CITATION: Blyth v SpencerSpencer v Neville [2005] NSWSC 653
HEARING DATE(S): 29/06/05
JUDGMENT DATE :
1 July 2005JURISDICTION: Equity Division
JUDGMENT OF: Associate Justice Macready at 1
DECISION: Paragraphs 60 and 61
CATCHWORDS: Family Provision. Claim under the Family Provision Act by a de facto partner. Application out of time and a distributed estate. Held no special circumstances under s28(5)(d) and proceedings dismissed.
PARTIES: Dianne Judith Blyth v Alexander Charles Spencer
Alexander Charles Spencer v Ronald Frederick Neville - Estate of Betty Kathleen Neville and anorFILE NUMBER(S): SC 2246/04; 3337/04
COUNSEL: Mr L. Ellison for Dianne Judith Blyth
Miss E. Cohen for Alexander SpencerSOLICITORS: Marsdens Law Group for Dianne Judith Blyth
Adams Partners for Alexander Spencer
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MACREADY
FRIDAY 1 JULY 2005
2244/04 - DIANNE JUDITH BLYTH v ALEXANDER CHARGES SPENCER & ANOR
3337/04 - ALEXANDER CHARLES SPENCER v RONALD FREDERICK NEVILLE ESTATE OF BETTY KATHLEEN NEVILLE & ANOR
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: This is the hearing of two actions which, with the consent of the parties, I have ordered be heard together, the evidence in one being the evidence in the other.
2 The first is 2244 of 2004 and are proceedings brought by Mrs Blyth under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act for orders for sale of a property bequeathed equally to her, her brother and Mr Spencer, a long time partner of the deceased. The deceased Betty Kathleen Neville died on 18 March 2002 aged eighty-one years.
3 The Family Provision Act proceedings are matter number 3337 of 2004 and are brought by Mr Spencer against Mrs Blyth’s husband and brother, who are the executors of the deceased’s will. He seeks he be given a life estate in the house. As a resolution of that claim may impinge upon the ownership of the house, it is appropriate to first consider the Family Provision Act application.
The last will of the deceased
4 The last will of the deceased was made on 18 July 2001. Under that will she left the house at 104A Lindsay Street, Campbelltown to her two children and Mr Spencer equally. She left her debentures to two children and the residue of the estate she also gave to her two children. The deceased’s son, Mr Neville, Mr Blyth’s brother, has taken no part in the proceedings, although he has been served with process in both matters.
Assets in the estate
5 At the date of death there was the property in which the deceased resided, then having a value of some $160,000, although now thought to have a value of about $300,000. There was cash of $1178 and debentures of $3000. There have to be paid the funeral account and administrative expenses and, effectively, the only asset in the estate is the house. Costs being incurred in the matters are the plaintiff’s costs of the Family Provision Act, which are estimated at $35,200 and the…
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- Case
- [2005] NSWSC 653
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the application was made within the required time frame and, if not, whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the statutory time limits. Given the estate had already been distributed, the court had to examine whether Ms Blyth could establish grounds for an out-of-time application, specifically if there were any mitigating factors that could be considered under the Act. The court considered the nature of the relationship between Ms Blyth and Mr Spencer, the extent of their cohabitation, and the impact of the estate distribution on Ms Blyth’s financial circumstances.
The court found that Ms Blyth had not established any special circumstances warranting an extension of time for her application under section 28(5)(d). The court emphasised the importance of strict compliance with the statutory time limits for family provision claims and noted that the estate had already been distributed, which was a significant factor against allowing the application. The court held that the application was not made within the requisite period and, even if it had been, there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay. Consequently, the proceedings were dismissed, and no further relief was granted to Ms Blyth.
The court’s decision underscores the stringent requirements for family provision claims, particularly in cases where the estate has already been distributed. The judgment reinforces the principle that special circumstances must be compelling and adequately supported by evidence to warrant an exception to the statutory time limits. As a result, Ms Blyth’s application was denied, and the court’s decision stands as a clear reminder of the importance of timely action in such legal matters.
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