Blackburne v Brisbane City Council

[2011] QPEC 10

[2011] QPEC 10

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT

JUDGE ROBIN QC

P & E Appeal No 1282 of 2010

ROYCE BLACKBURNE	Appellant
and
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL AND ANOTHER	Respondents

BRISBANE

..DATE 16/02/2011

..DAY 1

ORDER

CATCHWORDS

Integrated Planning Act 1997 s 3.5.1, s 4.1.41

Submitter appeal in which all parties consent to an order allowing the appeal and refusing the respondent developer's development application - in circumstances, no need to require the respondent to satisfy the court that public notification requirements had been complied with

HIS HONOUR: The Court makes an order in terms of the initialled draft which deletes from the document proffered by the representatives of the appellant submitter reference to the Court's satisfaction that the requirements of chapter 3 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 regarding public notification of the development application had been complied with.

The order does contain the accompanying declaration of the Court's satisfaction regarding compliance with the requirements of chapter 4 of the Act regarding service of the notice of appeal.  The Court is able to reach such satisfaction on the basis of an affidavit of Ms Evans.

So far as providing evidence regarding the chapter 3 requirements is concerned, Mr Houston, representing the co-respondent developer, indicates that the instructions of his client, which has the onus of showing satisfaction with those requirements (likewise the onus of showing that the appeal should be dismissed), are to cease work in this matter. It has abandoned its former interest in pursuing the development to the extent of consenting to the appeal being allowed and an order being made that the development application be refused. From its point of view, it does not matter whether the public notification stage was completed so that te decision stage could start for its development application under s 3.5.1.

I agree with Mr Houston that in the circumstances it's unnecessary for the Court to be troubled, as it usually is, to ensure that the ordinary pre-requisites to an appeal being entertained and determined on the merits as a “hearing anew” have been properly attended to.  Indeed, in the circumstances it was probably unnecessary for Ms Evans to go to the trouble of filing her affidavit, but one can understand that professional pride might be the explanation for her wishing to demonstrate to the Court that things had been done properly.

Order as per initialled draft.

I might say, no one at the Bar table differed from the approach that Mr Houston urged on the Court.

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