Bloodstock Auction Pty Ltd v Todd Curran

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[2025] FWC 3047

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Bloodstock Auction Pty Ltd
v

Todd Curran

(C2025/9907)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN

MELBOURNE, 10 OCTOBER 2025

Appeal against decision [2025] FWC 2864 of Commissioner Matheson at Sydney on 26 September 2025 in matter number U2025/3372 – stay refused

  1. Bloodstock Auction Pty Ltd (appellant) has applied for a stay under s 606 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) in connection with its appeal against a decision of Commissioner Matheson on 26 September 2025 ([2025] FWC 2864) in which the Commissioner determined that the dismissal of Todd Curran was unfair and ordered the appellant to pay him compensation of $18,000 within 14 days. The notice of appeal was lodged yesterday. I heard the stay application earlier today.

  1. The principles that apply to stay applications under s 606 are well established. Before granting a stay, the Commission must be satisfied that the appeal presents an arguable case, with some reasonable prospects of success both in respect of permission to appeal and the merits, and that the balance of convenience weighs in favour of a stay. The Commissioner’s decision was made under Part 3-2, and therefore s 400 applies to the appeal. Section 400(1) states that the Commission must not grant permission to appeal from a decision made under that Part unless it considers that it is in the public interest to do so. Further, s 400(2) provides that, to the extent that an appeal is brought on a question of fact, an appeal can only be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact.

  1. In her decision, the Commissioner determined that the appellant did not have a valid reason for the dismissal, because she was unable to find that the misconduct for which Mr Curran had been dismissed – bullying and aggressive behaviour – had occurred. The Commissioner found that Mr Curran could be direct and abrupt, and that certain matters weighed against a finding that the dismissal was unfair, including that Mr Curran did not acknowledge how aspects of his behaviour impacted on others. Ultimately however, having regard to all the circumstances, including the absence of a valid reason for dismissal, the Commissioner was satisfied that Mr Curran had been unfairly dismissed within the meaning of s 385 of the Act.

  1. The appellant’s notice of appeal contains 4 grounds. The first ground contends that the Commissioner erred in not attaching significant weight to the written statements of two of its witnesses, Ms Attard and Ms Mason, which attested to Mr Curran’s behaviour. In her decision, the Commissioner explained that she had not placed significant reliance on the statements of these witnesses because their evidence was contested by Mr Curran, and they had not been available for cross-examination. The appellant submitted that it was unfair of the Commissioner to penalise it for this fact, because it had received only 3 days’ notice of the hearing, and both Ms Attard and Ms Mason…

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Details
Case
[2025] FWC 3047
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bloodstock Auction Pty Ltd has appealed against a decision of Commissioner Matheson, who found that the dismissal of Todd Curran was unfair and ordered the appellant to pay him compensation of $18,000 within 14 days. The appeal was lodged the day before the application for a stay was heard by Deputy President Colman in Melbourne on 10 October 2025. The appellant's application for a stay of the Commissioner's decision was refused. The principles that apply to a stay under s 606 of the Fair Work Act 2009 are well established. Before granting a stay, the Commission must be satisfied that the appeal presents an arguable case, with some reasonable prospects of success both in respect of permission to appeal and the merits, and that the balance of convenience weighs in favour of a stay. The Commissioner’s decision was made under Part 3-2, and therefore s 400 applies to the appeal. Section 400(1) states that the Commission must not grant permission to appeal from a decision made under that Part unless it considers that it is in the public interest to do so. Section 400(2) provides that, to the extent that an appeal is brought on a question of fact, an appeal can only be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact.

Deputy President Colman found that the appellant’s application for a stay was without merit. The appellant contended that the Commissioner erred in not attaching significant weight to the written statements of two of its witnesses, Ms Attard and Ms Mason. The Commissioner explained that she had not placed significant reliance on the statements of these witnesses because their evidence was contested by Mr Curran, and they had not been available for cross-examination. The appellant submitted that it was unfair of the Commissioner to penalise it for this fact, because it had received only 3 days’ notice of the hearing, and both Ms Attard and Ms Mason were unavailable: Ms Attard was overseas, and Ms Mason was required at work. But the Commission’s case file told a very different story. On 6 May 2025, the Commissioner conducted a case management conference, at which she conferred with the parties and set the matter down for hearing on 30 June 2025. The Commissioner then sent the parties a notice of listing and directions to file materials. When the appellant failed to file materials, the Commissioner asked for an explanation. On 20 June 2025, the respondent’s solicitors replied that the directions had diverted to ‘junk email’. They requested an extension of time to file the appellant’s materials. This was granted. On 27 June 2025, Mr Curran advised that he required Ms Mason and Ms Attard for cross-examination. The appellant’s solicitors requested that cross-examination occur by video. This too was granted, and the Commissioner sent the parties a Microsoft Teams link. But on the day of the hearing, the appellant told the Commissioner that they were unavailable. It is clear that the appellant had ample notice of the hearing. Further, it asked for Ms Mason and Ms Attard to be cross-examined by video, but then failed to arrange for them to attend. There is no indication that the appellant asked for an adjournment. In these circumstances, it is not arguable that the Commissioner erred by not attaching significant weight to the statements of Ms Mason and Ms Attard. Their evidence could not be tested in cross-examination. The Commissioner’s approach appears to have been entirely orthodox. The other appeal grounds were also without any arguable merit. Based on the material presently before the Commission, Deputy President Colman concluded that the appellant did not have an arguable case, with some reasonable prospect of success, either in respect of permission to appeal or the appeal itself. In particular, there appears to be nothing that could engage the public interest, as s 400 requires. In these circumstances, there is no proper basis to stay the Commissioner’s order. It is therefore not strictly necessary to consider the balance of convenience. However, Deputy President Colman recorded his view that the balance of convenience does not favour a stay. Neither of the appellant’s contentions on this matter were persuasive. First, the appellant submitted that it was concerned that it would be difficult to recoup the compensation amount if its appeal is successful. But there is no evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that Mr Curran would not repay the amount if the appeal succeeded. Secondly, Deputy President Colman did not accept the appellant’s submission that it was not in a financial position to pay Mr Curran. The balance sheet submitted by the appellant shows bank assets of only $13,937.55, but this was as of 30 June 2025. Further, the document shows accounts receivable of several hundred thousand dollars. The starting point is that Mr Curran is entitled to the benefit of his success at first instance. Good reasons are required to warrant the Commission’s intervention to suspend the payment of his compensation. In Deputy President Colman’s view, there were no such reasons in this case. For these reasons, the application for a stay was refused.

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