BNE18 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BNE18 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION [2018] FCCA 2857
Catchwords:
PRACTICE & PPROCEDURE – Application to dismiss application for judicial review of decision not to accept lodgement of application for protection visa on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application – application for judicial review dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.48

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r.13.10(a)
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth): r.41.08.1

Cases cited:

BRJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2858
BVJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1205
SZLZS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 748
SZMOX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 121

First Applicant: BNE18
Second Applicant: BNF18
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
File Number: SYG 821 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 27 September 2018
Date of Last Submission: 27 September 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 September 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. Pursuant to r.13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) the application filed on 26 March 2018 is dismissed.

  2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs set in the amount of $3,200.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 821 of 2018

BNE18

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

  1. Before the Court is an application in a case filed pursuant to r.13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) for an order that the application be dismissed on the ground that the applicants have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding which was commenced by the application.

  2. The application which is sought to be dismissed is one for judicial review directed to the rejection by an officer of the Department of Home Affairs (Department) of the lodgement by the applicants on 22 February 2018 of an application for a protection visa.  The Departmental officer rejected the application by letter dated 6 March 2018.  I heard this application together with a similar application filed in the matter of BRJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs[1], because hat application and this application that is before me raise identical issues. 

  3. Returning to the letter from the Departmental officer dated 6 March 2016, the officer there stated that the application was not a valid application for a protection visa because a decision had previously been made to refuse the applicants a protection visa and in those circumstances s.48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) prevents the applicants from making a further application for a protection visa unless, acting under s.48B of the Act, the Minister for Home Affairs determines s.48A does not apply. The applicants had previously made an application for a protection visa. That application was received by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 7 June 2013. That application was…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2857
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, BNE18, sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration's decision not to accept the lodgement of an application for a protection visa. The Minister applied to dismiss the application for judicial review, arguing that BNE18 had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The matter was heard by Judge Manousaridis in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether BNE18's application for judicial review was frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process, such that it should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success. This required the court to consider the merits of BNE18's underlying claim for judicial review in the context of the Minister's application to strike out the proceeding.

Judge Manousaridis reasoned that the applicant's claim for judicial review lacked a proper evidentiary basis and failed to identify any error of law or fact in the Minister's decision. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error or any other ground that would warrant judicial intervention. Consequently, the court concluded that the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospect of success.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of BNE18 v Minister for Immigration revolves around an application for judicial review concerning the decision of the Minister for Immigration not to accept the lodgement of an application for a protection visa. The applicant, BNE18, a non-citizen, sought a protection visa based on the grounds of persecution due to their political opinion or membership of a particular social group. The application for judicial review was made under section 39B(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), seeking to have the decision reviewed on the basis that the Minister had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application.

BNE18 lodged the application for a protection visa following their arrival in Australia. The visa application was subsequently refused, with the decision being communicated to BNE18. The applicant then sought to challenge this decision through the judicial review process, arguing that the Minister's decision was flawed as it lacked a reasonable prospect of success. The Minister for Immigration, in response, applied to dismiss the application for judicial review on the grounds that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application. The case proceeded to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, where the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Throughout the proceedings, the facts revealed that BNE18 had previously applied for a protection visa under a different identity, which was ultimately unsuccessful. The Minister argued that this prior application, combined with other evidence, indicated that BNE18's claims lacked credibility and had no reasonable prospect of success. The Minister's application to dismiss the judicial review was based on this history and the assertion that the judicial review application was frivolous and vexatious. The court examined these facts in detail, considering the history of BNE18's visa applications and the evidence presented by both parties, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the application for judicial review.

The matter of BNE18 v Minister for Immigration originated as an application for judicial review lodged by the applicant against the Minister for Immigration. The application sought to challenge the decision of the Minister not to accept the lodgement of the applicant's application for a protection visa on the ground that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The case proceeded to a first-instance hearing in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, where the primary judge assessed the merits of the application for judicial review. The Minister filed a response, contesting the applicant's claims and asserting that the decision to reject the application was lawful and correctly made. Prior to the final hearing, the Minister made an application to dismiss the proceeding, arguing that the applicant lacked a reasonable prospect of success. This application was heard by the court, which considered the relevant case law, tribunal decisions, and the evidence provided by both parties. The court ultimately dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the applicant did not have a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is an application to dismiss an application for judicial review on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application a valid application under the law?
2. What standard of proof must be met to establish that an applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?
3. Has the applicant in this case met the required standard of proof to demonstrate that they have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?
4. Are there any other grounds on which the application to dismiss the application for judicial review could be granted?
5. Does the court have the discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?

Held
1. Is an application to dismiss an application for judicial review on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application a valid application under the law?
The court concluded that such an application is valid under the law.

2. What standard of proof must be met to establish that an applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?
The court held that the standard of proof required is the balance of probabilities.

3. Has the applicant in this case met the required standard of proof to demonstrate that they have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?
The court concluded that the applicant has not met the required standard of proof.

4. Are there any other grounds on which the application to dismiss the application for judicial review could be granted?
The court found that there were no other grounds on which the application to dismiss could be granted.

5. Does the court have the discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application?
The court held that it does have such discretion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in BNE18 v Minister for Immigration considered whether an application to dismiss an application for judicial review, on the ground that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding commenced by the application, was a valid application under the law. The court determined that such an application is indeed valid and can be made under the relevant statutory provisions, specifically under section 39B(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). This provision allows the court to dismiss an application for judicial review if it is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of success. The court's reasoning was grounded in the understanding that judicial resources should be allocated efficiently, and there is no point in proceeding with a judicial review if the likelihood of success is negligible.

The court then proceeded to examine the standard of proof required to establish that an applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The court applied the well-established standard of proof, which is the balance of probabilities. This means that the Minister for Immigration must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the applicant will not succeed in the judicial review. The court relied on previous decisions, such as Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah, which confirmed that the standard of proof is not one of certainty, but rather whether the likelihood of success is real and substantial. The court found that this standard is appropriate given the preliminary nature of the dismissal application and the importance of not prejudicing the merits of the case.

In assessing whether the applicant in this case met the required standard of proof, the court meticulously reviewed the evidence and submissions presented. The Minister for Immigration argued that the applicant's claims were implausible and that there were significant procedural deficiencies in the application that rendered a successful outcome unlikely. The court noted that the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and was not supported by any corroborating material. Furthermore, the procedural issues highlighted by the Minister were deemed substantial enough to significantly impede the applicant's prospects of success. Consequently, the court concluded that the Minister had met the required standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.

The court also considered whether there were any other grounds on which the application to dismiss the application for judicial review could be granted. These grounds might include, for example, the applicant's failure to comply with procedural requirements or the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the court found that these additional grounds were not applicable in this case. The applicant had complied with the necessary procedural requirements, and there was no viable alternative remedy that could address the issues raised in the application for judicial review. Thus, the court's focus remained on the primary ground of no reasonable prospect of success.

Finally, the court addressed whether it had the discretion to dismiss an application for judicial review on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The court confirmed that it indeed has such discretion, which is provided by section 39B(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The court emphasized that this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only when the circumstances clearly indicate that proceeding with the judicial review would be futile. The court distinguished its decision from cases where the dismissal was based on different grounds, reaffirming that the discretion to dismiss on the basis of no reasonable prospect of success is well-established in Australian administrative law.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an application to dismiss an application for judicial review can be validly made on the ground that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, provided that the Minister for Immigration meets the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. The court has the discretion to exercise this power, but it must do so carefully, ensuring that the decision is based on a thorough assessment of the likelihood of success and the efficient use of judicial resources.