Blunden v Blunden

Case [2008] SASC 286


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Applications Under Various Acts or Rules: Civil)

BLUNDEN v BLUNDEN & ANOR

[2008] SASC 286

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

27 October 2008

SUCCESSION - FAMILY PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE - PRACTICE - TIME FOR MAKING APPLICATION - EXTENSION OF TIME

SUCCESSION - FAMILY PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE - PRACTICE - PARTIES AND SERVICE

Application for extension of time in which to commence proceedings under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 – plaintiff is adopted daughter of deceased but only lived with deceased for a short time as a young child – deceased bequeathed entire estate to his two sons in equal shares – no provision made for plaintiff in will – final distribution of estate made less than six months after grant of probate – plaintiff attempted to serve summons on defendants’ solicitors within time but was informed solicitors did not have instructions to accept service – summons then served personally on defendants, out of time – court has no discretion to extend time once final distribution made – application for extension of time has no merit – plaintiff’s moral claim weak – no explanation for delay in bringing application – application dismissed.

Application for permission to amend prayer for relief in Statement of Claim by including an order setting aside distribution of estate – whether distribution lawful when made before the expiry of the period within which claim under Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 may be brought – executor or administrator should ordinarily refrain from distributing any part of estate during that period – no absolute prohibition on distribution – no statutory power for court to set aside distribution – application dismissed.

Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) s7 s8 s9 s14; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006  (SA) r66 r67; Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s8; Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) s15, referred to.
Guardian Trust and Executors Co of New Zealand Ltd v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1942] AC 115; Ernst v Mowbray [2004] NSWSC 1140, distinguished.
In the Estate of Gough, Deceased; Gough v Fletcher (1973) 5 SASR 559; In re Simson Deceased; Simson v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1950] Ch 38, discussed.
Burns v Elder's Trustees & Executory Co Ltd [1968] SASR 297; In Re Winwood (Deceased), Winwood v Winwood [1959] NZLR 246; In re Gimblett; Gimblett v Gimblett [1960] NZLR 664; Easterbrook v Young (1997) 136 CLR 308, considered.

BLUNDEN v BLUNDEN & ANOR
[2008] SASC 286

Civil

BLEBY J.

Introduction

  1. Quentin Lloyd Blunden died on 22 April 2006. Probate of his Will was granted to the first defendant, Michael John Blunden, on 8 January 2008. The first defendant was the sole executor named in the deceased’s Will.

  2. The deceased was survived by three children. The first defendant and the second defendant, David Lloyd Blunden, were both natural children of the deceased and his first wife. The plaintiff is the daughter of the deceased’s second wife. She was adopted by the deceased when she…

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Blunden v Blunden [2008] SASC 286
Case
[2008] SASC 286
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved an adopted daughter, the plaintiff, seeking an extension of time to commence proceedings under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972. The plaintiff was the adopted daughter of the deceased, who left his entire estate to his two biological sons in equal shares, excluding the plaintiff. The plaintiff's application for an extension of time was made after the final distribution of the estate, which occurred less than six months after the grant of probate. The plaintiff's initial attempt to serve the summons on the defendants' solicitors was unsuccessful as the solicitors did not have instructions to accept service, and the summons was ultimately served personally on the defendants outside the statutory time limit.

The court was required to decide whether it had the discretion to extend the time for the plaintiff to commence proceedings under the Act and whether there were any grounds to set aside the distribution of the estate, which occurred before the expiry of the period within which a claim under the Act could be brought. The court also had to consider the plaintiff's moral claim and whether there was any justification for the delay in bringing the application.

In its reasoning, the court found that there was no discretion to extend the time for the plaintiff to commence proceedings once the final distribution of the estate had occurred. The court noted that the plaintiff had not provided any explanation for the delay in bringing her application and that, apart from obtaining counsel's advice, little had been done within the available time to commence proceedings. The court also found that there was no statutory power to set aside the distribution of the estate, despite the general principle that an executor or administrator should refrain from distributing any part of the estate during the period within which a claim under the Act could be brought. Consequently, both the application for an extension of time and the plaintiff's application for provision out of the estate were dismissed.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for an extension of time and her application for provision out of the estate. The court found that there was no discretion to extend the time for the plaintiff to commence proceedings once the final distribution of the estate had occurred. The court also found that there was no statutory power to set aside the distribution of the estate. The plaintiff's moral claim was weak, and there was no explanation for the delay in bringing the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

BLEBY J
Furthermore, the plaintiff has not attempted to explain any basis for the delay in bringing her application. Apart from obtaining counsel’s advice, remarkably little seems to have happened within the time available to commence proceedings. In all the circumstances I consider that it would be inappropriate to grant an extension of time even if the Court had power to do so.Conclusion Accordingly, both the application for extension of time and the plaintiff’s application for provision out of the estate must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLEBY J

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