FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BMX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 700
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: BMX16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3102 File number: QUD 54 of 2017 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 21 June 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time – no satisfactory explanation for delay – no merit in appeal – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424(3)(a) Cases cited: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146
Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
NADR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167
Date of hearing: 18 May 2017 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Wheatley Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
QUD 54 of 2017 BETWEEN: BMX16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 JUNE 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application for extension of time filed on 8 February 2017 be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COLLIER J:
Before the Court is an application for extension of time to appeal a decision of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court.
The primary Judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review on 14 November 2016. The application for extension of time was filed on 8 February 2017. Accordingly the application was filed more than two months out of time.
Background to the appeal
The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh and was born in May 1988.
He arrived in Australia on 6 May 2013 and applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 13 August 2013. The applicant provided a statutory declaration with his visa application, detailing his claim of involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the BNP). On 30 December 2014, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) refused the visa application.
The following day, the applicant applied for review of the decision at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). At the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant was represented by a registered migration agent and assisted by an interpreter.
The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s evidence lacked credibility, particularly in light of inconsistencies between the statutory declaration and his claims before the Tribunal. Specifically, the Tribunal found:
34.… Considered cumulatively, the concerns the Tribunal holds about the applicant’s…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 700
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the applicant had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging the application, and whether the grounds of appeal had merit. The applicant argued that he was unaware of the applicable time limit for lodging an appeal, but the court found that this was not a satisfactory explanation as the applicant was present when the primary judgment was delivered and had no reason to be unaware of the time limit. The court also found that the grounds of appeal did not have merit, as the applicant was merely disagreeing with the findings of the primary Judge and the Tribunal. The applicant's claim of procedural unfairness was also rejected, as the court found that the Tribunal had not relied solely on the findings of the Department of Migration and Border Protection and generalised country information, and that the adverse credit findings were not the result of generalising all cases.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the grounds of appeal did not have merit. The court ordered that the application for an extension of time be dismissed with costs.
This case highlights the importance of complying with statutory time limits for filing appeals, and the need for applicants to provide a satisfactory explanation for any delay in lodging an application. It also emphasises the limited grounds on which an application for an extension of time may be granted, and the need for applicants to demonstrate that their grounds of appeal have merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application for extension of time filed on 8 February 2017 be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister provided detailed submissions about the proposed grounds of appeal, emphasising that the grounds were not those raised at first instance.Consideration In considering an application for an extension of time in which to lodge an appeal the following factors set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 are relevant:·whether the applicant can demonstrate an acceptable explanation for the delay in lodging the application;·prejudice to the respondent occasioned by the delay;·the merits of the substantial application;·considerations of fairness. Compliance with limitations in statutes for filing process is not optional or at the convenience of litigants. Sound policy reasons exist for those time limits, and litigants are expected to abide by them unless they can satisfy the Court that an application for extension of time should be granted. The only explanation for the delay offered by the applicant in this case is that he was unaware of the applicable time limit. A decision adverse to the applicant is very serious from his perspective. Further the Court can be sympathetic to litigants in person, whose first language is not English, and who are in the position of the applicant. However this sympathy has its limits. As the Minister points out, the evidence of the applicant is that he was present when his Honour delivered the primary judgment. There is no reason provided why the applicant could not have identified the relevant time limit on filing an appeal from his Honour’s decision. In my view, the applicant has not given a satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the current application. Further, I am not satisfied that the draft grounds of appeal on which the applicant seeks to rely have merit. The applicant in ground 1 does not particularise the basis on which his Honour erred in law. Properly read, in this ground the applicant simply cavils with the findings of the primary Judge and the Tribunal. In ground 2 the applicant cavils with the findings of the Tribunal concerning his claims of physical abuse, and his credibility. As a general proposition, credit findings are findings of fact for the decision-maker (NADR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9]); albeit subject to judicial review (CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 at [38]; Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51 at [64]). The applicant claims that the Tribunal’s deliberations were characterised by an absence of procedural fairness, for what appear to be the following reasons:·the Tribunal was heavily dependent on the findings of the Department of Migration and Border Protection and generalised country information; and·the adverse credit findings were the result of generalising all cases, and hence unfair. In earlier submissions the applicant contended that the Tribunal ignored its undertaking to give the applicant an opportunity to make further written submissions about the inconsistencies in his evidence, however this submission appeared not to be pressed in subsequent submissions filed by the applicant.