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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sl21 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
MICHAEL JOHN BLACK
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
DEANE J
DAWSON J
| Black | 1 | 20/5/93 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON THURSDAY, 20 MAY 1993, AT 9.58 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR T.A. GAME: If the Court pleases, I appear for the
applicant, together with my learned friend,
MR S.J. ODGERS. (instructed by T.A. Murphy, Acting
Director, Legal Aid Commission (New South Wales))
| MR R.O. BLANCH, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear for |
the Crown, with my learned friend,
MR F.D.L. HOLLES. (instructed by S.E. O'Connor,
Solicitor to Director of Public Prosecutions (New
South Wales)).
| MR GAME: | If the Court pleases, this application for special |
leave arises out of a decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeal in February 1992 dismissing appeals
against convictions following two trials, one
relating to a fire which occurred in September
1986, and another relating to a fire which occurred
in November 1987.
There is one common point between the two
trials which concerns the refusal of the trial
judge in both cases to order separate trials. It
will be our submission that in each case separate
trials should have been ordered, that in each case
the trial judge erred in principle in the approach
taken to the ordering of separate trials.
| MASON CJ: | But have you not got to show that the failure to |
order separate trials resulted in a miscarriage of
justice?
| MR GAME: | Your Honour, we would also submit that the first |
question is whether or not error has been
established and, if error has been established, the
question is then one of the application of the proviso. So that our submission would be that
section 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act demands, in
circumstances such as this, an approach which seeks
to identify whether there has been a defect in the trial such as to amount to an error of law, and in
our submission these are errors of law.
MASON CJ: But does not the decision of the Court in Darby
establish that it is for you to show that there has
been a miscarriage of justice at the trial,
resulting from the failure to order separate
trials?
| MR GAME: | The decision in Darby really only dealt with the |
question of separate trials - that is not the
central aspect of the decision of the Court in
Darby. In my submission, traditionally, in
relation to separate trials, the question has been
treated as if it were a question whether or not a
miscarriage of justice has occurred. That seems to
| Black | 2 | 20/5/93 |
follow from a line of cases going back to
Grondkowski.
But in our submission, that approach is
erroneous and it is erroneous because, just as in,
for example, Marie, erroneous admission of
evidence, results in the…
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- AGLC
- Black v The Queen [1993] HCATrans 124
- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court concerned whether the trial judge erred in principle in their approach to ordering separate trials, and if so, whether this error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The applicant argued that the refusal to order separate trials constituted an error of law, rather than merely a discretionary matter where the sole focus was on a miscarriage of justice. The applicant contended that the established approach, which traditionally treated the question of separate trials as one of miscarriage of justice, was erroneous.
The applicant submitted that, analogous to the erroneous admission of evidence or the refusal of an adjournment, an erroneous decision to refuse separate trials should lead to the application of the proviso, meaning the conviction would only be overturned if a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The applicant argued that the discretionary principles governing separate trials had not been adequately elucidated and that certain principles applied in New South Wales, requiring evidence to be "significantly different" and one case "significantly weaker than the other" as a precondition for separate trials, were erroneous. The applicant sought to establish that the trial judge's approach to these principles constituted an error of law.
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Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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