BMR16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BMR16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1282

Appeal from: BMR16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1034
File number: WAD 81 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review by that court of Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) decision – Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa application –– whether the Authority failed to consider material submitted by appellant – whether the Authority made its decision based upon findings and inferences of fact that were available on the material before it
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Date of hearing: 22 August 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Tattersall
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Spark Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 81 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BMR16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 21 February 2018.  The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa (the visa).

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who arrived on Christmas Island on 17 August 2012.  According to the Authority, he lodged an application for the visa on 17 August 2015.  On 27 April 2016 the delegate refused the grant of the visa. On 2 May 2016, the matter was referred to the Authority.  The Authority’s decision was made on 25 May 2016.

  3. Before turning to the Authority’s decision and the decision of the primary judge, I emphasise that an appeal of this kind is not the occasion for this Court to consider evidence for the first time, unless it is directed to show jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority, or error on the part of the primary judge.

    The Authority’s decision

  4. The Authority decided as follows.

  5. At [10], the Authority found that the appellant’s account, particularly of having been questioned and detained after specific security incidents during the Sri Lankan civil war, was plausible and credible.  At [11], the Authority accepted that the appellant and…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia regarding the refusal of a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa application by the appellant, BMR16, against the Minister for Home Affairs. The appellant contested the decision of the Federal Circuit Court that had dismissed his judicial review application seeking to overturn the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse his visa application. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to consider material submitted by him and that the IAA's decision was based on findings and inferences of fact that were not supported by the material before it.

The legal issues before the Federal Court were whether the IAA failed to consider material submitted by the appellant and whether the IAA's decision was based on findings and inferences of fact that were not supported by the material before it. The Federal Court noted that an appeal of this kind is not the occasion for the Court to consider evidence for the first time, unless it is directed to show jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA, or error on the part of the primary judge. The Court examined the submissions of the appellant and the material before the IAA, finding that the IAA had indeed considered the material submitted by the appellant and had made its decision based on the material before it. The Court also found that the IAA's decision was not based on unsupported findings and inferences of fact.

The Federal Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. The Court held that the appeal did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA, or error on the part of the primary judge, and that the IAA's decision was properly made based on the material before it. The Court also found that the submissions of the appellant did not establish any relevant error, and that the appeal was accordingly without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before turning to the Authority’s decision and the decision of the primary judge, I emphasise that an appeal of this kind is not the occasion for this Court to consider evidence for the first time, unless it is directed to show jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority, or error on the part of the primary judge.The Authority’s decision The Authority decided as follows. At [10], the Authority found that the appellant’s account, particularly of having been questioned and detained after specific security incidents during the Sri Lankan civil war, was plausible and credible. At [11], the Authority accepted that the appellant and his father were subject to numerous arrests and detentions during the period of the civil war. Also at [11], the Authority accepted that during the civil war the appellant and his father were questioned by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) when they were rounded up with other Tamils because they were collectively suspected of supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Authority also accepted that the appellant and his father may have come under suspicion because as three-wheeler drivers they were suspected of transporting LTTE personnel or supplies, or of having information about LTTE movements. However, the Authority said, there was no information before it to suggest that the appellant or his father were ever found to have been involved with the LTTE. They were detained for brief periods then released. Given that the war ended in 2009, the Authority did not consider that there was a real chance that routine arrests of this nature would continue. Country information indicated that the Sri Lankan security authorities continued to monitor Tamil populations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces which were still heavily militarised, although it appeared that the highly oppressive monitoring and registration regime in place just after the war was being eased. Reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions had significantly reduced. The purpose of the ongoing monitoring seemed now to be less concerned with seeking out those people who were previously involved with the LTTE than with ensuring that the organisation did not re-emerge, and with eliminating dissent. The Authority accepted that some people who had certain links with the LTTE may continue to be at risk of harm, especially if they were taken into detention by security authorities as part of the process of monitoring, given the evidence about the prevalence of torture and mistreatment in detention. Based on the information provided by the appellant, the Authority found that the authorities did not regard him as having past or present connections with the LTTE. The Authority then considered the appellant’s claims in relation to his role as a village councillor between 2010 and 2012. The Authority also considered, at [14], the arrest and detention of the appellant’s brother in 2012, as follows:I accept that the applicant’s brother was detained in 2012 because he was accused of involvement in pro-LTTE activity. According to the applicant’s account, he was released quickly and then left Sri Lanka to work overseas for 12 months, returning in 2013. The applicant says that his brother had no difficulty leaving or re-entering Sri Lanka and has not claimed that his brother has had any subsequent difficulties. I find that his rapid release and his ability to subsequently leave Sri Lanka and return without difficulty, together with the fact that he has not been subject to further arrest, indicates that he is not currently under suspicion as a supporter of the LTTE. I find that no adverse profile would be imputed to the applicant because of his brother, and find that he does not face a real chance of harm of any kind because of the connection with his brother or because of any activities in which his brother has been involved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister objected to the tender of the press release on the ground of relevance. In further oral submissions counsel for the Minister addressed in turn the individual paragraphs of the appellant’s written submissions of 1 August 2018: as I have mentioned, the written submissions on the part of the appellant post-dated those of the Minister.Consideration I deal first with the tender of the press release. It is in my opinion not relevant to showing error on the part of the primary judge or jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority. In my view its irrelevance is established not only by reference to its date, 6 August 2018, long after the Authority’s hearing and the hearing before the primary judge, but also by reference to its contents. I reject its tender on the ground of relevance. I will however mark it as MFI-1. As to the appellant’s oral submissions, the claim or evidence in relation to the appellant’s brother’s visa in the United Kingdom did not arise on the material before the Authority and what the appellant seeks now to put does not go to establishing error on the part of the primary judge or jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority. The appellant accepts that he did not disclose this material to the Department or to the Authority. He says this was because his brother’s application for a visa in the United Kingdom was then pending. But whatever the worth of the reason for not disclosing this material, it cannot now be put before this Court on appeal to establish relevant error. I now consider the appellant’s submissions in turn. Before doing so, I indicate that a reading of those submissions suggests no more than that the appellant disagrees, or disagrees strongly, with the merits of the Authority’s findings and reasons. Paragraph 2 is no more than prefatory and of itself contains nothing of substance. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are in substance the same as paragraphs 1 and 2 of the grounds before the primary judge. Paragraph 3, that both the primary judge and the Authority did not examine the evidence produced as to the appellant’s perceived links with the LTTE and consequent dangers if the appellant were to be returned to Sri Lanka, cannot be sustained in light of the detailed examination of the evidence by both the Authority and by the primary judge. In substance, this paragraph says no more than that the appellant disagrees with the results of that examination. Paragraph 4 concerns the Prevention of Terrorism Act of Sri Lanka. It is not clear how it is said that the Authority made a jurisdictional error in this respect. In my opinion, the primary judge made no error in reasoning, beginning at [10] but particularly at [28], that it was not necessary for the Authority to consider what might occur to the appellant in detention because the Authority was not satisfied that there was a real risk that the appellant would be detained. Furthermore, in my opinion, it is not the bare terms of the legislation which was properly the focus of attention but what was done or not done by the Sri Lankan authorities. The Authority did not err in focusing on actual circumstances as it had found them to be.