BLIGH & TROTT

[2017] FamCA 340

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLIGH & TROTT [2017] FamCA 340

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – REVIEW

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – INTERIM – where the father has been charged with child stealing – where the bail conditions imposed on the father restrain him from having any contact with the mother or child – where the father seeks to have the child live with a third party – where the father seeks the child live with him. 

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where the father seeks to have the proceedings stayed and transferred to a Family Court in England – where the father seeks to have the mother make disclosure of her tenancy history – where the father seeks to have the Independent Children’s Lawyer make disclosure of her personal health records – where the father seeks orders in relation to the forensic examination of a laptop computer – about which orders have previously been made – orders declined.

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – frivolous and vexatious proceedings – where the mother seeks to restrain the father from bringing further applications in relation to the interim care arrangements for the child – Application dismissed.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Goode & Goode (2006) 93-286

APPLICANT: Mr Bligh

RESPONDENT: Ms Trott

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Legal Aid Queensland

FILE NUMBER: BRC 2766 of 2015

DATE DELIVERED: 24 May 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J

HEARING DATE: 30 May 2016, 21 November 2016 and 31 January 2017

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT: In person

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Evans from Evans & Company Family Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms McArdle on 30 May 2016 and Ms Lilley on 31 January 2017

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Legal Aid Queensland

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The Application in a Case filed by the father, Mr Bligh, on 7 March 2016 is dismissed.

2. The Amended Application in a Case filed by the father, Mr Bligh, on 15 April 2016 is dismissed.

3. The Response to an Application in a Case filed by the mother, Ms Trott, on 16 May 2016 is dismissed.

4. The applications by the mother, Ms Trott, and the Independent Children’s Lawyer that the father pays their costs of and incidental to the Amended Application in a Case filed 15 April 2016 are reserved to the trial Judge.

NOTATION: 

(A)The Court notes that the consequence of this Order is that the operative parenting order remains that the child B (the child), born … 2011, live with the mother, that the mother have sole parental responsibility for decisions in relation to all major long term issues affecting the child and that the child not spend time with or communicate with the father.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Bligh & Trott has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 2766 of 2015

Mr Bligh

Applicant

And

Ms Trott

Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The current applications for interim parenting orders and other relief come before the Court as a consequence of the father’s application to review[1] the Order made by Acting Principal Registrar Cameron on 15 March 2016.  By this Order, the Application in a Case filed on 7 March 2016 by the father, who is self-represented, was dismissed and he was ordered to pay the costs of both the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer in sums assessed by the Acting Principal Registrar.[2]

   [1] Rule 18.08 Family Law Rules (2004).

   [2]$6,000.00 (incl GST) in so far as the mother is concerned and $2,557.50 (incl GST) in so far as the Independent Children’s Lawyer is concerned.

2. An Application for Review is not an appeal against Orders previously made. Given this, any criticisms of those who have made the Order the subject of the review are irrelevant. Instead, the Court is required to hear an Application for Review as an original hearing.[3] Thus, the Court must proceed in the manner in which all interim parenting applications are to be determined, applying the well-known principles to such determination.[4]

   [3] Rule 18.10(1) of the Family Law Rules 2004.

   [4]          See for example: Goode & Goode (2006) 93-286.

3. Ms Trott seeks that Mr Bligh’s application for review is dismissed. She also seeks that his application for any stay of Orders 3 and 4 made by Acting Principal Registrar Cameron on 15 March 2016 is refused and that the Court declare that it is satisfied Mr Bligh has brought proceedings which are vexatious within the meaning of s 102Q(1) of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) and that he be restrained from instituting further interim applications in the proceedings without leave to commence such application first having been granted by a Judge.

4. Ms Trott also seeks that Mr Bligh be restrained from taking any further step in the proceedings without first providing the Independent Children’s Lawyer with certain specified email transmissions and that an order be made requiring him to pay her costs of and incidental to the Application in a Case on an indemnity basis, with such costs to be fixed in the amount of $5,000.00.

   Why the delay in finalising the interim applications?

5. When the matter first came before the Court, Mr Bligh asserted that, as a consequence of him suffering from dyslexia, he was not in a position to proceed with the hearing. In order to ameliorate the costs to the other parties of my determination that adherence to the principles of natural justice required that he be afforded a further opportunity to be heard, I made provision for him to be heard via the provision of written submissions and afforded to the other parties the opportunity to respond to the same.

6. There was some minor delay in the provision of written submissions and then, after their provision, further delay in the finalisation of the matter. During the period the matter was reserved, the Independent Children’s Lawyer sought to re-open the hearing for the purpose of providing the Court with further updating material relevant to the determination of Mr Bligh’s application. Some delay attended the listing of that application and further logistic issues arose as a consequence of Mr Bligh’s current incarceration: for example, there was a further request by him for additional time in responding to the application and, once it was finally back before the Court, a further request for the opportunity to provide submissions in writing.

7. The orders made most recently provided a timetable for the provision of written submissions by Mr Bligh. I have deliberately delayed in finalising this matter to take into account the possibility that he might have experienced difficulty in complying with the same.

8. However, the interests of the other parties now make it appropriate in my view that I finalise the outstanding applications.

9. I have done so taking into account the oral submissions made on behalf of the parties at the various appearances and also by reference to the affidavits relied on and the contents of the various written submissions filed on 31 May 2016, 29 June 2016 and 5 July 2016.

Overview of the parenting proceedings

1. The parenting proceedings relate to the parties’ only child: B, who was born in 2011 in the United Kingdom. The child currently lives with his mother and his teenage half-sister, C.

2. As a consequence of Orders made on 6 August 2015, the child does not spend any time or have any communication with his father.

3. This situation arose after Mr Bligh removed the child from his daycare on 30 July 2015. At that time, the then operative Order (made on 9 April 2015) provided that the child live with his mother and spend supervised time with his father at a local Contact Centre.

4. The mother’s evidence is that, about one week before 30 July 2015, she had changed the child’s daycare arrangements so that he attended at a more secure Centre.

5. Her decision to do so arose in the context of the following circumstances.

Brief overview of circumstances before the events of 30 July 2015

1. The child’s parents, who were each born in D Town in the United Kingdom, met and commenced their relationship there. Whilst they are in dispute about when they commenced their relationship, it is sufficient for the determination of the current applications to state that their relationship appears to have started in about 2009.

2. Mr Bligh contends they commenced cohabitation in December 2010. From about then until the child’s birth in 2011, they lived together with C (Ms Trott’s daughter from a previous relationship), who was born in 2002.

3. On 4 October 2011, an Order made by the relevant Court in the United Kingdom permitted C to be relocated by her mother and Mr Bligh to live in Australia. This Order made provision for C’s time (both in Australia and in the United Kingdom) and her communication with her father.

4. Mr Bligh now asserts that the mother acted in an improper manner in obtaining the October 2011 Order. The mother denies this. The inherent limitations of the interim hearing make resolution of this factual dispute impossible.

5. In any event, Ms Trott, the child and C relocated to E Town, Queensland in about April 2012. Mr Bligh remained living in the United Kingdom, but travelled to Australia to spend time with them approximately every six weeks. He subsequently relocated to Australia in January 2013, at which time he commenced working on a two week on/ two week off basis at a plant at F Town. When the matter first came before me, he was still in this working arrangement. However, when I last heard orally from Mr Bligh, he was incarcerated.

6. The parties are in dispute about when they separated: Mr Bligh asserts they separated under the one roof in about February 2014, whilst Ms Trott says they separated on 16 March 2015. Whatever the nature of their relationship, it is uncontentious that they lived in the same premises until mid-March 2015.

7. It seems that, in about November 2014, Ms Trott and the children travelled to the United Kingdom to visit family. Mr Bligh asserts that her behaviour during this holiday visit caused him to lose all trust in her because, he alleges, she left the child in the care of her nephew – a person he asserts was convicted of raping that person’s cousin. Whilst Ms Trott accepts that an allegation of improper behaviour has previously been made against her nephew, she says she did not leave the children in his care; in fact, she says she had only met him on a handful of occasions. Whilst resolution of this issue is impossible on an interim basis, there is no suggestion that Ms Trott’s nephew now lives in Australia.

8. After the parties’ physical separation in mid-March 2015, they were unable to reach an agreement about the child’s care arrangements.

What happened between March 2015 and 30 June 2015?

1. During an exchange of correspondence about the child’s care arrangements, Mr Bligh emailed Ms Trott’s solicitor on 7 or 8 March 2015 to advise that he intended to collect the child from kindergarten on 18 March 2015,[5] retain him until 30 March and to take him camping for three nights during that time. When Ms Trott advised that she did not agree with this proposal, Mr Bligh reiterated his intention to collect the child on 18 March 2015.

   [5]          When he returned from his two weeks away at work.

2. Ms Trott says that, on 17 March 2015, Mr Bligh sent her a text message in which he said:

   You are a special type of evil. Do you think you should be allowed to raise [the child]. All you can teach him is how to be a fat, self-entitled, ungrateful, manipulative, immoral, stupid, lazy, horrible cunt. Surly you don’t want him to turn out a fat horrible immortal freeloader like yourself.[6]

   [6]           (Errors and omissions in original).

3. It seems that Mr Bligh contends that he was not the author of this message and asserts that any abusive text messages ostensibly received by Ms Trott from him were, in fact, sent by her to herself.[7] The dispute about the author of the message cannot be resolved at an interim hearing.

   [7] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [27].

4. Ms Trott’s evidence is that, after the parties separated in mid-March 2015, Mr Bligh sent her solicitor a number of emails in which he accused Ms Trott of beating the child and of having a history of physically assaulting him. She says he also sent text messages to, and left voicemail messages for, both her and her solicitor in which he accused her of harming the child; he also asked whether she had killed the child yet. I am unclear as to whether Mr Bligh disputes authorship of these texts and, again, resolution of any dispute about this issue cannot occur in the context of an interim hearing.

5. On 2 April 2015, the child spent time with Mr Bligh for the first time since about 3 March 2015. This occurred in the context that Mr Bligh was working away in fortnightly blocks. Mr Bligh’s evidence is that, whilst the child “showed few signs of physical harm”, he was a “ghost” of his former self and had lost confidence and personality. On his account, the child was distressed to return to Ms Trott’s care.

6. On 7 April 2015, Ms Trott filed an application for a domestic violence order.  

7. On 9 April 2015, the Court made an interim parenting order. This Order provided that the child live with Ms Trott and spend supervised time with Mr Bligh at a local Contact Centre (Suburb H) each Saturday and Sunday (if his work roster permitted) and on an additional occasion during the week. An Independent Children’s Lawyer was appointed.

8. On 10 April 2015, a Temporary Protection Order was made in Ms Trott’s favour.

9. On 28 April 2015, Mr Bligh obtained a Temporary Protection Order against Ms Trott.

10. The child spent time with Mr Bligh at the Contact Centre on 10 June 2015. The evidence before the Court suggests that, during this time, Mr Bligh asked the child why he had not been in kindergarten. Ms Trott’s evidence is that the child had not been in kindergarten because she had taken him away for a few days. However, Mr Bligh’s contention is that she had harmed him and withheld him from kindergarten to hide the physical evidence of this harm.  

11. Whilst resolution of these competing contentions is not possible in the determination of this application for interim parenting orders, it is relevant to note that, when Mr Bligh asked the child (during their time together on 10 June 2015) whether anyone had hurt him, the child said: “No”. Despite this response, the Contact Centre documents record that Mr Bligh then removed the child’s shirt to see if his shoulders were marked. Mr Bligh is recorded as having told the supervisor that, when Ms Trott shakes the child, it leaves marks for days.  During this supervised time with the child, Mr Bligh also contacted his kindergarten and learned he had been absent for two weeks. According to the supervisor’s observations, the child was attempting to get Mr Bligh’s attention during this call.

12. It seems that Mr Bligh then sought advice by telephone about what would happen if he did not hand the child over at the conclusion of the time.  In any event, when their visit concluded, Mr Bligh is reported to have given the child a big hug, started to cry and left. The child is reported as having returned happily to Ms Trott.

13. There is a dispute about whether the Contact Centre withdrew its services after this visit. The father says this was not the case. He says the supervisor was “heartbroken for the child” and wrote a report stating that he (the father) was “the most diligent father the Centre had ever seen”. This is a further matter which cannot be resolved at an interim hearing.

14. In any event, after receiving information from the Centre about the 10 June 2015 visit, the Independent Children’s Lawyer wrote to the parties on 11 June 2015 to tell them of her view that the level of supervision it provided was unacceptable. She suggested the parties register with the Relationships Australia Contact Service at Suburb I.

The Family Report interviews: 30 June 2015

1. On 30 June 2015, Mr G, the author of the Family Report (dated 27 July 2015) interviewed Mr Bligh and Ms Trott.  Mr G also observed the child, then three years of age, with each of his parents on 9 July 2015 and interviewed C that day.

2. At the time she spoke with Mr G, Ms Trott agreed to the child spending time with Mr Bligh at the Suburb I Contact Centre. However, Mr Bligh did not agree that his time with the child should be supervised.

3. The information provided to Mr G by the Independent Children’s Lawyer included that Mr Bligh contended that the April 2015 Order:

   a)was only intended to address what the Court saw as the parties’ communication problems; and

   b)was made mistakenly, insofar as it provided for the child’s time with him to be supervised: he contended that only changeovers were intended to be supervised.[8]

   [8]          Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure B.

4. As at the date of the interviews with Mr G, the child attended kindergarten on Monday to Thursday (from 7:30 am – 5:15 pm) and was cared for by his mother at home on Fridays when she worked from home.

5. When he spoke with Mr G on 30 June 2015, Mr Bligh “expressed his consternation about the decision as to whether he should simply remove the child from his kindergarten”.[9] He also told Mr G that:

   a)Ms Trott “has never been very caring towards [the child] and the whole relationship has been about threats and defending him from [the mother]. She has been very controlling”;[10] and

   b)The child was “an inconvenience to [Ms Trott], a lever to get what she wants and there is no maternal attachment to him” –  the child has “always been a tool for her to get what she wants”;[11] and

   c)Ms Trott was “famed and well known for approaching men for money and sniffing around them”;[12] and

   d)he believed Ms Trott got pregnant to him to gain access to his money;[13] and

   e)Ms Trott had “no attachment to [the child] whatsoever”;[14] and

   f)Ms Trott was a “monster”;[15] and

   g)Ms Trott had been sending text messages to herself in an “evil game” to create evidence against him.[16]

   [9] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [100].

   [10] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [22].

   [11] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [23].

   [12] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [23].

   [13] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [23].

   [14] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [24].

   [15] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [25].

   [16] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [27].

6. Given the context of the history as recounted by the parties in their material and to Mr G and the material in relation to Mr Bligh’s comments about removing the child from supervised time, Mr G decided to undertake his observations of the child with each of his parents separately and within the Court precincts.

7. Mr G recorded that the child related very affectionately with his parents, appeared to be very attached to Ms Trott and appeared very glad to see Mr Bligh but, after about 35 minutes or so of interacting with him, simply said he might like to go back to his mother and began packing up.

8. When Mr G spoke with C (then about 13 years of age), she presented as a bright girl with very good language skills and as settled and composed. She generally described her relationship with Mr Bligh as positive, felt he had cared for her, said she had enjoyed his company and that she missed him. She was very concerned, however, about his interactions with the child and said she could not understand why he was acting as he was and that she did not want to see him.

1. Mr G concluded that the ‘compelling feature’ of the family was the starkly incongruent accounts given by Mr Bligh and Ms Trott about almost everything and, particularly, about critical elements relevant to the child’s welfare: he thought Mr Bligh’s claim that Ms Trott had no maternal attachment to the child, had little capacity to make such an attachment and that her interest in him was vicarious were the essential elements or themes of Mr Bligh’s account.

2. Mr G considered that Ms Trott had reason to be fearful about Mr Bligh’s more recent actions. In particular, he considered that Mr Bligh’s expressed “strident and negative” critique about every aspect of Ms Trott’s parenting and personality “to the extent that he could ascribe to her no redeeming features as a person or a mother” was atypical and concerning.[17]

   [17] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [115].

3. Mr G also expressed his opinion that Mr Bligh’s account of the parties’ history had pattern of (internal) irregularity. He thought Ms Trott’s account of a relationship ‘beset by communication difficulties’ and Mr Bligh’s controlling nature amounted to a more probable description of their deteriorating relationship.

4. Mr G also said that he found the tenor of Mr Bligh’s claims to be “disturbing”.[18] He outlined his opinion that ‘an unshakeable belief with no basis in fact is suggestive of a mental health problem which – if undiagnosed – is a risk factor.’ He also commented that, whilst it was possible that there was, in fact, a basis in fact for Mr Bligh’s expressed beliefs about Ms Trott’s parenting of the child, he had not viewed any material, and was not aware of any information, which would support such a view of her.

   [18] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [124].

5. Mr G opined that the degree to which Mr Bligh expressed his intense view that the child had a special bond with him and no bond with Ms Trott was highly unusual and inconsistent with the history provided. He also assessed Mr Bligh as having ‘elevated suspicions’ of the actions of others and a sense that he is ‘the victim’ of forces aligned against him. Mr G expressed his opinion that Mr Bligh’s identification of Ms Trott as ‘inhuman’ was of ‘great concern’, and carried with it the “attached apprehension that an escalation in Mr [Bligh’s] behaviour will place [the child] at risk.”[19]

   [19] Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [110].

6. Mr G concluded his report by commenting that “threatening to remove a child from supervision is a concerning development in an already chaotic chain of events”. He thought it raised questions about Mr Bligh’s functioning and made it difficult to predict his future actions. Consequently, he recommended that the child’s parents undergo psychiatric assessment and that Mr Bligh’s time with the child remain supervised and occur at a recognized Contact Centre.[20]

   [20]         Affidavit of Mr G, filed 28 July 2015, at Annexure G, at [111] and [112].

The child starts at a new kindergarten: 27 July 2015

1. On 27 July 2015, the child started to attend a new and secure-access kindergarten. Ms Trott says she kept details about it and its location from Mr Bligh because she was suspicious he had been conducting surveillance of her and the child until then and because he had made repeated threats to her solicitor and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to remove the child from kindergarten or to otherwise “intervene” in relation to his care arrangements. She also says she was advised to take this step after the comments Mr Bligh made to Mr G during his Family Report interview.

2. Mr G’s report was filed on 28 July 2015.

3. The matter was listed for further hearing on 6 August 2015.

What happened on 30 July 2015?

1. At about midday on 30 July 2015, Mr Bligh was served with Ms Trott’s Amended Response to Application in a Case, by which she sought orders that the child spend no time (and not communicate) with him and various injunctive orders restraining Mr Bligh from approaching her or the child.

2. In addition to this information, the Independent Children’s Lawyer had previously provided the parties with information about the outcome of enquiries she had made with the relevant United Kingdom police service about Mr Bligh’s earlier assertions that Ms Trott was wanted in the United Kingdom for abducting C. As I understand it, such information was unsupportive of Mr Bligh’s contentions.

3. At about 3.00 pm on 30 July 2015, Mr Bligh removed the child from his kindergarten.  

4. The parties’ respective accounts of this incident vary markedly.  Ms Trott says Mr Bligh acted without her consent or prior knowledge. Mr Bligh advances a number of other explanations.

5. Information contained in documents subpoenaed from the Queensland Police Service is to the effect that, after Mr Bligh’s electronic devices were seized by police on 29 September 2016, a document entitled ‘Surveillance Log’ (for 22 July 2015) by Qld Covert Investigations identifies and locates the daycare facility at which the child was attending – details of which were, according to Ms Trott, until then previously unknown to Mr Bligh.

6. At approximately 4.30 pm on 30 July 2015, a Recovery Order was made urgently and on an ex parte basis.

7. At about 9.00 pm that night, police recovered the child from Mr Bligh’s care at a J Town hotel and returned him to Ms Trott’s care.

8. Mr Bligh was taken into custody and charged with various offences including child stealing, entering premises with intent to commit an indictable offence and a breach of a Domestic Violence Order. These offences are yet to be determined.

What happened between 30 July 2015 and the first appearance on 30 May 2016?

1. On 31 July 2015, Mr Bligh was released on bail. An undertaking to the K Town Magistrates Court prevented him from having any contact whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, personal or otherwise, with Ms Trott, the child or C.

2. On 4 August 2015, Mr Bligh attended upon a Dr M, a psychiatrist. The notes of that attendance record that he told Dr M that:

   a)Ms Trott was rough with the child; and

   b)Ms Trott came from a family of physical disciplinarians who were rough with their children; and

   c)he had concerns that Ms Trott shakes the child violently; and

   d)Ms Trott had been spiteful in dealing with the parental separation and custody issues; and

   e)he had telephoned Ms Trott to tell her he was going to the childcare centre to take the child in a few hours, as he had been denied any access to him; and

   f)he was concerned about the child’s wellbeing, given the alleged history of Ms Trott’s alleged behaviour toward the child; and

   g)police officers had arrived at the hotel where he was staying with the child and had apprehended him.

3. On 6 August 2015, Principal Registrar Filippello dismissed Applications in a Case filed by Mr Bligh on 13 May 2015, 21 May 2015, and 30 June 2015 respectively. She made an interim parenting order which accorded Ms Trott sole parental responsibility for decisions about major long term issues relating to the child and provided that the child not spend time with or communicate with Mr Bligh.

4. Submissions made by Mr Bligh to the Court that day seemed to include that:

   a)as his serious concerns for the child’s well-being and safety in Ms Trott’s care were not being addressed by authorities or the Court, he gave prior consideration to the risk to himself of removing the child in breach of the existing orders; and

   b)he believed he would, at most, receive a small fine for breaching the Protection Order and so decided to act as he did – he described his actions as “well-rehearsed”; and/or alternatively,

   c)he had come across a kindergarten in the vicinity, which displayed a vacancy sign which prompted his “naive” decision to enter the premises to ask whether the child may be inside and was “alright” – this resulted in him removing the child from the kindergarten for a few hours; and/or alternatively,

   d)he was invited by Ms Trott (via email he says she sent to his brother Mr L on 29 July 2015) to collect the child from the kindergarten that day and return him to kindergarten the next day: he has provided the alleged email to police.

5. Ms Trott’s position is that she did not send any relevant email to Mr Bligh’s brother. She says the email Mr Bligh speaks of is not authentic and is a fraud. In contrast, Mr Bligh maintains that the email he is referring to is authentic, is not a fraud and was sent by Ms Trott to his brother, Mr L Bligh. The limitations associated with disposing of the competing parenting applications on an interim basis means that resolution of this crucial difference of account cannot occur at present.

6. In order to address the significant dispute about the email asserted by Mr Bligh to have been sent by Ms Trott to his brother (by which Mr Bligh contends she consented to him removing the child from kindergarten), an Order was made on 10 September 2015 in relation to its forensic examination.

7. As something of an aside in the context of this chronological recounting of relevant matters, it appears that, after the Independent Children’s Lawyer was appointed, Mr Bligh raised various concerns about her alleged conduct and made various complaints about her alleged conduct to Legal Aid Queensland. On 12 October 2015, Legal Aid Queensland advised Mr Bligh that the complaints he had made against the Independent Children’s Lawyer had been found to be unsubstantiated. He was told that his allegations were unfounded.

   Dr N (psychiatrist) interviews Mr Bligh: 12 October 2015

8. When he spoke with Dr N, Mr Bligh reported that he was then living in E Town. He said this had been the case since July 2015. He remained employed as a supervisor and had been since February 2013. He said he did not know where Ms Trott and the child lived, but said he believed they lived at E Town.

9. Mr Bligh told Dr N he last saw the child on 29 July 2015 (it was, in fact, 30 July 2015) and, before that, on 9 June 2015. He said that, in the period from 8 April to 9 June 2015, he spent supervised time with the child but, before this, the child was “with him from March 2015”.  Mr Bligh advanced that the child should live with him and see Ms Trott regularly and have a relationship with her: he suggested that the parents could work together, or work it out.

10. Mr Bligh reiterated to Dr N at least some of the matters he had previously raised with Mr G: for example, he asserted the parental relationship ended because Ms Trott often shook the child and was rough with him and he disagreed with her about this; he said they had different values and differed in their approach to hygiene and he also said that he had only remained in a relationship with Ms Trott because of her pregnancy with the child.

11. Mr Bligh also told Dr N that, after March 2015, the parties had agreed the child would remain in his mother’s care for two weeks, during which time she would ensure she took him to kindergarten. He said they had also agreed that he would ring the child whenever he was in Ms Trott’s care and he gave the child (then four years of age) a mobile phone for this purpose. Mr Bligh also said that the parties had agreed that the child would then spend two weeks in his care, during which time Ms Trott could see him whenever required, providing that it did not interfere with his attendance at kindergarten or Mr Bligh’s plans.

12. Mr Bligh also told Dr N that, whilst he was away at work, Ms Trott’s solicitor sent an email effectively withdrawing from this agreement and instead proposing that the child spend one overnight with him each week.

13. Mr Bligh told Dr N he was surprised at the first return date of Ms Trott’s application when she produced numerous text messages from the mobile phone and iPad which she alleged he had sent to her: he said that, whilst these messages made him out to be a very aggressive and undesirable person, they were fraudulent. However, the fact of the text messages and their content resulted in the Court ordering the child’s time with him occur under supervision.

14. Mr Bligh told Dr N that he had had some issues with the Contact Centre because he did not believe they would restrict him from taking the child out of the Centre (for example, to the park) and that these disagreements had “caused bad feelings”. He said that, on 9 June 2015, he became aware that the child had not attended kindergarten for two weeks – this made him suspicious that Ms Trott had “been rough on him” and had removed him from kindergarten because she did not want the staff to see the consequences of this.

15. Mr Bligh accepted to Dr N that he made some statements by which it “may have been hinted” that he would remove the child from the Contact Centre and that it “could have been seen as a threat to do so.” He noted he did not in fact do this. He also told Dr N he accepted that taking the child’s shirt off at the Contact Centre, to see if he had any marks caused by Ms Trott, was the wrong thing to do.

16. Mr Bligh also provided the following account of the events of 30 July 2015 to Dr N:

    a)his elder brother, Mr L, had received a telephone call from Ms Trott in which she said, in essence, that the conflict between them (as the child’s parents) had gone too far and she wanted to mediate; and

    b)Mr L was invited to mediate between them and to fly out to Australia to do so; and

    c)Mr L said he did not want to fly to Australia if it would amount to nothing and so asked Ms Trott for a sign of good faith: that is, he asked her to let Mr Bligh collect the child from kindergarten; and

    d)Ms Trott agreed to this and, at Mr L’s request, sent him an email confirming her agreement.

17. Mr Bligh also asserted that, given there were then mutual domestic violence orders in place, Ms Trott should not have even been speaking to Mr L. Dr N noted that “somewhat peculiarly”, Mr Bligh told him that he believed Ms Trott had been told that, if she agreed to any unsupervised time between the child and him, the child would be taken into care.

18. Mr Bligh also told Dr N that, when he received a copy of the email he alleges Ms Trott sent to Mr L, he became very excited, collated his paperwork and attended at the kindergarten. Once there – and despite the staff’s remonstrations – he put the child in the car and left.

19. Dr N notes that, when asked to describe Ms Trott’s personality, Mr Bligh initially did not know what to say but then reported she was somewhat “Jekyll and Hyde”: she can be “soft and caring and then she changes”, “she is a very nice person if the issue is neutral … [but] if there is anything that benefits her she is different”. Similarly, he reported that her care of the child was changeable, in that she could be lovely with him and then rough with him.

20. Mr Bligh told Dr N that, initially following separation (after, on his case, Ms Trott reneged on their alleged agreement), he responded “too harshly”; he accepted he should not have been as negative about her or as abusive to her. He also accepted that he said the things which Mr G outlined in his report but asserted that he was distressed and distracted by events and thought such comments were what Mr G wanted to hear.

21. Dr N recounts that Mr Bligh was certain he could develop a working relationship with Ms Trott in relation to the child. He told Dr N he was in a different position, there was no benefit in continuing to “row” with Ms Trott,  both parents had made mistakes and they should forgive and forget and move on. He also agreed that he was self-defeating, in respect of his behaviour relating to the family court and issues involving the child.

Dr N interviews Ms Trott: 13 October 2015

1. Ms Trott told Dr N that, with everything that had happened, it was hard to trust Mr Bligh; she thought he needed help before supervised visits could commence. She also said, in essence, that whether the child should spend time with his father and in what manner would depend on what happened thereafter.

2. Ms Trott told Dr N that Mr Bligh had engaged in a series of concerning behaviours which included stalking her, hiring a private investigator and hacking into C’s phone. She said he had changed the number of his car registration plate, tried to move into a unit in the same block into which she had moved and had moved closer to where C was attending school. She also asserted he had been stalking her previous lawyer, which resulted in her changing lawyers.

3. Ms Trott told Dr N that Mr Bligh had discovered where the child attended kindergarten because he had stalked her. She also reported that he knew where she was all the time – and would imply this in email correspondence he sent to her. She also told Dr N that, whilst Mr Bligh had never made any direct threats to harm her, he had sent one of his friends a message that if he saw her, the only thing she would be good for was ‘victim compensation’.

   Dr N’s conclusions about and/or assessment of Mr Bligh and Ms Trott (as at October 2015)

4. Dr N concluded that Ms Trott exhibited no signs of depression or anxiety and there was no evidence of psychosis.

5. Dr N assessed Mr Bligh as quite easy to engage, possessing good social skills and with a reactive and warm aspect. He thought there was no evidence of pervasive depression – Mr Bligh’s demonstrated distress when discussing issues about the child, the charges against him and his current circumstances were appropriate to the content.

6. Dr N said Mr Bligh did not demonstrate any disorder of the form of thought: his thought was focussed on how he got to his current situation and how he could have done things differently. He was keen to point out that he had learned from the past. He was, however, entirely negative about Ms Trott.

7. Dr N considered that Mr Bligh did not suffer from any major mental disorder in the form of organic mental state, psychoses, mood disorder or anxiety disorder. There was no indication of substance abuse or dependence. However, he noted that his assessment of Mr Bligh’s personality was frustrated by the vast disparity of facts presented by the parents.

8. Dr N expressed that, if Mr Bligh’s account of Ms Trott’s behaviour was correct (that is: she had fabricated evidence to falsely allege he sent her abusive text messages), then she is an extremely devious and manipulative individual who would go to extreme lengths to have an exclusive relationship with the child, to the exclusion of Mr Bligh. In positing this hypothesis, Dr N also noted that Mr Bligh’s allegations seemed implausible, particularly insofar as they related to Ms Trott’s asserted creation of voicemail messages.

9. Dr N said that, if Ms Trott’s account of Mr Bligh’s behaviour was accurate, such behaviour was indicative of a personality disturbance and indicated a significant personality dysfunction in the narcissistic spectrum, with antisocial elements.

10. Dr N also opined that, on the assumptions that:

    a)Ms Trott did not, in fact, threaten to kill or harm the child and there was no reason to suspect the child was not being well cared for by her; and

    b)Mr Bligh’s claim that Ms Trott fabricated emails and other communication to show him in a very poor light (which resulted in the child’s time with him being supervised) and that he had her permission to collect the child from kindergarten on the basis of an alleged email from her to his brother were incorrect,

    then, Mr Bligh has a very significant disorder of personality, of a mixed type, (or non-specific): that is, there are aspects of his personality which vary from the norm to a significant extent and which are causing difficulties for others, as well as himself.

11. Dr N considered that the principal features of this disorder are: a poorly developed sense of self and identity, a lack of capacity to see issues from any perspective other than his own, antisocial traits and paranoid traits with a tendency to retaliate against those he (Mr Bligh) sees as standing in the way of what he seeks.

1. In addition, Dr N observed that it was curious that Mr Bligh’s presentation to him during the interview was not reflected in his material, in which he continued to attempt to paint Ms Trott in an extremely negative light. Dr N suggested that this contradiction indicated that, whilst Mr Bligh had at least a modicum of insight into how his behaviour had resulted in events and decisions contrary to his interests, he was unable to modify it.

2. Dr N concluded that, notwithstanding Mr Bligh’s personality disorder and provided any time was supervised, some degree of contact between him and the child could be resumed. He opined that unsupervised time should only occur after further evaluation and indications that Mr Bligh was able to modify his attitude toward Ms Trott and his resultant behaviour.  This was because Dr N identified that main difficulty in the father/child relationship was whether Mr Bligh was able to promote the child’s relationship with Ms Trott or, rather, would seek to disrupt it. He suggested that the key question was in relation to Mr Bligh’s attitude to the child’s relationship with Ms Trott and whether he would be content with anything less than the “full custody” he was then seeking.

3. Importantly, Dr N stated that, if Mr Bligh had engaged in stalking behaviour of Ms Trott, his personality configuration raised issues of safety to her and others whom he saw as standing in the way of his aims: in such a scenario, Dr N recommended that strict limits ought to be put in place in relation to this behaviour.

   Court related events

4. On 15 October 2015, Mr Bligh filed an Application in a Case seeking a Certificate pursuant to s128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). That application was acceded to on 11 February 2016.

5. On 27 October 2015, an Order was made that the email subject of dispute be forensically assessed by O Forensics. Despite this Order, it seems that the email has not been provided in a manner to enable the envisaged examination to occur. Ms Trott seeks to rely on this asserted non-compliance with the requirement to produce the email to O Forensics as the basis for an order restraining Mr Bligh from taking any further step in these proceedings until this Order has been complied with.

6. On 7 March 2016, Mr Bligh filed a further Application in a Case by which he sought various interim parenting orders, including a change to the child’s primary care arrangements.  As already noted, that Application was dismissed on 15 March 2016 and Mr Bligh was ordered to pay Ms Trott’s costs and those of the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

What happened after about April 2016?

1. In addition to the charges associated with his actions on 30 July 2015, Mr Bligh was charged, on or about 29 September 2016, with stalking (protracted) of Ms Trott, Breach of the Domestic Violence Order, breach of bail, obstructing police, improper use of an emergency telephone service, using carriage service to menace and harass, possession of dangerous drugs and perverting the course of justice.[21]

   [21]         on about 29 November 2016.

2. It appears from the contents of documents obtained pursuant to subpoena issued to the Queensland Police that these charges have arisen in the following manner.

   Broad overview of the circumstances relating to Mr Bligh’s more recent charges

3. Recourse to records held by police reveals that, since about 21 August 2016, 38 submissions have been made to Crimestoppers and Policelink about Ms Trott. These submissions asserted that she was engaged in dealing illicit drugs and/or was in possession of firearms.

4. Whilst police concluded that the information provided in these submissions appeared to be vexatious and baseless, the specific details provided in them appeared to indicate that Mr Bligh had been following Ms Trott in a manner which, it is alleged, constituted breaches of the operative Domestic Violence Order and, also, constituted an offence of stalking Ms Trott.

5. All of the information provided to Crimestoppers and Policelink was provided anonymously. Whilst the majority was submitted via email or via internet submissions, two phone call submissions have been made: the first at 1316 hrs on 24 August 2016 and the second at 1057 hrs on 9 September 2016. Police allege that Mr Bligh made these calls to Crimestoppers.

6. As I understand the content of the documents produced by police, an anonymous caller contacted 000 on seven occasions throughout 8 September 2016.  On each occasion, the male caller (who is described as having an English accent) provided current details of where Ms Trott or her car was located. The caller said that the woman associated with the car was dealing drugs – he had seen her do so and was following her. When one of these calls was played to Ms Trott later (I think, on about 13 September 2016), she said she recognised the voice as that of Mr Bligh.

7. It is, I think, appropriate that I record that, having heard directly from Mr Bligh during the course of his participation in these proceedings, his accent is one of some distinction.

8. In addition, Ms Trott contacted police at about 1005 hrs on 9 September 2015 to report that she had just seen a person she believed to be Mr Bligh jog away, through a carpark across from her workplace.

9. After reviewing the submissions made on 9 September 2016 and other intelligence, police prima facie concluded that it was evident that Mr Bligh was the person Ms Trott believed she saw. This conclusion was reached because a submission made at 1057 hrs that day indicated that the caller saw Ms Trott’s car at 1030 that day near K Town Shopping Centre, whilst a later submission made at 1220 hrs that day described what she was wearing: the provision of these details suggested to police that the provider of them had been watching Ms Trott that morning.

10. In addition, it seems that Ms Trott was, in fact, speaking with a police officer from her car during her drive to work on 9 September 2016, a matter which persuaded police to think it highly unlikely that she was dealing illicit drugs that morning (as had been alleged in the submission).

11. In very broad summary then, the allegations made by police against Mr Bligh are that he consistently reported to police that Ms Trott was a drug dealer and kept drugs in her car and that he did so in an attempt to have police search her car.

12. Police also allege that, after Ms Trott was told that Mr Bligh had been particularly adamant about having them search her car, she searched it on 2 October 2016 and immediately contacted police to report she had discovered a clipseal bag, containing powder, under the seat. When police subsequently inspected Ms Trott’s car that day, they record having seen a clipseal bag, containing smaller clipseal bags containing an off-white powder, under the driver’s seat. Police documents record that there were 15 smaller bags in total, each of which contained about two grams of a powder (being about one ounce in total); testing revealed the powder to be amphetamine, which is said to be valued at approximately $4,000.00-$5,000.00.

13. In further broad summary, police have alleged that Mr Bligh planted these drugs in Ms Trott’s car. They appear to have done so on the basis that the information provided by the caller was so specific it could only have been provided by the person who placed the drugs in the car: for example, in one call the caller said that Ice was hidden under the driver’s seat.

14. It also seems that police have alleged that, after Mr Bligh’s solicitor contacted them to tell them he had information that other people were involved in supplying illegal drugs, they attended at the K Town Watchhouse on 4 October 2016 to speak with him.

15. According to the contents of the police documents, Mr Bligh told the police that day that certain named persons and Ms Trott were involved in supplying drugs. He also told the police that his solicitor had told him to report to Crimestoppers (which he had done) and he admitted making the 000 calls – he said he knew a person who would tell him every time Ms Trott had drugs in a hideaway under the front seat of her car. Mr Bligh is recorded as having told the police that “I don’t want you looking into too much. If you stop that car, it could save the world for me”

16. However, when he spoke with police on 4 October 2016, Mr Bligh did not know that they had already located the drugs under Ms Trott’s car seat.

17. As far as I can make out from the documentation provided by police, it is also alleged that, when they spoke to the person Mr Bligh had nominated as his “informant”, that person told them he did not know Mr Bligh, had never met him and did not know Ms Trott.

18. In summary then, it seems police allege that Mr Bligh fabricated the information about the alleged informant for the sole purpose of having the drugs discovered in Ms Trott’s car and to provide him with grounds for, or in support of, an application for bail.

19. Police also allege that, after he had been charged and incarcerated, Mr Bligh attempted to arrange for his brother and a friend to contact various people and attempt to get them to claim that they had made certain of the reports to Crimestoppers; it is alleged this was done in the hope that it would cause the charges against Mr Bligh to be dropped.

20. It seems that, having previously indicated to police that a certain named person was responsible for making the complaints about Ms Trott to Crimestoppers, information obtained from Mr Bligh’s prisoner phone calls suggests he had instructed his brother and another associate on multiple occasions to contact that person. However, when police spoke with that person on 5 October 2016, she said she had never even seen Ms Trott, nor known her surname until Mr Bligh’s solicitor contacted her earlier the previous day to ask her to provide Mr Bligh with a character reference. Consequently, police allege that, in an attempt to obtain bail, Mr Bligh had attempted to coerce this person into providing a statement to indicate that she had made the complaints about Ms Trott.

21. Police also appear to allege that Mr Bligh arranged for a false witness statement to be forged and uttered to his solicitor so that the same could be forwarded by that person to police in an attempt to support Mr Bligh’s bail application.

22. As I understand it, police allege that, on 4 November 2016, Mr Bligh’s previous solicitor forwarded them a statement, which purported to be from a particular person and purported to emanate from a solicitor’s office in Africa. The statement contained the assertions that this person had been in a casual relationship with Mr Bligh from July 2016 until he was arrested, frequently stayed at his house, drove his car, had access to all his computers and phones, knew the passwords to all of his online accounts (which she would access) and knowing that he was concerned about the child’s safety – but unbeknownst to him – had reported Ms Trott to police via Crimestoppers and the police website on several occasions.

23. However, when police contacted this person, they report that she said she had never had a romantic relationship with Mr Bligh (they had only ever been workmates), had never seen the statement Mr Bligh’s previous solicitor had provided to police, knew nothing about any submission to Crimestoppers or Policelink, had never been to Africa (but was in the Caribbean on 2 November 2016 – the date of the statement) and had never had access to Mr Bligh’s electronic devices.

24. Perhaps as an aside, the police documentation associated with this allegation contains a comment that the assertion in the statement provided by Mr Bligh’s previous solicitor that the asserted author of the same had access to all of Mr Bligh’s online accounts was in “stark contradiction” to the reason Mr Bligh provided when he refused to disclose his password to police during the execution of a search warrant: namely, that to do so would have been in breach of the ‘Secrecy Act’ relating to his work.

25. In addition to the matters summarised very, very broadly above, Ms Trott also contends that Mr Bligh previously used various applications (such as ‘Find my Phone’ and ‘iforget’) to locate her and that he had previously undertaken searches using the following: ‘how to pay to find someone’, ‘find out where someone lives’’ ‘how to stalk(find) someone in Australia’, ‘GPS tracker’, ‘[Ms Trott] revenge’,  ‘what will happen if I take my children against a Family Court order’, ‘457 Visa cancellation process’, ‘fake message app’, ‘change apple password’, ‘Gmail change password’ and ‘replace lost child passport UK’.

26. Ms Trott also asserts that, after they separated, Mr Bligh registered himself as a patient at the Medical Centre at which she and the children had attended for a number of years – despite this being a significant distance from where he was then living. She also alleges he has complained to authorities that she submitted false documentation to get into Australia.

Applicable principles

1. As already alluded to, all interim hearings are attended by the reality that, given the absence of cross-examination, the Court is often unable to resolve disputes of fact. All that can be done – as authority makes clear – is for the Court to identify the issues in dispute and any agreed or uncontested relevant facts and, if possible, make findings about the relevant s 60CC considerations. It is also well established that, in interim proceedings, there may be little uncontested evidence to permit of more than a limited assessment and/or consideration of the statutory considerations.

The competing proposals

Mr Bligh[22]

[22]         Application in a Case filed 7 March 2016.

1. Even in circumstances where Mr Bligh’s incarceration prevents him from any physical interaction with the child in any event, it is instructive, I think, to outline in detail the interim orders he sought whilst on bail (before the more recent charges were brought):

   1.Reciprocal care, visa rights, and 100% parental responsibility to be awarded to the Father until the 03/03/2017.

   2.No directions hearing to occur until the 03/03/2017.

   3.The mother to provide the court detail of each time she has been forcibly evicted from a property by police whilst in the care of a child, within 28 days of the orders becoming available.

   4.The ICL, Justine Lilley must make a statement to the court about her use, reliance and history of use of antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs.

   5.[Mr P] to disclose details of any investigation or accusation, detailing him as a child sex offender, having indecent images of children or accusation of paedophile.

   6.The child [B] is released (Custody given) to his Grandparents, [Mr and Ms Bligh Snr] until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.

   7.The child [B] is released (Custody given) to his Auntie and uncle, [Mr L] and [Ms Q Bligh] until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.

   8.The child [B] is released (Custody given) to a mutual friend of both parents, “[Ms R]”, until contested issues are resolved or further instruction of the court.

   9.The court suspends the matter and allows the process to occur in the UK, where the full history of the parent’s background can be established, and witnesses are available. All parties are to be present in the UK within 28 days and may not return without the authority of the UK family court.

   10.[Mr P] is to provide an affidavit to explain why he has provided funds to the case within 28 days of the orders being available online.

   11.[Mr P] must disclose all payments he has made to the mother case within 28 days of the orders being available online.

   12.The case be moved before the [D Town] family court, so the parents backgrounds can be more accurately assessed

   13.The child [B] be placed into the custody of [Ms R] by the mother no later than 19:00 on the date of the hearing.

   14.On serving a change of bail conditions, on the court and all parties, the father, [Mr Bligh] be awarded full custody, visa rights, and parental responsibility of the child [B].

   15.Following the mother handing over the custardy of the child [B], by 19:00 on the date of the hearing, the mother must have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the child [B], unless approved in writing by the father and witnessed by a Justice of the Peace.

   16.The mother to pay all the fathers costs associated with this case within 6 months of orders being served on; or available to the parties.

   17.]O] forensic are ordered to destroy all records of investigation and relating to the case.

   18.A new computer forensic expert is instructed with reasonable orders to facilitate a detailed forensic investigation.

   19.The mother supply to the father all of the child’s bedroom furniture and items of comfort.

   20.The mother supply to the father a written account of [the child’s] routine, favourite activities, hobbies, interests and the location of his current child care centred.

   21.Costs are awarded to the father ($150,00)

   22.Mother to fund transcript from the December hearing. (Mr Evans ensured the court due diligence had occurred with [O] forensic).[23]

   [23]         Errors and omissions in original.

2. The third parties referred to are persons with whom the child has had either no interaction or no significant interaction.

3. Further, reference to Mr Bligh’s affidavits also suggests that he also seeks to restrain Ms Trott and the child from leaving the Commonwealth of Australia – presumably, unless in compliance with the terms of orders he seeks that he, the mother and the child return to the UK so that proceedings about the appropriate parenting arrangements for the child can take place there.

4. There are no current proceedings in the United Kingdom concerning the child. In fact, Mr Bligh’s bail conditions at the time the matter first came before me compelled him to deliver up his passport/s and restrained him from approaching within 100m of any point of international departure from Australia.

   The mother

5. Ms Trott proposes that Mr Bligh’s application for interim parenting orders different[24] to those contained within the Order made on 6 August 2015 is dismissed: that is, she proposes the August 2015 Order remain operative and that, accordingly, the child spend no time with his father and have no communication with him. 

   [24]Whether as a result of the Application in a Case filed 7 March 2016 or as a result of the Amended Application in a Case filed 15 April 2016.

   The Independent Children’s Lawyer

6. The Independent Children’s Lawyer supports Ms Trott’s position in respect of the interim parenting orders said to be in the child’s best interests at the present time.

The reality

1. Whilst he told the Court that he was hopeful of making an application for bail to the Supreme Court and that he was also hopeful that this would be successful, Mr Bligh remains incarcerated. Consequently, even if the parenting orders he seeks on an interim basis were considered to be in the child’s best interests, the same could not be put into effect.

2. Even if Mr Bligh was released on bail, the conditions of the same would, in my view, almost inevitably include that Mr Bligh not have any contact with Ms Trott or the child.

3. Even if this was not the case, I am not persuaded that it is in the child’s best interests at this time to live with Mr Bligh or spend any time with him or even communicate with him. This conclusion follows my assessment of the relevant s 60CC considerations given the circumstances as outlined above. In particular, I have accorded significant weight to the fact of the most recent, very serious allegations against Mr Bligh, particularly when these are viewed in the circumstances outlined above and in the context of the observations, assessments, opinions and postulations proffered by both Mr G and Dr N and the earlier allegations (which themselves resulted in Mr Bligh facing serious charges and being on bail at the time he allegedly acted in the manner that has been more recently asserted).

1. Even if Mr Bligh was not incarcerated, I am simply not persuaded at present that any benefit to the child of any interaction or communication with him is likely to be of such benefit to the child at this point in time as to outweigh the very real and, I think, significant risk to him that interaction and communication with Mr Bligh poses. At the very least, this risk can be seen in terms of the possible repetition of actions which resulted in the child’s removal from daycare and/or an attempt to remove him from Ms Trott’s primary care and/or his exposure to Mr Bligh’s unrestrained negative views about her.

2. Of course, this situation may be shown to be completely different once the evidence is able to be tested at trial.

3. The circumstances of this particular case, as summarised above, are such that I am easily persuaded that it is not appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility for the child to be applied. Even if the presumption had applied, I am satisfied it is not, at this time, in the child’s best interests for Mr Bligh and Ms Trott to have equal shared parental responsibility for major long term issues relating to him. The balance of the orders sought by Mr Bligh either have no legal or factual basis, are inappropriate, go to irrelevant matters or are not justified on the material before me.  Consequently, I decline to order the same.

Restraining Mr Bligh from instituting further applications without leave

1. I am not persuaded, at present, that Mr Bligh has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian Courts or tribunals. Consequently, I decline to make orders in the terms sought by Ms Trott in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Response to an Application in a Case filed 16 May 2016.

2. Ms Trott also seeks, in paragraph 6 of the Response to an Application in a Case filed 16 May 2016, an order, in essence, restraining Mr Bligh from taking any further step in these proceedings without first complying with the order which obliged him to deliver original email transmissions to the expert appointed to examine the same.  However, the existence of criminal proceedings against Mr Bligh seems to me to complicate matters and I consider it more appropriate that the issue of whether Mr Bligh should, or should not, be entitled to take any further step in these parenting proceedings be considered if he takes any further steps after today.

Costs

1. Mr Bligh’s current incarceration, the absence of any information about his current financial circumstances and the fact that his future financial circumstances will likely depend on the outcome of the criminal proceedings in which he is engaged at present persuades me that it is appropriate to reserve the costs of Ms Trott and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to the trial Judge.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-one (141) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 24 May 2017.

Associate:                 

Date:    24 May 2017