BLANCO and LOCAL GOVERNMENT STANDARDS PANEL - [2025] WASAT 95

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1995 (WA)
CITATION:   BLANCO and LOCAL GOVERNMENT STANDARDS PANEL [2025] WASAT 95
MEMBER:   MR E CADE, MEMBER
HEARD:   3 JUNE 2025
DELIVERED          :   11 SEPTEMBER 2025
FILE NO/S:   CC 127 of 2025
BETWEEN:   CAMILO BLANCO
Applicant
AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STANDARDS PANEL
Respondent
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Intervener

Catchwords:

Local Government - Minor breach - Decision of Local Government Standards Panel - Application for extension of time to make application for review of a decision of the Tribunal - Principles which apply to exercise of discretion to grant extension of time - Application for extension of time refused

Legislation:

Electronic Transactions Act 2011 (WA), s 14(1)(a)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 75, s 76
Local Government (Administration) Regulations 1996 (WA), reg 34D
Local Government (Model Code of Conduct) Regulations 2021 (WA), reg 20
Local Government Act 1995 (WA), s 5.102A, s 5.110(6), s 5.110(6)(b)(i), s 5.110(6)(b)(ii), s 5.110(6)(c), s 5.118(1), s 5.125, s 5.125(1), s 5.125(2), s 9.50
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 24, s 37(1)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9, r 9(a), r 10

Result:

Application for extension of time refused
Application for review dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr AJ Tharby
Respondent	:	Mr T Boyle
Intervener	:	Mr T Boyle

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Bennett
Respondent	:	State Solicitor's Office
Intervener	:	State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Gallo v Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR 458
Goedhart and Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASAT 49
Heidelberg Materials Australia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2025] WASAT 66
Kingston and Local Government Standards Panel [2025] WASAT 43
Treby v Local Government Standards Panel [2010] WASAT 81
Wood and Law Complaints Officer as Delegate of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2024] WASAT 35

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

These reasons deal with the preliminary issue in the proceeding which the applicant's application to extend time, under r 10 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules2004 (WA) (Rules), for him to lodge his application for a review of a decision by the Local Government Standards Panel (Panel).
The applicant, Camilo Blanco, was at the date of the hearing of the preliminary issue a councillor of the Town of Port Hedland (Town). The applicant was last elected to the Council of the Town at the 20 October 2023 election for a term expiring in October 2027. However, the applicant's position on the Town council was declared vacant effective 3 September 2025. Accordingly, the Tribunal will, without intending any disrespect, refer to the applicant as Mr Blanco in these reasons.
The proceeding is within the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The reviewable decision is the decision of Panel sent by email to Mr Blanco on 17 July 2024 under s 5.110(6)(b)(i), s 5.110(6)(b)(ii) and s 5.110(6)(c) of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) (LG Act) that Mr Blanco is to be publicly censured and, within a certain period of time, is to give a public apology.
Mr Blanco did not, however, give the public apology ordered by the Panel either within the time required or at all. Mr Blanco also did not lodge with this Tribunal an application for a review of the Panel's decision within the time required under r 9(a), which was within 28 days of the date on which he was given notice of the Panel's decision on 17 July 2024.
Rather, Mr Blanco on 20 February 2025 commenced this proceeding, which is both an application for a review of the Panel's decision and an application for an extension of time within which to lodge his application.
The respondent is the Panel which, properly, limited its participation in the proceeding to the production of a bundle of documents pursuant to s 24 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act).
The intervener is the Attorney General, who intervened in this proceeding pursuant to s 37(1) of the SAT Act. The intervener also acted as a contradictor to the application made by Mr Blanco in this proceeding to extend the time for him to lodge his application for a review.
On 3 June 2025, the Tribunal heard the application by Mr Blanco under r 10 to extend the time for him to lodge his application for a review of the decision of the Panel. For the reasons that follow the Tribunal refuses to extend time under r 10 to allow for a review of the decision of the Panel, and consequently the application for review is to be dismissed.

Background

On 29 November 2023, Mr Blanco made statements at an Ordinary Council Meeting of the Town.
On 1 February 2024, a Complaint of Minor Breach Form (Complaint) relating to the statements made by Mr Blanco on 29 November 2023 was received by the Town's Complaint's Officer.
On 2 February 2024, the Town's Complaint's Officer forwarded the Complaint to the Panel.
On 5 February 2024, the Panel notified Mr Blanco of the Complaint by email sent to Mr Blanco's Town email address [email protected]. Mr Blanco says, for reasons the Tribunal will discuss in detail later in these reasons, he did not become aware of this email until he was verbally advised of it by a Town employee on a date between 5 February 2024 and 19 February 2024. On becoming aware he had been sent an email by the Panel Mr Blanco accessed the emails sent to his Town email address and read the Panel's 5 February 2024 email.
On 19 February 2024, Mr Blanco responded to the Complaint by way of an email sent to the Panel from his Town email address.
On 14 March 2024, the Panel convened to consider the Complaint and after consideration it found Mr Blanco had committed a Minor Breach under:
a.the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) ("the Act") and regulation 20 of the Local Government (Model Code of Conduct) Regulations 2021 ("the Regulations"); and
b.the Act and Regulation 34D of the Local Government (Administration) Regulations 1996 ("the Administration Regulations"), when he made various public comments at an Ordinary Council Meeting falsely accusing the Town's administration of improper conduct ("the Minor Breach").
On 10 May 2024 the Panel sent notice of its findings along with a copy of the Panel's Finding and Reasons for Finding to Mr Blanco's Town email address. The Panel's notice stated the Panel would convene to consider how it should deal with the Minor breach under s 5.110(6) of the LG Act and offered Mr Blanco an opportunity to make submissions as to how the Minor Breach should be dealt with. Mr Blanco did not make any submissions to the Panel as to how the Minor Breach should be dealt with, nor did he respond to that email in any way.
On 10 June 2024, the Panel convened to consider how it should deal with the Minor Breach.
On 17 July 2024, the Panel sent notice to Mr Blanco by email to his Town email address of how it would deal with the Minor Breach of reg 20 of the Local Government (Model Code of Conduct) Regulations 2021 (WA) (the Regulations) and reg 34D of the Local Government (Administration) Regulations 1996 (WA) (Administration Regulations). The Panel dealt with the Minor Breach by ordering that under s 5.110(6)(b)(i), s 5.110(6)(b)(ii) and s 5.110(6)(c) of the LG Act Mr Blanco was to, in effect:
(1)be publicly censured by the Panel; and
(2)publicly apologise as specified by the Panel with the requirement to apologise within a certain timeframe, failing which the Town is to publish the apology on behalf of Mr Blanco.
The Panel's notice included information on Mr Blanco's right to apply to this Tribunal for a review of its decision within 28 days of the date of the notice.
Mr Blanco did not, as required by Order 3 of the Panel's orders dated 17 July 2024, make an apology at a meeting of the Council '[o]n the ordinary council meeting of the Town of Port Hedland first occurring after the expiration of 28 days from the date of service of this Order on him' and neither did he ever give such an apology at any later ordinary council meeting of the Town. It is accepted by the parties that the date of the 'first occurring' ordinary council meeting of the Town was 28 August 2024. Mr Blanco also did not respond to the Panel's email and nor did he lodge an application for a review of the Panel's decision within the time set out in the notice.
On 2 September 2024, the Chief Executive Officer of the Town (CEO of the Town) sent an email to Mr Blanco's Town email address informing Mr Blanco that in accordance with the Panel's decision the Town will publish the Public Censure and Apology on the Town's Facebook page and website in the upcoming week and on 19 September 2024 it will publish these in the Town Community newsletter. Further, this email stated, '[a]s directed by the Department of Local Government, I will also notify the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) as specified in accordance with s 5.118(1) of the Act, of your failure to comply with the terms of the Order'. Mr Blanco did not respond to this email.
It is accepted by the parties that on 4 September 2024 the Town did publish the Public Censure and Apology on the Town's Facebook page and on its website. The Tribunal has not been provided with any information as to whether these were also published in the Town Community newsletter, but whether or not the Town published the Public Censure and Apology in the Town Community newsletter is of no significance to the extension application.
On 4 September 2024, the CEO of the Town in accordance with s 5.110(6)(b)(i) and s 5.110(6)(b)(ii) of the LG Act referred Mr Blanco's failure, on 28 August 2024, to comply with Order 3 of the Panel's orders to this Tribunal. This referral was given the matter number DR 135 of 2024. However, on the basis of Mr Blanco's own evidence this referral did not come to his attention until the day before the first directions hearing in DR 135 of 2024, which was held on 27 September 2024.[1] That is, DR 135 of 2024 did not come to his attention until 26 September 2024.
[1] Witness statement of Mr Blanco, para 34.
On 27 September 2024 Mr Blanco participated in a directions hearing held by a Senior Member of the Tribunal in DR 135 of 2024. He then participated in a mediation of that proceeding at the Tribunal on 17 October 2024.
On 13 January 2025 Mr Blanco lodged with the Tribunal and gave to the other parties the bundle of documents he intended to rely upon at the hearing of DR 135 of 2024.
On 22 November 2024 and on 17 January 2025 Mr Blanco again participated in directions hearings in DR 135 of 2024, which on 24 January 2025 was then listed for final hearing on 21 February 2025.
On 20 February 2025 Mr Blanco, through his recently engaged solicitors, lodged an application in DR 135 of 2024 to adjourn the hearing listed for 21 February 2025. On 21 February 2025 the Tribunal after hearing from both parties adjourned the hearing.
On 20 February 2025, Mr Blanco under s 5.125(1) of the LG Act also lodged this application, which became CC 127 of 2025, in which he sought the following orders:
(1)The time for the applicant to apply for a review from the Local Government Standards Panel's decision be extended to 21 February 2025.
(2)The Local Government Standards Panel's decision made 14 March 2024 be set aside.
(3)The complaint referred to the Local Government Standards Panel be dismissed.
On 10 April 2025 Senior Member Aitken of this Tribunal required the applicant to lodge submissions in support of his extension application in this proceeding and required the intervener in turn to lodge its submissions in response. The extension application was then listed for hearing at 10.00 am on 3 June 2025.
On 13 August 2025 Senior Member Aitken listed DR 135 of 2024 for a directions hearing at 11.00 am on 27 September 2025 'to await the decision in the applicant's application for an extension of time to commence the proceedings in matter number CC 127/2025'.

The extension application

The documents available to the Tribunal at the hearing on 3 June 2025 of the extension application were:
•the applicant's submissions;
•the intervener's submissions;
•a Hearing Book (HB) comprising documents lodged by Mr Blanco and the respondent; and
•the witness statement of Mr Blanco dated 16 May 2025.
Mr Blanco gave oral evidence under affirmation via audio visual link at the hearing of the extension application. In his evidence Mr Blanco confirmed as true the contents of his witness statement dated 16 May 2025. Mr Blanco's witness statement was then tendered and marked by the Tribunal as Exhibit. The interevener was given and took the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Blanco. At the conclusion of the hearing counsel for Mr Blanco and counsel for the intervener made oral closing submissions.
The basis upon which the Tribunal will determine whether to exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time to commence a review proceeding under r 10 is well established, and is not in dispute in this proceeding, which is that the discretion is to be guided by four principal considerations:
(a)the length of delay;
(b)the reasons or explanation for delay;
(c)whether there is an arguable case for review; and
(d)whether the extension would cause prejudice.
For the purpose of determining this extension application the Tribunal respectfully adopts the exposition of these principles given by Deputy President Jackson in Heidelberg Materials Australia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2025] WASAT 66. The Deputy President, when explaining these principles, cited a passage of McHugh J in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR 458 as to the object of the discretion to extend time:
The object of the [discretion to extend time] is to ensure that those Rules which fix times for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Court or Justice to do justice between the parties … This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time.
The Tribunal will now consider each of these principles in turn.

The Length of the delay

Under s 5.125(1) of the LG Act '[a] party may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of a decision of a standards panel'. Under s 5.102A 'party' 'when used in connection with a complaint' means the person who made the complaint or the person against whom the complaint was made. There is no doubt that Mr Blanco is a party who may apply for a review of a decision of the Panel.
Importantly, under s 5.125(2) of the LG Act, 'decision' 'means a decision to make an order under s 5.110(6)', with s 5.110(6) relating to one or more of the orders that are to be made by the Panel upon finding a council member has committed a breach.
Rule 9 states that, subject to the Rules, 'an application to the Tribunal under its review jurisdiction must be made within 28 days of', relevantly, 'the day on which the decision-maker gives notice under the Act section 20(1)'.
On the basis of this reasoning, in combination with the facts which are not in dispute between the parties, the Tribunal is satisfied and finds:
(a)Mr Blanco was a councillor of the Town on 29 November 2023 and that he continued to be a councillor of the Town as at 3 June 2025.
(b)Mr Blanco on 29 November 2023 during open debate at an Ordinary Council Meeting did make the statements imputed to him at paragraph 17 of the Panel's reasons dated 10 May 2024.
(c)The Panel gave notice of its decision that Mr Blanco had committed a Minor Breach by email sent to his Town email address on 10 May 2024 and that it gave notice of its sanction decision by email sent to his Town email address on 17 July 2024.[2]
(d)Mr Blanco did not, as required by Order 3 of the Panel's orders dated 17 July 2024, make an apology at the ordinary council meeting of the Town on 28 August 2024.
(e)the Panel is a 'decision-maker' for the purposes of r 9 and Mr Blanco is a person who has a right of review under an enabling Act, which in this case is the LG Act.
(f)Mr Blanco lodged his application for review with the Tribunal on 20 February 2025.
(g)under s 5.125 of the LG Act read with s 5.110(6), the date by which Mr Blanco under r 9(a) of the Rules should have lodged his application with this Tribunal for review of the Panel's decision, is 14 August 2024.
(f)consequently, Mr Blanco lodged his application 190 days outside of the time permitted by r 9(a).
[2] See s 14(1)(a), Electronic Transactions Act 2011 (WA).
Mr Blanco's conduct during the period 29 November 2023 to 20 February 2025 will be considered in detail in these reasons. The evidence as to Mr Blanco's conduct is to be found in the evidence Mr Blanco gave at the hearing of the extension application as well as the documents contained within the bundles lodged with the Tribunal by Mr Blanco and the respondent.
Before turning to Mr Blanco's evidence, the Tribunal makes clear it found Mr Blanco to be a frank and forthright witness.
In summary, Mr Blanco's evidence is:
(a)Shortly after he was elected to the Town council on 20 October 2023, he was issued a laptop by the Town for his use on the condition he signed a 'Conditions of Computer/Communication Use Agreement' (Use Agreement) which he believed would permit the Town's IT services to monitor his communications including his emails and telephone calls.
(b)He refused to sign the Use Agreement as he was concerned this would mean emails sent to him by constituents could be read by the Town.
(c)As he refused to sign the use Agreement, he handed the laptop back to the Town and thereafter he used his personal laptop to access emails sent to his Town email address, although this was difficult and time consuming. He estimated his attempts to access his Town email's failed about 80% of the time. However, when he was alerted to and did look for the Panel's email sometime between 5 and 19 February 2024, he was able to find and read the email.
(d)He emailed the Panel on 19 February 2024 using his Town email address even though he was aware at that time it was difficult for him to access his Town emails and he accepts that, perhaps, he should have asked the Panel to email him thereafter on an alternative email address which he could access more easily.
(e)It was his belief, based on his prior experience as Mayor of the Town, that the Panel would take around two years to resolve the complaint made to it on 2 February 2024. He therefore believed that he would not hear back from the Panel for around twelve to fifteen months.
(f)He read the apology published by the Town on its Facebook page on 4 September 2024, which is the day it was published, and he accepts the apology contains information which made it clear that the Panel had dealt with the complaint about him.
(g)Based on his prior experience when he had successfully challenged a decision of the Panel, he knew that he was able to apply to the Tribunal for a review of a decision of the Panel.
(h)He did not apply to the Tribunal before 4 September 2024 for a review of the Panel's decision as he was not aware until that date that the Panel had made a decision about him. Then, from the time he became aware of DR 135 of 2024 which was on 26 September 2024, he believed he would be able to have the Panel's decision reviewed in that proceeding. However, based on legal advice he later received he now accepts that his belief in this regard was incorrect.
(i)On 13 January 2025 Mr Blanco lodged a bundle of documents with the Tribunal in DR 135 of 2024 the contents of which, he says, clearly show that at this time he considered the Tribunal would review the Panel's decision in that proceeding. Then, on 17 January 2025, he attended a directions hearing in DR 135 of 2024 at the Tribunal where he understood the presiding Deputy President to say in effect, it was open for him to seek a review of the Panel's decision in that proceeding.

While Mr Blanco accepts he did not lodge his application for review until 20 February 2025, which he also accepts is 190 days outside of the time permitted under the Rules, he nonetheless submits that for the purpose of calculating the extent of the time he delayed before making his application for review the Tribunal should have regard to the date the date on which he believed (genuinely but incorrectly) that an application for review of the decision of the Panel was before the Tribunal, which was when he became aware of DR 135 of 2024 on 26 September 2024. This, Mr Blanco contends, means that the extent of his delay was not in fact the 190 days between 14 August 2024 and 20 February 2025 (218 days in total from 17 July 2024) but, rather, was the 43 days between 14 August 2024 and 26 September 2024 (71 days in total from 17 July 2024).
The Tribunal has a number of difficulties with this submission.
First, it is clear that Mr Blanco did not lodge an application for review with the Tribunal on or as soon as practicable after 4 September 2024. That is, even accepting that Mr Blanco did genuinely believe that the Panel's decision could be reviewed within DR 135 of 2024, which evidence the Tribunal does accept, this belief does not explain why he failed to lodge an application for a review of the Panel's decision in the period between 4 September 2024 and 26 September 2024, which is when he became aware of DR 135 of 2024. That is, Mr Blanco provides no explanation as to why he did not either prepare to lodge or did not actually lodge an application for a review of the Panel's decision in the period of time between 4 September 2024 and 26 September 2024.
Second, implicit in Mr Blanco's evidence is his admission that even once he became aware on 4 September 2024 that the Panel had reached conclusions and made orders about him, he gave no real explanation as to why he did not persist with his attempts to access the emails sent to his Town email address in order to find any email sent to him by the Panel or, failing that, to obtain a copy of the Panel's decisions by, for example, contacting either the Town or the Panel to request from them a copy of the Panel's decisions. Had Mr Blanco done any of these things he would have learned he had 28 days from 17 July 2024 in which to lodge an application for a review of the Panel's decisions and, while, that time would have passed, he could have then made an extension application much earlier than he in fact did.
Third, Mr Blanco provides no convincing reason why he should not be held to the consequences of choosing to correspond with the Panel through his Town email address when he knew this was difficult and that he had the option to give another easily accessible email address to the Panel. That is, whilst the Tribunal accepts that Mr Blanco did experience difficulties in accessing his Town emails, it finds that he nonetheless chose to use this email address to communicate with the Panel and that, while it was difficult for him to access those emails, he could, when he wanted, in fact access them.
After considering all these matters the Tribunal is satisfied and finds that Mr Blanco was given notice of the Panel's decisions on 10 May 2024 and 17 July 2024, these being the dates on which the Panel sent its emails to Mr Blanco at his Town email address.
Accordingly, the Panel is satisfied and it finds that Mr Blanco was 190 days out of time when he lodged his application for a review of the Panel's decision on 21 February 2025.

The reasons or explanation for delay

As discussed above, the explanation given by Mr Blanco for failing to lodge an application with the Tribunal for a review of the Panel's decision until 20 February 2025 is that:
(a)he was not aware that the Panel had made any decision until 4 September 2024; and
(b)he believed that that he was able to have a review of the Panel's decision in DR 135 of 2024.
In Wood,[3] w the former President of this Tribunal, Pritchard J said:
The time limits for the commencement of applications in the Tribunal, in so far as they apply in review applications, reflect the fact that there is clearly a public interest in the finality and certainty of decisions which are amenable to merits review by the Tribunal. To permit the review of such decisions after a delay, much less a substantial delay, can be productive of great uncertainty, not only for decision makers (who will ordinarily be expected to be consistent in their decision making) but for third parties who may be affected by such decisions.
[3] Wood and Law Complaints Officer as Delegate of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2024] WASAT 35 [101].
The explanations given by Mr Blanco for not lodging an application for a review of the Panel's decision until 20 February 2025 are discussed above.
For the reasons set out there, the Tribunal finds Mr Blanco's explanations to be inadequate, that is, to be without good explanation.

Whether there is an arguable case for review

Mr Blanco in his written submissions identifies 'three reasons why the Tribunal's correct and preferable decision, at least arguably, would differ from the Panel's decision'.
Mr Blanco's first reason is that, while his statements on 29 November 2023 are a reflection on the Town's administration, they are not, when considered in their broader context and in line with the protection afforded by the implied freedom of political communication, an 'adverse reflection' as he contends is required by reg 34D of the Administration Regulations. Mr Blanco says, when looked at in context, his statements were simply identifying an 'apparent inconsistency' in statements made by the Town's Mayor and administration.
Mr Blanco's second reason is that, if the Tribunal finds his statements are an 'adverse reflection' within the meaning of reg 34D of the Administration Regulations, then they are statements directed to the 'Town administration' or 'administrative staff of the Town' and not, as he contends is required, directed to any particular staff member.
Mr Blanco's third reason is that, even if the Tribunal should accept that the Panel's decision is otherwise correct and preferable, that the mode of publication as well as the wording of the censure and apology, which included words such as 'falsely' and 'unfounded accusations' as well as an 'admission of wrongdoing', were inappropriate given that Mr Blanco believed, and had a reasonable basis to believe, a certain state of affairs about the matters the subject of his statements.
The intervener in its written submissions contends each of these reasons does not have merit and little weight should be afforded to them when the Tribunal considers whether to exercise its jurisdiction to extend time.[4]
[4] Intervener's Submissions, para 22.
With respect to Mr Blanco's first reason, the intervener says Mr Blanco in his statements said information had been 'withheld', a 'cover up' was ongoing, 'someone is not being truthful', there had been 'restriction on certain information' and anyone who did not agree with him was 'agreeing that this sort of behaviour is your standard and you're happy for it to continue'. The intervener contends that statements such as these are clearly adverse reflections which imply the Mayor and/or members of the Town's administration:
(a)covered up information to protect the Town from reputational harm;
(b)failed to undertake an investigation into the matters complained of despite their stating they had; and
(c)deliberately withheld information from councillors and approved a media release which was not truthful.
The intervener also contends that each of these statements amounts to a statement that a local government employee was 'dishonest' and/or 'incompetent' and would be perceived 'by a reasonable person as tending to lower a person in the estimation of his or fellow persons by making them think less of him or her'. The intervener then observes that in any event it was open to Mr Blanco under cl 9.14 of the Town's Standing Orders to seek that the meeting resolve that the question before the meeting cannot be adequately considered without reflecting adversely on the character or actions of another member or employee, or to impute any motive to a member or employee, and that he did not avail himself of this procedure.
The intervener then cites observations by Senior Member Aitken of this Tribunal in Kingston and Local Government Standards Panel [2025] WASAT 43 at [47] which are to the effect that the implied constitutional freedom of political communication is not a personal right and it 'is not a restriction on the exercise of the functions of the Panel in dealing with complaints'.
With respect to Mr Blanco's second reason the intervener contends that contrary to Mr Blanco's submissions, a council member will be in breach if an employee or council member is capable of being identified through the context of the statements, even if they are not directly named. On that basis, the intervener says Mr Blanco's reference to the 'officer' who undertook the investigations, those responsible for the preparation of the council minutes and documents, and the Mayor are all references to persons who are identifiable.
With respect to Mr Blanco's third reason, the intervener contends that Mr Blanco's belief about 'certain things' does not mean that his adverse reflections were true. In any event, the intervener contends that Mr Blanco has provided no good reason why the Public Apology and Censure should not be published on the Facebook page, the Town's website and its community newsletter, given that to do so clearly promotes the objects of the minor breach process and enables the public disapprobation of the councillor's conduct. The intervener refers to passages by Pritchard J in Treby v Local Government Standards Panel [2010] WASAT 81 [123] - [127] in support of this propositions.
After considering these matters the Tribunal finds that none of the three reasons advanced by Mr Blanco have merit.
First, Mr Blanco's statements are clearly statements which convey adverse reflections on the Town's officers and its then Mayor as well as amounting to statements that such persons are dishonest or incompetent. Any suggestion that such statements are protected by an implied constitutional freedom of political communication is, as Senior Member Aitken has said in Kingston, not sustainable.
Second, the statements clearly do refer to the 'officer' who undertook the investigations, those responsible for the preparation of the council minutes and documents, and the then Mayor, and these are all persons who are identifiable.
Third, while much time was spent during the hearing reviewing the materials in the hearing book to determine when and how the information about the massage parlour that concerned Mr Blanco was passed to the Town's councillors, Mr Blanco could point to nothing which showed that the Mayor and/or members of the Town's administration covered up information to protect the Town from reputational harm, that they failed to undertake an investigation into the matters complained of or had approved a media release which was not truthful. Rather, to the contrary, what emerged was information which showed:
(a)In August 2023 (prior to Mr Blanco being elected to the Council) a briefing was given to Councillors 'where there was discussion around the use of the premises and the potential for it to be used as a brothel': Minutes of Ordinary Council Meeting 1 November 2023.[5]
(b)The ordinary Council Meeting Agenda dated 30 August 2023 (which is prior to Mr Blanco being elected to the Council) noted an allegation had been made that an illegal business was operating from the premises of the proposed massage parlour, but the objector who raised the allegation wished to remain anonymous and for this reason the objection documents were not included in or attached to the report.[6]
(c)The ordinary Council Meeting Minutes dated 1 November 2023 included a response by the Director Regulatory Services that:[7]
The Town Planning unit has not misled or withheld information from Councillors in relation to the Jibson Close massage therapy business as alleged by this question and the statement provided. Assessment of the application, including an assessment of the property by two Town Planning Officers, found no evidence of activities of a sexual nature, therefore the officer's recommendation to Council was to conditionally approve the application. Councillors received a briefing on this item prior to the Ordinary Council Meeting at which comment was made in relation to the services provided based on the objection received during the public consultation period. The objection included the same information included in the electronic correspondence provided by Mr Blanco to Councillors during question time[.]
[5] HB, page 414.
[6] HB, page 278.
[7] HB, page 410.
None of these documents supports the contention made by Mr Blanco that his statements about the Mayor and members of the Town's administration were true.
The Tribunal also gave Mr Blanco an opportunity after the hearing to lodge further evidence in respect of his application, namely, to lodge the Mayor's media release which was said to be misleading or untruthful. However, Mr Blanco did not lodge this media release with the Tribunal.
The Tribunal is for these reasons not satisfied that any of the three reasons advanced by Mr Blanco are arguable, even on the basis that the threshold to establish an arguable case is not particularly onerous.[8]

Whether the extension would cause prejudice

[8] Goedhart and Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASAT 49 [21].

Mr Blanco in his written submissions contends that the respondent would suffer no prejudice by the extension of time but, on the other hand, Mr Blanco himself would lose the opportunity to review a decision he was unaware of and that he would be then susceptible to suspension or disqualification as a Councillor in the Town's enforcement proceeding. Mr Blanco says this significant prejudice outweighs any identifiable prejudice to the respondent.
The intervener in its written submission's points to the following prejudice that would be suffered should there be an extension of time:
(a)current and former employees of the Town including the then Mayor, would suffer the stress and uncertainty of their reputation, competence or honesty once more being brought into question, noting the Panel's decision was finalised on 17 July 2024;
(b)the Town has arranged its affairs on the basis of the decision being final; and
(c)the respondent, upon the expiration of the time allowed Mr Blanco to apply for a review of its decision, has a 'vested right to retain the judgement'.
The intervener does not, however, submit that any of these prejudices is especially significant, or that they cannot be ameliorated.
The intervener also submits that there is nothing that would indicate why Mr Blanco would be suspended or disqualified for conduct that it considers is of 'middling' seriousness.

Consideration

The Tribunal must balance each of the principles set out above in the exercise of its discretion.
In the Tribunal's view all relevant factors go against granting an extension of time. The factors which weigh against granting an extension of time are the lengthy delay by Mr Blanco in lodging his review application (190 days) in circumstances where his explanation for this delay are inadequate, that his case is not arguable and that there will be some modest but not incurable prejudice to the respondent and employees of the Town if an extension of time is granted.
The Tribunal has therefore decided that strict compliance with the Rules will not work an injustice upon Mr Blanco. That is, the Tribunal has decided it is in the interests of justice between the parties to refuse to grant an extension of time for Mr Blanco to make the review application.
The Tribunal will now make the following orders.

Orders

The Tribunal orders:
1.The application for an extension of time to make the application for review is refused.
2.The application for review is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MR E Cade, MEMBER
11 SEPTEMBER 2025