Blake v Holland
[1987] TASSC 131
•24 December 1987
Serial No B61/1987
List "B"
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Blake v Holland [1987] TASSC 131; B61/1987
PARTIES: BLAKE, Raymond Vincent
v
HOLLAND. Richard
FILE NO/S: 515A/1987
DELIVERED ON: 24 December 1987
JUDGMENT OF: Wright J
Judgment Number: B61/1987
Number of paragraphs: 30
Serial No B61/1987
List "B"
File No 515A1987
RAYMOND VINCENT BLAKE v RICHARD HOLLAND
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT WRIGHT J
24 December 1987
The plaintiff, a divorcee now aged 44 years was injured in a motor accident near Strahan on the West Coast on 9 July 1981. He was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by the defendant which left the road and overturned. The plaintiff sues the defendant for damages for negligence and, liability not having been contested, interlocutory judgment was entered on the 17 March 1986 for damages to be assessed. The matter comes before me for this purpose.
At the time of the accident the plaintiff and the defendant were both working for the Department of Main Roads. They were resident at a camp near the Henty River and had been into Strahan to cash their pay cheques. They had a counter tea and about half a dozen beers each. As they were returning to camp the car left the road, and rolled over. The plaintiff clambered out through the front window. It was a very cold night and he immediately felt pain in his neck and shoulder. The defendant, who was apparently uninjured, returned to the camp on foot, leaving the plaintiff at the accident scene. Fortunately for him a passerby gave him a lift back to camp soon after. He spent a very uncomfortable night and at lunch time the next day arrangements were made to convey him to the Mersey General Hospital at Latrobe. He was attended by Mr Dermot Morgan and was found to have a subluxation of the cervical vertebrae at level C4/5. This injury was initially treated conservatively but the disorganised neck failed to become stable and on 25 February 1982 he underwent an anterior interbody fusion between the fourth and fifth cervical vertebrae. He continued to experience persistent and disabling neck pain, despite a cervical manipulation carried out under general anaesthetic in July 1982, and on 24 November 1983, a second anterior interbody fusion was carried out at level C5/6. A further cervical manipulation under general anaesthetic took place in May of 1984. Mr Dermot Morgan was the surgeon on all the occasions that I have mentioned.
The plaintiff however continued to experience significant and chronic pain and consulted Dr Michael Jackson of Hobart, who has practiced as a specialist in the management of chronic pain since 1978. The plaintiff first saw him on the 1 August 1984 and since then has had many consultations and has undergone a number of treatments under general anaesthetic. On the 6 August 1984, he received a cervical epidural injection at Calvary Hospital. In common with subsequent procedures of the same kind, this afforded him some substantial initial relief from his painful neck. Indeed it rendered him almost pain free for a period of between four and six weeks, or possibly a little longer. Similar procedures were undertaken on the 16 November 1984, the 20 November 1984, the 12 March 1985 and the 28 May 1986. It was suggested during the course of the trial that the plaintiff's failure to seek or obtain further cervical epidural injections after the 28 May 1986 indicated that he no longer found them efficacious, but I accept the plaintiff's assertion that the only reason he has not approached Dr Jackson for further epidural injections since that date, is that in his current straitened financial circumstances, he is unable to afford the cost. He is currently an invalid pensioner and due to a somewhat anomalous situation, procedures of this kind are not available to him free of charge. I accept that following the finalisation of this matter, he will continue to seek periodic relief from his ongoing pain by submitting to procedures of this kind at the hands of Dr Jackson. It is plain, however, that the procedures themselves are somewhat hazardous and cause initial severe discomfort. It is also plain that their effectiveness has diminished somewhat over the years and I think that the plaintiff will resort to them with diminishing frequency over the balance of his life. Dr Jackson originally supplied the plaintiff with a TENS machine which the plaintiff found useful but, following the onset of severe dermatitis it was necessary to abandon the use of this equipment. It seems unlikely that the TENS machine will be used again.
The plaintiff has also received a left cervical facet block (24 August 1984) from Dr Jackson with little or no benefit and, on 16 November 1984, and again on the 14 March 1985, Dr Jackson carried out a left lateral cutaneous nerve block procedure on the plaintiff's left hip for the purpose of alleviating pain which emanated from a surgical site which occurred when Mr Morgan harvested bone from that area for the purpose of the plaintiff's first cervical fusion operation. Since that operation, the left hip has been a source of considerable pain to the plaintiff and despite the procedures just mentioned carried out by Dr Jackson, the plaintiff found it necessary to consult Mr H W Bye an orthopaedic surgeon who, on 7 July 1986 at Calvary Hospital performed an excision of the scar on that site and debrided the irregular areas of bone which were detected underlying the scar. Mr Bye found it difficult to effect an efficient soft tissue closure over the operation site, and the wound became infected. After treatment with antibiotics it was necessary to review the wound in the operating theatre. The wound has now healed satisfactorily, but the plaintiff claims that it is still painful and he walks with a pronounced limp. It was submitted that it is unlikely that the left hip is still a source of substantial pain to the plaintiff, but I reject this contention. It is plain from the evidence that operations on the iliac crest to harvest bone can be productive of significant chronic pain and I accept that the plaintiff continues to experience severe discomfort in this area despite the best endeavours of Mr Bye. It should be noted that a similar harvesting operation was carried out on the right hip by Mr Morgan for the second cervical fusion and although this has left an obvious scar, it is of no cosmetic significance to the plaintiff and does not disable him in the same way as the left.
For the purpose of these proceedings the plaintiff was examined by two specialist surgeons in Hobart, Mr Graham Patrick Duffy, a neurosurgeon and Mr R W L Turner, an orthopaedic surgeon. Both doctors were of the opinion that the plaintiff has sustained a severe injury to the cervical spine which has significantly reduced its movement and flexibility. It is also somewhat deformed at the level of one of the fusion sites. Both doctors noted as I also noted during the course of the plaintiff's sojourn in the witness box, that he holds himself very stiffly, with his neck tilted somewhat to the left and slightly rotated. They were of the view that it was inadvisable for the plaintiff to undertake heavy lifting and they thought that he would be no longer able to carry out the duties of plant operator which he was discharging at the time of the accident. It was also clear that, in common with Dr Jackson and the plaintiff's general practitioner, Dr Bell, they regarded him as having been rendered unemployable as a result of the accident and its sequelae. This was a conclusion which was not really challenged by the defence which adduced no contradictory medical opinion. In the circumstances however, this does not cause me to draw any adverse inferences against the defence case. Equally, Mr Dermot Morgan's absence from the witness box during the case for the plaintiff causes no inference adverse to the plaintiff.
It is perhaps appropriate that at this stage I should record my own impressions of the plaintiff. In the first place, he looked considerably older than his stated 44 years and, accepting as I do, the evidence of Mr Leo Sheehan, a former workmate who has known the plaintiff for many years, it is plain that his aged appearance has come about since the accident. I infer that it has been caused by a combination of chronic pain, anxiety and depression. I have already noted that the plaintiff held himself rigidly in the witness box. He also changed his posture from time to time and chose to stand rather than sit on occasions. I am satisfied that these were manoeuvres carried out to alleviate discomfort, rather than to impress me. Although moved to eloquence on occasions, the plaintiff was basically taciturn and phlegmatic. I do not think that he consciously exaggerated his symptoms, although I do find that in relation to his previous medical history, he was less than frank and indeed, I think he set out to deliberately mislead me in some important areas.
The defence submitted that notwithstanding the plaintiff's unemployability since the accident, this was a case in which a mathematical approach to assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity would not be appropriate. This submission was based primarily upon the proposition that prior to the accident the plaintiff's employment with the Department of Main Roads, albeit an employment of some 18 or 19 years' duration, had been placed in substantial jeopardy by the plaintiff's over indulgence in alcohol, necessitating his undergoing treatment at the Devon Clinic and, on one occasion, losing his driving licence for a substantial period. It was submitted that his partiality for liquor, coupled with his acknowledged heavy smoking of fifty cigarettes a day, even if not leading to his dismissal or suspension from employment, was likely to cause a deleterious effect on his health and his retirement prior to the normal retirement age of 65 years.
In light of these submissions which, if accepted, would have an important effect upon the plaintiff's award under this head of damages, I have carefully reviewed the relevant hospital records. They were not referred to in detail by either counsel at the trial, and it has therefore been necessary for me to find my own way through a weighty dossier.
The plaintiff was admitted to, and treated at the Devon Clinic attached to the Mersey General Hospital over a period of about 8 years prior to his accident. The plaintiff's cross–examination was conducted on the basis that these admissions were for the purpose of his treatment for alcoholism, but it seems from copy medical reports which are attached to the hospital records, that the treating doctors found it uncommonly difficult to arrive at a firm diagnosis of his condition. To illustrate this diagnostic problem, I set out hereunder two reports dated the 2 December 1975 and the 3 August 1977 respectively:
"2nd December, 1975
FR/JR
Dr G Jamieson,
157 William Street,
DEVONPORT
Tasmania
Dear Dr Jamieson,
re: Raymond Vincent Blake (32)
81 Sorell Street, Devonport
Admitted 23rd November, 1975
Discharged 25th November, 1975
DiagnosisRecurrent attacks of unconsciousness closely related to alcohol intake
This man was admitted unconscious after being found slumped over the steering wheel of his car by his wife. He has a two year history of attacks commencing with frothing of the mouth and then frantic scratching his face and head finally lapsing into unconsciousness. He was investigated in 1973 at which time he had skull x–rays, brain scan and EEG, all of which were reported as NAD He had had no attacks for twelve months until a week prior to the present occasion when he had had one attack seven days prior to admission and a further attack two days prior to admission. On the night prior to admission he had consumed at least twenty glasses of beer, had returned home at about 8pm and was bleeding from abrasions on his face presumably after having had another attack. About 10pm he went out to buy some cordial for his children and did not return. The following morning his wife set off to go to work and noticed the patient's car parked a few hundred yards down their street with the patient slumped over the steering wheel with a car pointing away from the kerb.
On examination he was unconscious and unresponsive to voice or painful stimuli. He was opening his eyes occasionally in a dream–like fashion. There was no pallor/cyanosis/jaundice. He was apyrexial with a pulse rate of 104/min regular and his blood pressure was 130/75. His respiration was stertorous ?? Cheyne–Stokes. Pupils were equal and reacting to light and accommodation. Fundi were NAD Tone was symmetrical but somewhat variable between rigidity and flaccidity. Reflexes were normal and symmetrical. Plantars were both flexor.
He recovered consciousness spontaneously within about two hours of admission and remembered nothing of what had happened. There was no history of tongue biting or urinary incontinence with these attacks. It is noted that these attacks only occur after drinking somewhere in the order of twenty + beers and it would seem that these are not primarily psychological. They are closely related to alcohol and not directly due to intoxication. Dr Hall feels that they may be an epileptic variant with the headache as an aura but alcohol induced hypoglycemia is also a possibility. The remedy is very obvious – drastic reduction in alcohol intake, this the patient has agreed to.
Yours sincerely,
F ReynoldsResident Medical Officer
DEVON CLINIC
3rd August, 1977
JSH/THL
Dr G Jamieson,
157 William St,
DEVONPORT 7310
Dear
Re: RAYMOND VINCENT BLAKE (34)
81 Sorell St, Devonport
Admitted: 24677
Discharged: 8777
Diagnosis: Possible Temporal Lobe Epilepsy Possible Dissociative Hysteria
This patient was admitted for investigation of his 'turns' which he had been having episodically for some years but which had increased recently. On previous occasions he has been thoroughly investigated including, in 1973, EEG and brain scan in Launceston, both of which results were normal.
The 'turns' once again consisted of episodes of apparent unconsciousness following which he clawed at his head and produced considerable lacerations. He claimed that he did not have knowledge of what he was doing other than that afterwards he developed severe headache. He has a history of extremely heavy alcoholic intake habitually at the weekend but only drinks very little during the week. In the past I have consistently advised him to abstain from all alcohol but he has consistently refused to follow my advice.
We observed many of his attacks whilst he was in hospital and were unable to decide between an epileptic variant and dissociative attacks. He went over to Launceston for an EEG and this reading was reported as normal even though he had an attack of diminished consciousness an hour later whilst returning to the ward in the car. On this evidence therefore an epileptic variant is less likely.
On further discussion both with the patient and his wife separately there were pointers to dissociation; from his wife's account he has always been selfish and bad tempered and she felt that these attacks were related to his personality difficulties, but were also worse in relation to alcohol.
Eventually we decided to cover the possibility of an epileptic variant by giving him Tegretol medication but also his wife became more determined than usual and was prepared to leave him if he did not now take advice and abstain from all alcohol.
He was therefore discharged home in order to allow his wife to have a rest in place of him and I will follow them both up in Outpatients. He was discharged on Tegretol 200mg QID.
Kind Regards,
Yours Sincerely
J S Tooth
REGIONAL PSYCHIATRIST
cc Dr Lane"
It is plain that the plaintiff's work was not directly affected by his consumption of alcohol and that the amounts of sick leave which he took from time to time do not either of themselves or in conjunction with the other evidence, suggest that they were occasioned by an alcohol problem. His former wife was not called to give evidence and her only untested complaints about his condition are to be found in the medical records. The plaintiff conceded that he drank heavily from time to time, but only at the weekends and in the absence of any direct medical or lay witnesses who can assist me as to the plaintiff's pre–accident health, I am left with the impression that he was a heavy episodic drinker who abused alcohol from time to time but was not necessarily alcohol dependent. I have no doubt that many of his marital difficulties were occasioned by the consequences of his heavy drinking which may well have included epileptic behaviour brought about by alcohol induced hypoglycemia. This, coupled with the evidence of Mr Partridge an executive officer employed by the Department of Main Roads who gave evidence of a somewhat speculative character as to the benevolent departmental attitude to long term employees who suffered licence disqualifications and the evidence of Mr Leo Sheehan, a brief but impressive witness, his daughter Miss Karen Blake and a lady friend, Mrs Anne Puncheon, leaves me with the impression that there was no immediate threat to the plaintiff's employment with the DMR at the time of the accident. On the other hand, whether his puzzling behaviour necessitating admission to the Devon Clinic arose from a normal or abnormal reaction to alcohol, it was something which was likely to lead to a real risk of injury or death if he did not totally abstain from liquor and it is plain that this is something which he was not prepared to do. As already noted he had been drinking with a workmate on the night of the accident giving rise to these proceedings. I am also prepared to take judicial notice that a long term consumption of fifty cigarettes per day constitutes a serious and cumulative threat to the plaintiff's health. Whether or not this would have had some permanently disabling effect upon the plaintiff during the balance of his working life, I am, of course, unable to say. In my opinion, whilst these factors do not justify me in departing from a basically mathematical approach to the assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity in the present case, they do constitute a valid and compelling reason for allowing a higher than average discount factor for contingencies. I do not lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff's father was aged 74 when he died, his mother was aged 78 when she died and on the basis of the Australian Life Totals a man of the plaintiff's age would normally have a life expectancy in excess of 30 years at the present time.
The plaintiff is currently receiving an invalid pension from the Department of Social Security, but in accordance with the High Court decisions in the National Insurance Company of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 and Redding v Lee (1982) 151 CLR 117, it is plain that the plaintiff's income from this source is to be disregarded for the purpose of the assessment of damages.
The plaintiff was the youngest of a family of seven children and was initially educated at the Sheffield Primary School. When his parents moved to Devonport he was then educated at the Devonport Primary School for a number of years and went on to the Reece High School. He failed to distinguish himself academically and left school aged 14½. His first job was as roustabout in a bootmaker's shop and thereafter he obtained work as a bricklayer's labourer in Devonport. Over the next few years he went back and forth to the Mainland working in basically labouring jobs in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. In between times he returned to Devonport and resumed working as a bricklayer's labourer. He finally returned to Devonport in 1964 where he took up work with the Public Works Department as a labourer on the Hot Mix gang. He worked in various capacities making and repairing roads and claims to have enjoyed the work. There is no need to discuss the physical requirements of the particular tasks that he was required to perform because it is quite clear from the evidence of Mr Partridge that he would not regain employment with the Department of Main Roads unless he was in good physical health. On the basis of the medical evidence which I have already discussed it is perfectly clear that he has no prospect of re–employment, either with the Department of Main Roads or in any other capacity in the foreseeable future. It is also quite plain that he is a man of limited intellect and is not capable of being successfully retrained for employment in a non–labouring capacity. He has no skills in any other field and his physical limitations effectively render him completely unemployable.
The plaintiff's claim has been particularized under a number of subheadings and it seems to me to be appropriate and convenient to examine and comment upon each component of the claim in a similar sequence.
Past Economic Loss
This claim is calculated upon the basis of the earnings of Mr Kerry Hingston, an employee with the Department of Main Roads whose earning capacity is, and has been, directly comparable with the earnings which the plaintiff could have achieved if he had not been injured. During part of the period since the accident, the plaintiff received a disability allowance from the MAIB and, as will be seen, the nett value of the allowance has been deducted from the plaintiff's calculated nett income over the relevant periods. In the calculations prepared by the plaintiff's solicitors no provision has been made for income tax payable upon the camping and travelling allowances which would have been payable to the plaintiff from time to time in connection with his employment. I think that such deductions should be made for the purposes of this assessment, as it is plain to me, that although such allowances would have been payable to the plaintiff they would have represented an increment to his income rather than an actual reimbursement for expenditure actually incurred by him. As such they conferred a financial benefit upon him but that benefit would, in my view, have been taxable as income in his hands both before and after the far reaching legislative changes effected to the Income Tax Assessment Act in recent years. I am aware that a proportion of the allowances was made available to workers to compensate them for daily travelling from their homes to their place of work beyond the town limits and that this sum was, in all probability, calculated as a reimbursement of the actual cost of this travel, but it may well be that this would not be a deductible expense for tax purposes in any event. As it is, the plaintiff has not satisfied me that any part of the combined sum shown in the particulars as "allowances" (without any differentiation between the two) would not be taxable. I therefore propose to reduce each segment of the allowances claimed by 30% to approximate the plaintiff's marginal tax rate during the relevant period.
I allow the following amounts under this heading:
a) 8981 – 30682
Wages 15,449.42
Less tax 3,601.00
11,848.42 11,848.42
Allowances 11,270.80
Less 30% 381.24
889.56 889.56
12,737.98
Less nett disability allowance 8,586.00
Nett loss $ 4,151.98 $ 4,151.98
b) 1782 – 30682
Wages 19,108.90
Less tax 4,549.00
14,559.90 14,559.00
Allowances 2,274.65
Less 30% 682.40
1,692.25 1,692.25
16,252.15
Less nett disability allowance 10,367.00
Nett loss $ 5,885.15 $ 5,885.15
c) 1783 – 30684
Wages 19,065.46
Less tax 4,341.00
15,324.46 15,324.46
Allowances 2,623.40
Less 30% 787.02
1,836.38 1,836.38
16,160.84
Less nett disability allowance 7,193.00
Nett loss 9,967.84 $ 9,967.84
d) 1784 – 30685
Wages 19,220.33
Less tax 4,124.00
15,096.33 15,096.33
Allowances 2,573.00
Less 30% 771.90
1,801.10 1,801.10
Nett Loss 16,897.43 $16,897.43
e) 1785 – 30686
Wages 20,561.28
Less tax 4,564.00
15,997.28 15,997.28
Allowances 2,260.25
Less 30% 678.08
1,582.71 1,582.71
Nett Loss 17,579.45 $17,579.45
6) 1786 – 30687
Wages 20,788.22
Less tax 4,485.00
16,303.22 16,303.22
Allowances 2,839.21
Less 30% 851.76
1,987.45 1,987.45
Nett Loss 18,290.67 $18,290.67
8) 1787 – 171187
Wages 7,508.97
Less tax 1,636.00
5,872.97 5,872.97
Allowances 1,130.47
Less 30% 339.41
791.33 791.33
Nett Loss 6,664.30 $ 6,664.30
181187 – 231287
Wages 1,948.45
Less tax 435.75
1,512.70 1,512.70
Allowances 300.00
[Page 16]
Less 30% 90.00
210.00 210.00
Nett loss 1,722.70 $ 1,722.70
Total Nett Loss $81,559.42
Future Economic Loss
The plaintiff, if still employed with the Department of Main Roads, would be earning $354.70 gross per week plus average overtime equivalent to 3¾ hours ordinary time per week ($34.99 gross per week). His allowance would amount to $60.00 per week. Tax on these amounts would approximate $95.15 per week, giving a nett earning capacity of $354.54 at the present time. Assuming retirement at age 65 the plaintiff's remaining working life would be 20 years, 25 weeks – say 20½ years. On this basis it would be appropriate to apply a multiplier of $802.00 per $1.00 of income rather than $816.00 as claimed, in accordance with the 3% compound interest tables (as per Annexure "B" to the particulars). This gives a total of $274,341.08.
As I have indicated above, I consider that a substantial discount factor should apply for contingencies and for this reason I propose to reduce the above sum by 30%. Additionally it should be borne in mind that the plaintiff has already had two convictions for breathalyser offences (one before and one since the accident) and although such convictions in the future would be unlikely to cause his actual dismissal from the Department of Main Roads, it is plain from evidence that during any period of licence disqualification, he would be demoted to a less remunerative position than that of plant operator. I therefore allow a total of $192,038.76 under this head.
Past Pharmaceutical Expenses
These have been agreed at $630.00 and accordingly I allow that sum.
Future Pharmaceutical Expenses
I am satisfied that the plaintiff will continue to require the use of analgesics indefinitely but the estimates of quantities, contained in the particulars do not match up with the plaintiff's evidence, which was somewhat vague. All in all I think an allowance of $5.00 per week is appropriate. As tablets are likely to be required for the remainder of the plaintiff's life a multiplier of 30 years will be used but again I propose making a 30% reduction for contingencies. I am aware that considerations other than those already discussed apply when making a discount for contingencies in respect of future expenses rather than for contingencies associated with future employment. The time scale is different and the "vicissitudes" are different. In looking at a claim for future expenditure spanning the entire balance of a man's life factors such as premature death from accident or disease, reduction of medication on medical advice and the possibility of the development of improved pain management techniques should all be considered. With such considerations in mind I have concluded that a 30% reduction of this component of the claim is fair. On this basis I allow $3,633.00.
Past Medical Expenses
Agreed at $706.00 and allowed accordingly.
Future Medical Expenses
I think it likely that the plaintiff will continue to see his general practitioner for ongoing management about 10 times per year. The standard consultation rate is $21.50 at the present time, but the plaintiff would be entitled to a Medicare refund of $17.60. Accordingly the nett cost to be reckoned is $3.90 per visit or $39.00 nett per annum.
The sum of $200.00 claimed as the current annual cost of pain relief treatment if provided by Dr Jackson has been agreed. I think that the plaintiff is unlikely to see Dr Jackson for this purpose as frequently in the future as he has in the past, but rather than attempting to make a specific estimate of this frequency, I propose to allow the sum as claimed (no Medicare rebate having been estimated or discussed during the course of the trial) subject only to the 30% contingency factor applied previously.
I therefore assess the total annual cost of future medical attention at $239.00, ie $4.60 per week. Using a multiplier of 1038 (for 30 years) this becomes $4,774.80, less 30% $3,341.36. I allow this part of the claim at $3,341.36.
Past Hospital Expenses
Agreed and allowed at $2,491.00.
Future Hospital Expenses
It is claimed that the plaintiff will need to enter hospital for about 2 or 3 days every year for the remainder of his life to receive treatment (eg cervical epidural injections). I think it is reasonable to allow 2 days per annum amounting to $430 for bed charges and $160 for theatre fees, ie $590 per annum. Again I propose to apply a 30% reduction for contingencies and allow this item at $11,779.30.
Past Travelling Expenses
This was claimed at $28.20 but was not proved. I disallow the item.
Future Travelling Expenses
It has been agreed that the approximate return taxi fare for the plaintiff to visit his general practitioner is $6.00. As I have said he will need to make such a journey about 10 times per year. When he goes to see Dr Jackson in Hobart it will cost him $51.20 for bus fare. This gives a total annual cost of $111.20. I allow $1,154.25 subject to 30% reduction, ie $807.98.
Loss of Retirement Allowance
This has been proved to my satisfaction as claimed ($5,440.00) but for the reasons already stated 30% reduction for contingencies will be made. I therefore allow this sum at $3,808.00.
Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities
This item has not been particularized for obvious reasons but it is plain from the details already discussed above that the plaintiff has had, and will continue to have, chronic debilitating pain. He had no hobbies and his recreational activities were few before the accident. He is able to manage his own housework and gardening at the present if he takes his time and does not over–exert himself.
He has found it difficult to come to terms with his disability and the pain it engenders and he has not fully adapted even now. I think he has a fairly bleak future ahead of him in this respect. I think it appropriate to allow $35,000 under this head.
Summary
I therefore asses damages as follows:
Past Economic Loss $ 81,559.42
Future Economic Loss $192,038.76
Past Pharmaceutical Expenses $ 630.00
Future Pharmaceutical Expenses $ 3,633.00
Past Medical Expenses $ 706.00
Future Medical Expenses $ 3,341.36
Past Hospital Expenses $ 2,491.00
Future Hospital Expenses $ 11,779.30
Future Travelling Expenses $ 807.98
Loss of Retirement Allowance $ 3,808.00
Pain, Suffering and Loss of
Amenities $ 35,000.00
$335,794.82
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