, it is difficult to form a view as to the strength of this contention. In the context of the application for an interlocutory injunction, it was not feasible to, and the parties did not attempt to, undertake this kind of detailed examination. In relation to ground 3, the applicant’s senior counsel relied on the applicant’s written submissions. At first blush, the Reasons do appear to identify the matters referred to in this ground (see, in particular, paragraphs 33 to 41 and 212 to 215 of the Reasons). This ground does not, therefore, appear to be strong. Nevertheless, I accept that it is arguable. I will now address the balance of convenience. In doing so, I have regard to the discussion above regarding the strength of the prima facie case. The applicant contends, in broad outline, that MMG’s proposed action is likely to have a significant impact on the Tasmanian Masked Owl. The applicant submits that this is the case even if MMG adopts the measures proposed in the Referral or the more extensive measures it proposes now (in the context of the application for an interlocutory injunction). The applicant submits that the injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo, namely, that no part of the proposed action is taken: see Tegra (NSW) Pty Ltd v Gundagai Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 806; 160 LGERA 1 at [34]-[35] per Preston J. The applicant submits that, if the proposed action proceeds, the central plank of the relief sought by the applicant in this proceeding would be rendered nugatory. The applicant submits that there is little value in remitter or a permanent injunction if the significant impact to the Tasmanian Masked Owl has already materialised as a result of the proposed action having been undertaken.