Bluefin Seafoods Pty Ltd v Fraser Coast Regional Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bluefin Seafoods Pty Ltd v Fraser Coast Regional Council [2018] QSC 14      

PARTIES:

BLUEFIN SEAFOODS PTY LTD ABN 90 063 023 807
(plaintiff)
v
FRASER COAST  REGIONAL COUNCIL

(defendant)

FILE NO:

SC No 5626 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

9 February 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 February 2018

JUDGE:

Bowskill J

ORDERS:

1.    The further amended statement of claim filed on 1 December 2017 is struck out.

2.    Judgment is entered for the defendant.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – GENERAL MATTERS – AMENDMENT OF ORIGINATING PROCESS AND PLEADINGS OUTSIDE LIMITATION PERIOD – AMENDMENTS INTRODUCING NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OR PARTICULARISING CAUSE OF ACTION – Where the defendant applies to strike out the statement of claim in its entirety, on the basis that the plaintiff’s claims are statute barred – where the plaintiff concedes that the causes of action for which it commenced the proceedings on 8 June 2016 are statute barred – whether new allegations in the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim filed in December 2017 constitute new causes of action, in respect of which the limitation periods have expired – whether the new causes of action arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as the earlier causes of action for which relief was claimed

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 376(4)

Borsato v Campbell [2006] QSC 191
Draney v Barry [2002] 1 Qd R 145
Paul v Westpac Banking Corporation [2017] 2 Qd R 96
Thomas v Queensland [2001] QCA 336

COUNSEL:

K N Wilson QC for the defendant (applicant)

SOLICITORS:

Barry Nilsson Lawyers for the defendant (applicant)
Ms T M Rimmer, a director of the plaintiff, appeared for the plaintiff by leave

  1. On 8 June 2016 Bluefin Seafoods Pty Ltd commenced proceedings against the Fraser Coast Regional Council seeking “damages including equitable damages”.    Ms Rimmer and Mr Meaclem, in their capacity as shareholders of Bluefin, were the second and third plaintiffs, but their action has been discontinued.  The cause(s) of action relied upon by Bluefin are difficult to elucidate from the original statement of claim, but appear to comprise claims for damages for misleading and deceptive conduct, on the basis of representations by representatives of the Council, which Bluefin relied upon in making certain decisions in relation to a sea cucumber aquaculture hatchery operated by it at Urangan, to its financial detriment; as well as related claims for damages for negligence and breach of contract (in relation to what is described as a Development Agreement entered into in October 2006).

  2. At no stage since this proceeding was commenced has Bluefin been legally represented.  Ms Rimmer, as a director of Bluefin, was given leave to appear for Bluefin at the hearing of this application, there being no objection to that course from the Council.[1]

    [1] As to the need for leave, see s 90 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (formerly s 209 of the Supreme Court Act 1995); see also

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bluefin Seafoods Pty Ltd v Fraser Coast Regional Council, the court was tasked with determining whether new allegations introduced in an amended statement of claim constituted new causes of action for which the limitation periods had expired. The case arose from a dispute between Bluefin Seafoods and Fraser Coast Regional Council, with the plaintiff initially commencing proceedings on 8 June 2016. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended statement of claim in December 2017, introducing new allegations. The defendant sought to strike out the amended statement of claim, arguing that the new causes of action were statute-barred.

The legal issues before the court included whether the new allegations introduced by the plaintiff constituted new causes of action, and if so, whether these new causes of action arose out of the same or substantially the same facts as the earlier causes of action. The court considered the criteria for determining whether an amendment introduces a new cause of action, referencing previous cases such as Borsato v Campbell, Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran, Thomas v Queensland, and Central Sawmilling No 1 Pty Ltd v Queensland. These cases provided guidance on distinguishing between new causes of action and further particulars of an existing cause.

The court determined that the new allegations introduced by the plaintiff in the amended statement of claim constituted new causes of action, as they involved different duties, breaches, and causes of injury. The court found that these new causes of action did not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as the earlier causes of action, and thus the limitation periods had expired. Consequently, the court struck out the further amended statement of claim filed on 1 December 2017 and entered judgment in favour of the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended statement of claim filed on 1 December 2017 is struck out.

2. Judgment is entered for the defendant.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Borsato v Campbell [2006] QSC 191 McMurdo J (as his Honour then was) said this in relation to the meaning of “cause of action” in r 376(4):“[8] The term ‘cause of action’ was defined in Cooke v Gill as being ‘every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’, a definition which many judgments have employed in the context of this rule or its equivalent: see eg Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran per McPherson JA. But it has not been applied literally, for otherwise any new fact to be added to a plaintiff’s case would be treated as raising a new cause of action which required leave in the context of a rule such as r 376(4). So in Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran for example, there is an indication of what the Court of Appeal in Thomas v Queensland subsequently endorsed as a ‘fairly broad brush comparison between the nature of the original claim and that to which it is sought to be amended’. The dividing line is between the addition of facts which involve a new cause of action and those which are simply further particulars of the cause already claimed, and its location involves a question of degree which can be argued, one way or the other, by the level of abstraction at which a plaintiff’s case is described. Some illustrative guidance is provided by Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran; Thomas v Queensland and another judgment of the Court of Appeal, Central Sawmilling No 1 Pty Ltd v Queensland. [9] In Allonnor, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a delivery driver, and sued for an injury to his back and neck said to have been suffered on a certain date making a certain delivery of furniture. He sought to amend to add a claim for an injury to his shoulder, allegedly caused by another delivery made to a different address but on the same day. McPherson JA ‘doubted whether what was sought to be added by way of amendment really amounts to a new cause of action’ but in any case held that the new cause of action (if any) arose out of substantially the same facts and the amendment should be allowed. His Honour said: On any view of what is pleaded, the plaintiff was, at the end of the day in question, left with physical injury to his body, which resulted from the same cause, which was lifting (whether on one or more than one occasion) in the course of the same employment with the same employer. It is not unreasonable to state it in this way, although admittedly it is to some extent a matter of the level of generality at which the proposition is expressed.[10] In Thomas v Queensland, the Court of Appeal disallowed an amendment of a case brought by an injured motorcyclist against the State as the authority responsible for the highway on which he was injured. His case was that there was a large amount of soil on the road surface which caused his motorcycle to lose traction and collide with another vehicle. His claim was pleaded originally on the basis that the defendant had been undertaking road works at the scene which had resulted in this soil on the road. He sought to amend to claim that the soil was there because it had been washed from a nearby embankment in a way which was attributable to poor construction of the highway in the first place. The court held that this was a new cause of action, saying in its joint judgment: The essential elements in a claim for damages for negligence are the duty of care, breach of that duty and injury caused by that breach. Here, although only for one injury an incident is alleged, different duties, different breaches and different causes of injury are now alleged. In our view the effect of the amendment is to include new causes of action.[11] In Central Sawmilling, the plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of contract, saying that the defendant, the State of Queensland, by three identified written agreements had promised to provide them with certain quantities of timber. They then sought to amend to plead another agreement made between various timber millers, including the plaintiffs, and the defendant by which they were to receive those amounts of timber. That was held to involve a new cause of action.”[3][3] Emphasis added; references omitted.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established