BMY19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2021] FCA 1609
•15 December 2021
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BMY19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1609
Appeal from: BMY19 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3240 File number: NSD 1942 of 2019 Judgment of: YATES J Date of judgment: 15 December 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the applicants’ application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which affirmed a decision not to grant protection visa Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J(1)(a), 36(2), 36(2A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Sch 3, Item 15.2
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12(1)(a)
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 55 Date of hearing: 15 December 2021 Counsel for the Applicants: The Applicants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for First Respondent: Ms D Stone of Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance ORDERS
NSD 1942 of 2019 BETWEEN: BMY19
First Applicant
BMZ19
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 DECEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal filed on 22 November 2019 be dismissed.
2.Pursuant to r 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
YATES J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) given on 11 November 2019.
The applicants are husband and wife. They met, and married, in Australia. They have three Australian-born children who are Australian citizens.
The first applicant is a citizen of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). He has been in Australia since June 1994, except for two relatively short periods of time. On 5 January 1996, he applied for a protection visa. The application included his wife (the second applicant).
The protection visa application was refused on 19 May 2016 by a delegate of the then responsible Minister.
On 1 June 2016, the applicants applied to the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), for review of the delegate’s decision. On 27 March 2019, they appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments, without the assistance of an interpreter.
The Tribunal noted the first applicant’s claims in its Decision Record (at T[16]):
16. The first named applicant’s claims in his application for Protection visas are summarised as follows:
∙He has been in Australia since June 1994. He came to Australia for a better future.
∙He and the second named applicant have purchased a house in Belmore. He is well established and settled in Australia. He cannot return to live in South Korea permanently especially after the shocking death of his father.
∙He and the second named applicant have two sons and a daughter who were born in Australia and educated here. They treat Australia as their home. His children will not be able to adjust to living in South Korea as they have never lived or been educated there. His family went to South Korea when his father died and it was a disaster.
∙South Korea is a good country but he will not be able to adjust to living there. He did not experience physical harm in South Korea but fears emotional and mental harm because it will be difficult to adjust to living there and the type of life he enjoys in Australia will not be available to him in South Korea.
∙He and his children will be prejudiced if they return to South Korea. He will have to sell his house in Australia and buy a house in South Korea. His children speak Korean but are unable to read and write fluently in Korean. He does not believe South Korea will have a suitable school for his children.
∙He has an Australian sponsor who is prepared to sponsor him as a skilled and experienced carpenter. He has never been a burden on taxpayers.
∙The political situation in South Korea is heated. He is afraid that something may happen in the future that will affect them.
The second applicant made no claims in her own right.
The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, stating (at T[31] – T[34]):
31.The Tribunal accepts that the first named applicant was born on 19 January 1968 at Hwa Sung city in South Korea. The Tribunal accepts that he completed High School in South Korea in 1985 and then undertook a course in aircraft maintenance mechanics. The Tribunal accepts that he came to Australia on 27 June 1994 to undertake further studies in aircraft maintenance mechanics. The Tribunal accepts that he completed those studies but was unable to obtain a Temporary Business visa.
32.The Tribunal accepts that the first named applicant subsequently undertook studies in carpentry and did an IELTS test. The Tribunal accepts that he subsequently applied for and was granted a subclass 457 Temporary Business visa. The Tribunal accepts that he was unable to satisfy the requirements for a permanent Business visa. The Tribunal accepts that he applied for Protection visas so that he and the second named applicant could remain in Australia with their three children and they could continue their education here.
33.The Tribunal accepts that it would be difficult for the first named applicant to re-establish his life in South Korea and to adjust to living in South Korea after his long absence from there. The Tribunal accepts that if his three children accompany him to South Korea it would be very difficult for them to adjust to living and studying in South Korea. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that these difficulties amount to serious harm or significant harm.
34.In view of the first named applicant’s own evidence and the above findings, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance or a real risk that the first named applicant will suffer serious harm or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed if he returns to South Korea now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the first applicant would suffer serious harm for any reason set out in s 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) if he were to return to South Korea. It followed that he did not have a “well-founded fear of persecution” that would classify him as a “refugee” within the meaning of s 5H of the Act. It followed that he did not satisfy the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Further, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real risk that the first applicant would suffer “significant harm” within the meaning of s 36(2A) of the Act as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to South Korea. It followed that he did not satisfy the requirements of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
These findings could hardly have been controversial because, at T[25] of its Decision Record, the Tribunal noted:
25. The first named applicant gave evidence that he is aware that he does not satisfy the requirements for a Protection visa. He stated that his main concern is for his three children. He requested that the Tribunal refer his application to the Minister for Ministerial intervention.
The Tribunal recorded the following matters at T[39] of its Decision Record, no doubt acting on the first applicant’s request:
39.The Tribunal considers that the circumstances of this case may raise the following matters:
∙Strong compassionate circumstances that if not recognised would result in serious, ongoing and irreversible harm and continuing hardship to an Australian citizen or an Australian family unit, where at least one member of the family is an Australian citizen or Australian permanent resident.
∙Circumstances that may bring Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child into consideration, including the best interests of the child - which must be treated as a primary consideration, but can be balanced against other primary considerations.
∙The level and nature of the person’s integration into the Australian community and the length of time they have been in Australia, both as a lawful and unlawful non-citizen.
On 28 March 2019, the Tribunal referred the matter to the Minister’s Department for consideration under the Ministerial intervention guidelines. As events transpired, Ministerial intervention was unsuccessful.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
The applicants sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. Their amended application, filed on 14 June 2019, contained three grounds, expressed as follows:
1. In light of the Federal Court of Australia judgment of 4 April 2019 NSD1500 of 2018, Jabbour v Secretary Department of Home Affairs, the Ministerial Intervention Unit in their letter of 4 April 2019 acted unreasonably and denied me and my family ministerial intervention as recommended by the Tribunal and I do believe that my case was judicially reviewable for legal unreasonableness.
2. I do believe that the Delegate of the Minister namely Rashmi, Position no 60019093, should not make the decision and assess that the request by the Tribunal does not meet the guidelines for referral to the Minister.
3. The Tribunal was generous and sympathetic but failed to consider my fear of harm with my family should we be compelled to return to Korea.
Although expressing obvious sympathy with the applicants’ predicament—they had been permitted to remain in Australia for (then) approximately 25 years, during which time they had put down roots and had three children whom the applicants wished to support by remaining in Australia—the primary judge concluded that there was no substance to the grounds of review.
The primary judge found (at J[19] – J[20]):
19.Grounds 1 and 2 are misconceived in seeking review of the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to refer the request for Ministerial intervention to the Minister. The request for Ministerial intervention is not the subject of these judicial review proceedings. Further, it is not relevant to establishing whether there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision in circumstances where the request for referral was denied by the Minister’s Department after the Tribunal’s decision was made. Further and in any event the Tribunal did refer the matter for Ministerial intervention.
20.Ground 3 is merely a broad assertion of error that without further particulars fails to identify any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal correctly set out the criteria in s.36 of the Migration Act. On a review of the material before the Court, including the transcript of the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal considered and made findings in relation to all of the claims raised by the applicants. The applicant accepted that they did not meet the criteria for the grant of protection at [25].
The primary judge also noted, at J[22], with reference to the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, that:
22.… at the hearing the applicants acknowledged that they did not meet the protection criteria and that the applicant accepted he did not meet the criteria for the grant of the visa.
The primary judge concluded that the applicants were unable to demonstrate an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. His Honour made an order pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) that the application be dismissed.
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
Background
The judgment given by the Federal Circuit Court is interlocutory in character. An appeal from this judgment cannot be brought unless leave to do so is granted: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
The question whether leave to appeal should be granted is normally approached by considering (a) whether the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal; and (b) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were to be refused (supposing the decision to be wrong): Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at pages 298 – 299; Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139 at 4.
The application for leave to appeal states:
1. I accept the wonderful way His Honour Judge Driver dealt with my case but I continue to believe that the Tribunal's decision is affected by error of law because there is a risk and serious harm if I return to Korea with my three Australian children and for that reason the Tribunal recommended ministerial intervention which was not considered.
The first applicant made an affidavit in support of the application for leave to appeal, which includes the following:
2. I appeared before His Honour Judge Driver on 11 November 2019 and I was unrepresented. I expected that His Honour will accept that my life is affected by serious risk if I return to Korea and contrary to my expectations His Honour refused and dismissed my application.
3. I am very upset that my three Australian children cannot be left alone in Australia if my wife and I had to leave the country and apply from overseas. I have a mortgage to look after and it is not possible for me to depart Australia so I am hoping that the honourable Federal Court will consider my review until also a decision is made on my 457 application.
The draft notice of appeal accompanying the application for leave to appeal contains a single ground:
1. His Honour Judge Driver refused my application on the basis that there was no error in the decision of the Tribunal. I do not agree with His Honour's judgment as I continue to believe that I will face harm and risk if I return to Korea and the Tribunal failed to expressly consider the political situation in South Korea.
On 25 November 2019, an order was made that the applicants file and serve a written outline of submissions in support of their application (and in support of any appeal were the Court to grant leave to appeal) no later than 10 business days before the hearing date of the application. A corresponding order was made that the Minister file and serve a written outline of submissions no later than five business days before the hearing date. It is abundantly clear that the Minister’s outline of submissions was intended to be responsive to the applicants’ outline of submissions.
The application for leave to appeal was allocated to my docket on 4 June 2021. On 7 June 2021, I made an order that the application be listed for hearing on 1 September 2021. However, due to the difficulties associated with holding in-person hearings under the conditions of the Covid‑19 pandemic, the hearing date of 1 September 2021 was vacated. Given that circumstance, I raised with the parties the possibility of the application for leave to appeal being determined on the papers. The applicants did not agree to this course.
In contemplation of the easing of restrictions in relation to in-person hearings, I made an order on 11 November 2021 that the application for leave to appeal be listed for hearing on 15 December 2021. This was the first possible date on which an in-person hearing could be held without restrictions.
In the context of the anticipated hearing listed for 1 September 2021, the applicants did not comply with the time limit for filing and serving their written outline of submissions, as ordered on 25 November 2019. The Minister filed his written outline of submissions within time, on 25 August 2021. Subsequently, on 30 August 2021, the applicants filed a written outline of submissions. Understandably, the Minister’s written outline of submissions did not (and could not) respond to the applicants’ written outline of submissions.
The Minister’s written outline of submissions
The Minister’s written outline of submissions summarises the background to the present application, including the Tribunal’s decision and the reasons for judgment of the primary judge.
With respect to the ground raised in the application for leave to appeal, the Minister notes that, contrary to what is there stated, the Tribunal did not recommend Ministerial intervention on the basis that the Tribunal had found that the first applicant would suffer a risk of serious harm were he to return to South Korea. Rather, the Tribunal made its recommendation on compassionate grounds: T[39]. More importantly, the primary judge correctly held, at J[19], that the Tribunal’s request for Ministerial intervention was not relevant to the question of whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.
Apart from expressing general disagreement with the judgment below, and repeating the first applicant’s subjective belief that he will face “harm and risk” should he return to South Korea (albeit, it would seem, not of a kind referred to in s 5J of the Act), the draft ground of appeal raises the contention that the Tribunal failed to expressly consider “the political situation in South Korea”.
The Minister accepts that the Tribunal’s reasons do not include express consideration of “the political situation in South Korea”. However, the Minister points to the fact that the primary judge did deal with this contention.
By way of preface, I note that, at T[16] of its Decision Record, the Tribunal identified the first applicant’s claims, including his claim that “(t)he political situation in South Korea is heated”. As to all the claims made by the first applicant, the Tribunal concluded (at T[34]):
34.In view of the first named applicant’s own evidence and the above findings, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance or a real risk that the first named applicant will suffer serious harm or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed if he returns to South Korea now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The primary judge said (at [J [22]):
22.The Tribunal recognised the applicant’s claim to fear harm because the political situation in South Korea is “heated” and he feared something would happen in the future. The Tribunal concluded, on the basis of the applicant’s evidence that he applied for protection so that he and the second applicant could remain in Australia with their children, there was no real chance or real risk the applicant would suffer serious or significant harm for any of the reasons claimed if he returned to South Korea now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. While the Tribunal did not expressly consider the political situation in South Korea, the Tribunal’s findings were sufficient to deal with this claim, especially in circumstances where no further evidence was provided to support it and at the hearing the applicants acknowledged that they did not meet the protection criteria and the applicant accepted he did not meet the criteria for the grant of the visa.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The Minister submits that no appealable error is revealed by this finding.
The applicants’ written outline of submissions
The applicants’ written outline of submissions appear to be written from the first applicant’s perspective. I will treat them as such. As I have noted, the second applicant has made no claims for protection on her own behalf.
The first applicant submits that he disagrees with the Minister’s submissions. He expresses his continuing belief that the Tribunal overlooked “the subjective well-founded fear of harm my family and I will face in South Korea”. He submits:
The children will be prejudiced, the political situation in South Korea is heated and I clearly stated that I am afraid that something may happen in the future that will affect them.
The first applicant does not descend to greater particularity as to what this “something” might be. Moreover, he does not elaborate on why or in what respects “the political situation in South Korea is heated” or why this political situation might be a source of harm to him or to his family (his children in particular).
As the primary judge noted (at J[22]), no evidence was provided to the Tribunal of the likelihood of harm being suffered due to the “political situation” in South Korea being “heated”. The transcript of the first applicant’s oral evidence given to the Tribunal was in evidence before the primary judge. The transcript records that the Tribunal asked the first applicant directly: “So what do you think would happen if you go back to Korea?” The first applicant’s response—to which I will return—says nothing about possible harm being suffered by the first applicant or his family because of the “political situation in South Korea”.
The written outline of submissions continues to express the first applicant’s concern that his children “would be very disadvantaged and prejudiced to adjust to living and studying in South Korea”. The first applicant submits that the Tribunal’s failure to accept that these difficulties amount to “serious harm” or “significant harm” is “a failure to base the assessment on probative evidence”.
The first applicant also submits that the Tribunal, and the primary judge, overlooked, and failed to properly assess, important issues, including “relocation issues”. The first applicant elaborates on this submission by pointing to evidence he gave to the Tribunal concerning the conduct of his older brother. This evidence was given in response to the question (referred to above) that asked the first respondent to explain what he thought might happen to him if he goes back to Korea:
MemberSo what do you think would happen if you go back to Korea?
ApplicantMe and my wife will survive but it’s not easy over there also. My father passed away actually this is very personal problems cause problems private problems. My older brother took the whole estate of my father’s heritage. Now me and my sister, my brother actually we take to the court at the moment because my old brothers gave me nothing. I have nothing in there.
MemberSo your father’s estate didn’t go to your mother?
ApplicantNo we two brother my brother and my sister gave authority to my older brother because this is a tradition in Korea. And all the brother have to be divided what you have, what you brother’s is. But he didn’t do this.
By reference to this evidence, the first applicant submits:
Subjectively speaking my children who enjoy life in Australia and school and sport and are brilliant and smart will be prejudiced and harmed in Korea especially when I have to appear in Court against the behaviour of my brother who took the whole estate of my father’s heritage.
He also submits:
I do believe that neither the Tribunal nor His Honour understood that what will happen to us in Korea would amount to persecution. I do believe that the discrimination my children will face should amount to persecution and the circumstances before the Tribunal were misunderstood and the [T]ribunal incorrectly ignored the gravity of the conduct of my brother in Korea and wrongly adopted the test for persecution and the harassment or threats which amount to persecution. The Tribunal ignored my human dignity which will be constituting persecution as a result of appearing in Court against my brother and his behaviour and in that case the Tribunal ignored the serious punishment and disadvantage as well as discrimination which involves interrogation, fighting for my rights in the presence of my Australian born children. Such is in itself a serious harm to their wellbeing because I did mention to the Tribunal that my wife and I have always protected our children's peace by even not telling them about our immigration status. I do believe again that there is persecution which involves discrimination that results in harm to my children and my family and the harm will be sufficiently serious to warrant persecution. Therefore the Tribunal misled itself to distinguish between the damage suffered by our family by relocating in South Korea and such in itself is harm yet serious harm which will not be avoided. The Tribunal did not act or failed to act on the damage and harm which will be suffered and the denial of human rights and property issue which constitutes persecution.
It is obvious from the answers quoted at [40] above that the first applicant’s evidence about court proceedings against his older brother was in the context of the first applicant telling the Tribunal that he has “nothing” (by which I take him to mean no family assets) in South Korea. The first applicant did not make any claim that his children would be “prejudiced and harmed in Korea” because of the first applicant’s involvement in court proceedings against his older brother. Further, it is difficult to understand how the Tribunal “ignored the gravity of the conduct” of the first applicant’s brother in South Korea when the first applicant gave no greater elaboration on that subject beyond the answer he gave—once again, in the context of him saying he has “nothing” in South Korea.
What is more, the applicants advanced no ground of judicial review in the proceeding below based on the Tribunal’s alleged failure to consider the fact that the first applicant was involved in court proceedings against the older brother. This is an entirely new claim exposed for the first time in the written outline of submissions filed by the applicants on 30 August 2021.
In the written outline of submissions, the first applicant also expresses his sadness about the lack of Ministerial intervention to grant him and his wife visas. In that context he submits:
… I continue to believe that the difficulties brought to the attention of the Tribunal and not acted upon would amount to serious and significant harm which was not considered by the Tribunal.
The applicants’ oral submissions
At the hearing of the application, the first and second applicants addressed the Court orally. They each spoke of their long-standing attachment to Australia and the lives they had made for their family in Australia. They emphasised the circumstances of their children, their children’s educational achievements, and the difficulties their children would face in attempting to integrate into South Korean life.
These submissions reflect the evidence given by the first applicant when asked by the Tribunal: “Why don’t you want to go back to South Korea?”
Applicant I have no place to go there.
MemberYou could buy a house. If you sell your house here you’ll get lots of money.
ApplicantI’m well established here and also my three children. They raise up and educate here. Their families here, their career here everything here so.
MemberIs there any other reason why you are concerned or fear returning to South Korea?
ApplicantI leave my country 1994 since 1994 I never been to South Korea for a long time. Only short stay. I’m really scared how I’m going to adjust my life there. And also now I have three children born in Australia here they all raised here. They educated here. I don’t think they going to be adjusting in Korea as well.
MemberSorry can you repeat that. I’m not the last sentence.
ApplicantMy children can’t adjust to the settle down in Korea. That’s my subject feel of harm.
MemberAnd are these the only reasons why you don’t want to return?
ApplicantThat’s my main reason.
MemberWhat other reasons are there?
ApplicantI love this country Australia. I settle down here, everything here. I work here. My family here. I spend half my life in here.
Consideration
The applicants’ outline of written submissions is directed, essentially, to the proposition that the difficulties that the first applicant and his family (particularly his children) would experience in relocating to South Korea amount to “serious harm”, or “significant harm”, or “persecution”, and that the Tribunal should have accepted this fact, and acted upon it, for the purpose of reviewing the delegate’s decision and considering the applicants’ respective entitlements to protection visas. The submissions allege error on the part of the primary judge for not accepting this proposition.
Like the primary judge, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal overlooked any of the first applicant’s claims for protection. The simple fact is that, unfortunately for the applicants, none of the matters raised by the first applicant could possibly establish any entitlement to a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. This fact was recognised, correctly, by the Tribunal. Indeed, even before the Tribunal the first applicant accepted, candidly, that he does not satisfy the relevant criteria.
For the reasons given by the primary judge, the grounds of judicial review raised in the Federal Circuit Court do not reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the applications for the visas. Moreover, the fact that Ministerial intervention was not forthcoming is simply irrelevant to the question whether the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
In order to succeed in the present application, it is necessary for the applicants to show that the judgment below is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. That burden has not been discharged. It cannot be discharged by merely repeating concerns which, even if conscientiously held by the first applicant, do not engage with any of the legal criteria on which a protection visa can be granted—particularly when the first applicant accepts that he does not satisfy those criteria.
The particular reference in the proposed ground of appeal to the Tribunal failing to expressly consider the political situation in South Korea is without merit, for the reasons given by the primary judge. The correctness of the primary judge’s finding in that regard is not in doubt. The first applicant’s claim that “(t)he political situation in South Korea is heated” and that he is afraid that “something may happen in the future” that will affect his children, was a bare assertion made to the Tribunal without any elaboration whatsoever. As I have noted, when asked what he thought would happen if he went back to Korea, the first applicant said nothing about possible harm because of “the political situation in South Korea”. The Tribunal was not required to engage in some generalised discussion about “the political situation in South Korea” or to speculate how that situation might affect the first applicant’s children, when the first applicant did not, himself, identify the possibility, let alone the likelihood, of specific and relevant harm that engages with the criteria for a protection visa.
It follows that the applicants’ proposed ground of appeal is without merit. For this reason, the application will be dismissed.
The Minister seeks an order for costs. He submits that it would be appropriate to fix costs in the amount of $4,000. He submits that this amount is significantly less than the amount that can be claimed in a Short Form Bill for an application for leave to appeal involving a migration decision: see Item 15.2 of Sch 3 to the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). He submits that the amount he seeks is reasonable and proportionate to the nature of the case, having regard to its complexity.
I accept those submissions. Costs will be awarded accordingly.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Yates. Associate:
Dated: 15 December 2021
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