BMW Australia Finance Limited v Nelson

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   BMW AUSTRALIA FINANCE LIMITED -v- NELSON [2008] WADC 84

CORAM:   KEEN DCJ

HEARD:   19 MAY 2008

DELIVERED          :   16 JUNE 2008

FILE NO/S:   CIV 556 of 2005

BETWEEN:   BMW AUSTRALIA FINANCE LIMITED (ACN 007 101 715)

Plaintiff

AND

GRAHAME BRETT NELSON
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Appeal against leave to amend statement of claim - Application by defendant for judgment under O 16 Rules of the Supreme Court - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Hire Purchase Act 1959

Result:

Appeal and application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr R A C Cullen

Defendant:     Mr K C Staffa

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Cullen Babington Hughes

Defendant:     Staffa Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Cooper & Anor (1993) 9 WAR 112

Brown v Universal Guarantee Pty Ltd [1968] WAR 23

Bulong Operations Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v ComputerCorp Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] WASC 147

Bunbury Foods Pty Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1984) 153 CLR 491

Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Van Delft [1965] WAR 237

Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Kett (1993) 9 SR (WA) 65

Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99

Gair v Smith (1964) VR 814

Glentham Pty Ltd v Luxer Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor [2002] WASC 80

Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia v Hunt (1982) 44 ALR 365

Mir Bros Projects Pty Ltd v 1924 Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 907

  1. KEEN DCJ:   This matter arises out of a hire purchase agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on 21 September 1999 in respect of a 1999 BMW 523i, registration number 90‑DE.

  2. For the purposes of these reasons it is not necessary for me to set out the terms of the hire purchase agreement.

  3. What is now before the Court is the defendant's appeal against a decision of the Deputy Registrar made 23 August 2007 whereby he gave the plaintiff leave to amend its statement of claim pursuant to a Chamber summons filed 15 August 2007.  That summons in turn sought leave to amend in the terms of a minute of proposed second amended statement of claim again filed 15 August 2007.

  4. Apart from that appeal the defendant also seeks judgment under O 16 of the Rules of Supreme Court. 

  5. It is convenient to deal with the two matters in the order noted above because matters relating to the summary judgment application arise by reason of the amendments to the statement of claim.

The appeal

  1. The statement of claim as it stood pleaded certain terms of the hire purchase agreement and then, relevantly, pleaded:

    "4.On 22 July 2004 the defendant owed the plaintiff the sum of $3,341.16 plus interest accruing at a daily rate for arrears in instalments pursuant to the Agreement.

    5.By notice dated 22 July 2004 the plaintiff made demand upon the defendant for payment of the…

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Details
Case
[2008] WADC 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the case of BMW Australia Finance Limited v Nelson involved a dispute concerning the validity of a statement of claim and the application for summary judgment. BMW Australia Finance Limited, the plaintiff, sought to enforce a hire purchase agreement, while Nelson, the defendant, contested the claim, asserting that the statement of claim was defective and that BMW had failed to comply with statutory notice requirements. The legal issues before the court revolved around the interpretation of statutory notice requirements under the relevant hire purchase legislation, the consequences of non-compliance, and whether the defendant had a viable defence on the merits that would warrant summary judgment.

The court considered the statutory provisions governing the notice requirements and the implications of non-compliance, particularly under the Third and Fourth Schedules. The plaintiff argued that errors in the notices did not deprive them of their rights under the agreement or the Act, citing the case of Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Kett, where the court held that non-compliance with notice requirements did not preclude the owner from recovering monies due. The defendant, however, relied on the Van Delft case, which was distinguished by the court as being specific to estimates of resale value. Given the lack of authority directly addressing the issue, the court determined that the matter should be resolved through a full argument on the construction of the Act.

The court concluded that the defendant's defence was not without merit, particularly given the potential for the law to develop in a manner that could recognise a cause of action. It was held that the power to grant summary judgment should be exercised with caution and only when it is clear that there is no real question to be tried. Therefore, the application for summary judgment was dismissed, allowing the case to proceed to trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of the "amount due" counsel also referred to a decision of this Court, Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Kett (1993) 9 SR (WA) 65. In that case his Honour Judge Sadleir was dealing with a hire purchase agreement under which the owner had served a notice under the Third Schedule. Following that notice negotiations took place and a lump sum payment was made by the hirer. Repossession was not pursued. The defendant fell further into arrears and the plaintiff repossessed the vehicle without giving a further notice under the Third Schedule. His Honour noted that:"In the end, although it may be regarded as a hiatus in the Act, I am unable to find that there is any consequence under the general law upon the plaintiff's right to recover monies due pursuant to the agreement after repossession, even though it has not given a further Third Schedule notice prior to that repossession. It seems to me that on the law as it stands, even in the absence of any such notice at all, an owner of goods is not precluded from recovering monies due under the agreement upon repossession. Of course a Fourth Schedule notice must be given, but that is not a matter that is involved in this appeal." The defendant relied upon the use of the words "monies due" and argued that the monies due as expressed in the Third Schedule notice were not the monies that were due. The plaintiff for its part argued that these sorts of errors or estimates in the Third and/or Fourth Schedule notices did not deprive the owner of its rights under the hire purchase agreement or Act. The Van Delft case is clearly distinguishable and is limited to the facts of that case, that is to say specifically estimates in respect of the re‑sale value of the vehicle. The comments made by his Honour Judge Sadleir in Kett's case as to the Fourth Schedule are clearly obiter. I was not taken to any further authorities dealing with the effects of a failure to "strictly" comply with the notice requirements under the Third and Fourth Schedule. I was told by counsel that there were no such authorities. That being the case it seems to me that this case falls to be determined upon a proper construction of the Act after full argument. It is to be noted that this is an application for summary judgment. On such an application a matter may be disposed of summarily if the Court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or vexatious or that the defendant has a good defence on the merits. The first grounds for such an application were not argued before me. The only question is whether or not the defendant has a good defence on the merits. It has oft been stated that the power to order summary judgment should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried (Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99). It is further said that the Court should be astute not to risk stifling the development of the law by summarily disposing of actions in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it will be found in the development of the law still embryonic, that a cause of action does lie; Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia v Hunt (1982) 44 ALR 365 at 373.